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Foreword
It is my great pleasure to introduce the inaugural issue of South Asia Develop-ment Matters. More and Better Jobs in 
South Asia is timely because of its relevance 
to the region’s 490 million young people 
who can make South Asia the region of 
the future. Despite having one of the low-
est female participation rates in the devel-
oping world, South Asia will add at least 
one  million people to its labor force every 
month. The significant additions to the 
labor force could be a demographic divi-
dend or a curse, which is why this report 
is so important: the key to future peace 
and poverty reduction in South Asia is the 
creation of enough good-quality jobs in the 
decades to come. Future generations will 
thank this one for using this opportunity 
to create an environment for progressively 
better jobs, which are the only sustainable 
pathway out of poverty. 
The South Asia Development Matters 
series will be published annually under the 
supervision of Kalpana Kochhar, Chief Econ-
omist for the South Asia Region. I hope the 
series will promote dialogue and debate with 
all our partners, not only policy makers but 
also civil society organizations, academic 
institutions, development practitioners, and 
the media. This series will serve as a vehicle 
for voicing an in-depth synthesis of economic 
and policy analysis on key development top-
ics for South Asia. 
Next year we will address the theme of 
inequality, the challenges faced by individ-
ual countries in South Asia, and the ways in 
which inequality can be addressed so that 
countries can grow and develop with equity. 
I hope that the knowledge gathered in the 
South Asia Development Matters series will 
benefi t the entire region and that it promotes 
debate and builds consensus of all those who 
care about stimulating development and 
eradicating poverty in South Asia.
I would like to thank the team members 
for their high-quality product. They were 
able to tackle a very diffi cult issue in a way 
that examined technical quality, with great 
openness to views from different professional 
streams. This was a tough topic, and they 
have produced important recommendations 
to promote policy debate. 
Isabel Guerrero
Vice President, South Asia Region
The World Bank
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Preface
More and Better Jobs in South Asialaunches the series South Asia Development Matters. When 
selecting the fi rst topic in the series, we had no 
doubt that it should focus on jobs. South Asian 
countries will add 1.0 million to 1.2 million 
new entrants to the labor force every month 
for the next two decades and will contribute 
about 40 percent of the total new entrants to 
the global working-age (15–64) population. It 
is not surprising that we decided to focus our 
attention on the changes in policies necessary 
to create a larger number and higher quality 
of jobs. Identification and implementation 
of these policies are central to South Asia’s 
employment challenge of absorbing the grow-
ing number of entrants to the labor force at 
rising levels of productivity.  
Recent global events have helped shine 
a brighter light on this issue. According to 
the International Labour Organization, 
as many as 30 million people worldwide 
lost their jobs as a result of the 2008 crisis. 
Youth unemployment is especially high, and 
inequality has increased in many countries 
around the world. As recent events during 
the “Arab Spring” in the Middle East and 
North Africa demonstrate, joblessness and 
inequality can trigger political instability 
and unrest. Closer to home, labor is the most 
important, if not the only, asset of the poor.
South Asia, despite impressive growth 
and poverty reduction over the past two 
decades, remains home to more than half a 
billion poor people, large numbers of whom 
have little or no education and suffer from 
poor health. Part of the reason is that South 
Asia has some of the worst nutrition indi-
cators in the world. Research clearly shows 
that a person’s cognitive development begins 
in the early years of life, long before formal 
schooling begins. Nutrition and early child-
hood development have a strong positive 
relationship with educational achievement 
and signifi cant payoffs for lifetime learning 
and labor market productivity. The chal-
lenge of generating more productive jobs is 
intensifi ed because most of the countries in 
the region are still in confl ict or have only 
recently emerged from it and many people 
face serious problems related to access to 
opportunities based on gender, caste, and 
socioeconomic status. 
More and Better Jobs in South Asia
attempts to answer three questions:
•  Has South Asia been creating an increas-
ing quantity and quality of jobs?
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•  What are the determinants of the quality 
of job creation and what is the employ-
ment challenge going forward?
•  What demand- and supply-side bottle-
necks need to be eased to meet South 
Asia’s employment challenge in the face of 
intensifying demographic pressure?
Although details vary by country, overall 
there is reason for cautious optimism. Over 
the past two decades, the region has created 
more jobs—at a rate largely comparable to 
growth in the working-age population—and 
better jobs, in terms of higher pay for wage 
workers, lower poverty for self-employed 
workers, and reduced risk of low and uncer-
tain income for the most vulnerable group of 
workers. Yet, there is no room for compla-
cency because the challenges are big. Not only 
do a larger number of jobs need to be created, 
but the jobs also need to be more produc-
tive and make workers less vulnerable. Our 
study shows that creating a larger number 
of more productive jobs for a growing labor 
force calls for a multisectoral reform agenda 
that includes improving access to electricity 
for fi rms across all sectors in urban and rural 
settings, dealing decisively with issues of gov-
ernance and corruption, improving access to 
land and transport links between town and 
country, improving nutrition in early child-
hood, equipping workers with skills relevant 
for the world of work, and reorienting labor 
market regulations and programs to protect 
workers rather than jobs.
This book is divided into seven chapters. 
Chapter 1 is an overview. Chapter 2 reviews 
South Asia’s recent track record with regard 
to the quantity and quality of job creation. 
It traces the relationship of such job cre-
ation mostly to overall economic growth and 
attempts to answer what needs to be done 
to meet South Asia’s employment challenge. 
Chapter 3 discusses the key features of 
labor markets in South Asia, including where 
the better jobs are, who holds them, and 
the implications for the employment chal-
lenge ahead. Chapter 4 reviews the busi-
ness environment constraints affecting, in 
particular, those fi rms that have expanded 
employment and discusses policy options for 
overcoming the most binding business con-
straints in South Asia. Chapter 5 analyzes the 
dimensions of the education and skills chal-
lenge in the region and discusses policy pri-
orities for improving the quality and skills of 
graduates of education and training systems. 
Chapter 6 reviews the role of labor market 
policies and institutions in encouraging job 
creation and protecting workers in the formal 
and informal economy and discusses possible 
directions for labor market policies, including 
options to increase the access of informal sec-
tor workers to programs that help them man-
age labor market shocks and improve their 
future earnings potential. Finally, chapter 7 
reviews the key constraints to job creation 
and the policy priorities for creating more 
and better jobs in confl ict-affected areas. 
Kalpana Kochhar
Chief Economist, South Asia Region
The World Bank
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Message 1: South Asia has created many, 
mostly better jobs.
•  Job creation in South Asia averaged almost 
800,000 a month between 2000 and 2010. 
The rate of employment growth broadly 
tracked that of the working-age (15–64) pop-
ulation. Open unemployment is low.
•  Real wages rose for wage workers, and poverty 
declined for the self-employed as well as all 
types of wage workers. Wages and poverty are 
the primary criteria for improved job quality 
that guide the analysis in this book. A reduced 
risk of low and uncertain income for the most 
vulnerable group of workers is a secondary 
criterion for improved job quality. It could be 
monitored only in India, where it is satisfi ed.
•  The improvement in job quality has been 
associated with accelerating economic growth 
in Bangladesh and India since the 1980s. In 
Nepal, where growth has been slow for several 
decades, massive out-migration in response to 
limited opportunities at home has improved 
labor market prospects for those who remain. 
Workers’ remittances have reduced poverty 
across a wide swath of households.
Message 2: The region faces an enormous 
employment challenge, but its demography can 
work in support of the reforms needed to meet it.
•  An estimated 1.0–1.2 million new entrants will 
join the labor market every month over the next 
few decades—an increase of 25–50 percent 
over the average number of entrants between 
1990 and 2010. The employment challenge for 
the region is to absorb these new entrants into 
jobs at rising levels of productivity.
•  Aggregate productivity growth in South Asia 
over the last three decades was driven by an 
extraordinary surge in the growth of total 
factor productivity (TFP) (a combination of 
changes in the effi ciency with which inputs are 
used and changes in technology). Its contribu-
tion was larger than in the “miracle” growth 
years of high-performing East Asian econo-
mies (excluding China). Going forward, rap-
idly growing countries in South Asia need to 
sustain and slow-growing countries to ignite 
growth by easing constraints to physical and 
human capital accumulation. Higher rates of 
factor accumulation, alongside more typical 
rates of TFP growth, which will vary according 
to country circumstances, will allow the region 
to absorb new entrants to the labor force at 
rapidly rising levels of labor productivity. 
•  Aggregate TFP growth should also increase 
through a faster reallocation of labor from 
agriculture to industry and services, where TFP 
growth is higher. Reallocation across sectors 
needs to be complemented by moving labor 
out of lower-productivity fi rms in manufac-
turing and services, where the overwhelming 
majority of South Asians who are employed 
in these sectors work, into higher-productivity 
fi rms within those sectors. Reallocation across 
and within sectors will require physical capital 
accumulation (in electricity, for example, the 
lack of reliable supply of which is reported 
by job-creating fi rms as an obstacle to their 
operation). It will also require investment in 
human capital to provide workers with the 
skills necessary to access better jobs.
•  The “demographic transition”—the period 
during which the number of workers grows 
more rapidly than the number of dependents—
can provide a tailwind in support of policy 
reform for the next three decades in much of 
South Asia, as the resources saved from hav-
ing fewer dependents provides a “demographic 
dividend.” This dividend can be used for high-
priority physical and human capital invest-
ments necessary to absorb the growing number 
of entrants into the labor force at rising wages 
and more productive self- employment. The div-
idend can be reaped, however, only if a policy 
framework is in place that can channel the extra 
savings into priority investments (including, for 
example, an effi ciently intermediating fi nancial 
 sector and a business environment conducive 
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to firms’ carrying out those investments). In 
the absence of such a framework, productiv-
ity will grow slowly or remain stagnant, and 
the dividend will go uncashed. The window of 
demographic opportunity is expected to close 
around 2040 for all countries except Sri Lanka, 
where it closed around 2005, and Afghani-
stan, where it will stay open beyond 2040. The 
demographic transition will eventually give 
way to old age dependency, as the share of the 
elderly in the population increases.
•  Continuance of high economic growth, which 
has been an important driver of improved job 
quality, is not assured. Globally, correlations of 
country growth rates across decades are low. 
Thus policy reforms required to ease bottle-
necks to improving job quality are needed, 
irrespective of whether there is a demographic 
dividend, in order to maintain and increase 
the pace of creation of better jobs, even in 
lower growth environments. The window of 
demographic opportunity lends urgency to the 
agenda, since policies take time to bear fruit.
Message 3: Creating more and better jobs for a 
growing labor force calls for a reform agenda 
that cuts across sectors.
•  Investing in reliable electricity supply is criti-
cal. South Asian fi rms of all types—rural and 
urban, formal and informal—rate electricity as 
a top constraint to operations. Reported power 
outages are consistent with reported sever-
ity: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal have 
some of the highest reported outages in the 
world. The gap between demand and supply 
of electricity is large. Reforms need to manage 
the required expansion of capacity effi ciently 
and improve the financial and commercial 
viability of the power utilities. They involve a 
combination of investment and reform of gov-
ernance in the sector—both are critical.
•  Formal urban fi rms cite corruption in interac-
tions with the state, especially in transactions 
involving tax administration and utilities, as 
an important constraint to their operations.
•  Informal urban fi rms in India report inad-
equate access to land among their leading 
constraints. Rural-based industry and ser-
vice fi rms in  Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka report as a top constraint inadequate 
transport, which inhibits their access to 
markets that would make them less depen-
dent on local demand.
•  Agriculture will continue to be the largest 
employer in much of South Asia for the fore-
seeable future. Boosting TFP growth in the 
sector through accelerated diversification 
into cash crops and high-value activities 
will require investment in key public goods. 
Investment in agricultural research and 
development has much higher returns than 
power, fertilizer, and credit subsidies. 
•  Education reform and action before children 
enter school are key. Poor nutrition in early 
childhood, where South Asia has the weak-
est indicators in the world, impairs cognitive 
development before children get to school, 
reducing the payoff from subsequent educa-
tional investments. Policy makers must also 
strengthen the quality of learning at all levels 
to equip tomorrow’s workers, not only with 
academic and technical skills, but also with the 
behavioral, creative thinking, and problem-
solving skills employers increasingly demand.
•  Moving away from protecting jobs to pro-
tecting workers is essential for formal sector 
job creation in India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. 
Enterprise managers in the urban formal sec-
tor report labor regulations as being a more 
severe constraint to the operation of their busi-
ness than is the case for countries at their levels 
of per capita income. High costs of dismissing 
regular workers are, in effect, a tax on hiring 
them. Reforms to encourage job creation in 
the formal economy should lower these costs, 
which protect a minority of workers. These 
reforms must go hand in hand with reforms 
that strengthen labor market institutions and 
programs that formal and informal sector 
workers can use to help them adjust to labor 
market shocks and improve their future earn-
ings potential. Building incrementally on exist-
ing schemes is likely the best way forward.
  3
Overview
This book investigates how more and better jobs can be created in South Asia.1 It does so for two reasons. First, 
this region will contribute nearly 40 percent 
of the growth in the world’s working-age 
(15–64) population over the next several 
decades. It is important to determine what 
needs to be done to absorb them into employ-
ment at rising levels of labor productivity. 
Second, creating more productive jobs—with 
jobs defi ned to include all wage work and self-
employment—is the most reliable route out of 
poverty for a region that is home to more than 
40 percent of the world’s absolute poor.2 
The book addresses three major questions.
•  Has South Asia been creating an increas-
ing number of jobs and better jobs?
•  What determines the quality of job cre-
ation, and what is the employment chal-
lenge going forward?
•  What demand- and supply-side bottle-
necks need to be eased to meet South 
Asia’s employment challenge in the face of 
intensifying demographic pressure?
South Asia’s track record
This section examines South Asia’s track 
record in creating jobs. It looks at the 
 quantity of jobs, the quality of jobs, and labor 
mobility.
Job quantity
Employment grew in South Asia over the 
past decade, broadly tracking growth in 
the working-age (15–64) population (fi gure 
1.1). Lack of safety nets precludes high rates 
of open unemployment, which averaged 
a little over 3 percent in the region. Thus 
employment growth tends to broadly mirror 
growth in the labor force. As the propor-
tion of the working-age population that is in 
the labor force changes slowly, the growth 
of the labor force tends to track that of the 
working-age population. Together these 
observations imply that employment growth 
can be expected to broadly refl ect that of the 
working-age population.
Among five of the larger countries in 
the region, employment growth since 2000 
was highest in Pakistan, followed by Nepal 
and Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka. 
Total employment in South Asia (excluding 
Afghanistan and Bhutan) rose from 473 mil-
lion in 2000 to 568 million in 2010, creating 
an average of just under 800,000 new jobs 
a month.
1
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In all countries except Maldives and Sri 
Lanka, the largest share of the employed 
are the low-end self-employed (fi gure 1.2).3 
Nearly a third of workers in India and a 
fi fth of workers in Bangladesh and Pakistan 
are casual laborers. Regular wage or sala-
ried workers represent a fi fth or less of total 
employment.
Job quality
South Asia has created better jobs, defi ned 
primarily as those with higher wages for 
wage workers and lower poverty levels for 
the self-employed and secondarily as jobs 
that reduce the risk of low and uncertain 
income for the most vulnerable group of 
FIGURE 1.1 Annual growth in working-age population, employment, and labor force in selected South 
Asian countries
Sources: Authors, based on data on working-age population from UN 2010 and data on employment and labor force from national labor force surveys.
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workers. By these measures, results have 
been positive:
•  Real wages for wage workers—both 
casual and regular wage or salaried—
grew 0.1–2.9 percent a year during vari-
ous subperiods between 1983 and 2010 
for which comparisons can be made 
 (fi gure 1.3).
•  A higher proportion of self-employed 
workers (on whom information on earn-
ings is not available) are now in house-
holds above the national poverty line in 
Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and 
Sri Lanka. This fi gure is used as a proxy 
for improving job quality for this segment 
of the labor force (fi gure 1.4).4 Increas-
ing proportions of casual and regular 
wage or salaried workers in Bangladesh, 
India, and Nepal and all wage workers 
in Pakistan and Sri Lanka are also now 
in households that are above the poverty 
line. Indeed, poverty rates for all types of 
workers during all time periods show a 
decline when the data are disaggregated 
by location (rural or urban) or gender. 
Thus, the primary criterion for better jobs 
is satisfi ed. 
•  In India over the period 1999/2000 
through 2009/10, there was a decline 
in the average number of months for 
which all casual laborers were without 
work despite looking for it (fi gure 1.5). 
Thus, the secondary criterion for better 
jobs—that they should reduce the risk of 
low and uncertain incomes for the most 
vulnerable—has been met in India. This 
is not necessarily the case in other coun-
tries in South Asia. (For a discussion of 
these criteria and the way in which they 
are used to rank jobs by quality, see 
annex 1C.)
Notwithstanding the variation in wages 
and poverty rates across employment types 
and their changes over time, there is a 
stable pattern of association between pov-
erty and the type of employment that has 
been maintained over time. Regular wage 
or salaried workers have the highest wages 
and lowest poverty rates; the self-employed 
have higher poverty rates; and casual work-
ers, especially in agriculture, have the low-
est wages and highest poverty rates (see 
annex 1C). 
The proportion of workers in different 
employment types has remained largely 
unchanged over time (fi gure 1.6). At this 
level of aggregation, better jobs have been 
created mainly as a result of increasing 
FIGURE 1.3 Average annual increases in mean real wages in selected countries in South Asia
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys. 
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FIGURE 1.4 Percentage of workers in households below the poverty line in selected South Asian countries, 
by employment status 
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
Note: URP = uniform recall period (the period in which respondents were asked to recall all consumption items over the same recall period [for example, 7 days]). 
MRP = mixed recall period (the period need not be the same for all items, [for example, 7 days for some and 365 days for others]). Figures are for workers age 15–64.
29 
18 15 
12 
39 
29 
26 
18 
58 
47 
42 
31 
43 
33 
29 
21 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1983
URP
1993/94
URP
1999/2000
MRP
2004/05
MRP
b. India, 1983–93/94 and 1999/2000–2004/05
28
7
38
27
48
44
39
28
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1995/96 2003/04
c. Nepal, 1995/96–2003/04
30
24
21
38
28
22
67
61
4747
38
30
0
10
20
30
40
50
pe
rc
en
t
pe
rc
en
t
pe
rc
en
t
pe
rc
en
t
pe
rc
en
t
60
70
80
2000 2005 2010
a. Bangladesh, 2000–10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
2001/02 2007/08
d. Pakistan, 2001/02 to 2007/08
26
15
24
11
25
13
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
43
23
70
80
1995/96 2006/07
e. Sri Lanka, 1995/96–2006/07
all regular wage or salaried all self-employed all casual labor all workers
all self-employed, all wages, and
all workers
all wages all self-employed
all workers
FIGURE 1.5 Average number of months without work in the past year, casual laborers in India, by sector, 
1999/2000–2009/10 
Source: Authors, based on data from Indian labor force and household surveys.
Note: Figures are for workers age 15–64 who were available for work during at least part of the month.
1.8 1.9
1.41.4 1.4
1.1
1.6 1.5
0.9
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
m
on
th
s
2.0
1999/2000 2004/05 2009/10
agriculture rural nonfarm urban
 O V E R V I E W   7
FIGURE 1.6 Distribution of rural and urban workers in selected South Asian countries, by employment type
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
a. Data from the Bangladesh Household Income and Expenditure Surveys (HIES) were used to calculate worker poverty rates. The share of workers by employment type 
in the HIES diff ers from the share in the Bangladesh labor force surveys. The diff erence is likely to be partly driven by how female employment is captured, with female 
participation rates in the HIES less than half those reported in the labor force survey. Therefore, the changes in the share of workers by type in Bangladesh from the HIES 
should be interpreted with caution. For example, between 2005 and 2010 the signifi cant increase in the share of regular wage or salaried work in urban areas was driven 
largely by changes in the female urban workforce reported in the HIES 2005 and HIES 2010. 
b. Although there is variation in the shares of casual labor and self-employment in rural areas in India, there is no persistent increase or decline in the shares throughout 
the whole period (for example, the increase in casual labor between 2004/05 and 2009/10 mostly reversed the decline between 1999/2000 and 2004/05); the share of 
regular wage or salaried workers remained constant throughout the 25-year period.
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 quality within jobs rather than  reallocation 
of the labor force across employment 
categories. 
Looking across broad sectors, wages in 
industry and services are higher than in agri-
culture. Thus, the rural nonfarm economy 
offers better jobs than agriculture. Improve-
ment in job quality has been associated with 
increasing shares of industry and services 
in employment, which includes a growing 
share of the rural nonfarm economy in rural 
employment.
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Labor transitions 
The broad constancy in the share of work-
ers across employment types masks labor 
mobility at the level of individual workers. 
Many rural workers in Bangladesh, India, 
and Nepal (the three countries studied in the 
labor transition analysis in this book) have 
moved from agriculture to the rural non-
farm economy and vice versa. 
Education is closely tied to labor mobil-
ity. Secondary and higher levels of education 
increase the ability of workers to move out 
of agriculture, casual wage jobs, and low-
end self-employment to better jobs. Although 
analysis was conducted for both rural and 
urban Bangladesh, India, and Nepal, in the 
interest of space only the results for rural 
India are shown (fi gure 1.7). 
Rural workers who were in agriculture 
in the fi rst period were more likely to make 
the transition to a better job—to nonfarm 
work—if they had secondary or higher levels 
of education. This higher mobility is typically 
greater for workers who completed upper-
secondary education. Conversely, workers 
with less education were more likely to expe-
rience a transition in the opposite direction—
from nonfarm work to agriculture. Workers 
with lower levels of education are more likely 
to lose better jobs than they are to secure 
them, as shown in the higher levels of tran-
sition bars for lower levels of education in 
the right-hand panel compared with the left-
hand panel in fi gure 1.7. Workers with higher 
levels of education are more likely to move to 
better jobs than they are to lose them. 
FIGURE 1.7 Conditional probability of moving into and out of better jobs in rural India, by education and 
gender, 2004/05–2007/08
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
Note: The probability of transition is conditional on being in a specifi c type of employment in the fi rst period (e.g., panel a shows the estimated probability 
that a rural male worker who was in agriculture in the fi rst period is working in a nonfarm job in the second period). The probability diff ers by the level of 
education of the worker. Upper and lower bounds of the estimated probabilities are shown. The blue lines are drawn through the midpoints of the bounds.
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Determinants of job quality and 
the employment challenge 
Improving job quality for most segments 
of the labor force can usually occur only in 
a growing economy. South Asia has seen 
an acceleration of growth in gross domes-
tic product (GDP) per capita over the three 
decades since 1980; its growth has been 
second only to that of East Asia (fi gure 1.8).
But growth experiences have varied within 
South Asia (figure 1.9). Growth in GDP 
per capita accelerated, particularly since 
the 1980s, in  Bangladesh and India. It stag-
nated in Nepal and was marked by volatility 
around a broadly declining trend over the last 
four decades in  Pakistan. Sri Lanka witnessed 
an acceleration of growth over the last fi ve 
FIGURE 1.8 Annual growth in GDP per capita, by region, 1960s–2000s
Source: Authors, based on data from World Bank 2011c.
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FIGURE 1.9 Annual growth in GDP per capita in South Asia, by country, 1960s–2000s
Source: Authors, based on data from World Bank 2011c.
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decades, except for a dip in the 1980s, and 
it managed to avoid the slowdown or stagna-
tion of the 1970s that affected the other coun-
tries in the region.
Sources of growth
The marked acceleration in growth in South 
Asia has allowed better jobs to be created. 
Among industrial and all developing regions 
except China, aggregate labor productivity 
(GDP per worker) grew fastest in South Asia, 
at 3.7 percent a year, between 1980 and 
2008 (fi gure 1.10). This performance repre-
sents a striking turnaround from the preced-
ing two decades (1960–80), when aggregate 
labor productivity in South Asia grew just 
1.6 percent a year—more slowly than any 
other region, including Sub- Saharan Africa. 
Growth in aggregate labor productivity 
can be decomposed into two factors: 
•  “Extensive” growth, comprising growth 
in physical capital per worker (capital 
deepening) and growth of human capital 
per worker (education)
•  “Intensive” growth, comprising growth in 
total factor productivity (TFP), a measure 
of the efficiency with which inputs are 
combined to produce output. 
This decomposition indicates that growth 
in TFP made a larger contribution to the 
growth of aggregate labor productivity in 
South Asia during 1980–2008 than did 
physical and human capital accumula-
tion (see fi gure 1.10). In fact, the contribu-
tion of TFP growth was higher than in the 
high-performing East Asian economies 
FIGURE 1.10 Sources of annual growth in labor productivity, by region, 1960–80 and 1980–2008
Source: Bosworth 2010.
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excluding China during their “miracle” 
growth years.5 
The sources of growth varied across 
countries (fi gure 1.11). In Bangladesh, edu-
cation accounted for a fifth of the growth 
in aggregate labor productivity. Growth of 
TFP was more important in India, reflect-
ing its increased exposure to external and 
internal competition brought about by trade 
liberalization and deregulation. Capital deep-
ening played a signifi cant role in India and 
Pakistan. But whereas its contribution rose in 
India after 1980, it fell sharply in Pakistan, 
accounting for the relative importance of TFP 
growth there. Capital deepening was more 
important in Sri Lanka, where the share of 
investment in GDP nearly doubled following 
its “big bang” opening up in 1977. 
Job quality has not been associated 
with accelerated economic growth every-
where in the region. In Nepal, for example, 
growth in per capita GDP remained at 
about 2 percent a year during the last three 
decades. It was the massive out-migration 
of workers—estimated at at least a third of 
all working-age men—that contributed to 
the reduction in labor supply and led to ris-
ing real wages for those left behind (World 
Bank 2010). Declining poverty, which is 
used as a proxy for improving job quality, 
owes less to growth in Nepal than to the 
infl ow of worker remittances, estimated at 
nearly a quarter of GDP.
The employment challenge
The pressure to create better jobs will inten-
sify very substantially over the next few 
decades. In its medium-fertility scenario, the 
United Nations projects that the region’s cur-
rent population of 1.65 billion will increase 
25 percent by 2030 and 40 percent by 2050. 
Given the region’s generally youthful popu-
lation, the working-age population is pro-
jected to increase even more (35 percent by 
2030 and 50 percent by 2050). 
Two scenarios reveal the job creation 
implications of these demographic changes. 
FIGURE 1.11 Sources of annual growth in labor productivity in selected countries in South Asia, by 
country, 1960–80 and 1980–2008
Source: Bosworth 2010.
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In the first, there is no increase in  female 
labor force participation rates from current 
levels. In this scenario, South Asia adds nearly 
1 million entrants a month to the labor force 
between 2010 and 2030. The proportion-
ate increases are largest in countries with the 
youngest populations (Afghanistan, Nepal, 
Pakistan) and smallest in the single aging 
country in the region (Sri Lanka).
Under the second scenario, female labor 
participation rates increase 10 percentage 
points by 2030 in Bangladesh, India, and 
Pakistan, which together account for 95 per-
cent of the region’s working-age population 
and have the lowest rates of female participa-
tion (31 percent in Bangladesh, 30 percent in 
India, and 22 percent in Pakistan). (This phe-
nomenon would be consistent with observed 
behavior in Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, 
Malaysia, and Thailand between 1960 and 
2000.) Participation rates remain unchanged 
in the rest of South Asia. Nearly 1.2 million 
new entrants a month join the labor force 
between 2010 and 2030, intensifying labor 
market pressure in Bangladesh, India, and 
Pakistan. These projections imply a huge 
increase over the just under 800,000 entrants 
a month that joined the labor force between 
1990 and 2010. 
Can high economic growth, which has 
been the major driver of improving job quality 
in some South Asian countries, be expected 
to continue over the next few decades? The 
historical evidence from around the world 
shows on the contrary that growth rates are 
highly unstable over time: the cross-decade 
rank correlation of growth rates per capita 
for 94 countries across fi ve decades is a mere 
0.1–0.4—and correlations with time periods 
more than two decades apart are typically 
negligible.6 The rarity of sustained growth 
is underlined by the fact that since 1950, per 
capita GDP has grown at a rate of 7 percent 
or more—the rate required to double living 
standards every 10 years—in only 13 coun-
tries, 9 of them in East Asia (World Bank 
2008b). 
Looking forward, productivity growth 
in the region will need to rely more on fac-
tor accumulation (physical capital deepening 
and human capital accumulation) and less 
on the extraordinary growth of TFP seen 
in the last three decades.7 As the region has 
become more open to the international econ-
omy, it is importing better-quality capital 
and intermediate goods at world prices and 
using standard technology to produce goods 
that are either sold domestically or exported 
in competitive world markets. Inasmuch as 
the technology is widely used internationally, 
the increases in TFP arising from it will be 
limited to what is routine in global best prac-
tice. For a country such as India, which has 
a large internal market, domestic sales could 
lead to temporarily larger increases in TFP as 
less competitive producers exit the market. 
But, even with acceleration in “second-gener-
ation” structural reforms, TFP growth is not 
likely to continue at the rates triggered by the 
reforms of the 1990s. Hence, a key task for 
policy makers will be to create an improving 
enabling environment for factor accumula-
tion (physical capital deepening and human 
capital formation), which, alongside more 
routine rates of TFP growth, can deliver ris-
ing wages and declining poverty. 
Aggregate TFP growth could also be 
increased as a result of a faster reallocation of 
labor out of low-productivity agriculture. The 
contribution of reallocation to TFP growth 
has been substantially greater in East Asia 
than in South Asia (fi gure 1.12). Reallocation 
accounted for two-thirds of aggregate TFP 
growth in Thailand between 1977 and 1996, 
a period during which the share of agricul-
ture in employment fell nearly a third. The 
contribution of reallocation to TFP growth in 
China between 1978, when reforms started, 
and 1993 was nearly one-third. During this 
period, the share of agriculture in employ-
ment fell more than a fi fth.8 In contrast, real-
location contributed 15 percent to aggregate 
TFP growth in Pakistan and 20 percent in 
India between 1980 and 2008, during which 
time the share of agriculture fell just under a 
fi fth in both countries. 
The creation of better jobs also requires 
that labor be moved more rapidly not only 
out of agriculture into industry and ser-
vices but also out of lower-productivity into 
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FIGURE 1.12 Sources of annual growth in total factor productivity in China, India, Pakistan, and Thailand, by sector 
and reallocation eff ects
Sources: Authors, based on data from Bosworth 2005, 2010; Bosworth and Collins 2008. 
Note: The contribution of reallocation during a decade is calculated as aggregate TFP growth minus the sum over the three sectors of TFP growth weighted by the share 
of the sector in GDP at the beginning of the decade.
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 higher-productivity fi rms within industry and 
services. Wage differentials between smaller 
and larger fi rms are particularly marked in 
India’s manufacturing sector, where both 
output and wages per worker in formal 
firms employing one to four workers aver-
age  one-quarter the levels of fi rms employing 
more than 200 workers (fi gure 1.13).9
Output per worker and wages are also 
much lower in informal fi rms than in formal 
FIGURE 1.13 Median wage and value added per manufacturing worker in India, by fi rm size and type, 2005
(percentage of median wages/value added per worker in formal fi rms with 200 or more employees)
Sources: Authors, based on data on formal fi rms from the Annual Survey of Industries and data on informal fi rms from the National Sample Survey manufacturing surveys. 
Note: Formal fi rm with 200 or more employees = 100 percent. 
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fi rms within the same size class. In informal 
firms with one to four workers, these mea-
sures are just 25–50 percent of those of formal 
fi rms the same size. The difference probably 
refl ects both the higher capital intensity and 
the higher skill levels at larger firms versus 
smaller ones and at formal fi rms versus infor-
mal fi rms of the same size. Firm-size produc-
tivity differentials exist in other countries, but 
they are particularly high in India compared 
with East Asia.
Although output per worker and wages at 
larger, formal fi rms are higher, more than 
80 percent of employment in manufactur-
ing in India is in micro fi rms (fi rms with 1–4 
workers) and small fi rms (fi rms with 5–49 
workers), a situation that has persisted over 
time (fi gure 1.14). In fact, half of employment 
is in own-account manufacturing enterprises 
that do not hire any wage workers. The con-
centration of employment in micro and small 
firms is even higher in services, where 96 
percent of workers are in fi rms that employ 
fewer than 50 people. As in manufacturing, 
the size distribution of fi rms did not change 
between 2001 and 2006. 
Notwithstanding its declining share of 
employment, agriculture will continue to be 
the largest employer among the three broad 
sectors in most of South Asia for some time. 
For this reason, it is important that agricul-
tural productivity be increased to ensure that 
the quality of jobs be improved for workers 
in the sector (box 1.1).
Accelerating the exit from agriculture to 
industry and services and enabling industrial 
and service sector fi rms to expand, become 
more productive, and thus pay higher wages 
requires urgent action on a number of fronts. 
The limited educational attainment of the 
labor force, inadequate infrastructure, and 
low capital intensity of most fi rms imply that 
realizing higher TFP growth through the 
intersectoral and intrasectoral reallocation of 
labor will require substantial investment in 
human and physical capital. 
FIGURE 1.14 Share of manufacturing employment in India, by fi rm size and type, 1994–2005
Sources: Authors, based on data on formal fi rms from the Annual Survey of Industries and data on informal fi rms from the National Sample Survey 
 manufacturing surveys.
Note: The data show a small share (1 percent or less) of informal employment in the larger fi rms as well.
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BOX 1.1 Increasing productivity in agriculture
The exit of workers from agriculture to industry 
and services, whether rural or urban based, is an 
important correlate of economic development. It is 
nevertheless critical to ensure that TFP in agricul-
ture—the key driver of economic growth over the 
long haul— continues to grow. Increasing agricul-
tural TFP is important for two reasons. First, it can 
provide  better jobs for workers who remain in the 
sector. Second, it allows workers to transition more 
rapidly from agriculture to industry and services, 
where TFP growth is higher. 
Notwithstanding South Asia’s transformation 
from a food defi cit to a food surplus region, the pro-
ductivity of agriculture remains low. India and Paki-
stan have improved their agricultural productivity 
over the years; elsewhere in the region, improvements 
began only in the 1990s, after decades of relative 
stagnation. There is some room to expand area under 
cultivation in selected rain-fed parts of the region (in 
Afghanistan, Bhutan, Nepal, and eastern Sri Lanka). 
There are also some unexploited opportunities for 
expanding area through watershed development and 
irrigation (in Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and 
Pakistan). But the bulk of future growth will have to 
rely on boosting TFP growth, which has lagged inter-
national best practice.
The key to accelerating TFP growth lies in diver-
sifying into cash crops (tea, sugarcane, cotton, 
spices, and rubber) and high-value activities. Cash 
crops have traditionally been important sources of 
agricultural growth and employment in many parts 
of South Asia. They are more labor intensive than 
food staples (mechanization options are limited) and 
well suited for small-scale production. Improved 
technology, together with a reduction of implicit 
taxation, could boost the yields of such crops. 
Rising incomes, urbanization, and changing con-
sumer preferences are creating strong demand for 
high-value commodities in most South Asian coun-
tries. The shift has increased incentives to diversify, to 
which farmers across the subcontinent are respond-
ing. Agricultural diversifi cation has proceeded most 
rapidly for fruits and vegetables in  Bangladesh, 
 Bhutan, and Nepal; horticulture, fi shing, and live-
stock in India; and livestock in Pakistan. These 
developments have occurred despite the disincentives 
 created by policies that favor food security crops (rice 
and wheat), such as those in India,  Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka. A shift from cereal-based to high-value agri-
culture requires substantial farm-level investment, 
as well as greater exposure to risk. It is necessary to 
widen access to fi nancial and insurance  services for 
many smallholders in order to enable them to partici-
pate in the high-value supply chains. 
Core public goods are particularly important in 
agriculture. Only the public sector can invest in much 
research and development, because private inves-
tors are not able to appropriate rents, except in a 
few cases, such as hybrid seeds. Public investment in 
agriculture has been an important driver of growth 
and poverty reduction in India and can provide high 
returns to investment in South Asia. The highest 
returns to public spending during the 1970s through 
the 1990s tended to be in research and development, 
roads, education, and irrigation (box table 1.1.1). 
Although marginal returns have diminished over 
(continues next page)
BOX TABLE 1.1.1 Returns to agricultural growth from investments in public goods and subsidies in India, 
1960s–90s
(percent)
Public good  1960s  1970s  1980s  1990s
Agricultural research and development 3.12 5.90 6.95 6.93
Road investment 8.79 3.80 3.03 3.17
Educational investment 5.97 7.80 3.88 1.53
Irrigation investment 2.65 2.10 3.61 1.41
Credit subsidies 3.86 1.68 5.20 0.89
Power subsidies 1.18 0.95 1.66 0.58
Fertilizer subsidies 2.41 3.03 0.88 0.53
Irrigation subsidies 2.24 1.22 2.38 —
Sources: Fan, Gulati, and Thorat 2008; World Bank staff . 
Note: — = Not available.
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time, they remain  signifi cant. In  contrast, returns to 
input subsidies (fertilizer, power, and credit) are gen-
erally low.
Institutional weaknesses such as thin land markets, 
suboptimal water-use arrangements, and regulatory 
restrictions on marketing arrangements also constrain 
productivity growth in agriculture. There is thus a 
substantial agenda of institutional reform.
Sources: World Bank staﬀ ; Hazell et al. 2011.
BOX 1.1 Increasing productivity in agriculture  (continued)
Cashing the demographic dividend
South Asia’s changing demographic profi le 
can help it meet the enormous employment 
challenge it faces.10 All South Asian coun-
tries are undergoing a process, known as the 
“demographic transition,” by which high fer-
tility and mortality rates are replaced by low 
ones. A key indicator of where a country is 
situated in the transition is the inverse depen-
dency ratio, which is the ratio of the working-
age population to the dependent population. 
Typically, there is an initial decline in this 
ratio, refl ecting a drop in the infant mortal-
ity rate that precedes a decline in the fertility 
rate. The ratio subsequently increases as the 
baby boom caused by the lagged decline in 
the fertility rate becomes part of the work-
ing-age population. The resulting rise in the 
share of the working-age to the nonworking-
age population implies that there are fewer 
 dependents to support (figure 1.15). The 
resources saved as a result—the “demographic 
FIGURE 1.15 Ratio of working-age to nonworking-age population in South Asia, by country, 1960–2008
Source: Authors, based on data from World Bank 2011c.
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dividend”—can be used for high-priority 
investments. Eventually, as the baby boom 
cohort ages, the demographic transition gives 
way to old age dependency. 
Although the inverse dependency ratio 
has followed the same broad pattern in all 
of South Asia, there are country differences. 
Afghanistan’s ratio started increasing only in 
2005. Bangladesh’s ratio rose sharply, catch-
ing up with India’s in 2003 and exceeding it 
thereafter. The improvement refl ected, among 
other things, a very rapid decline in fertility 
that was supported inter alia by the country’s 
reproductive health program. Maldives saw 
the fastest increase in the ratio, thanks to its 
plunging fertility rate. Pakistan’s ratio began 
a gentle climb in the 1980s and Nepal’s in the 
1990s. 
In its medium-fertility scenario, the 
United Nations estimates that the inverse 
dependency ratio will peak for most South 
Asian countries around 2040. The excep-
tions are Sri Lanka, where it occurred 
around 2005, and Afghanistan, where it 
will still be rising in 2040. Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, India, and Maldives are already 
experiencing the demographic transition 
and therefore have the potential to ben-
efi t from it. Nepal and Pakistan, where the 
demographic transition started later, have 
yet to see a dividend.
The demographic dividend grows when 
the inverse dependency ratio rises more rap-
idly and peaks at a higher level. This will be 
the case if the fertility decline occurs soon 
after the decline in infant mortality and is 
rapid. Policies such as creating an effective 
reproductive health program and expanding 
female primary and secondary education, 
which reduces family size, can help bring 
this about.
The resources made available by the 
demographic dividend can be used for phys-
ical capital deepening (electricity, transport) 
and human capital formation (education, 
skills) if the business environment is condu-
cive to making such investments. Policy also 
needs to help improve the quality of fi nan-
cial intermediation, so that the increased 
private savings of households find their 
way into the investments in physical and 
human capital that have the highest returns. 
Increased factor accumulation would then 
increase aggregate labor productivity, which 
would help absorb entrants into the labor 
market at rising wages and more remunera-
tive self-employment. 
Without policy reform, the demographic 
dividend cannot be increased or used to 
boost growth and living standards. In this 
event, entrants into the labor market will 
be absorbed at stagnant or slowly rising 
levels of productivity, and the potential 
of the demographic dividend will remain 
untapped. Policies to improve the environ-
ment for factor accumulation and raise 
the quality of physical and human capital 
formation are necessary to create better 
jobs whether or not there is a demographic 
dividend. But the fact that, for most of the 
region, the window of demographic oppor-
tunity will be open for only another three 
decades lends urgency to the need for policy 
reform. 
Because of volatile economic growth, 
an uneven policy framework, and armed 
confl ict in a number of countries, there is 
only a broad correspondence between per 
capita GDP growth and the demographic 
transition. The acceleration in India’s eco-
nomic growth started in the 1970s, when its 
inverse dependency ratio started its climb 
(see figures 1.9 and 1.15). Bangladesh’s 
acceleration began in the 1980s; during 
the middle of the decade, its ratio began 
to increase as well. With the exception of a 
slowdown in the 1980s, Sri Lanka has seen 
an acceleration of economic growth over 
nearly fi ve decades since the 1960s, when 
its inverse dependency ratio started rising 
rapidly. Pakistan, where economic growth 
has been volatile around a broadly declining 
trend across the decades, and Nepal, where 
growth has been low and stagnant, have yet 
to see a demographic dividend. With better 
policies, their growth performance could 
improve in the future as the demographic 
transition takes hold. 
Except in Nepal and, to a lesser extent 
Bhutan, the female employment rate (the 
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ratio of female employment to the female 
working-age population) in South Asia is 
among the lowest in the developing world—
primarily a reflection of the region’s low 
rates of female labor force participation. 
Participation rates are particularly low in 
the three largest countries: Pakistan, where 
almost four out of fi ve women do not partic-
ipate in the labor force, and Bangladesh and 
India, where slightly more than two out of 
every three do not participate. Nonpartici-
pation does not imply inactivity: household 
duties were cited as the most important rea-
son for nonparticipation. A rising propor-
tion of working-age women in increasingly 
productive employment in the near future 
would provide a boost to growth in coun-
tries such as Bangladesh and India, which 
are going through the demographic transi-
tion. While the demographic transition is 
less advanced in Pakistan, the situation is 
no less urgent there since the female partici-
pation rate is the lowest in the region. (For 
a comprehensive discussion of options to 
improve economic opportunities for women, 
see World Bank 2012.)
The employment challenge in South 
Asia is one of improving job quality rather 
than quantity, as job growth over long 
periods tracks the growth of the working-
age population. The challenge will be to 
fi nd better jobs for a workforce whose size 
will increase 25–50 percent in the coming 
decades. In the presence of policy reform, 
the demographic transition can provide a 
favorable tailwind in support of economic 
growth and improving job quality. Policy 
will be needed,  however, to address the 
main demand- and supply-side constraints 
to job creation, discussed in the next two 
sections respectively.
Improving an inconducive 
business environment 
What constrains the demand for labor in 
South Asia? What types of policy reform 
would facilitate firm expansion and the 
demand for labor? How do the business 
environments of individual South Asian 
countries compare with the rest of the devel-
oping world?
Enterprise surveys ask fi rms to rate the 
severity of inadequacies in the various ele-
ments of the business environment for their 
ability to operate and expand their busi-
ness. These elements, which are external to 
the fi rm and resemble public goods, include 
regulation, physical infrastructure, the 
availability of skilled labor, macroeconomic 
conditions, the quality of the judiciary, and 
crime and corruption. The question takes 
the form: “How much of an obstacle is X 
to the operation and growth of your busi-
ness?” The firm’s response regarding its 
severity—rated on a fi ve-point scale, with 0 
being no obstacle and 4 being a very severe 
obstacle—is a measure of the marginal 
reported cost imposed by the constraint on 
the operation and growth of its business. 
These data can be interpreted as the differ-
ence between the fi rm’s profi t in the hypo-
thetical situation in which the business 
environment poses a negligible obstacle to 
its operations and the fi rm’s actual profi t, 
given the existing quality of the business 
environment.11
Power, payments, and politics
The three most common binding con-
straints for medium-size urban formal 
fi rms in South Asia are electricity, corrup-
tion, and political instability (table 1.1 and 
figure 1.16).12 Although there are some 
variations, the top three constraints facing 
formal, urban firms are common to most 
countries. In every country except Bhutan 
and Maldives, electricity is one of the top 
two constraints; it is the top constraint in 
India and Sri Lanka. Except for Bhutan, 
political instability is among the top three 
constraints in all countries where it was 
included in the survey instrument. In fi ve 
of the eight countries studied, corruption 
is among the four top constraints cited by 
urban formal sector fi rms. 
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Table 1.1 and fi gure 1.16 show the sever-
ity and ranking of constraints for a bench-
mark firm in the urban formal sector. A 
benchmark firm is a medium-size manu-
facturing firm with 30 employees that is 
domestically owned, does not export or 
import, is located in a large city, and did 
not expand employment in the preceding 
three years. A comparison across coun-
tries and regions requires that these fi rm 
characteristics, which are distributed dif-
ferently across countries, be controlled for. 
For instance, if a country has a dominance 
of skill-intensive fi rms, the answer to the 
question on labor skills (“How much of an 
obstacle are labor skills to the operation 
and growth of your business?”) might be 
more important than it would be in coun-
tries that do not have fi rms requiring such 
skills. That said, although the severity of 
constraints differs between benchmark and 
nonbenchmark fi rms (for example, fi rms in 
the service sector), the ranking of the top 
constraints is very similar across types of 
TABLE 1.1 Top fi ve constraints reported by South Asian benchmark fi rm in the urban formal sector, by country
South Asia region Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
Electricity 2 2 1 1 2 2 1
Political instability 1 1 2 n.a. n.a. 1 3 n.a.
Corruption 3 3 3 2 3 4
Tax administration 4 5 5 3 1
Labor regulations 3 4 5 5
Inadequately educated 
 labor 2 5 2
Access to land 4 4 1
Transport 1 3
Government policy 
uncertainty 5 4 2
Courts 4 5
Crime, theft, and disorder 5 5
Business licensing 4
Macro instability 3
Competition 4
Source: Authors, based on Carlin and Schaff er 2011b (from World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: A benchmark fi rm is a medium-size manufacturing fi rm with 30 employees that is domestically owned, does not export or import, is located in a large city, and did not expand 
employment in the preceding three years. n.a. = Not applicable (question was not asked). Analysis is based on pooled sample of enterprise surveys conducted between 2000 and 2010. 
Access to fi nance and tax rates constraints are excluded.
fi rms within the urban formal sector across 
countries in South Asia.
Electricity
In most South Asian countries, the cost 
imposed on firms by the electricity con-
straint is among the highest in the world; in 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal, it is 
higher than in other countries at similar lev-
els of per capita GDP (fi gure 1.17). Moreover, 
the severity of the constraint has increased 
over time in India, Nepal, and Pakistan. 
The downward slope in the fi gure implies 
that although fi rms in richer countries can 
be expected to make greater demands on the 
electricity grid, which would lead to rising 
severity of complaints, richer countries can 
more than offset those demands in the pro-
vision of electricity, resulting in lower levels 
of severity at higher incomes per capita.
The high frequency of power outages in 
South Asia is consistent with the reported 
severity of the electricity constraint. Indeed, 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal have 
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some of the highest reported outages in the 
world, with virtually 100 percent of firms 
experiencing them. Predictably, the use of 
generators to mitigate the effects of uncer-
tain power supply is higher in South Asia 
than elsewhere, with 87 percent of fi rms in 
Afghanistan, 52 percent in Sri Lanka, and 
49 percent in India having generators. 
Corruption 
Corruption is among the top fi ve constraints 
in fi ve South Asian countries (see table 1.1). 
Firms face high levels of corruption in a 
range of interactions with public offi cials, 
particularly for utilities and tax inspections 
(fi gure 1.18). Government interactions that 
have the highest frequency of bribes vary by 
country (with the proportion of fi rms report-
ing such payments in parentheses).
•  Afghanistan: Government contracts 
(43 percent), electrical connections 
(38 percent)
•  Bangladesh: Utilities (42–76 percent), tax 
meetings (54 percent), import licenses 
(51 percent)
•  India: Construction permits (67 percent), 
tax meetings (52 percent), operating 
licenses (52 percent), electrical connec-
tions (40 percent)
•  Pakistan: Electrical connections (71 per-
cent), water connections (62 percent), tax 
meetings (59 percent).
The high frequency of bribes faced in con-
necting to power supply is another dimension 
of the issue of access to electricity and may 
be related to businesses having to compete 
to secure power (World Bank 2008a). More 
than half of fi rms in Bangladesh, India, and 
Pakistan are expected to pay bribes during tax 
inspections. The tax systems in these countries 
are complex and create not only high costs of 
compliance but also opportunities for corrup-
tion. (Chapter 4 compares the severity of cor-
ruption as an obstacle to doing business and 
the prevalence of bribes in individual South 
Asian countries and countries outside the 
region at similar levels of per capita GDP.) 
Political instability
The reported costs of political instabil-
ity are high in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
and Nepal; in all three countries, it is the 
most or second-most severe constraint (see 
chapter 4 for details). These three countries 
have some of the highest reported costs of 
political instability in the world. (Chapter 7 
examines the costs imposed by armed con-
fl ict on fi rms and workers.) 
FIGURE 1.16 Severity of constraints reported by South Asian 
benchmark fi rm in the urban formal sector 
Source: Authors, based on Carlin and Schaff er 2011b (from World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: A benchmark fi rm is a medium-size manufacturing fi rm with 30 employees that is 
 domestically owned, does not export or import, is located in a large city, and did not expand 
employment in the preceding three years. Analysis is based on pooled sample of enterprise 
 surveys conducted between 2000 and 2010. The severity of constraint is rated by fi rms on a 
5-point scale, with 0 being no obstacle, 1 being a minor obstacle, 2 being a moderate obstacle, 
3 being a major obstacle, and 4 being a very severe obstacle. Access to fi nance and tax rates 
 constraints are excluded.
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FIGURE 1.17 Cross-country comparisons of reported severity of electricity constraint and 
power outages for a benchmark fi rm
Source: Carlin and Schaff er 2011b (based on World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: The cross-country regression line shows the relationship between the reported severity of the electricity constraint (panel a) and the 
percentage of fi rms experiencing more than one power outage per month (panel b) for a benchmark fi rm and the log of per capita GDP. The 
shaded area is the 95 percent confi dence interval band around the regression line. Vertical bars show confi dence intervals of 95 percent around 
the reported severity of the electricity constraint (panel a) and the percentage of fi rms experiencing more than one power outage per month 
(panel b) for countries in South Asia. Analysis is based on pooled sample of enterprise surveys conducted between 2000 and 2010. For further 
details, including why some observations in panel b are less than zero or are more than 100 percent, see notes to fi gures 4.2 and 4.3.
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Constraints facing job-creating fi rms in 
the urban formal sector
Job-creating firms, which are similar in 
all respects to the benchmark firm except 
that they expanded employment during 
the preceding three years, report signifi-
cantly higher severity in 14 of the 16 busi-
ness constraints (fi gure 1.19). The rankings 
are shown in Table 1.2. Job-creating fi rms 
also report higher levels of mitigation activi-
ties, such as using generators as a response 
to unreliable electricity supply and paying 
bribes to navigate a corrupt environment. 
Job-creating fi rms in the urban formal sec-
tor perform well in other respects, too. They 
engage in research and development, intro-
duce new processes and products, sell to mul-
tinational companies, offer in-fi rm training, 
and have better-educated managers. The 
increase in the cost of constraints for expand-
ing fi rms versus the benchmark is highest in 
India and Pakistan. Job-creating fi rms report 
lower costs in Afghanistan and Bangladesh.
FIGURE 1.18 Percentage of fi rms expected to give gifts to public offi  cials, by type of interaction 
Source: Authors, based on data from World Bank enterprise surveys.
Note: Figures show percent of fi rms in South Asian countries citing corruption as one of their top three constraints.
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FIGURE 1.19 Severity of constraints identifi ed by South Asian 
benchmark (nonexpanding) and expanding fi rm in the urban formal 
sector 
Source: Authors, based on Carlin and Schaff er 2011b (based on World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: Analysis is based on pooled sample of enterprise surveys conducted between 2000 and 2010. 
A point farther away from the origin indicates that the business constraint is considered more severe. 
The severity of constraint is rated by fi rms on a 5-point scale, with 0 being no obstacle, 1 being a 
minor obstacle, 2 being a moderate obstacle, 3 being a major obstacle, and 4 being a very severe 
obstacle. Survey does not make clear what fi rms mean by “competition.” Only statistically signifi cant 
diff erences in severity between the benchmark (nonexpanding) and the expanding fi rms are shown.
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Although the level of severity is different, 
job-creating fi rms rank constraints in much 
the same way that benchmark firms do, 
ranking electricity, corruption, and politi-
cal stability as the top three constraints (see 
table 1.2).13 
The severity of the electricity constraint 
facing urban formal fi rms—as well as urban 
informal fi rms and rural nonfarm enterpris-
es—prompts a discussion of the problems 
facing the sector and the policies and other 
initiatives being undertaken to address them 
(box 1.2). The need to make substantial 
investment in electricity is an example of the 
point made earlier that a rapid reallocation 
of workers to more productive sectors will 
require accumulation of physical capital. 
Constraints facing rural fi rms
Improving the business environment can 
spur development of the rural nonfarm 
economy, which accounts for an increasing 
share of rural employment in many South 
Asian countries and, therefore, the creation 
of better jobs within it. (See chapter 3 for a 
discussion of the rural nonfarm economy.) 
Doing so requires an understanding of the 
constraints fi rms in this sector face.
The severity of constraints reported by 
rural firms in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and 
TABLE 1.2 Top fi ve constraints reported by South Asian benchmark (nonexpanding) and expanding fi rm in the urban formal 
sector, by country
Constraint
South Asian 
region Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
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Electricity 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1
Political 
instability 1 1 1 1 2 2 n.a. n.a. 1 1 3 1 n.a. n.a.
Corruption 3 3 3 4 3 3 2 1 3 4 4 4 1
Tax 
administration 4 4 5 5 5 5 3 3 1 4
Labor 
regulations 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 5
Inadequately
educated labor 2 2 5 5 2 2
Access to land 4 5 4 4 1 1
Transport 1 1 3 3
Government 
policy 
uncertainty 5 5 4 3 2 2
Courts 4 5 5
Crime, theft, and 
disorder 5 3 5 3
Business 
licensing 4 4
Macro instability 5 3 3
Competition 4 4
Source: Authors, based on Carlin and Schaff er 2011b (based on World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: Analysis is based on pooled sample of enterprise surveys conducted between 2000 and 2010. n.a. = Not applicable (question was not asked). Access to fi nance and tax rates 
constraints are excluded.
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BOX 1.2 Options for reforming the power sector in South Asia
South Asia is characterized by low levels of access, 
low consumption per capita, and wide demand-
supply gaps. Some 600 million people in the region 
lack access to electricity—more than 40 percent of 
the world total. Access rates range from 44 per-
cent of the population in Nepal to 77 percent in Sri 
Lanka. The average annual per capita consumption 
for the region is 500 kilowatt hour, lower than any-
where else in the world except Africa. 
Supply has not kept pace with demand, resulting 
in shortages at peak times ranging from 1 gigawatt 
(GW) in Bangladesh (13 percent) to 12 GW (10 per-
cent) in India. The toll on the economy is enormous: 
in Pakistan, the cost of industrial load shedding 
is 400,000 lost jobs; in India, 17 percent of total 
capacity is based on expensive diesel generation. 
Countries have responded through massive invest-
ment in expanding generation capacity. India added 
50 GW of capacity between 2006 and 2011 and ini-
tiated a series of “ultra mega” (4 GW) generation 
 projects based on competitive bidding by independent 
power producers. Bangladesh plans to develop 9.4 
GW of new generation capacity by 2015. Bhutan has 
successfully established public-private partnerships 
for a large export-oriented hydropower project. 
Signifi cant institutional reforms have also taken 
place since the 1990s. Most countries have unbun-
dled their power sectors or corporatized previously 
 vertically integrated power utilities. The sector has 
been opened to private entry and greater competition 
in generation, transmission, and distribution, and new 
regulatory frameworks and independent regulatory 
bodies have been established. The degree of reform 
varies across countries and across states in India. 
Sector fi nancial losses across the region are large, 
resulting from the misalignment of tariffs, the high 
cost of power procurement, and high transmission 
and distribution losses. In India, the combined cash 
loss of state-owned distribution companies is more 
than $20 billion a year (total investment needs for 
2010–15 are estimated at $300 billion). The sector 
defi cit in Pakistan is estimated at about $2 billion a 
year (total investment needs for 2010–20 are esti-
mated at $32 billion). 
Several challenges need to be addressed to alle-
viate power shortages and improve service delivery. 
Each is addressed briefl y below.
Improving the fi nancial and commercial viability 
of the power sector
Policy makers can choose from a range of options 
to improve the fi nancial and commercial viability of 
the power sector:
•  Increase the level of tariffs to reflect the cost of 
supply, and rationalize tariffs to address cross-
 subsidization. Some countries have not revised 
tariffs in years. Others have made progress toward 
achieving cost-refl ective tariffs, primarily to reduce 
fi scal pressure. All countries offer “lifeline” rates to 
residential consumers to enable the poor to access 
at least a minimum quantity of electricity as well as 
nominally priced electricity to agriculture consumers 
to support irrigation and food security. The burden 
of cross-subsidization falls on industrial and com-
mercial consumers. Any tariff increase will need to 
ensure that adequate safety nets are in place to min-
imize the impact on the poor. Innovative initiatives 
such as the separate provision of heavy-duty agri-
cultural feeders for agricultural needs and regular 
feeders for domestic and industrial purposes in the 
Indian state of Gujarat has allowed transparency of 
agricultural consumption and, by providing reliable 
supply to both farmers and rural domestic consum-
ers, spurred the growth of rural productivity.
•  Reduce losses by improving collection, curbing 
theft, and improving overall effi ciency. India has 
initiated incentive schemes such as the  Restructured 
Accelerated Power Development Reform Program 
(R-APDRP), which aims to limit losses to 15 
percent. 
•  Improve the capacity and independence of regula-
tory agencies to ensure transparency and account-
ability in tariff setting, which continues to be driven 
by political exigencies. New initiatives in regula-
tion have been put in place, such as the implemen-
tation of multiyear tariffs in India, which provide 
certainty regarding the costs for which utilities can 
be held accountable and reduce day-to-day regula-
tory interference.
Enhancing the business environment for private 
investment in power sector
The generation sector has attracted substantial pri-
vate interest, but obstacles remain in the form of 
(continues next page)
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procedural bottlenecks (for example, land acquisi-
tion, environmental and forest clearances, provision 
of water for thermal plants); limited technical and 
fi nancial capacity to implement large projects; and 
the shortage of fuel (both domestic and imported) to 
ramp up capacity utilization. The region also needs 
to improve the operating environment to attract pri-
vate players in transmission and distribution.
Exploiting the signifi cant potential of intraregional 
energy trade
One of the most cost-effective options for alleviating 
shortages in the region is increasing intraregional 
energy trade. Such trade has increased in recent 
years, particularly in the form of hydro exports from 
Bhutan to India and, to a limited extent, between 
Nepal and India. 
Improving the governance of utilities and 
strengthening institutional capacity 
Steps are being taken to develop strong boards and 
high-quality professional management. Doing so is 
necessary to transform an organizational culture 
of risk-averse top-down bureaucratic control to one 
more suited to commercialization. Some states in 
India (such as Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal) 
have adopted technology initiatives, particularly in 
metering, and accountability frameworks to improve 
sector performance.
Source: World Bank staff .
BOX 1.2 (continued)
TABLE 1.3 Top fi ve constraints reported by micro benchmark fi rm in 
the urban and rural sectors of Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka 
Constraint
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
Urban, formal Rural
Electricity 1 2
Political instability 2 3
Corruption 3
Macro instability 4 1
Access to land 5
Transport 4
Source: Authors, based on Carlin and Schaff er 2011a (based on World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: Analysis is based on a pooled sample of enterprise surveys conducted in Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka between 2000 and 2010. Access to fi nance and tax rates constraints are 
excluded. Crime, theft, and disorder as well as competition constraints were not asked in the rural 
surveys. Macro instability was asked only in Bangladesh and political instability was asked only in 
Bangladesh and Pakistan. Only the top four constraints are shown for rural fi rms, as the remaining 
constraints were not reported on average as obstacles.
Sri Lanka is compared with the severity 
reported by urban (formal) fi rms in the same 
countries.14 As rural fi rms typically employ 
far fewer than 30 employees, the comparison 
is with a micro benchmark fi rm—a bench-
mark fi rm with 5 employees. The results are 
as follows (table 1.3 and fi gure 1.20): 
•  Rural fi rms report less severe constraints 
to their operations than urban firms. 
This pattern is not unusual in develop-
ing countries, where larger urban firms 
are typically more productive and, during 
the course of their expansion, place more 
demands on publicly provided services 
than rural fi rms. 
•  Rural firms identify electricity as one 
of the most binding constraints to their 
operations. They report levels of power 
outages similar to those for urban fi rms 
and use generators more intensively than 
urban sector fi rms. In Bangladesh, 73 per-
cent of nonmetropolitan nonfarm enter-
prises have an electricity connection, with 
99 percent of them reporting power out-
ages. In Sri Lanka, shortages and unreli-
ability of power are severe in rural areas, 
where less than 70 percent of enterprises 
use electricity from the national grid.
•  Unlike their urban counterparts, rural 
firms cite transport as one of their top 
four constraints. Firms in Bangladesh and 
Sri Lanka complain about the poor con-
ditions and inaccessibility of rural roads. 
Poor transport limits access to larger, 
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urban markets, forcing rural enterprises 
to sell predominantly to local customers, 
which limits the size of the market for 
their products and goods.15 Rehabilitat-
ing and maintaining existing rural roads 
as well as building new roads would open 
up opportunities for rural fi rms. 
Constraints facing informal urban fi rms
Enterprise surveys in the informal and for-
mal urban sectors in India make it possible 
to compare the constraints encountered by 
informal firms with those facing formal 
firms. The comparison is between formal 
and informal urban benchmark firms. As 
the median fi rm in the informal urban sec-
tor has fewer than 30 employees, the bench-
mark fi rm size is 5 rather than 30.16 
There are both similarities and differences 
between formal and informal firms in the 
ranking of business constraints (table 1.4 and 
fi gure 1.21). Both types of fi rms cite electric-
ity as an important constraint. Informal fi rms 
are more likely to cite access to land and trans-
port and less likely to cite corruption and tax 
administration.17 Informal fi rms report access 
to fi nance as the most severe constraint to the 
operations of their businesses. However, this 
fi nding does not necessarily have implications 
TABLE 1.4 Top fi ve constraints reported by micro 
benchmark fi rm in India’s urban formal and informal 
sectors
India
Formal Informal
Electricity 1 1
Corruption 2
Tax administration 3
Crime, theft, and disorder 4
Access to land 5 3
Competition 2
Transport 4
Government policy uncertainty 5
Source: Authors, based on Carlin and Schaff er 2011a (based on World Bank 
enterprise surveys).
Note: Analysis is based on a pooled sample of enterprise surveys 
conducted in India between 2000 and 2010. Access to fi nance and tax 
rates constraints are excluded. Political instability was not asked in the 
India surveys.
FIGURE 1.21 Severity of constraints reported by micro benchmark 
fi rm in India’s urban formal and informal sectors 
Source: Authors, based on Carlin and Schaff er 2011a (based on World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: A point farther away from the origin indicates that the business constraint is considered more 
severe. The severity of constraint is rated by fi rms on a 5-point scale, with 0 being no obstacle, 1 
being a minor obstacle, 2 being a moderate obstacle, 3 being a major obstacle, and 4 being a very 
severe obstacle. Only statistically signifi cant diff erences in reported severity between the micro 
benchmark fi rms in urban formal and urban informal sectors are shown. For further details on the 
sample and constraints analyzed, see the note for table 1.4.
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FIGURE 1.20 Severity of constraints reported by micro 
benchmark fi rm in urban and rural sectors of Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka 
Source: Authors, based on Carlin and Schaff er 2011c (based on World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: A point farther away from the origin indicates that the business constraint is considered more 
severe. The severity of constraint is rated by fi rms on a 5-point scale, with 0 being no obstacle, 
1 being a minor obstacle, 2 being a moderate obstacle, 3 being a major obstacle, and 4 being a 
very severe obstacle. Only statistically signifi cant diff erences in reported severity between the 
micro benchmark fi rms in urban and rural sectors are shown. For further details on the sample and 
constraints analyzed, see the note for table 1.3. 
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for policy, as “access to fi nance” is a dimen-
sion of the business environment that, unlike 
the judiciary or tax administration, is not a 
public good. The fi rm’s response regarding 
the inadequacy of fi nance could simply refl ect 
the fact that some fi rms do not have bank-
able projects. Other indicators of access (for 
example, the proportion of fi rms using exter-
nal fi nance) suggest that fi nance may indeed 
be an issue for micro and small fi rms in some 
countries. 
The concern regarding access to land 
expressed by urban informal firms may 
refl ect the impact of regulations that shape 
the operation of land markets in India. Den-
sity regulations in India, which limit the 
ratio of fl oor space to plot area, lead cities to 
expand outward instead of upward. Together 
with limited accessibility of public transport, 
such expansion can make it more diffi cult for 
informal manufacturing units to be located 
where they should be—close to buyers and 
suppliers. Relaxing density regulations, 
improving urban transport, and increasing 
the supply of property might help reduce the 
severity of the land constraint for informal 
urban fi rms (World Bank 2011a). 
Improving workers’ skills 
Enterprise managers in the urban formal sec-
tors in Bhutan, India, and Maldives report 
inadequate skills of the labor force among 
the top fi ve constraints to the operation and 
growth of their fi rms (see table 1.1). In Bhutan 
and Maldives, inadequate skills of the labor 
force are among the top two constraints; in 
India they rank 5th. Firms in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan rate skills constraints among 
the least problematic. 
Focused employer surveys in India and Sri 
Lanka highlight concerns with the skills of 
tertiary education graduates. Employers hir-
ing fresh engineering graduates in India eval-
uated the degree of importance of a broad 
range of skills and their level of satisfaction 
with recent hires. They rated behavioral skills 
(teamwork, reliability, leadership, willingness 
to learn), creative thinking and problem-
 solving skills, and specific knowledge and 
technical skills needed for the job. Two out of 
three employers reported that most of these 
skills are “very” important but that they 
were only somewhat satisfi ed (at best) with 
the graduates’ skills (figure 1.22). (Similar 
concerns are echoed by Sri Lankan employ-
ers in a survey of the information technology 
workforce [Sri Lanka Information Commu-
nication Technology Association 2007].) The 
foundation for many of these skills is estab-
lished well before graduates enter the world 
of work—in primary and secondary educa-
tion and indeed even earlier. 
The wage premium has been rising for 
higher levels of education in all countries, 
even as the supply of educated workers has 
increased. Figure 1.23 presents trends in 
wage premiums for different levels of educa-
tion in three South Asian countries between 
about 2000 and 2008 and a longer period for 
India. The premiums refl ect the differential 
between the average earnings of a worker 
with a particular level of educational attain-
ment and the average earnings of a worker 
with the level of attainment just below (for 
details, see chapter 5). The pattern over time 
has been that the premium to lower levels of 
education has been falling while the premi-
ums for upper-secondary and tertiary edu-
cation have been increasing. These changes 
have been taking place in a context in which 
the educational attainment of the labor force 
has been rising. The pattern is thus consistent 
with a situation in which the supply of work-
ers at lower levels of education is increasing 
faster than demand, whereas the demand for 
workers with secondary or tertiary education 
is outpacing the increased supply. 
The heterogeneity of the region is refl ected 
in variations across countries. India and 
Nepal have seen increases in  premiums to 
both upper-secondary and tertiary educa-
tion. Indeed, the wage premium for ter-
tiary education more than doubled in India 
between 1999/2000 and 2009/10, despite a 
large increase in the share of the labor force 
with tertiary education. In Nepal, the larg-
est relative increases in wage premiums were 
at the upper-secondary level, suggesting that 
demand increases at this level were greater 
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than the small increases in supply. In con-
trast, in Pakistan and Sri Lanka, the wage 
premium increased for upper-secondary edu-
cation but decreased for tertiary education, 
particularly in Sri Lanka. 
Despite significant progress in recent 
years, the contrast between increasing 
demand for higher levels of education and 
the educational attainment of the labor 
force remains stark. Educational attainment 
remains low,  particularly in secondary and 
tertiary  education, with well over a quarter 
of the labor force in all countries except Sri 
Lanka lacking any education at all (fi gure 
1.24). The average years of education of 
people age 15–34 increased in all countries 
between the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
but it is still low in most countries, ranging 
from 2.5 years in Afghanistan to 7.1 years 
in India. (It is higher in Maldives [7.8 years] 
and Sri Lanka [10.2 years].) In many coun-
tries, the picture is considerably worse for 
women (see panel a of fi gure 1.24).
Success in school is affected by what hap-
pens to children before they enter school. In 
fact, the greatest payoffs to subsequent edu-
cational investments may well come from 
addressing poor nutrition and other factors 
in early childhood, before children enter for-
mal schooling (box 1.3).
FIGURE 1.22 Employers’ perceptions of skills of recently graduated engineers in India 
Source: Blom and Saeki 2011.
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The education challenge facing South 
Asia is broad. It includes improving nutri-
tion and other factors in early childhood, 
increasing attainment from primary to sec-
ondary and higher levels, ensuring equal 
opportunity for all groups, and equipping 
graduates with the skills necessary to suc-
ceed in the world of work. Country priori-
ties will vary. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
achieving universal primary education 
remains a priority, and these countries still 
have significant gender disparities in pri-
mary education. India, Maldives, and Sri 
Lanka are focusing on expanding upper-
secondary school. All countries are expand-
ing tertiary education. A key priority for 
all South Asian countries is to improve the 
quality of learning and skills of graduates 
at all levels.
Improving the quality of learning in 
primary and secondary schools requires 
strengthening incentives and capacity in the 
school system. To do so, governments could 
consider the following actions in the school 
subsector:
•  Address information gaps by developing 
national assessment systems that provide 
reliable feedback on learning.
•  Improve capacity and accountability at the 
school level by devolving greater respon-
sibility to schools while increasing their 
accountability to local stakeholders. 
•  Improve the quality and performance 
of teachers by engaging in transparent 
recruitment and development of career 
and pay systems that build capacity and 
provide incentives. 
As more and more students enter higher 
levels of education, pressure to expand ter-
tiary education will intensify. Priorities to 
ensure a focus on the quality and relevance 
of skills of graduates of both tertiary institu-
tions and preemployment training systems 
include the following:
FIGURE 1.23 Wage premiums in selected South Asian countries, by level of education
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
Note: The fi rst bar for each country-year pair refl ects the wage premium for even some primary education relative to no education; the last bar refl ects the wage premium for 
 completing tertiary relative to completing upper-secondary education. 
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FIGURE 1.24 Share of South Asian labor force with no education, with international comparisons
Sources: Authors, based on data from World Bank 2011c and national labor force and household surveys.
Note: The dark line shows the predicted values of the share of the labor force with no education by per capita GDP, based on a cross-country regression 
(excluding high-income countries). The shaded area is the 95 percent confi dence interval band around the regression line. GDP = gross domestic product. 
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The fi rst years of life— long before formal schooling 
begins—are a key period for building human capi-
tal. The benefi ts of health and nutrition early on can 
have effects that persist through life; damage from 
childhood disease and malnutrition in terms of lost 
opportunity for learning can be diffi cult to undo. 
Low levels of cognitive development in early child-
hood are often strongly correlated with low socio-
economic status and malnutrition. In addition to 
protein-energy malnutrition, micronutrient defi cien-
cies, which often begin before birth, can impair cog-
nitive and motor development and therefore school 
outcomes. 
South Asia has some of the highest rates of 
 malnutrition in the world, as well as high levels of 
anemia and iodine defi ciency. As measured by stunt-
ing, underweight, and wasting, it has the world’s 
highest prevalence of malnutrition in children under 
fi ve (box fi gure 1.3.1).a Indeed, malnutrition rates 
are higher than in Sub-Saharan Africa. South Asia 
also has high levels of anemia and iodine defi ciency. 
In South Asia, as globally, rates of malnutrition, 
anemia, and iodine defi cits improve with wealth, but 
only modestly. This means that high malnutrition 
and micronutrient defi ciencies are likely important 
contributors to developmental delays in low-income 
groups in South Asia; they may also be important 
factors for overall cognitive development of the 
broader population. Income growth alone will not 
eliminate malnutrition and micronutrient defi cien-
cies; focused attention is needed. 
Most South Asian countries do not have inte-
grated policy frameworks for early childhood devel-
opment. Early childhood interventions—which 
include nutrition, hygiene, early cognitive stimula-
tion, and preschool programs—are among the most 
cost-effective investments for improving the quality 
and effi ciency of basic education, as well as labor 
market success. 
India has the strongest enabling policy frame-
work in South Asia, with a foundation  deriving from 
the constitution, among other sources. National 
nutrition policies and programs in Bangladesh and 
some aspects of public health campaigns related to 
nutrition in Pakistan have contributed to improve-
ments in nutrition in both countries, but  neither 
BOX 1.3 The critical role of nutrition in early childhood development
(continues next page)
BOX FIGURE 1.3.1 Percentage of children under fi ve with malnutrition, by region and country 
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country has a national policy on early childhood 
development.
Very few programs at scale seek to inte-
grate early childhood interventions. Several pilot 
projects can serve as a laboratory for design-
ing cost-effective programs, but many lack care-
ful plans for evaluation. Potentially promising 
efforts are under way, however. For example, 
pilots run by the International Center for Diar-
rheal Disease Research (ICDDR) in Dhaka have 
stronger evaluation designs and have proven the 
feasibility of promoting better parenting and 
mother-child interactions through home visits. The 
Lady Health Workers Programme in Pakistan—a 
community-based government preventive care 
program—holds promise for promoting nutrition 
and child care through scaling up of carefully eval-
uated cost-effective pilot designs.
Source: Authors, based on Alderman 2011. 
a. Wasting, stunting, and underweight indicators refer to the proportion of 
children under fi ve whose weight for height, height for age, and weight for 
age respectively are more than two standard deviations below the medians 
of an international reference population recognized by the World Health 
Organization (WHO).
BOX 1.3 The critical role of nutrition in early childhood development (continued)
•  Provide information on the quality 
of graduates of institutions and their 
 employability, and strengthen quality 
assurance and accred itation.
•  Increase the role of the private sector in 
provision and that of employers in the 
management of public institutions.
•  Increase the autonomy of public higher 
education institutions and improve incen-
tives for improved performance, such as 
those provided by moving from histori-
cally negotiated budgets to performance-
based approaches.
•  Increase contributions from students while 
protecting students less able to pay.
Reforming labor market 
institutions
Labor market policies in South Asia need to 
strike a balance between facilitating protec-
tion for the vast majority of workers, primarily 
in the informal sector, who are not covered by 
social protection instruments while enhancing 
their incentives for income generation. Efforts 
are needed on two fronts: (a) reforming statu-
tory regulations and institutions to encour-
age job creation in the formal economy while 
protecting the fundamental rights of covered 
workers and (b) building on programs that 
can help informal workers adjust to labor 
market shocks and improve their productivity 
and future earnings potential.
Beyond protecting the basic rights of 
workers, labor market institutions have 
an important role to play in regulating the 
employment relationship, with potentially 
important implications for labor market 
efficiency and social protection. Employ-
ment protection legislation covers the kinds 
of contracts permitted and the conditions 
and procedures for termination. Restric-
tions on nonpermanent hiring and employer 
dismissal rights can increase employment 
security and provide protection to work-
ers from arbitrary dismissal by employ-
ers. If excessively restrictive, however, they 
can discourage formal job creation, limit 
the effi cient reallocation of labor, and fail 
to provide real protection, as employers 
find ways around the rules. The evidence 
suggests that, in some countries, notably 
India and Sri Lanka, the effi ciency costs of 
employment protection legislation outweigh 
the benefi ts in terms of worker protection 
(see chapter 6). 
Labor market policies in India, Nepal, 
and Sri Lanka are oriented toward protect-
ing jobs. India, for example, has employment 
protection laws that are considerably tighter 
than laws in Western countries and most 
other major emerging economies (figure 
1.25). India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka require 
not only notifi cation but prior approval by 
the state to lay off or retrench workers, indi-
vidually or collectively. In Sri Lanka, prior 
FIGURE 1.25 Employment protection indicators in selected countries 
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FIGURE 1.26 Weeks of wages required to be paid in severance in regions, country income groups, and selected 
South Asian countries, by length of service
a. International comparators by region
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approval is necessary only when the work-
er’s written consent for layoff cannot be 
obtained. This is different from India, where 
large fi rms need prior approval from the gov-
ernment before they can dismiss an employee 
even if the worker consents to the dismissal. 
Severance pay, which typically requires 
minimum tenure in the establishment and 
increases with seniority, is also high in most 
South Asian countries, particularly in Sri 
Lanka but also in Bangladesh, Nepal, and 
Pakistan (fi gure 1.26). 
Most countries have reasonably flexible 
contracting rules. Bangladesh, Nepal, and 
Pakistan place limits on the use of fixed-
term contracts, however, and lack of clarity 
in India has led to widely varying interpre-
tations, regulations, and practices across 
states. 
Enterprise managers in India, Nepal, and 
Sri Lanka report labor regulations to be an 
important constraint to the operation and 
growth of their business. In contrast,  formal 
sector fi rms in Afghanistan and Bangladesh 
rate labor regulations as among the least 
problematic. There is some evidence that 
labor regulations become more costly to fi rms 
as per capita GDP rises (fi gure 1.27). India, 
Nepal, and Sri Lanka report higher levels of 
severity of this constraint than other countries 
at their level of development, however. When 
asked which labor regulations most affected 
the operation of their businesses, nearly one 
in three fi rms in India for whom labor regula-
tions were perceived as a moderate or severe 
constraint reported that restrictions on dis-
missal are a constraint to hiring. About one 
in four cited restrictions on casual work, and 
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one in five cited constraints on temporary 
work. 
In addition to creating disincentives for 
expanding the formal sector, labor market 
rules in South Asia have failed to protect 
workers for two main reasons. First, these 
rules cover much less than 10 percent of the 
labor force in most countries and less than a 
third even in Sri Lanka, which has the most 
formalized labor market. Second, the impact 
of labor market rules is weakened by non-
compliance. As regulations become more 
costly, fi rms increasingly employ strategies to 
 circumvent them, reducing de facto protec-
tion from labor market regulations. In India, 
for example, medium-size and large fi rms in 
organized manufacturing adjust employment 
levels by hiring and terminating contract 
workers. In Sri Lanka, where statutory sever-
ance rights are generous, workers often fail to 
benefi t from them because of nonpayment or 
partial payment, particularly during periods 
of economic distress. Limited options and 
lengthy and costly procedures for resolving 
disputes and grievances provide additional 
incentives for noncompliance. 
South Asian countries would benefi t from 
reorienting their labor market policies from 
“protecting jobs” to “protecting workers.” 
As the region modernizes, an approach that 
moves away from protecting jobs through 
strong job security laws to encouraging more 
fl exibility in the labor market, while provid-
ing workers with better tools to manage the 
fl uctuations of the market, will lead to more 
job creation and offer more protection. 
This approach requires two coordinated 
strategies. The fi rst involves realigning labor 
market regulations and institutions to relax 
the procedures and costs associated with 
 dismissals; extending the legality of nonper-
manent contracts; improving protection of 
fundamental worker rights; improving the 
 effi ciency of dispute resolution and the enforce-
ment of employment protection legislation; 
and streamlining and clarifying regulations. 
FIGURE 1.27 Cross-country comparison of reported severity of the labor regulation constraint 
Source: Carlin and Schaff er 2011b (based on most recent World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: The cross-country regression line shows the relationship between the reported severity of the constraint for a benchmark fi rm and the log of per 
capita GDP. The shaded area is the 95 percent confi dence interval band around the regression line. Vertical bars show confi dence intervals of 95 percent 
around the reported severity of the constraint for countries in South Asia. Analysis is based on a pooled sample of enterprise surveys conducted between 
2000 and 2010.
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The second involves strengthening the tools 
available to workers in both the formal and 
informal sectors to help them manage labor 
market shocks. These tools include income 
support in the event of unemployment and 
active labor market programs, including cost-
effective training and employment services.
Over time, this strategy will create a more 
favorable environment for formal sector job 
creation. Less restrictive regulations, espe-
cially pertaining to dismissal, could create 
incentives for formal sector job creation; ben-
efit certain groups, including women; and 
encourage compliance with the law. 
In the long run, as the workforce becomes 
better educated and productivity rises, the 
formalization gains from such an institu-
tional framework could be considerable. In 
the short run, however, this strategy would 
benefit only some informal sector workers 
who might be able to fi nd formal sector jobs 
in a more favorable regulatory environment. 
The vast majority of workers would continue 
to lack social security benefi ts and disability 
and health coverage. 
One way to close the gap between pro-
tected and unprotected workers would be to 
extend (statutory) social insurance to infor-
mal workers. India’s Rashtriya Swasthya 
Bima Yojna (RSBY) is designed to provide 
hospitalization coverage to households below 
the poverty line. The new pension law in 
Maldives provides for matching pension con-
tributions for informal sector workers such as 
fi shers, in order to encourage informal sector 
participation in the pension scheme. 
Any such plan needs to take account of 
fi nancing, as well as the effect on the inci-
dence of informality itself. Employers may be 
more likely to seek ways to opt out of formal 
contributory systems if they know employees 
can access social protection in other ways; 
workers themselves may prefer to remain 
informal, depending on how programs are 
fi nanced. Thus the potential for social insur-
ance to be extended into the informal sector 
will depend a great deal on fi nancing and 
the scope to which individuals are able to 
contribute. Given the high prevalence of 
workers with very limited or no capacity to 
contribute, coverage can be expanded only 
if governments are willing to allocate signif-
icant subsidies. The level of subsidies would 
need to be determined not only in light of 
the mandate of the programs but also by 
other calls on budgetary resources. It there-
fore seems likely that protection will be built 
incrementally on numerous existing schemes 
and adjusted in light of lessons learned dur-
ing their implementation.
Well-targeted and well-designed pro-
grams can help informal workers smooth 
consumption and enhance their income-
generating potential. Countries in the region 
have a variety of training, public works, and 
self-employment assistance programs, oper-
ated by the government as well as by pri-
vate and nongovernment sponsors. (Details 
are in chapter 6.) The effectiveness of many 
of these programs is not well understood 
because of the lack of evaluation evidence. 
However, if well targeted and efficiently 
implemented, such programs can incor-
porate both a safety net perspective (help-
ing workers manage income-related risks) 
and an activation perspective (helping them 
improve their capacity to generate income). 
A priority is to encourage evaluation and 
expand programs that meet standards of 
targeting and cost-effectiveness. 
Creating jobs in confl ict-aff ected 
areas 
Measured by the proportion of country-
years in conflict since 2000, South Asia 
is the most conflict-affected major region 
in the world (fi gure 1.28). Four of the top 
10 countries in terms of direct deaths from 
armed conflict in 2008 were in South 
Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and 
Sri Lanka). Ongoing confl icts affect all of 
Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan and, at a 
lower intensity, India. Nepal and Sri Lanka 
are in postconfl ict status.
Confl ict affects the demand for and the 
supply of labor. On the demand side, it affects 
both the incentives and the ability of fi rms to 
invest in confl ict-affected regions and create 
jobs. In addition to concerns about security, 
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disincentives to the operation of private fi rms 
may arise from inadequate infrastructure, 
confusing regulations and the poor quality of 
governance in areas affected by confl ict. On 
the supply side, confl ict affects the capacity 
of the population to supply labor—because 
of security concerns and, over time, disrup-
tions to education, increased mortality and 
morbidity, and the loss of job-related skills 
and training. At the same time, economic 
need and the absence of key income earners 
could lead to an increase in labor supply, par-
ticularly among women.
Armed conflict in South Asia seems to 
be associated with an increase (or a smaller 
reduction) in the share of the working-age 
population that is economically active and 
employed. Between 1996 (preconfl ict) and 
2004, for example, the proportion of the 
working-age population in Nepal that was 
employed increased about 2 percentage 
points in low-confl ict areas and more than 
4 percentage points in high-confl ict areas. 
In India, employment rates in conflict-af-
fected areas fell less than in peaceful areas. 
In  Afghanistan, 56 percent of the working-
age population was employed in low-confl ict 
and 68 percent in high-confl ict provinces. 
These numbers usually refl ect higher female 
labor force participation in confl ict-affected 
areas.
Labor markets in conflict zones differ 
from labor markets in nonconflict areas 
in several other ways. First, except in Sri 
Lanka, jobs in high-confl ict areas are more 
likely to remain rural and based on agricul-
ture. The terrain in rural areas makes them 
more favorable to rebellion (Collier and 
Sambanis 2005).  Furthermore, the confl ict 
itself delays the structural transformation of 
the economy.
Second, there is a lower likelihood of mov-
ing to better jobs in conflict areas, as the 
workforce is more likely to remain engaged 
in unpaid family labor, partly because of the 
higher concentration of employment in agri-
culture and related activities. The workforce 
is also less likely to become regular wage or 
salaried employees because of the relative 
absence of employers.
FIGURE 1.28 Proportion of country-years in armed confl ict, by region, 2000–08
Source: UCDP/PRIO Armed Confl ict Dataset version 4-2009 (http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Confl ict/UCDP-PRIO/Armed-Confl icts-Version-X-2009/).
Note: Armed confl ict refers to internal armed confl icts between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups that result in at least 
25 battle-related deaths a year.
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Third, the workforce is less likely to be 
well educated—although confl ict in Nepal 
seems to have been associated with an 
improvement in school access—and there-
fore less able to access better jobs were 
they to become available. This outcome 
reflects both the negative impact of con-
fl ict on the demand for schooling and the 
destruction of schools and complementary 
infrastructure.
Even when it is already over, armed con-
flict remains a serious obstacle to job cre-
ation in South Asia. Almost 60 percent of 
fi rms included in the enterprise surveys rank 
political instability as a major or severe con-
straint to doing business. In Afghanistan, 
fi rms located in areas where confl ict is most 
violent report that they are more severely 
constrained than their counterparts in more 
peaceful areas with regard to infrastructure, 
the regulatory environment, security, and 
skills (fi gure 1.29).
Governments can improve security in con-
fl ict situations and help restore livelihoods by 
implementing disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration (DDR) programs. Such 
programs, which target excombatants, are 
underway in Afghanistan and Nepal. They 
include three broad phases: 
•  Disarmament (collecting and disposing of 
weapons)
•  Demobilization (disbanding military 
structures)
•  Reintegration (facilitating the return of 
former combatants to civilian life, the 
armed forces, or the police).
In addition to providing a minimal level 
of security, without which economic recov-
ery is virtually impossible, the public sector 
has a potentially important role to play in 
creating jobs in the early stages of a post-
conflict situation. In addition to employ-
ment through DDR programs,  well-designed 
FIGURE 1.29 Severity of business environment constraints (average) reported by fi rms in low-confl ict 
and high-confl ict areas of Afghanistan, 2008
labor regulations
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Source: Authors, based on data from the 2008 Afghanistan enterprise survey.
Note: High-confl ict provinces are defi ned as provinces in which the number of deaths per 1,000 population caused by terrorist incidents in 2007 was greater 
than 0.1. By this defi nition, Baghlan, Ghazni, Farah, Helmand, Kandahar, Khost, Kunarha, Nimroz, Paktika, Paktya, Panjsher, Takhar, Urozgan, Wardak, and 
Zabul are high-confl ict areas. Only diff erences that are statistically signifi cant at at least the 5 percent in an ordinary least squares regression including fi rm 
size and industry fi xed eff ects are shown.
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and implemented public works programs 
that target rural areas and build or reha-
bilitate community infrastructure can 
play an important role. Training and self-
employment assistance programs are also 
important. 
Priority is often initially given to seg-
ments of the population that are particularly 
vulnerable and sectors that have the poten-
tial to absorb large numbers of workers. Ini-
tially, labor market programs and policies in 
confl ict-affected areas need to target three 
types of populations with special needs: 
•  Excombatants, who need to be integrated 
into the workforce and given incentives to 
refrain from violence 
•  At-risk youth and war victims (families 
who lost members, people with physical 
or mental disabilities, and households that 
are extremely vulnerable as a result of the 
lack of a steady stream of income)
•  People displaced by the confl ict, who may 
wish to return to their homes but need 
to be able to find jobs and feel secure 
there. 
Labor market programs are important, 
but fiscal and capacity constraints will 
limit the potential for direct job creation by 
the public sector in confl ict environments. 
Both constraints are likely to be most severe 
for nationwide confl icts. Thus the govern-
ment is in a better position to implement 
employment programs in Sri Lanka, where 
confl ict was localized, than in Afghanistan 
or Nepal. International organizations and 
foreign governments have key roles to play 
in providing funding and building capac-
ity, particularly in cases of nationwide 
confl ict. 
Given resource constraints and the risks 
of the politicization of extended public sec-
tor involvement, policy makers need to take 
early steps to gradually make the private 
sector a more signifi cant creator of jobs once 
a minimum level of security is achieved. 
Improving the regulatory environment is 
important in this regard, but true institu-
tional transformation could take a genera-
tion. Governments could begin by reducing 
barriers to fi rm entry and tackling at least 
the most blatant pockets of corruption 
(World Bank 2011d). In addition, govern-
ments could facilitate private sector activi-
ties by creating “safe economic zones” that 
provide the needed security, services, and 
infrastructure in a focused manner and pro-
moting “resource corridors” in areas rich in 
natural resources to better link them to the 
rest of the economy. Although much of the 
effort of job creation will initially be in agri-
culture and construction, the focus should 
shift over time from low-skilled agricultural 
jobs to higher-productivity nonfarm jobs 
and from targeted programs to broad-based 
job creation. 
The peace dividend for job creation is 
potentially large. A striking example is the 
reduction in unemployment in the Northern 
and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka during 
the 2002–04 ceasefi re (fi gure 1.30). Unem-
ployment fell from 13.0 percent to 9.2 per-
cent in the Northern Province and from 
15.9 percent to 10.5 percent in the Eastern 
Province, at a time when the national unem-
ployment rate decreased from 8.8 percent to 
8.3 percent.
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FIGURE 1.30 Unemployment rates in the Northern and Eastern 
provinces of Sri Lanka, 1997–2001 and 2002–04
Source: Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 
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Conclusion 
This overview began by posing three ques-
tions. This section summarizes the answers 
to those questions.
Has South Asia been creating an 
increasing number of jobs 
and better jobs?
South Asia has created jobs at a rate that 
broadly tracks the growth in the region’s 
working-age population. Indeed, the rank-
ing among five of the larger countries in 
the region, in descending order of growth 
of employment (Pakistan, Nepal, Bangla-
desh, India, and Sri Lanka), coincides with 
their ranking by growth of the working-age 
population. 
But do workers have better jobs? This 
book uses two primary measures (increases 
in real wages for casual laborers and regu-
lar wage or salaried earners and decreases 
in poverty rates for the self-employed) and 
one secondary measure (mitigation of the 
risk of low and uncertain income arising 
from lack of work for the most vulnerable 
group of workers) to assess their well-being. 
Based on the primary criteria, South Asian 
workers are indeed better off than they were 
in the earliest period for which comparable 
data are available. Real wages have risen for 
wage workers, including both casual labor-
ers and regular wage or salaried earners. 
Among all groups of workers—rural and 
urban workers, men and women—a higher 
proportion of the self-employed belong to 
households that are above the poverty line. 
In India—the only country in which the 
data permitted the secondary measure to 
be calculated—the risk of low and uncer-
tain income arising from lack of work has 
been mitigated over the last decade for the 
most vulnerable segment of the labor force, 
casual workers.
What determines the quality of job 
creation, and what is the employment 
challenge going forward?
Strong economic growth in the region since 
the 1980s—second only to that of East 
Asia—improved the well-being of workers in 
South Asia. Rising aggregate labor produc-
tivity has largely driven this growth. South 
Asia has seen the fastest growth in total fac-
tor productivity in the world over the last 
three decades. But not all countries in the 
region have enjoyed rapid growth. Some 
countries that had stagnant or slow growth 
experienced massive international out-migra-
tion, which opened up job opportunities for 
those who remained behind. Together with 
a substantial infl ow of workers’ remittances, 
the tighter labor market has contributed to 
rising real wages and declining poverty.
South Asia will have to accommodate 
1.0–1.2 million new labor market entrants 
a month between 2010 and 2030—a 25–50 
percent increase over the average number of 
new entrants in 1990–2010. Finding jobs of 
increasing quality for this massive number 
of new workers represents an enormous chal-
lenge. With TFP growth likely to return to 
more typical rates for the region as a whole, 
policy makers have to create incentives for 
physical capital deepening and human capital 
formation. The relative contribution of these 
factors to the growth of aggregate labor pro-
ductivity will vary by country. 
Faster reallocation of labor from agri-
culture to industry and services, where TFP 
growth is higher, can also raise aggregate 
TFP growth. Such a reallocation of workers 
will need physical capital accumulation (in, 
for example, electricity and transport) and 
investment in human capital. Reallocation 
across sectors needs to be complemented by 
moving labor out of low-productivity fi rms in 
manufacturing and services, where the bulk 
of workers in these sectors are employed.
What bottlenecks need to be eased to 
meet the employment challenge given 
intensifying demographic pressure?
Accommodating new entrants into the labor 
force at rising levels of productivity will 
require reforms to ease demand- and supply-
side bottlenecks to expanding employment. 
Investing in electricity to ensure reliable 
power supply is the most important and per-
vasive reform. But the reform agenda is not 
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only about investment. Improvements in the 
regulatory framework and governance of the 
sector must go hand in hand. Urban formal 
sector fi rms consistently cite corruption in 
dealings with the state—in particular, utili-
ties and tax administration—among the top 
constraints to their operations. 
Improving the quality of education is a key 
supply-side priority. Efforts to do so should 
start with interventions in early childhood to 
improve nutritional status and prevent cogni-
tive impairment before children get to school. 
Policies should focus on the quality of learn-
ing at all levels once children enter the school 
system. Ensuring that graduates are equipped 
not only with specifi c knowledge and tech-
nical skills but also with the behavioral, 
problem-solving, and creative thinking skills 
increasingly required in the world of work 
is critical. Moving labor market institutions 
away from protecting jobs for a minority of 
insiders toward protecting the vast majority 
of workers in the informal sector who lack 
protection is essential.
A challenging, but feasible agenda
The proposed reform agenda is challeng-
ing—but it is feasible, especially given the 
resources that will be freed up over the 
next three decades as a result of South 
Asia’s demographic transition. Business as 
usual will accommodate new entrants to 
the labor force, but doing so at stagnant 
or barely rising levels of productivity will 
mean that the quality of employment will 
be poor. The vicious circle of poverty and 
low- productivity employment would then 
be drawn around another generation. This 
is the price of failure. It is a price that need 
not be paid.
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Annex 1A Summary statistics on South Asian countries
TABLE 1A.1 Summary economic statistics of South Asian countries
Statistic Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka South Asia
GDP per capita, 2009 
(at 2005 purchasing 
power parity dollars) 879a 1,419 4,525 2,993 4,967 1,047 2,358 4,256 2,713
Gross capital formation 
(% of GDP) 25 24 54 36 53 30 19 25 33
Gross savings (% of GDP) — 39 — 35 35 38 22 24 34
Total population (millions) 30 162 1 1,155 0.3 29 170 20 1,568
Sector share of GDP (%)
1980          
Agriculture — 32 44 36 — 62 30 28 35
Industry — 21 15 25 — 12 25 30 24
Manufacturing — 14 4 17 — 4 16 18 16
Services — 48 42 40 — 26 46 43 41
2008          
Agriculture 32 19 19 18 6 34 20 13 18
Industry 26 29 46 29 18 17 27 29 29
Manufacturing 16 18 7 16 7 7 20 18 16
Services 42 53 35 54 76 50 53 57 54
Sector share of employment (%)
Earliest year available in 
national labor force surveys — 2002/03 2003 1983 1998 1998/99 1999/2000 2000 
Agriculture — 51 80 63 25 77 47 37 60
Industry — 14 3 16 25 10 19 25 16
Manufacturing — 10 1 12 15 6 12 17 11
Services — 35 18 21 49 13 34 38 24
Latest year available in 
national labor force surveys 2007/08 2005/06 2007 2007/08 2004 2007/08 2008/09 2008 
Agriculture 59 47 68 53 17 73 43 31 52
Industry 13 15 7 20 27 11 21 27 20
Manufacturing 5 11 4 12 20 7 13 19 12
Services 29 38 24 26 55 16 36 42 28
Sources: Authors, based on data from Aggarwal 2010; ILO KILM and LABORSTA databases 2010; World Bank 2011c; and national labor force surveys.
Note: Totals may sum to less than 100 percent because of employment in unknown or unclassifi able categories. Employment and GDP shares for 2008 are based on most recent year 
available. — = Not available.
a. GDP per capita 2008.
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Annex 1B Defi nition of key labor market terms
TABLE 1B.1 Defi nitions of key labor market terms used in this book
Term Defi nition
Employed Persons who worked during at least part of the reference period (typically the last 
seven days), regardless of whether employment was formal or informal, paid or 
unpaid. Reference period in Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka 
was reference week (generally past seven days). Reference period in Afghanistan 
and Maldives was past month.
Unemployed Persons who did not work in the reference period but actively sought work. 
Inactive 
(nonparticipant in labor force)
Persons who were neither employed nor unemployed during the reference period. 
This category includes discouraged workers—people who left the labor force 
because they believed no jobs were available or did not know how to search.
Regular wage or salaried workers Persons who receive regular wages or salary from a job in the public or private 
sector. These workers are usually on the payroll and usually earn leave and 
supplementary beneﬁ ts. A signiﬁ cant proportion of these workers are in the public 
sector (ranging from 27 percent in India to 67 percent in Afghanistan). 
Casual laborers Persons who are paid on a casual, daily, irregular, or piece-rate basis. These workers 
typically do not have access to formal instruments of social protection. In rural areas, 
this category includes landless agricultural workers as well as workers in rural-based 
industry and services, such as construction. 
Self-employed Employers, own-account workers, and unpaid family enterprise workers. Except in 
Maldives and Sri Lanka, this is the largest group of workers in South Asia, where the 
majority of people work as own-account or family enterprise workers. In rural areas, 
this category comprises largely farmers working their own land, although many self-
employed workers also work in the rural nonfarm sector.
High-end self-employed Employers in all occupations and own-account workers and unpaid family workers 
working as managers, professionals, technicians, and clerks.
Low-end self-employed Own-account workers and unpaid family workers working as service workers, skilled 
agricultural workers, craftspeople, machine operators, and workers in elementary 
occupations.
Source: Authors.
Two main criteria are used to assess job qual-
ity. The primary criterion is higher average 
earnings. For wage workers, earnings can be 
assessed using information on average wages. 
This information is not available on the self-
employed, whose earnings are in the form of 
returns to both labor and capital. As these 
fi gures are not available, poverty rates (the 
percentage of workers living in households 
below the poverty line) are used as a proxy 
for job quality for this segment of the labor 
force. Better jobs are thus those associated 
with higher (average) wage rates and lower 
poverty rates. 
The second criterion of job quality looks 
beyond average income to its variability. Lack 
of stable employment and the associated vari-
ation in income and consumption are of con-
cern for casual wage workers, who are typi-
cally the poorest segment of the labor force. 
Data limitations in all countries except India 
precluded a consistent analysis of this second-
ary criterion. The primary criterion for better 
jobs thus guides most of this book.
Various additional dimensions of job qual-
ity are often cited, including access to non-
wage benefi ts, access to public social protec-
tion mechanisms, the ability to upgrade skills 
and receive training on the job, and the pres-
ence of a safe working environment. These 
factors are strongly correlated with wages, 
poverty, and job security. 
Annex 1C What is a “better” job, and which jobs are “better”?
4 4   M O R E  A N D  B E T T E R  J O B S  I N  S O U T H  A S I A  
FIGURE 1C.1 Percentage of workers in households below the poverty line in Bangladesh, India, and Nepal, by 
employment status
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
Note: Figures are for workers age 15–64. Poverty rates for India are based on offi  cial poverty lines prevailing until 2010. Using the new offi  cial poverty lines for 2004/05 (revised in 
2011) would increase poverty rates in rural areas, making the poverty rates of rural workers higher than those of urban workers for the same employment type. The hierarchy in terms 
of employment type would remain the same. 
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Based on the criteria of average wages or 
poverty rates and the risk of low and uncer-
tain incomes, several observations can be 
made about where the “better” jobs are in 
South Asia (fi gures 1C.1 and 1C.2):
•  Poverty rates are highest among casual 
wage workers and lowest among regular 
wage or salaried workers. Within the rural 
non-farm sector and in urban areas, regu-
lar wage workers earn 23–59 percent more 
than casual workers in the four countries—
Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan—
where these comparisons can be made. In 
Bangladesh (with the exception of its rural 
non-farm sector), India, and Nepal, regu-
lar wage or salaried workers have poverty 
rates that are just a third or less than those 
of casual workers. The poverty rates for 
the self-employed are typically between 
those of casual and regular wage workers. 
•  In India and Nepal—the two countries for 
which data were available—casual labor is 
also associated with the least stability and 
regular wage work with the most stability. 
In India in 2009/10, for example, casual 
workers reported being out of work for 
0.9–1.4 months the previous year. In con-
trast, the self-employed reported 0.2–0.7 
months out of work, and regular wage 
or salaried workers reported virtually no 
time out of work. 
•  Among the casual labor force, workers 
in the agricultural sector have the lowest 
average earnings and the highest poverty 
rates. Casual workers in rural-based indus-
try and services (the rural nonfarm sector) 
earn 10–50 percent more than casual work-
ers in agriculture, even though the skills 
profi les are broadly similar. Urban casual 
workers earn up to 20–30 percent more 
than casual agricultural workers in Nepal 
and Pakistan. In India, the risk of uncer-
tain income arising from inability to fi nd 
work is also highest for agricultural casual 
laborers, 49 percent of whom spent at least 
one month without work in the previous 
year, with an average of 1.4 months spent 
without work. In contrast, 40 percent of 
rural nonfarm casual labor reported being 
without work for at least 1 month the 
previous year, with an average of 1.1 
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months spent without work. This risk is 
lower still for urban casual workers, 31 
percent of whom reported being without 
work for at least one month, with an aver-
age of 0.9 months spent without work. 
•  Wage differentials between sectors and 
employment types partly reflect educa-
tional attainment. Workers in indus-
try and services are more educated than 
workers in agriculture. Regular wage or 
salaried workers are more educated than 
casual workers. Almost all have some edu-
cation, and a signifi cant proportion have 
secondary education or above. The self-
employed are more educated than casual 
workers. Even after accounting for higher 
skills, however, the majority of industry 
and service jobs still pay more than casual 
jobs in the agricultural sector.
In summary, less desirable jobs are found in 
casual employment, with the most precarious 
and lowest-paying jobs held by agricultural 
casual workers. Self-employment is in the 
middle, with high-end self-employed work-
ers having consumption profi les and poverty 
rates closer to regular wage workers and low-
end self-employed having profi les and poverty 
rates that are closer to those of casual labor-
ers. “Better jobs” are held by regular wage or 
salaried workers in industry and services.
Notes 
 1.  See annex table 1A.1 for summary statistics 
on the eight South Asian countries
 2.  The absolute poor live on less than $1.25 a 
day in 2005 purchasing power parity dollars.
 3.  See annex table 1B.1 for a defi nition of key 
terms. Srinivasan (2010) provides a more 
detailed account.
 4.  It is not possible to rule out reasons other than 
improving job quality for falling poverty rates 
in these households. Such factors include the 
fl ow of workers’ remittances in Nepal, which 
bring in close to a quarter of gross domestic 
product and are estimated to account for half 
of the decline in national poverty rates, or an 
increase in hours worked by household mem-
bers in situations of low wage growth.
 5.  Young (1994, 1995) notes the dominance of 
physical and human capital accumulation 
compared with TFP growth in East Asia. 
Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) note the 
overwhelming importance of TFP growth in 
India during 1980–99.
 6.  These data update the point made in Easterly 
and others (1993).
 7.  Bosworth, Collins, and Virmani (2007) 
emphasize this point in the context of India.
 8.  Reallocation contributed only 5 percent to 
TFP growth in China between 1993 and 
2004 because of an extraordinarily high rate 
of within-sector TFP growth (more than 6 
percent a year in industry). 
FIGURE 1C.2 Ratio of rural nonfarm and urban wages to agricultural wages in Bangladesh, India, and Nepal
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
Note: Figures are median wages for latest year available. 
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 9.  The discussion of India’s manufacturing sec-
tor uses the terms establishments and fi rms 
interchangeably. 
10.  The discussion draws on Bloom, Canning, 
and Rosenberg (2011), which is based on an 
analysis of the contribution of demographic 
change to economic growth at the global 
level in Bloom and Canning (2008).
11.  Enterprise surveys provide information only 
about the constraints facing existing enter-
prises; they are not useful in understanding 
constraints perceived by potential fi rms that 
did not enter in the fi rst place.
12.  The question on political instability was not 
asked in India and Sri Lanka. Tax rates and 
access to fi nance constraints are excluded.
13.  Only in Pakistan do the rankings by bench-
mark and expanding fi rms differ: for expand-
ing fi rms corruption and political instability 
are the top constraints.
14.  The samples for the investment climate 
assessments of rural fi rms are pooled because 
of the limited sample size (500 fi rms) in each 
country.
15.  The importance of urban-rural links for the 
nonfarm economy has been discussed in 
other studies. The World Bank’s India pov-
erty assessment (2011b) fi nds that that the 
expansion of the nonfarm sector is more 
closely linked to urban than to agricultural 
growth. This fi nding is also confi rmed by a 
simple multivariate regression analysis using 
census data from Nepal.
16.  To facilitate comparison, fi rms with more 
than 20 employees were dropped from the 
sample of formal fi rms. 
17.  Informal fi rms also cite “competition” as a 
severe constraint. The survey does not make 
clear what fi rms mean by competition. 
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Questions
•  What is South Asia’s recent track record with 
regard to the quantity and quality of job 
creation?
•  What needs to be done to improve the qual-
ity of jobs in the face of intensifying demo-
graphic pressure?
Findings
•  Rapid growth in aggregate output per worker 
in much of South Asia since 1980 has been 
associated with rising real wages for casual 
labor and regular wage or salaried workers 
and an increase in the proportion of the self-
employed above the poverty line (a proxy for 
improved job quality). Larger shares of casual 
workers and regular wage or salaried earners 
now also belong to households above the pov-
erty line. 
•  Rising real wages and declining poverty are 
the primary criteria used to assess job qual-
ity. By these measures, jobs improved for all 
three types of workers. A secondary criterion 
is the reduction in the risk of low and uncer-
tain incomes for the most vulnerable workers. 
Data limitations allowed this criterion to be 
monitored only in India, where it is satisfi ed.
•  Large-scale out-migration in countries, where 
growth has been slow, has exerted upward 
 pressure on real wages, thus benefi ting work-
ers who remain. 
•  Employment growth has broadly tracked 
the growth of the working-age population, 
creating just under 800,000 new jobs a 
month between 2000 and 2010. A projected 
1.0–1.2 million entrants will enter the labor 
force every month for the next two decades. 
The employment challenge is to absorb them 
at rapidly rising levels of productivity.
•  Labor productivity growth since 1980 owes 
more to growth in total factor productiv-
ity than to accumulation of physical and 
human capital, refl ecting the region’s open-
ing up to the world economy and deregula-
tion. Going forward, creating an enabling 
framework for physical and human capital 
accumulation to occur will be important. 
•  Reallocation of workers across sectors has 
played a comparatively modest role in total 
factor productivity growth in South Asia. 
Labor will need to be reallocated more rap-
idly, not only from agriculture to industry and 
services but also from less productive to more 
productive units within industry and services. 
Doing so will require investment in physical 
and human capital.
•  Much of South Asia is going through the 
demographic transition, where the number of 
workers is growing more rapidly than their 
dependents. The resources saved as a result of 
there being fewer dependents to support—the 
demographic dividend—can be channeled into 
high-priority investments, which can raise the 
productivity of the larger number of entrants 
into the labor force. But only if there is an 
enabling policy framework for doing so.
•  Continuance of high growth is not assured: 
globally, correlations of country growth 
rates across decades are low. Structural 
reforms to ease demand- and supply-side 
bottlenecks to expanding employment are 
needed, irrespective of whether there is a 
dividend, in order to maintain and improve 
the pace of creation of better jobs even in 
lower-growth environments. But the pros-
pect of reaping the demographic dividend, 
which will be available only for the next 
three decades, lends urgency to the need for 
reform.
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This chapter looks at the growth con-text in South Asia in which labor market outcomes are embedded. The 
fi rst section decomposes growth in aggregate 
gross domestic product (GDP) per worker (or 
aggregate labor productivity) during the past 
three decades into the contributions of phys-
ical and human capital accumulation and 
changes in total factor productivity (TFP). 
The second section explores how sources of 
growth may be different in the future. The 
third section examines South Asia’s track 
record regarding the number and quality 
of jobs created. The last section argues for 
moving ahead quickly with reforms in order 
to absorb the rapidly growing number of 
new entrants to the labor market at rising 
levels of labor productivity even in situations 
of lower economic growth.
Economic growth 
in South Asia
Improving job quality for most segments of 
the labor force can usually occur only in a 
growing economy. South Asia has seen an 
acceleration of growth over the three decades 
since 1980 that is second only to that of East 
Asia (figure 2.1).1 But growth experiences 
have varied within South Asia (fi gure 2.2). 
Growth in per capita GDP has accelerated, 
particularly since the 1980s, in Bangladesh 
and India. Bhutan saw generally high growth 
starting in the 1980s, albeit with some fl uc-
tuations. Maldives also enjoyed high growth, 
although it experienced a deceleration 
between the 1990s and the first decade of 
the 21st century. Per capita growth has been 
marked by volatility around a broadly declin-
ing trend since the 1980s in Pakistan and has 
stagnated in Nepal. Sri Lanka has witnessed 
an acceleration of growth over the last fi ve 
decades, except for a dip in the 1980s, avoid-
ing the slowdown or stagnation of the 1970s 
that affected the rest of the region. 
Aggregate labor productivity growth
Growth in aggregate output per worker, or 
aggregate labor productivity, may be decom-
posed into two factors:2
•  “Extensive” growth, comprising growth 
in physical capital per worker (capital 
deepening) and growth of human capital 
per worker (education)
•  “Intensive” growth, comprising growth 
in TFP—a combination of changes in the 
effi ciency with which inputs are used and 
changes in technology.
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the growth of aggregate output per worker 
in South Asia and its sources in relation to 
growth in other regions.3 Figure 2.4 shows 
the sources of growth for Bangladesh, India, 
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Together they help 
illustrate the following points:
Growth in aggregate labor productivity in 
South Asia between 1980 and 2008 benefi ted 
from rapid growth in TFP, in contrast to the 
1960–80 period, when extensive growth 
accounted for the bulk of growth in aggre-
gate labor productivity. Figure 2.3 presents 
FIGURE 2.1 Annual growth in GDP per capita, by region, 1960s–2000s
Source: Authors, based on data from World Bank 2011c.
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•  Growth in aggregate labor productivity 
in South Asia during 1980–2008, which 
averaged nearly 3.7 percent a year, was 
well above the world average and second 
only to that witnessed in China. However, 
excluding 1997 and 1998, the years when 
East Asia experienced a fi nancial crisis, 
growth in aggregate output per worker 
in East Asia less China was higher than 
in South Asia during 1980–96 and lower 
during 1999–2008. Productivity growth 
varied within South Asia during 1980–
2008, when it ranged from 2 percent in 
Bangladesh to nearly 4.5 percent in India. 
•  TFP growth in South Asia—which aver-
aged about 2 percent a year over 1980–
2008, 2.5 times the world average—was 
second only to China’s and nearly twice 
that of East Asia less China.4 This rapid 
growth represented a striking turnaround 
from the situation during 1960–80, when 
virtually all growth in aggregate output per 
worker in South Asia was the result of fac-
tor accumulation and TFP growth was the 
lowest among all developing and industrial 
regions, including Sub-Saharan Africa. 
During 1980–2008, TFP growth accounted 
for more than half of aggregate labor pro-
ductivity growth in South Asia. Its contri-
bution ranged from just over a third in Ban-
gladesh and Sri Lanka (a range comparable 
to that in the high-performing East Asian 
economies during 1960–96) to 50–60 per-
cent in India and Pakistan. The transforma-
tion of the role of TFP growth is consistent 
with the picture of a region responding to 
improved policies that exposed it to greater 
internal and external competition.5
•  Capital deepening was 2.5 times higher in 
East Asia less China than in South Asia dur-
ing 1960–80; it was only about 40 percent 
higher during 1980–2008, when capital 
deepening accounted for about 35 percent 
of the growth in aggregate labor productiv-
ity. The contribution of capital deepening 
to labor productivity growth was about 
a third in India and Pakistan, more than 
40 percent in Bangladesh, and more than 
FIGURE 2.4 Sources of annual growth in labor productivity in selected countries in South Asia, by 
country, 1960–80 and 1980–2008
Source: Bosworth 2010.
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50 percent in Sri Lanka. The magnitude 
of capital deepening in South Asia was 1.5 
times the world average during this period.
•  The difference in the contribution of edu-
cation in South Asia and in East Asia 
less China steadily narrowed between 
1980 and 2008, falling from a factor of 
2 during 1960–80 to a factor of 1.5 dur-
ing 1980–90 and about 1.3 during 1990–
2000 and 2000–08. The magnitude of 
growth in education in South Asia was 
comparable to the world average during 
1980–2008. Within the region, educa-
tion accounted for 10 percent of growth 
in aggregate labor productivity in South 
Asia during 1980–2008, ranging from 
the low double digits in India, Pakistan, 
and Sri Lanka to more than 20 percent in 
Bangladesh. 
In summary, rising aggregate labor pro-
ductivity in South Asia owed a great deal to 
accelerating TFP growth, which was second 
only to China. Although factor accumulation 
played a less prominent role than in the years 
of rapid investment-led growth of East Asia 
less China, both capital deepening and edu-
cation were increasingly important sources 
of growth in India decade by decade over 
1980–2008. 
Demographic transition
Almost all South Asian countries are expe-
riencing a demographic transition—the 
process by which high fertility and mortal-
ity rates are replaced by low ones.6 A key 
indicator of where a country is situated in 
the transition is captured by the inverse 
dependency ratio, the ratio of the working-
age (15–64) population to the dependent 
population (people under 15 and over 65) 
(fi gure 2.5). Initially, the inverse dependency 
FIGURE 2.5 Ratio of working-age to nonworking-age population in South Asia, by country, 1960–2008
Source: Authors, based on data from UN 2008.
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ratio decreases, because the infant mortal-
ity rate falls before the fertility rate. The 
ratio subsequently rises, as the baby boom 
caused by the lagged decline in the fertility 
rate becomes part of the working-age popu-
lation. The resulting rise in the share of the 
working-age to the nonworking-age popu-
lation means that there are fewer depen-
dents to support. The resources saved as a 
result—the “demographic dividend”—can 
be used for high-priority investments. Even-
tually, as the baby boom cohort ages, the 
demographic transition gives way to old-age 
dependency.
Sri Lanka’s inverse dependency ratio 
reached its peak around 2005. Since then it 
has been declining, making it the only aging 
country in the region. Bangladesh’s ratio 
shows a sharp increase since the mid-1980s, 
catching up with India’s in 2003 (the result, 
among other factors, of a very rapid decline 
in fertility, which was supported by a repro-
ductive health program) and exceeding it 
thereafter. India’s inverse dependency ratio 
began to increase in the 1970s. Maldives saw 
the fastest increase in the ratio, as a result 
of its plunging fertility rate. In Bhutan, the 
inverse dependency ratio fl uctuated, rising in 
the mid-1970s and then falling through the 
mid-1990s before rising sharply again. Turn-
ing to countries with young populations, 
Nepal’s ratio began to rise in the 1990s. 
 Pakistan’s ratio began a gentle climb in the 
1980s. The inverse dependency ratio started 
increasing in Afghanistan, the region’s most 
youthful country, only in 2005.
In the medium-fertility scenario in the 
United Nations’ population projections, the 
ratio of the working-age to the nonworking-
age population in South Asia is expected to 
peak around 2040, except in Afghanistan, 
where the ratio will still be increasing, and in 
Sri Lanka, where it has already peaked. Thus 
the demographic window of opportunity 
will close after 2040 for most South Asian 
countries. 
Trends in each country suggest a classifi ca-
tion into three groups:
•  Young countries: Afghanistan, Nepal, and 
Pakistan
•  Potential demographic dividend coun-
tries: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and 
Maldives7
• Aging country: Sri Lanka. 
This classifi cation (used later in the chapter 
to project the numbers of entrants into South 
Asia’s labor markets in the coming decades) is 
chosen to refl ect the following considerations. 
First, the demographic transition is over in 
Sri Lanka. Second, with improved policies, 
 Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Maldives, 
which though growing rapidly, could benefi t 
yet more from the demographic dividend. 
Third, Nepal, where growth has been stag-
nant, and Pakistan, where growth has been 
volatile around a broadly declining trend, 
have yet to see a demographic dividend, while 
the demographic transition has barely begun 
in Afghanistan. 
The resources made available by a demo-
graphic dividend can be used to deepen 
physical capital (for example by investing in 
electricity or transport infrastructure) as well 
as human capital (by investment in educa-
tion and skills training).
But the realization of the dividend requires 
a supportive policy framework, such as a 
fi nancial sector that intermediates the addi-
tional savings effectively and a business envi-
ronment that provides fi rms with the incen-
tives to make high-priority investments. 
Without policy reform, the demographic 
dividend cannot be harnessed to productive 
ends.
Sources of future growth
Looking forward, productivity growth in the 
region will fi rst need to rely more on factor 
accumulation (physical capital deepening 
and human capital accumulation) and less 
on the extraordinary growth of TFP seen 
in the last three decades. As the region has 
become more open to the global economy, 
it is importing better-quality capital goods 
and intermediate goods at world prices 
and using standard technology to pro-
duce goods that are sold domestically or 
exported in competitive world markets. Inas-
much as the technology used is widely used 
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internationally, the increases in TFP arising 
from exports will be limited to what is rou-
tine in global best practice. For a country 
such as India, which has a large domestic 
market, domestic sales could lead to larger 
increases in TFP as less competitive produc-
ers exit the market. Even with acceleration 
in “second-generation” structural reforms, 
TFP growth, although still an important 
driver of long-run economic growth, is not 
likely to expand at the rates triggered by 
the reforms of the 1990s. Hence, a key task 
for policy makers is to create an improving 
enabling policy framework within which 
physical capital deepening and human capi-
tal formation can take place. Such a frame-
work is needed to absorb the growing num-
ber of entrants into the labor force at rising 
productivity levels.
The transfer of underutilized labor from 
agriculture to the rest of the economy yields 
reallocation-driven gains in TFP. The share 
of agriculture in employment in South Asia 
has generally fallen more slowly than its 
share in GDP (fi gure 2.6). Indeed, shares of 
employment by broad sector (agriculture, 
industry, and services) have changed more 
slowly than shares of value added in South 
Asia. In 2008, India was an outlier in having 
too large a share of workers in agriculture for 
its income level. Although the share of GDP 
provided by agriculture fell by almost half 
between 1983 and 2008, the proportion of 
employment fell by only 20 percent. 
The comparison of the shares of employ-
ment and GDP relative to average develop-
ment experience is captured more formally by 
comparing South Asian countries to a bench-
mark for market economies. The benchmark 
is derived by regressing the shares of employ-
ment and GDP in each sector against per cap-
ita GDP, its square, and a measure of country 
size, represented by its land area, for nearly 55 
industrial countries and emerging economies 
in 2008. Figure 2.7 shows the market econ-
omy benchmarks for agriculture and services. 
The evolution of the benchmark is consistent 
with the stylized facts in the development 
literature—namely, that as per capita income 
rises, the share of employment in agriculture 
FIGURE 2.6 Sectoral shares of GDP and employment in selected countries in South Asia, 
1980s–2008 
Sources: Authors, based on data from ILO 2010; World Bank 2011c; and India National Sample Survey. 
Note: Emp = employment.
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declines and the share of employment in ser-
vices grows and that the share of employment 
in industry rises and subsequently declines (as 
workers move into services). The straight lines 
in fi gure 2.7 direct attention to the change in 
the share of employment and value added in 
South Asian countries from 1980 (or the fi rst 
available year of employment data by sector 
subsequent to it) through 2008. 
The regressions show that the share of 
agriculture in employment in India was 14 
percentage points above the benchmark in 
2008, refl ecting among other things the lim-
ited absorption of labor in the nonagriculture 
economy compared with countries at India’s 
level of per capita income (see column 1 in 
annex 2C, table 2C.1). The share of services 
in employment in India was 15 percentage 
points below the benchmark in 2008. The 
share of services in employment was below 
the benchmark by nearly 10 percentage 
points in Sri Lanka, but, unlike in India, the 
share of GDP in services was significantly 
above the benchmark, indicating much 
higher output per worker in services. The 
share of employment in industry was signifi -
cantly above the benchmark in Sri Lanka in 
2008, but the share regressions for industry 
fi t the data much less well than those for agri-
culture and services. The share of agriculture 
in GDP in Bangladesh—a predominantly 
agrarian economy at the time of its creation 
in 1971—was already below the benchmark 
by 14 percentage points in 2008 (see annex 
2C for full regression results).
Reallocation across sectors has played a 
more limited role in boosting TFP in the two 
largest countries of South Asia than it did 
FIGURE 2.7 Shares of agriculture and services in employment and GDP in South Asian and comparator countries, 2008
Sources: Authors, based on data from Aggarwal 2010; ILO 2010; World Bank 2011c; and India National Sample Survey.
Notes: The cross-country regression lines shown are shares of employment and GDP by sector regressed on the log of 2008 GDP per capita and the log of 2008 GDP per capita squared 
(in 2005 purchasing power parity dollars). Figure excludes the transition economies of Europe and Central Asia. The horizontal axis is on a log scale. 
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in some East Asian countries.8 Figure 2.8 
presents the results of a decomposition of 
TFP growth into within- and between-sector 
contributions over 1980–2008 for India and 
Pakistan, the two countries in South Asia for 
which data on capital stocks by broad sector 
allow growth accounting to be conducted 
for agriculture, industry, and services. On 
average, reallocation contributed 20 per-
cent to aggregate TFP growth in India and 
15 percent in Pakistan during the period. The 
share of employment in agriculture fell from 
67 percent in 1983 to 54 percent in 2008 in 
India and from 53 percent in 1980 to 43 per-
cent in 2008 in Pakistan.
Reallocation was considerably more 
important in East Asian countries such as 
China and Thailand (fi gure 2.9).9 In China, 
the contribution of reallocation to the growth 
of total factor productivity was nearly 30 per-
cent between 1978, when reforms started, and 
1993. The share of agriculture in employment 
fell by more than a fi fth, from 71 percent to 
56 percent, over this period. (Reallocation 
contributed a mere 5 percent to TFP growth 
in China between 1993 and 2004, because of 
the extraordinarily high rate of within-sector 
TFP growth—averaging more than 6 percent 
a year—in industry.) The share of agriculture 
in employment fell by nearly a fi fth, from 56 
percent in 1993 to 47 percent in 2004. Real-
location amounted to two-thirds of aggre-
gate TFP growth in Thailand between 1977 
and 1996, a period during which the share 
of agriculture in employment fell by nearly a 
third, from 65 percent to 45 percent.
A comparison between China, India, and 
Pakistan reveals several patterns. Whereas 
the declining share of reallocation in China 
across the two subperiods studied reflects 
a steep rise in within-sector TFP growth in 
industry, the increasing share of reallocation 
in Pakistan since 1980 refl ects an across-the-
board decline in TFP growth. In India, the 
share of reallocation falls, but, in contrast 
to Pakistan, it does so as a result of increas-
ing, rather than declining, within-sector TFP 
growth and, in contrast to China, in services 
rather than industry.
As a result of the slower evolution in 
the shares of employment than in changes 
in GDP in South Asia, output per worker 
in industry and services was three to eight 
times as large as in agriculture in 2008. 
This is evident from table 2.1, which shows 
large differences in output per worker across 
the three sectors, with agriculture the low-
est and, except in Bangladesh, services the 
highest. The differences in sectoral output 
per worker are particularly marked in India. 
FIGURE 2.8 Sources of annual growth in total factor productivity in 
India and Pakistan, by sector and reallocation eﬀ ects, 1980–2008 
Source: Authors, based on data from Bosworth 2010. 
Note: The contribution of reallocation during a decade is calculated as aggregate TFP growth minus the 
sum over the three sectors of TFP growth weighted by the share of the sector in GDP at the beginning 
of the decade.
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Gaps in output per worker between agricul-
ture and the rest of the economy remain 
in East Asia as well, with larger gaps for 
industry than services. 
Hence an acceleration in the movement 
of resources from agriculture (where TFP 
growth has been slowest) into industry and 
services (where growth has been brisker) 
has the potential to increase aggregate TFP 
growth. Reallocation of workers is also 
necessary to accelerate the movement of 
resources from low-productivity to high-
productivity activities within the three 
broad sectors. However, the limited educa-
tional attainment of the labor force in South 
Asia, analyzed in chapter 5, implies that 
realizing higher TFP growth through the 
intersectoral and intrasectoral reallocation 
FIGURE 2.9 Sources of annual growth in total factor productivity in China, India, Pakistan, and Thailand, 
by sector and reallocation eﬀ ects
Sources: Authors, based on data from Bosworth 2005, 2010; Bosworth and Collins 2008. 
Note: The contribution of reallocation during a decade is calculated as aggregate TFP growth minus the sum over the three sectors of TFP growth weighted 
by the share of the sector in GDP at the beginning of the decade.
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TABLE 2.1 Labor productivity in South Asia and East Asia, by sector, 2008
(per worker, in 2005 purchasing power parity dollars)
Region/country
Total 
(1)
Agriculture 
(2)
Industry
(3)
Services
(4)
Ratio 
(3)/(2)
Ratio 
(4)/(2)
South Asia
Bangladesh 4,116 1,754 6,876 5,635 3.9 3.2
India 7,049 2,202 10,368 14,939 4.7 6.8
Nepal 2,577 1,125 3,861 8,691 3.4 7.7
Pakistan 8,287 3,778 11,097 12,430 2.9 3.3
Sri Lanka 12,842 5,257 14,334 17,928 2.7 3.4
East Asia
Korea, Rep. of 49,677 17,625 73,013 44,305 4.1 2.5
Malaysiaa 36,156 26,439 60,590 27,335 2.3 1.0
Thailand 14,744 4,324 30,747 15,906 7.1 3.7
Source: Bosworth 2010. 
a. The utilities industry in Malaysia is included in services rather than industry.
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of labor will require substantial investment 
in human capital. Defi ciencies in infrastruc-
ture, analyzed in chapter 4, imply that real-
location will require investment in physical 
capital as well. Creating an enabling envi-
ronment for accelerated physical and human 
capital formation and reallocation of labor 
to higher-productivity areas must go hand 
in hand. Doing so represents the most press-
ing growth challenge facing South Asia. 
The track record on 
employment
This section examines South Asia’s record 
on the quantity of jobs created, the qual-
ity of jobs created, and the degree to which 
workers move across job categories.
Job quantity
In all South Asian countries, the number 
of jobs created has grown broadly in line 
with the working-age population, for two 
reasons (figure 2.10). First, rates of labor 
force participation—the proportion of the 
working-age population that is in the labor 
force—have moved slowly in South Asia, 
implying that the growth of the labor force 
has tracked that of the working-age popula-
tion. Second, in countries where the lack of 
social safety nets does not allow the luxury 
of open unemployment, the proportion of 
the labor force that is unemployed is low 
and does not change very much. At the mar-
gin, additional entrants into the labor force 
are absorbed into low-productivity occu-
pations. Hence the growth of employment 
moves broadly in line with that of the labor 
force. 
Taken together, these observations imply 
that employment growth can be expected 
to broadly track growth in the working-age 
population.10 Total employment in South 
Asia (excluding Afghanistan and Bhutan) 
rose from 473 million in 2000 to 568 million 
in 2010, an average annual rate of growth of 
1.8 percent, ranging from just over 1 percent 
a year in Sri Lanka to nearly 4 percent a year 
in Pakistan.11, 12 
FIGURE 2.10 Annual growth in working-age population, employment, and labor force in selected South 
Asian countries
Sources: Authors, based on data on working-age population from UN 2010 and data on employment and labor force from national labor force surveys.
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Job quality
Two criteria are used to assess job quality. 
The primary criterion is higher average earn-
ings. For wage or salaried workers, it can be 
assessed using information on average earn-
ings. Survey data do not contain information 
on earnings of the self-employed, the larg-
est segment of the labor force in South Asia 
(except Maldives). Changes in poverty rates 
(the percentage of workers living in house-
holds below the poverty line) are used as a 
proxy for job quality for this segment of the 
labor force. Based on these primary criteria, 
better jobs are those associated with higher 
(average) wage rates for wage workers and 
lower poverty rates for the self-employed. 
A secondary criterion of job quality looks 
beyond average income to its variability. 
Variation in income and consumption arising 
from the lack of stable employment exposes 
workers to the risk of low and uncertain 
income. These risks can be major for casual 
wage workers. Because data limitations in all 
countries in the region except India preclude 
a consistent application of this secondary cri-
terion, the primary criterion for better jobs 
guides most of this book.13
The creation of better jobs is refl ected in 
rising real wages for both casual workers and 
regular wage or salaried workers and fall-
ing poverty rates for the self-employed. Real 
wages in much of South Asia grew 0.1–2.9 
percent a year during various subperiods 
between 1983 to 2010 for which comparisons 
can be made (fi gure 2.11). A higher  proportion 
of the self-employed belong to households 
that are above the national poverty line in 
Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka (fi gure 2.12). This proportion is used 
as a proxy for improving job quality for the 
self-employed, although falling poverty rates 
in households of the self-employed could also 
be a result of an increase in other sources of 
income, such as workers’ remittances (which 
are very important in Nepal and somewhat 
important in Bangladesh) or increased hours 
worked by household members.14 
Higher proportions of casual work-
ers and regular wage or salaried workers in 
 Bangladesh, India, and Nepal and all wage 
workers in Pakistan and Sri Lanka also belong 
to households above the poverty line (fi gure 
2.12).15 This trend is consistent with the evi-
dence of improving job quality provided by 
rising real wages and, in Nepal, the poverty-
reducing impact of workers’ remittances.
Poverty rates for all types of workers dur-
ing all time periods also show a decline when 
the data are disaggregated by location (rural 
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FIGURE 2.11 Average annual increases in mean real wages in selected countries in South Asia
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys. 
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or urban) or gender, although details vary by 
country. Whereas urban poverty fell some-
what faster than rural poverty in Bangladesh 
and Sri Lanka and considerably faster in 
Nepal, the opposite was true in India between 
1983 and 1993 and between 1999 and 
2004.16 In Pakistan, urban and rural worker 
poverty rates fell equally rapidly between 
2001/02 and 2007/08. Poverty rates for both 
male and female workers declined in all fi ve 
countries, but poverty rates for female work-
ers remained higher than for male workers in 
urban Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan (fi g-
ure 2.13 shows data on India). In sum, using 
the primary criteria of higher wages for wage 
workers and lower poverty rates for the self-
employed, South Asia has created better jobs. 
There has also been an improvement in 
job quality in India based on the secondary 
criterion, namely, a reduced risk of low and 
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FIGURE 2.12 Percentage of workers in households below the poverty line in selected South Asian countries, 
by employment status
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FIGURE 2.13 Percentage of workers in households below the poverty line in India, by employment status and gender
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Note: URP = uniform recall period (the period in which respondents were asked to recall all consumption items over the same recall period [for example, 7 days]). 
MRP = mixed recall period (the period need not be the same for all items, [for example, 7 days for some and 365 days for others]). Figures are for workers age 15–64.
Notwithstanding the variation in pov-
erty rates across employment types, there is 
a consistent association between poverty and 
type of employment across countries and 
over time (figure 2.12). Casual labor is the 
most vulnerable segment of the labor force 
and has the highest poverty rates (more than 
40 percent in both rural and urban 
 Bangladesh, for example). The poverty rates 
of the self-employed are the second highest.18 
Poverty rates are generally lowest among 
regular wage or salaried workers; on average, 
they are one-third or less of those for casual 
labor. This pattern of association is evident 
in the consumption distribution by type of 
employment (fi gure 2.15). It is also consistent 
with observed wage differentials between 
regular wage or salaried workers and casual 
labor (see chapter 3). These patterns have 
endured over time. Hence, better jobs could 
be created either through improvement within 
an employment type or through the realloca-
tion of workers from job types with higher 
poverty rates and lower wages to those with 
lower poverty rates and higher wages.
uncertain income for casual wage workers 
(India was the only country that had suffi -
cient data on which to conduct this analysis). 
The average number of months for which all 
casual laborers (farm and nonfarm, rural and 
urban) were without work, despite looking for 
it, declined between 1999/2000 and 2009/10 
(fi gure 2.14).17 Thus, the secondary criterion 
for better jobs is established for India.
Economic growth in the region has driven 
improvements in the quality of jobs. But not 
all countries have enjoyed high or accelerating 
growth. Per capita GDP was virtually stag-
nant in Nepal in the 1960s and 1970s and 
has grown at 2 percent or less a year since the 
1980s (fi gure 2.2). Despite sluggish growth, 
real wages have risen nearly 3 percent a year 
since the 1980s, and poverty among workers 
fell between the mid-1990s and the 2000s. 
These improvements reflect massive out-
migration of workers in response to limited 
job opportunities, which has improved labor 
market outcomes for those who stay behind. 
A large infl ow of remittances has contributed 
to declining poverty (box 2.1).
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FIGURE 2.14 Average number of months without work in the past year, casual laborers in India, 
by sector, 1999–2010 
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Source: Authors, based on data from Indian labor force and household surveys.
Note: Figures are for workers age 15–64 who were available for work during at least part of the month.
BOX 2.1 International migration in Nepal and its eff ects on poverty
Despite slow economic growth, Nepal has enjoyed 
higher wages and a signifi cant decline in poverty rates 
among workers—thanks in large part to massive out-
migration and infl ow of workers’ remittances. Labor 
migration has been a feature of life in Nepal for 200 
years. The primary destination for migrants was tra-
ditionally India, although since the 1990s migrants 
have increasingly headed to the Middle East and 
Malaysia. The Maoist insurgency from 1996 to 2006 
accelerated the pace of migration, especially after 
fi ghting intensifi ed in 2001, as many people fl ed rural 
communities affected by the hostilities.
The total number of migrants is estimated at 
about 4.2 million, equivalent to 13 percent of Nepal’s 
population. Migration is widespread, occurring in 
households of all income groups and from all parts 
of the country. Almost half of all households have 
had at least one migrant abroad at some time. The 
vast majority of migrants (93–94 percent) are men, 
most of them 20–40 years old. At least one-third of 
working-age men in Nepal are migrants. 
Why is migration so prevalent in Nepal? The 
 phenomenon is viewed as a response to limited 
domestic job opportunities in a stagnant economic 
environment with a poor business climate and politi-
cal  instability. The majority of migrants worked in 
agriculture in Nepal but moved into manufactur-
ing, construction, and services (such as hotels and 
catering) after migration. More than 87 percent of 
migrants are literate compared with 62 percent of 
nonmigrants. Before migration, migrants earned 
about Nr 4,000 a month; after migration their  average 
earnings were Nr 16,000. Despite higher living costs 
overseas, migrants are able to save, with a typical 
migrant saving about Nr 8,000 a month—twice the 
amount earned in Nepal. 
Nepal has the largest remittances as a share of GDP 
of any country in the world with more than 10 mil-
lion people. Offi cial remittances totaled $2.7 billion in 
2009, equivalent to 22 percent of GDP; including infor-
mal fl ows and remittances from India, total infl ows are 
estimated to have exceeded 25 percent of GDP. 
Remittances have increased household income sig-
nifi cantly. An estimated 39 percent of all households 
and 84 percent of households with recent migration 
experience received remittances in 2009. Income 
from remittances accounted for 24 percent of the 
annual income of all households and two-thirds of 
the income of remittance-receiving households. The 
additional income is spent largely on consumption, 
education, and childcare. More than half the decline 
in Nepal’s poverty rate between 1996 and 2004 (from 
42 percent to 31 percent) is estimated to have been the 
result of remittances. 
Migration has also had a signifi cant impact on 
the labor force. The male labor supply has fallen, 
especially in rural areas. Remittances have caused 
recipient households to increase their consumption of 
leisure and reduce labor supply as well. The decline 
in the male labor supply has reduced domestic unem-
ployment and underemployment and led to rising 
real wages.
Source: World Bank 2011a.
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The proportion of workers in the three 
employment types has remained broadly 
unchanged over time, in both rural and 
urban areas (figure 2.16). In India, which 
has the longest time series, the decline in 
self-employment and increase in casual labor 
observed between 1983/84 and 1999/2000 
was reversed by 2004/05 but observed again 
between 2004/05 and 2009/10.19 Given the 
hierarchy of poverty rates (which are high-
est among casual workers and lowest among 
regular wage and salary earners), this implies 
that no signifi cant change in poverty status 
occurred over time as a result of transitions 
across the three groups. Workers in South 
Asia have better jobs than they previously did 
mainly as a result of increasing quality within 
rather than across employment categories 
(table 2.2). 
Disaggregating further by sector can 
reveal more across-type movements in the 
labor force. Separating India’s rural economy 
into agriculture and nonfarm (rural-based 
industry and services) sectors reveals that 
between 1983/84 and 2004/05, the share of 
casual labor increased (from 25 percent to 
28 percent) and the share of regular wage or 
salaried jobs decreased (from 27 percent to 
25 percent) (fi gure 2.17). The share of casual 
labor in the rural nonfarm sector increased 
to 38 percent by 2009/10, because most rural 
nonfarm employment was casual work.20 
The World Bank’s poverty assessment of 
India (World Bank 2011b) notes the increas-
ingly bimodal nature of consumption by rural 
nonfarm regular wage or salaried workers, 
among whom a minority earns wages that 
are much higher than average. These trends 
in the nonfarm economy notwithstanding, 
median wages of casual and regular wage 
or salaried workers in the rural nonfarm 
economy increased and poverty rates fell dur-
ing this period. In addition, the number of 
months in which rural nonfarm casual labor-
ers were available for work but unemployed 
declined between 2004/05 and 2009/10 (see 
fi gure 2.14). Thus, both the primary and the 
secondary criteria for improved job quality 
were met in the rural nonfarm economy. 
The effect of a growing labor force, 
declining poverty rates, and changes in the 
proportion of workers by different employ-
ment types has generally led to a decline in 
the number of working poor (for details, see 
annex 2E). In Bangladesh, the number of 
working poor decreased 18 percent between 
2000 and 2010, with declines in most types 
of employment except rural nonfarm casual 
labor, urban casual labor, and urban regu-
lar wage or salaried workers. In India, the 
number of working poor increased 2 per-
cent between 1985 and 1995 for all types of 
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FIGURE 2.15 Distribution of per capita household expenditure in 
India and Nepal, by employment status
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
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FIGURE 2.16 Distribution of rural and urban workers in selected South Asian countries, by employment type
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
a. Data from the Bangladesh Household Income and Expenditure Surveys (HIES) were used to calculate worker poverty rates. The share of workers by employment type 
in the HIES diﬀ ers from the share in the Bangladesh labor force surveys. The diﬀ erence is likely to be partly driven by how female employment is captured, with female 
participation rates in the HIES less than half those reported in the labor force survey. Therefore, the changes in the share of workers by type in Bangladesh from the HIES 
should be interpreted carefully. For example, between 2005 and 2010 the signiﬁ cant increase in the share of regular wage or salaried work in urban areas was driven 
largely by changes in the female urban workforce reported in the HIES 2005 and HIES 2010. 
b. Although there is variation in the shares of casual labor and self-employment in rural areas in India, there is no persistent increase or decline in the shares throughout 
the whole period (for example, the increase in casual labor between 2004/05 and 2009/10 mostly reversed the decline between 1999/2000 and 2004/05); the share of 
regular wage or salaried workers remained constant throughout the 25-year period.
8 7 8 8 8
43 41 41 40 43
61 60 57
61
54
40 42 41 45 41
31 33 35 31 38
18 18 18 15 17
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
19
83
19
93
–9
4
19
99
–2
00
0
20
04
–0
5
20
09
–1
0
19
83
19
93
–9
4
19
99
–2
00
0
20
04
–0
5
20
09
–1
0
b. India, 1983–2009/10
14 15 17
43 43
51
47 49 44
35 36
28
38 36 39
22 21 21
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
pe
rc
en
t
pe
rc
en
t
pe
rc
en
t
pe
rc
en
t
pe
rc
en
t
100
20
00
rural
20
05
20
10
20
00
urban
rural urban
rural
rural urban
urban
rural urban
20
05
20
10
a. Bangladesh, 2000–2010
5 4
27 26
79 83
55
61
15 13 18
12
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
19
96
20
04
19
96
20
04
c. Nepal, 1996–2004
12 14 13
35 36 36
71 70 71
46 45 45
17 16 16 19 20 19
0
20
40
60
80
100
19
99
–2
00
0
20
07
–0
8
20
08
–0
9
19
99
–2
00
0
20
07
–0
8
20
08
–0
9
d. Pakistan, 2000–2009
55 56
69 67
45 44
31 33
0
20
40
60
80
100
20
00
20
08
20
00
20
08
e. Sri Lanka, 2000–2008
casual labor self-employed regular wage or salaried
casual labor self-employed regular wage or salaried
self-employed
wage worker
casual labor—agricultural, rural nonfarm, 
and urban—and for the urban self-employed. 
In contrast, the number of working poor fell 
18 percent between 2000 and 2005 and in 
most employment types.21 In Nepal, the 
number of working poor decreased 2 percent 
between 1995 and 2005, falling among rural 
nonfarm regular wage or salaried workers, 
rural nonfarm self-employed and urban 
casual labor. 
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TABLE 2.2 Decomposition of decline in worker poverty rates 
(percent)
India Nepal Bangladesh
Contribution to decline in worker poverty rates 1983–93 1999–2004 1995–2003 2000–10
Changes in poverty rates of diff erent 
employment types 101.0 90.7 78.6 93.3
Changes in distribution of employment type –1.9 12.9 20.0 10.0
Interaction/residual 0.9 –3.6 1.5 –3.4
Sources: Authors, based on national labor force and household surveys. 
Note: Changes in poverty rates holds distribution of employment status constant; changes in distribution of employment status holds poverty rates 
constant. The interaction term equals 100 percent – (A + B).
Labor mobility
The broad constancy in the share of work-
ers across employment types does not nec-
essarily imply a lack of mobility at the 
level of individual workers across employ-
ment types. As an illustration, the analysis 
focuses on labor transition for rural workers 
from agricultural work (less desirable jobs 
on average) to rural nonfarm work (more 
desirable jobs on average) and vice versa 
(fi gure 2.18). Lower- and upper-bound esti-
mates of the shares of rural workers falling 
into each of the four possible states (the 
combinations of the two possible employ-
ment types in each of the two time periods 
shown in the fi gure) are generated by adapt-
ing a technique developed by Lanjouw, 
Luoto, and Mckenzie (2011) to study pov-
erty transitions.22 
A sizable share of rural workers in the 
three countries is moving in both directions 
between agriculture and the rural nonfarm 
sector (fi gure 2.19). The share of rural work-
ers moving from agriculture to rural non-
farm work was 5–17 percent in Bangladesh 
FIGURE 2.17 Distribution of rural nonfarm workers in India, by employment type, 1983–2009/10
27 25 25 24 22
48 49 47 48
41
25 26 28 28
38
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
pe
rc
en
t
1983 1993/94 1999/2000 2004/05 2009/10
casual wage self-employed regular wage or salaried
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
 G R O W T H  A N D  J O B  Q U A L I T Y  I N  S O U T H  A S I A   6 7
FIGURE 2.18 Labor transitions in rural areas
Source: Authors.
Agriculture Rural nonfarm
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re No transition:
agriculture both
periods
More desirable
transition:
agriculture to
rural nonfarm
Ru
ra
l n
on
fa
rm Less desirable
transition:
rural nonfarm to
agriculture
No transition:
rural nonfarm
both periods
Second period
Fi
rs
t p
er
io
d
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between 2002 and 2005, 10–20 percent 
in India between 1999 and 2004 and 3–13 
percent between 2004 and 2007, and 4–11 
percent in Nepal between 1996 and 2004. 
The movement from the rural nonfarm sec-
tor back to agriculture was 5–17 percent in 
Bangladesh between 2002 and 2005, 2–12 
percent in India between 1999 and 2004 
and 8–18 percent between 2004 and 2007, 
and 3–10 percent in Nepal between 1996 and 
2004. The data do not allow a conclusion to 
be drawn as to which transition was larger, 
as the bounds for both the more desirable 
(agriculture to rural nonfarm labor) and less 
desirable (rural nonfarm labor to agriculture) 
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0.1–0.4. The correlation between growth 
rates in 1971–80 and growth rates thereafter 
is 0.37 for 1981–90, 0.28 for 1991–2000, 
and negligible thereafter (table 2.3). East-
erly and others (1993) attribute this fi nding 
to exogenous shocks, such as adverse move-
ments in the terms of trade and armed con-
fl ict, both of which are prevalent in South 
Asia. The presence of such shocks is an 
important reason for undertaking reforms 
of the business environment (chapter 4) 
and education systems (chapter 5) to ensure 
that the creation of better jobs is not overly 
dependent on continued high economic 
growth.
Demographic pressures lend further 
urgency to the need for reform. Most coun-
tries in the region have a demographic 
window of opportunity during which an 
enabling policy framework can help them 
reap a demographic dividend. But the 
opportunity is time bound and will close 
for most of South Asia around 2040. Pop-
ulation projections and the age structure 
of the population are used to develop two 
scenarios (details of the projections are in 
annex 2D):
•  Scenario 1: South Asia adds 1 million 
entrants to the labor force every month 
between 2010 and 2030. This scenario 
assumes no increase in the rates of female 
labor force participation, which are 
among the lowest in the world.
•  Scenario 2: Female labor participation 
rates in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan 
increase 10 percentage points by 2030, 
in line with observed behavior in labor 
force participation rates in Indonesia, the 
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Thai-
land between 1960 and 2000. In this sce-
nario, 1.2 million entrants are added to the 
labor force between 2010 and 2030, fur-
ther intensifying labor market pressure. 
By way of comparison, an average of 
just under 800,000 entrants joined the 
labor market in South Asia every month 
between 1990 and 2010. The two sce-
narios thus represent increases of 25–50 
percent above the average for this period. 
transitions overlap. In fact, the similarity of 
both sets of transition bounds, especially in 
Bangladesh and Nepal, suggests that the pro-
portion of workers could be similar in both 
types of transitions. These results are con-
sistent with the observed constancy of the 
share of the rural workforce engaged in rural 
nonfarm activities noted later in chapter 3. 
Although the bounds still overlap by a small 
amount in India between 1999 and 2004, the 
size of the more desirable transition is notice-
ably larger than that of the less desirable 
one. This fi nding is consistent with the large 
increase in the share of the rural workforce in 
rural nonfarm activities—from 25 percent in 
2000 to 30 percent in 2004—noted in chap-
ter 3. The bounds of the more desirable and 
less desirable transitions overlap much more 
between 2004 and 2007, when the share of 
the rural nonfarm workforce in India was vir-
tually fl at.
The less desirable transition suggests that 
the nature of the rural nonfarm work itself 
might be transient and temporary in nature. 
In fact, the variance of the wage distributions 
for casual nonfarm workers is higher than 
that for casual agricultural workers in India 
in all labor force surveys except 2004/05. 
Chapter 5 takes the labor transition analysis 
farther by looking at which types of workers 
are more likely to make more desirable and 
less desirable transitions.
In summary, the labor transition analysis 
suggests that there is labor mobility in South 
Asia and that labor moves to both more 
desirable and less desirable jobs. These two-
way transitions are masked when looking at 
cross-sectional data at the aggregate level.
The urgency of reform
The continuation of economic growth, 
which has been associated with improved 
job quality in South Asia during the last 
three decades, cannot be taken for granted. 
Growth rates are famously unstable over 
time: across five decades, the correlation 
of growth rates of GDP per capita for 94 
countries for which data are available in 
the World Development Indicators is just 
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TABLE 2.3 Correlations of country growth rates of per capita GDP across decades 
1961–70 1971–80 1981–90 1991–2000 2001–10
1961–70 1 0.34*** 0.37*** 0.22** –0.18*
1971–80 1 0.37*** 0.28*** 0.14
1981–90 1 0.43*** 0.07
1991–2000 1 0.18*
2001–10 1
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from World Bank 2011c.
Note: Findings are based on 94 countries. *** Signiﬁ cant at the 1% level; ** signiﬁ cant at the 5% level; * signiﬁ cant at the 10% level.
Annex 2A Methodology for decomposing growth 
A country’s output in any given year depends 
on its factor inputs—labor and (human and 
physical) capital—as well as the effi ciency 
with which factors are used in production.23 
Defi ne Y as real GDP, K as the physical capi-
tal stock, A as the level of technology, and L 
as labor (measured as “bodies of economi-
cally active persons”), which is assumed to 
be “augmented” by H, an index of the aver-
age level of labor quality, measured by aver-
age years of schooling. Assume that a coun-
try’s output can be expressed as a function 
of these inputs, using the specifi c functional 
form shown in equation (2A.1), and that 
returns to scale are constant.
Y = AK(HL)(1) (2A.1)
The results are reported in a form that 
decomposes growth in output per worker into 
the contributions from the growth of physi-
cal capital per worker, education per worker, 
and total factor productivity, as shown in 
equation (2A.2) (lower-case letters denote a 
variable’s average annual growth rate).
y/l = (k/l) + (1)h  a (2A.2)
Given an estimate for  and measures of 
Y, L, K, and H, it is straightforward to solve 
for A (or a) and construct the decomposition. 
It is assumed that capital’s share  = 0.35. 
An analysis that used actual income shares 
in each period would allow for the consid-
eration of a much wider range of underlying 
production functions. However, few coun-
tries are able to allocate the incomes of the 
self-employed between capital and labor, a 
particular problem in South Asia, where the 
self-employed make up the bulk of the labor 
force.
L is employment for industrial countries 
plus Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka and labor force for all other countries. 
The capital stock measure is constructed 
from investment data using the perpetual 
inventory method, with annual depreciation 
rate of 0.05 percent. The construction of H 
assumes that human capital is directly related 
to average years of schooling (S) and that 
there is a 7 percent return to each additional 
year of schooling:
H = (1.07)S (2A.3)
The critical question is whether increases 
of this magnitude will be absorbed at ris-
ing or low levels of productivity. The two 
scenarios, together with the possibility that 
high economic growth may not continue, 
highlight the importance of proceeding 
quickly with reform in order to meet the 
employment challenge.
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Annex 2B Sources of average annual growth 
in output per worker
(continues next page)
TABLE 2B.1 Sources of average annual growth in output per worker, by region, 1960–2008
(percent)
Region/period
Change in Contribution of 
Output
Output 
per worker 
Physical capital 
per worker
Education per 
worker
Total factor 
productivity
World (83 countries) 
1960–80 4.91 3.12 1.29 0.41 1.34 
1980–90 3.81 1.96 0.81 0.38 0.60 
1990–2000 4.03 2.41 0.97 0.38 0.85 
2000–08 4.30 2.73 0.93 0.24 0.99 
1980–08 4.03 2.34 0.90 0.34 0.80 
Industrial countries (22 countries)
1960–80 4.45 3.21 1.20 0.42 1.45 
1980–90 3.08 1.91 0.73 0.31 0.78 
1990–2000 2.43 1.61 0.84 0.33 0.57 
2000–08 1.83 1.08 0.76 0.14 0.13 
1980–2008 2.49 1.56 0.77 0.27 0.52 
Sub-Saharan Africa (19 countries)
1960–80 4.53 2.16 0.87 0.18 1.15 
1980–90 1.62 (1.47) (0.11) 0.47 (1.78)
1990–2000 1.92 (1.60) (0.76) 0.48 (1.38)
2000–08 4.72 2.24 0.25 0.41 1.58 
1980–2008 2.61 (0.47) (0.24) 0.45 (0.69)
China 
1960–80 4.89 2.65 0.91 0.44 1.27 
1980–90 9.29 6.62 2.09 0.39 4.03 
1990–2000 10.42 9.11 3.28 0.50 5.12 
2000–08 10.18 9.25 3.45 0.39 5.20 
1980–2008 9.95 8.25 2.90 0.43 4.75 
East Asia less China (7 countries)
1960–80 7.84 4.46 2.58 0.56 1.27 
1980–90 7.42 4.26 2.15 0.64 1.18 
1990–2000 6.13 3.98 2.35 0.50 0.78 
2000–08 4.46 2.53 0.78 0.49 1.30 
1980–2008 6.11 3.66 1.83 0.55 1.07 
1980–96 7.57 4.68 1.50 0.59 2.31 
1999–2008 4.81 2.76 1.50 0.49 0.78 
Latin America and the Caribbean (21 countries)
1960–80 6.06 2.84 0.87 0.36 1.58 
1980–90 1.49 (1.65) 0.11 0.52 (2.32)
1990–2000 3.15 0.47 0.08 0.48 (0.14)
2000–08 3.52 1.28 0.24 0.39 0.69 
1980–2008 2.66 (0.06) 0.14 0.47 (0.69)
Middle East (9 countries)          
1960–80 5.68 3.40 2.45 0.43 0.95 
1980–90 3.78 1.26 0.44 0.60 0.36 
1990–2000 3.80 1.11 0.15 0.57 (0.02)
2000–08 4.84 2.74 0.73 0.46 1.39 
1980–2008 4.09 1.63 0.42 0.55 0.52 
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TABLE 2B.2 Sources of average annual growth in output per worker in South Asia, by country, 1960–2008
(percent)
Country/period
Change in Contribution of
Output
Output per 
worker 
Physical capital 
per worker
Education per 
worker
Total factor 
productivity
Bangladesh
1960–80 2.39 0.21 0.27 0.21 –0.26
1980–2008 4.66 2.01 0.87 0.44 0.69
India
1960–80 4.67 1.34 1.00 0.25 0.08
1980–2008 6.2 4.39 1.41 0.42 2.60
Pakistan
1960–80 5.94 3.1 2.38 0.19 0.53
1980–2008 5.28 2.67 1.00 0.30 1.40
Sri Lanka
1960–80 4.49 2.18 0.43 0.43 1.31
1980–2008 4.91 3.08 1.62 0.27 1.16
Source: Bosworth 2010.
Note: Average annual growth in output per worker is the sum of the physical capital, human capital, and TFP contributions to growth in productivity. Totals may not add up to total 
growth in output per worker because of interaction terms. The growth accounts use employment data from national labor force surveys (latest available in August 2010). 
South Asia (4 countries)
1960–80 3.93 1.63 1.04 0.27 0.31
1980–90 5.24 3.18 1.11 0.42 1.46
1990–2000 5.37 3.47 1.21 0.37 1.92
2000–08 7.05 4.94 1.67 0.34 2.90
1980–2008 5.80 3.78 1.30 0.38 2.04
Source: Bosworth 2010. 
Note: Average annual growth in output per worker is the sum of the physical capital, human capital, and TFP contributions to growth in productivity. Totals may not add up to total 
growth in output per worker because of interaction terms. Table is based on aggregated growth accounts, except for Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka data from 1980 
onward, which are based on disaggregated growth accounts. For South Asia, growth accounts use employment data from national labor force surveys (latest available in August 
2010). Aggregated growth accounts for regions other than South Asia use labor force estimates from World Bank 2011c (taken from the International Labour Organization [ILO]), 
which include the unemployed population. ILO data include extrapolated data.
TABLE 2B.1 Sources of average annual growth in output per worker, by region, 1960–2008 (continued)
Region/period
Change in Contribution of 
Output
Output 
per worker 
Physical capital 
per worker
Education per 
worker
Total factor 
productivity
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Annex 2C Shares of agriculture, industry, and services in 
employment and GDP
Annex 2D Methodology and data sources for labor force 
projections
This annex describes the assumptions used 
to generate the labor force projections for 
2030. The scenarios are developed at the 
country level and aggregated for the region.
Historical period (1990–2010)
Trends in the region’s labor force cover 
the period 1990–2010. The source of the 
labor force in 1990 for each country is the 
LABORSTA database of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO). The labor 
force in 2010 is obtained by applying the 
(fi ve-year) age/gender labor force participa-
tion rates obtained from the latest available 
household surveys (mostly 2008) to the 2010 
age-gender populations from the United 
Nations (UN 2008).24
Scenario 1 (demographic case)
Labor force projections in 2030 under sce-
nario 1 are based purely on demographic 
projections, using UN (2008). In this and 
the next scenario, the labor force in 2010 for 
each country is calculated using the same 
method described in the historical descrip-
tion. Similarly, the 2030 labor force projec-
tions are obtained by multiplying the 2030 
(five-year) age/gender populations by the 
TABLE 2C.1 Regressions of shares of agriculture, industry, and services in employment and GDP, 2008 
Variable
Employment GDP
Agriculture
(1)
Industry
(2)
Services
(3)
Agriculture
(4)
Industry
(5)
Services
(6)
ln (per capita GDP, 2008 
in 2005 constant purchasing 
power parity dollars)
–64.77**
(25.82)
28.92
(18.30)
29.87
(26.93)
–44.96***
(14.13)
69.57
(56.68)
–24.61
(54.82)
ln (per capita GDP, 2008 
in 2005 constant purchasing 
power parity dollars, squared)
2.783**
(1.365)
–1.505
(0.954)
-0.988
(1.425)
2.040***
(0.724)
–3.780
(2.990)
1.740
(2.899)
ln (land area, square kilometers) 0.316
(0.216)
–0.210
(0.348)
0.0783
(0.470)
–0.226
(0.378)
1.245
(0.887)
–1.019
(0.826)
Bangladesh dummy –12.28
(7.444)
1.169
(5.946)
9.185
(7.745)
–13.90**
(5.659)
11.22
(15.89)
2.679
(14.92)
India dummy 13.96***
(3.497)
1.102
(2.895)
–15.26***
(3.661)
–3.045
(2.693)
–2.457
(8.026)
5.502
(7.433)
Nepal dummy 4.107
(7.754)
0.396
(6.180)
–6.753
(8.069)
–1.170
(5.842)
1.490
(16.61)
–0.320
(15.61)
Pakistan dummy 2.393
(3.380)
1.812
(2.748)
–5.220
(3.462)
–1.613
(2.776)
–2.101
(7.036)
3.714
(6.454)
Sri Lanka dummy 2.905
(1.900)
4.758***
(1.462)
–9.682***
(2.079)
–2.062
(1.954)
–1.629
(2.232)
3.691**
(1.828)
Constant
 
373.0***
(121.0)
–112.7
(86.40)
–133.0
(125.7)
251.1***
(69.45)
–300.2
(260.1)
149.1
(250.8)
N
Adjusted R-squared
55
0.860
55
0.095
55
0.799
53
0.827
53
0.080
53
0.376
Sources: Authors, based on data from ILO 2010; World Bank 2011c; and India National Sample Survey.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Sample restricted to countries for which employment data were available from both 1980 (or the earliest year in the subsequent ﬁ ve-year 
period) and 2008 (or the latest year in the preceding ﬁ ve-year period). Data exclude transition economies in Europe and Central Asia. *** Signiﬁ cant at the 1% level; ** signiﬁ cant at 
the 5% level; * signiﬁ cant at the 10% level. 
 G R O W T H  A N D  J O B  Q U A L I T Y  I N  S O U T H  A S I A   7 3
same current age/gender–specifi c labor force 
participation rate, calculated from the latest 
household surveys.
Scenario 2 (behavioral case)
Scenario 1 assumes no change in labor 
force participation rates over the projec-
tion period for specifi c age/gender groups. 
Scenario 2 assumes that participation by 
women in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan 
will increase between 2010 and 2030. These 
three countries are selected for this scenario 
because each has very low female partici-
pation rates by international standards. 
Together with the fact that they dominate 
South Asia’s overall population (accounting 
for 95 percent of the working-age popu-
lation), this implies that any increases in 
female participation in these three large 
countries could have an important effect on 
the region’s labor force. Under scenario 2, 
participation rates are assumed to remain 
at current levels for men in all countries 
and women in the other five countries in 
the region (scenarios 1 and 2 are identical 
for Afghanistan, Bhutan,  Maldives, Nepal, 
and Sri Lanka).
The experience of four Asian countries 
(Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
and Thailand) was used to develop this sce-
nario. These countries represent an interest-
ing example for South Asia, for a variety of 
reasons. First, as neighbors they share some 
social and cultural characteristics. Second, 
they developed earlier than the large South 
Asian countries and can therefore provide 
insights as benchmark countries. Third, at 
the beginning of their “take-offs,” Indonesia, 
Korea, and Malaysia (though not Thailand) 
had female participation rates comparable 
to those of Bangladesh and India and a bit 
higher than Pakistan. In the past 50 years, to 
different degrees, these countries experienced 
strong economic growth and modernization; 
in the process, all of them except Thailand 
experienced increases in female participation 
rates (box 2D.1). Tracking these historical 
development indicators and roughly match-
ing them with projected trends (for example, 
per capita GDP) for the South Asian coun-
tries to 2030 suggest that an increase in 
the female labor force participation rate of 
10 percentage points would approximate a 
convergence with the historical experience of 
these benchmark countries.
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BOX 2D.1 Trends in female labor force participation in southeast and East Asian 
comparator countries
Table 2D.1.1 summarizes what happened to female 
labor force participation in Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, and Thailand during the periods when 
per capita GDP increased through the range pro-
jected for Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan to 2030. 
In Indonesia, Korea, and Malaysia, female participa-
tion rates increased consistently, in some cases, sub-
stantially, with per capita GDP (in 2005 purchasing 
power parity dollars) rising from the mid-$2,000s 
to almost $10,000. When per capita GDP was at the 
lower end of this range, female participation rates in 
Indonesia, Korea, and Malaysia were in the low to 
mid-30s—not too different from rates in India and 
Bangladesh today, though about 10 points higher 
than in Pakistan. The case of Thailand demonstrates 
that increasing participation is not inevitable as 
per capita GDP increases. Although female rates in 
Thailand did rise as per capita GDP grew to about 
$5,000, they subsequently stalled and then started 
to decline. 
BOX TABLE 2D.1.1 Female labor force participation in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan and Asian comparator 
countries
Country
Projected per capita GDP 2007–30 
(in 2005 purchasing power 
parity dollars)
Southeast and East Asian 
comparators
Projected changes in female 
labor force participation rate 
(percentage points)
Bangladesh Mid-$2,000s to high $3,000s Indonesia 1980–90s
Malaysia 1960–70s
Thailand 1970–80s
Republic of Korea 1960–70s
Almost +10 
More than +5 
About +5 
About +10 
India High $3,000s to low $9,000s Malaysia 1970s–90s
Thailand 1980s onward
Republic of Korea 1970s–90s
Almost +10 
About –10 
About +10 
Pakistan Mid $3000s to Low $6000s Indonesia 1990 onward
Malaysia 1970–80
Thailand 1980–90
Republic of Korea 1970–80
About +5 
About +3 
No change
About +2 
Sources: Authors, based on GDP trends from Penn World Tables 6.3 and female labor force participation rates from ILO LABORSTA.
Note: Projections of per capita GDP assume that the 1990–2007 annual growth rates will continue through 2030. The per capita GDP data used are 2005 purchasing power 
parity estimates from the Penn World Tables 6.3. 
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Annex 2E Poverty rates and the number of working poor in South Asia
TABLE 2E.1 Percentage of workers in households below the poverty line in Bangladesh, by employment type, 2000–10
Type of 
employment
2000 2005 2010
Poverty 
rate 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Poverty 
rate 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Poverty 
rate 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Rural agricultural regular wage or salaried 39.6 29.5 49.7 58.8 48.8 68.8 54.1 42.5 65.7
Rural agricultural self-employed 39.5 37.4 41.6 29.7 28.0 31.4 22.0 20.3 23.6
Rural agricultural casual labor 72.1 69.9 74.3 66.2 63.9 68.5 51.0 48.7 53.3
Rural nonagricultural regular wage or salaried 33.8 30.7 37.0 25.7 23.2 28.2 26.2 23.9 28.5
Rural nonagricultural self-employed 41.1 38.2 44.0 32.9 30.3 35.5 26.1 24.0 28.2
Rural nonagricultural casual labor 60.9 57.6 64.1 55.7 53.0 58.4 44.8 42.4 47.1
Urban regular wage or salaried 25.7 23.4 28.0 19.2 17.3 21.1 15.6 14.1 17.1
Urban self-employed 29.3 26.8 31.9 18.6 16.9 20.4 13.6 12.1 15.2
Urban casual labor 62.2 58.8 65.6 55.5 52.8 58.2 44.1 41.6 46.6
Regular wage or salaried 30.5 28.6 32.3 23.6 22.1 25.2 20.9 19.6 22.2
All self-employed 38.3 36.9 39.7 28.2 27.0 29.3 21.6 20.5 22.6
All casual labor 67.4 65.8 69.0 60.6 59.1 62.0 47.3 45.9 48.7
All rural 50.0 48.8 51.2 41.7 40.6 42.7 33.8 32.8 34.8
All urban 34.9 33.3 36.5 26.8 25.6 28.0 21.0 20.0 22.1
All workers 46.8 45.8 47.7 37.7 36.9 38.5 30.0 29.3 30.8
Source: Authors, based on data from labor force and household surveys.
Note: Lower and upper bounds in the table refer to the 95 percent conﬁ dence intervals of the poverty rate estimate by employment type.
7 6   M O R E  A N D  B E T T E R  J O B S  I N  S O U T H  A S I A  
TABLE 2E.2 Number of working poor in Bangladesh, by employment type, 2000–10
Type of employment
Percentage change in number 
of working poor
Number of working poor (thousands) 2000–05 2005–10
2000 2005 2010 Total Annual Total Annual 
Rural agricultural regular wage or salaried 186 244 162 31 6 –50 –8
Rural agricultural self-employed 4,025 3,555 2,177 –12 –2 –63 –9
Rural agricultural casual labor 6,036 4,938 4,018 –18 –4 –23 –4
Rural nonagricultural regular wage or salaried 1,478 1,284 1,601 –13 –3 20 5
Rural nonagricultural self-employed 2,293 1,851 1,881 –19 –4 2 0
Rural nonagricultural casual labor 2,687 3,205 3,181 19 4 –1 0
Urban regular wage or salaried 1,017 1,092 1,267 7 1 14 3
Urban self-employed 962 877 617 –9 –2 –42 –7
Urban casual labor 1,249 1,564 1,484 25 5 –5 –1
Regular wage or salaried 2,681 2,620 3,030 –2 0 14 3
Self-employed 7,280 6,282 4,675 –14 –3 –34 –6
Casual labor 9,972 9,707 8,683 –3 –1 –12 –2
All rural 16,704 15,076 13,020 –10 –2 –16 –3
All urban 3,228 3,534 3,369 9 2 –5 –1
All workers 19,932 18,609 16,389 –7 –1 –14 –3
Source: Authors, based on data from labor force and household surveys
Note: The number of working poor for each employment type is calculated by multiplying the estimated total employment (estimated in ﬁ ve yearly intervals) by the share of 
employment and poverty rate by employment type from the closest year of the household survey. For example, for the number of working poor in India in 1985, the share of 
employment and poverty rate by employment type used was estimated from the 1983 labor force survey.
TABLE 2E.3 Percentage of workers in households below the poverty line in India, by employment type, 1983–2004/05
Type of employment
1983 1993/94 1999/2000 2004/05
Poverty 
rate 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Poverty 
rate 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Poverty 
rate 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Poverty 
rate 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Rural agricultural regular wage or salaried 52.7 51.0 54.5 43.3 40.5 46.1 37.0 34.8 39.2 26.6 24.1 29.2 
Rural agricultural self-employed 37.1 36.7 37.4 28.6 28.3 29.0 24.6 24.3 24.9 17.0 16.7 17.3 
Rural agricultural casual labor 60.6 60.0 61.1 47.8 47.2 48.4 43.2 42.6 43.8 30.8 30.1 31.4 
Rural nonagricultural regular wage or salaried 25.2 24.2 26.1 13.6 12.9 14.2 11.0 10.4 11.6 8.4 8.0 8.8 
Rural nonagricultural self-employed 41.2 40.4 42.0 27.2 26.4 27.9 26.3 25.7 27.0 17.6 17.1 18.0 
Rural nonagricultural casual labor 47.0 45.9 48.1 38.0 36.9 39.1 30.2 29.2 31.2 24.7 23.9 25.5 
Urban regular wage or salaried 26.2 25.6 26.7 17.8 17.3 18.2 15.6 15.1 16.0 13.7 13.3 14.1 
Urban self-employed 42.8 42.2 43.4 32.3 31.8 32.9 28.2 27.7 28.7 24.3 23.8 24.8 
Urban casual labor 59.9 58.9 60.9 57.1 56.1 58.0 51.5 50.6 52.4 45.5 44.5 46.4 
Regular wage or salaried 28.8 28.3 29.2 17.8 17.4 18.2 15.5 15.1 15.8 12.3 12.0 12.6 
Self-employed 38.6 38.3 38.9 29.0 28.8 29.3 25.5 25.3 25.8 18.5 18.3 18.7 
Casual labor 58.2 57.8 58.7 47.4 46.9 47.9 42.0 41.6 42.4 31.2 30.7 31.6 
All rural 43.7 43.5 44.0 33.4 33.2 33.7 29.8 29.5 30.0 20.3 20.1 20.5 
All urban 38.8 38.4 39.2 30.7 30.4 31.1 27.2 26.9 27.5 23.1 22.8 23.4 
All workers 42.6 42.4 42.9 32.8 32.6 33.1 29.2 29.0 29.4 20.9 20.8 21.1 
Source: Authors, based on data from labor force and household surveys.
Note: Lower and upper bounds in the table refer to the 95 percent conﬁ dence intervals of the poverty rate estimate by employment type.
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TABLE 2E.5 Percentage of workers in households below the poverty line in Nepal, by employment type, 1995/96 and 2003/04
Type of employment
1995/96 2003/04 
Poverty 
rate 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Poverty 
rate 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Rural agricultural regular wage or salaried 50.9  41.8 59.9 30.1 4.9 55.3 
Rural agricultural self-employed 39.7 38.2 41.1 30.7 29.4 32.0 
Rural agricultural casual labor 50.2 46.3 54.2 50.0 45.7 54.3 
Rural nonagricultural regular wage or salaried 21.2 15.4 27.0 10.0 6.3 13.7 
Rural nonagricultural self-employed 30.4 25.9 34.8 16.7 13.3 20.0 
Rural nonagricultural casual labor 44.8 39.5 50.0 43.4 37.8 49.1 
Urban regular wage or salaried 9.7 6.6 12.8 3.3 1.9 4.8 
Urban self-employed 18.4 15.6 21.2 8.9 7.4 10.4 
Urban casual labor 45.2 38.2 52.1 16.1 11.7 20.6 
Regular wage or salaried 27.6 24.2 31.0 7.4 5.6 9.1 
Self-employed 38.1 36.8 39.3 27.3 26.2 28.3 
Casual labor 48.1 45.2 51.0 43.7 40.8 46.7 
All rural 40.0 38.8 41.2 31.1 29.9 32.2 
All urban 21.0 18.7 23.2 8.3 7.2 9.5 
All workers 39.0 37.9 40.1 28.0 27.1 29.0 
Source: Authors, based on data from labor force and household surveys.
Note: Lower and upper bounds in the table refer to the 95 percent conﬁ dence intervals of the poverty rate estimate by employment type.
TABLE 2E.4 Number of working poor in India, by employment type, 1985–2005
Type of employment
Number of working poor (thousands)
Percentage change in number 
of working poor
1985–95 2000–05
1985 1995 2000 2005 Total Annual Total Annual 
Rural agricultural regular wage or salaried 2,290 1,177 1,320 639 –49 –6 –52 –13
Rural agricultural self-employed 36,916 36,007 31,661 25,639 –2 0 –19 –4
Rural agricultural casual labor 30,943 33,898 34,635 22,177 10 1 –36 –9
Rural nonagricultural regular wage or 
salaried 2,974 2,209 1,965 1,943 –26 –3 –1 0
Rural nonagricultural self-employed 9,156 8,553 8,807 8,302 –7 –1 –6 –1
Rural nonagricultural casual labor 5,641 6,336 6,079 6,701 12 1 10 2
Urban regular wage or salaried 6,210 5,484 5,355 5,438 –12 –1 2 0
Urban self-employed 9,453 10,192 9,772 10,806 8 1 11 2
Urban casual labor 5,988 7,597 7,757 6,514 27 2 –16 –3
Regular wage or salaried 11,474 8,870 8,641 8,021 –23 –3 –7 –1
Self-employed 55,525 54,751 50,240 44,746 –1 0 –11 –2
Casual labor 42,571 47,831 48,470 35,392 12 1 –27 –6
All rural 87,919 88,181 84,467 65,401 0 0 –23 –5
All urban 21,651 23,272 22,884 22,758 7 1 –1 0
All workers 109,570 111,453 107,351 88,159 2 0 –18 –4
Source: Authors, based on data from labor force and household surveys.
Note: The number of working poor for each employment type is calculated by multiplying the estimated total employment (estimated in ﬁ ve yearly intervals) by the share of 
employment and poverty rate by employment type from the closest year of the household survey. For example, for the number of working poor in India in 1985, the share of 
employment and poverty rate by employment type used was estimated from the 1983 labor force survey.
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In 1983 and 1993/94, the same house-
holds were sampled for the employment and 
unemployment surveys and the consumption 
expenditure survey. The household consump-
tion expenditure aggregate in the employment 
and unemployment surveys is the unabridged 
uniform recall period measure from the con-
sumption expenditure survey. These two 
datasets are comparable.
In 1999/2000 and 2004/05, the employ-
ment and unemployment surveys and 
 consumption expenditure survey sampled dif-
ferent households. The consumption expendi-
ture survey used unabridged uniform recall 
period and mixed recall period consumption 
measures. The consumption module in the 
employment and unemployment surveys used 
an abridged (fewer questions) mixed recall 
period to measure the household consump-
tion expenditure aggregate. 
The estimates of poverty rates using 
abridged mixed recall period in these two 
employment and unemployment surveys are 
TABLE 2E.6 Number of working poor in Nepal, by employment type, 1995–2005
Type of employment
Number of working poor (thousands)
Percentage change in number 
of working poor
1995–2005
1995 2005 Total Annual
Rural agricultural regular wage or salaried 92  9 –91 –21
Rural agricultural self-employed 2,456 2,464 0 0
Rural agricultural casual labor 432 463 7 1
Rural nonagricultural regular wage or salaried  60  41 –31 –4
Rural nonagricultural self-employed 181 136 –25 –3
Rural nonagricultural casual labor 207 215 4 0
Urban regular wage or salaried  13  14 11 1
Urban self-employed  50  89 79 6
Urban casual labor  41  33 –20 –2
Regular wage or salaried 165  65 –61 –9
Self-employed 2,687 2,689 0 0
Casual labor 680 711 5 0
All rural 3,427 3,328 –3 0
All urban 104 137 31 3
All workers 3,531 3,465 –2 0
Source: Authors, based on data from labor force and household surveys
Note: The number of working poor for each employment type is calculated by multiplying the estimated total employment (estimated in ﬁ ve yearly intervals) by the share of 
employment and poverty rate by employment type from the closest year of the household survey. For example, for the number of working poor in India in 1985, the share of 
employment and poverty rate by employment type used was estimated from the 1983 labor force survey.
Annex 2F Analysis of poverty and unemployment in India 
A more complete analysis of the links 
between poverty and unemployment is pos-
sible in India, where time series data for a 
longer period are available. Some data com-
parability issues merit attention, however.
Data used
Data from the employment and unemploy-
ment surveys by the India National Sample 
Survey—which are equivalent to labor force 
surveys—were used for 1983, 1993/04, 
1999/2000, and 2004/05. The old offi cial 
state level poverty lines for the same time 
periods were used for the analysis, because 
they are available for all survey years. 
Employment and unemployment surveys 
were used instead of consumption expendi-
ture surveys because they contain both con-
sumption expenditure and labor force vari-
ables, which allow the estimation of poverty 
rates by employment types—something the 
consumption expenditure survey does not.
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comparable with each other but not compa-
rable with the 1983 and 1993/94 unabridged 
uniform recall period measures. The abridged 
mixed recall period measures should not be 
interpreted as accurate estimates of poverty 
rates, because mixed recall period measures 
tend to generate lower poverty rates than 
uniform recall period measures and abridge-
ment creates differences in the estimates 
using unabridged measures. Therefore, the 
poverty estimates from the 1999/2000 and 
2004/05 employment and unemployment 
surveys should only be used to look at trends 
by employment type.
Given the changes in the consumption 
measure, the estimated worker poverty rates 
of 1993/94 and 1999/2000 cannot be com-
pared to determine whether poverty declined. 
However, official poverty measures using 
unabridged uniform recall period from the 
consumption expenditure survey in 1993/94 
and 2004/05 show a significant decline in 
poverty rates for the whole population, from 
36.0 percent to 27.5 percent. It is highly 
unlikely that poverty increased between 
1993/94 and 1999/2000, as this would imply 
an even higher percentage decline between 
1999/2000 and 2004/05. It is also unlikely 
that during a period in which poverty rates 
declined signifi cantly for the whole popula-
tion, worker poverty rates would not also 
have fallen. 
Categories of Employment
Nine categories of employment are consid-
ered, based on the main activity of each 
working member of a household. They 
include regular wage or salaried, self– 
employed, and casual labor in the rural agri-
cultural, rural nonagricultural, and urban 
sectors.
TABLE 2F.1 Official and authors’ estimated poverty rates for urban, rural, and all workers in India, 
1983–2004/05
Year/estimate Urban workers Rural workers All workers
1983
Offi  cial estimates (based on unabridged uniform recall period 
from consumption expenditure survey) 40.8 45.7 44.5
Authors’ estimates (based on unabridged uniform recall period 
from employment and unemployment survey/consumption 
expenditure survey) 38.8 43.7 42.6
1993/94
Offi  cial estimates (based on unabridged uniform recall period 
from consumption expenditure survey) 32.4 37.3 36.0
Authors’ estimates (based on unabridged uniform recall period 
from employment and unemployment survey/consumption 
expenditure survey) 30.7 33.4 32.8
1999/2000
Offi  cial estimates (based on unabridged mixed recall period 
from consumption expenditure survey) 23.6 27.1 26.1
Authors’ estimates (based on abridged mixed recall period 
from employment and unemployment survey) 27.2 29.8 29.2
2004/05
Offi  cial estimates (based on unabridged uniform recall period 
from consumption expenditure survey) 25.7 28.3 27.5
Offi  cial estimates (based on unabridged mixed recall period 
from consumption expenditure survey) 21.7 21.8 21.8
Authors’ estimates (based on abridged mixed recall period 
from employment and unemployment survey) 23.1 20.3 20.9
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
Note: Oﬃ  cial estimates include the entire population living in households below the poverty line; authors’ estimates include only people age 15–64. The 
unabridged mixed recall period measures from the consumption expenditure surveys conducted in 1999/2000 and 2004/05 are roughly but not strictly 
comparable, because of diﬀ erences in design.
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Sample
The sample includes 209,223 employed indi-
viduals in 1993/94, 213,986 in 1999/2000, 
and 228,244 in 2004/05, about 30 percent 
of whom are women. Rural agricultural reg-
ular wage or salaried workers represent just 
1.7 percent of the sample in 1983 and 0.6 
percent in 2003/04. Given this small sample 
size, estimated poverty rates for this type of 
worker should not be treated as reliable.
In 1983 and 1993/94, the headcount pov-
erty rates from the employment and unem-
ployment surveys were comparable to offi cial 
poverty rates, as the consumption expendi-
ture survey sampled the same households 
(table 2F.1). The differences refl ect the fact 
that the estimates are for workers and not the 
whole population.
Between 1999/2000 and 2004/05, offi-
cial estimates using the unabridged mixed 
recall period measure from the consumption 
expenditure survey also show a decline in 
poverty. The differences between the offi cial 
poverty estimates and the authors’ estimates 
refl ect the fact that (a) the authors’ estimates 
refer to workers and not the whole popula-
tion and (b) the mixed recall period measure 
is unabridged in the consumption expendi-
ture survey and abridged in the employment 
and unemployment surveys. The compari-
son of the mixed recall period and uniform 
recall period measures from the consumption 
expenditure survey in 2004/05 also shows 
that the mixed recall period measures esti-
mate lower poverty rates than the uniform 
recall period. Hence, it is not possible to com-
pare the results from the 1983 and 1993/94 
employment and unemployment surveys with 
the 1999/2000 and 2004/05 employment and 
unemployment surveys.
Notes
 1.  Europe and Central Asia, (not shown in the 
fi gure) grew faster than South Asia during 
the 2000s, but this refl ected, in part, recovery 
from a transition recession following the exit 
from the command economy.
 2.  The decomposition is formally presented 
in annex 2A. Data constraints allowed 
growth accounting to be conducted only for 
Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
 3.  The fi gures for South Asia are GDP at purchas-
ing power parity–weighted averages of the fi g-
ures for Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka and are therefore weighted most heav-
ily by India. For further details, see annex 2B, 
which contains sources of growth by region 
per decade between 1960 and 2008.
 4.  Young (1994, 1995) highlights the relatively 
limited role of TFP growth in East Asia less 
China during its years of rapid investment-led 
growth.
 5.  Bosworth, Collins, and Virmani (2007) 
develop this point in the context of India.
 6.  This discussion draws on Bloom, Canning, 
and Rosenberg (2011).
 7.  “Potential” is used because without enabling 
policies, a rising ratio of the working-age 
population to the nonworking-age population 
will not necessarily boost economic growth.
 8.  Reallocation during a period is calculated as 
a residual by subtracting the weighted sum 
of TFP growth in each sector (agriculture, 
industry, services) from aggregate TFP growth 
during that period, where the weights are the 
share of each sector in GDP at the beginning 
of the period.
 9.  The choice of countries is dictated by the 
availability of sectorally disaggregated growth 
accounts. The Thailand numbers are from 
Bosworth (2005); data from China were 
adapted by the authors from Bosworth and 
Collins (2008).
10.  The ratio of employment to the working-
age population can be written as follows: 
(employment/labor force)  (labor force/
working-age population). The fi rst term is (1 
– the unemployment rate); the second is the 
labor force participation rate.
11.  Afghanistan and Bhutan are excluded, because 
2000 data are not available. Including them 
in 2010 would bring total employment to 
577 million in 2010.
12.  The employment status of workers is defi ned 
here on the basis of questions on current 
weekly status (generally the past seven days) 
in the labor force surveys of Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka and on the basis of employment status 
in the last month in the labor force surveys 
of Afghanistan and Maldives (where weekly 
status questions were not included).
13.  Various additional dimensions of job qual-
ity are often cited, such as access to nonwage 
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 benefi ts and public social protection mecha-
nisms, the ability to upgrade skills and receive 
training on the job, and a safe working envi-
ronment. There is typically a strong correlation 
between better jobs as defi ned by the criteria 
used in this book and many of these additional 
dimensions. 
14.  The use of this proxy for the self-employed 
was proposed in the Indian context by 
Sundaram (2004).
15.  The household survey data for Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka used for the poverty-employment anal-
ysis do not distinguish between casual work-
ers and regular wage and salaried  workers.
16.  This trend prompted an investigation into the 
cost of living in urban India and a recent revi-
sion of the offi cial poverty lines.
17.  This question was based not on a reference 
week but on a reference year. A worker’s usual 
principal activity is determined by the activity 
the worker spent most of his or her time doing 
in the year preceding the survey. Any activ-
ity other than the principal status constitutes 
a worker’s subsidiary status. “Usual’” status 
workers include principal status workers (who 
spent most of their time employed or looking 
for jobs) and subsidiary workers (who spent 
part of their time working or looking for jobs 
in the year preceding the survey).
18.  An exception is Nepal, where the poverty rate 
for urban casual workers is signifi cantly lower 
than the rate for the rural self-employed, 
which is driven by the subsegment of urban 
casual labor employed in short-term contract 
work. This group is more educated than daily 
wage workers and has poverty rates that are 
closer to those of urban regular wage or sala-
ried workers.
19.  The number of self-employed workers declined 
between 2004/05 and 2009/10. Casual labor 
accounted for nearly 80 percent of net addi-
tional employment in those sectors that 
expanded employment between 2004/05 and 
2009/10 (the remaining net additional employ-
ment was in regular wage or salaried jobs).
20.  This trend toward casualization of the rural 
nonfarm labor force was highlighted in the 
World Bank’s India poverty assessment for 
1983–2004/05 (World Bank 2011b).
21.  The number of working poor in India is likely 
to have declined between 1985 and 2005. 
Annex 2F explains why poverty rates for the 
fi rst and second subperiods cannot be directly 
compared.
22.  The details of the methodology are described 
in appendix B. 
23.  This annex is based on Collins (2007).
24.  The household survey–based participation 
rates are used to maintain consistency with 
the methodology used for the projections. 
ILO estimates of the labor force in 2010 are 
slightly different from the estimates developed 
here. The ILO estimate of the total labor force 
in South Asia in 2010 is about 27 million 
higher, with an annual growth rate between 
1990 and 2010 of 2.3 percent, compared 
with the 2.1 percent posited in this book.
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Questions
•  What are they key features of labor markets 
in South Asia?
•  Where are the better jobs, and who holds 
them?
•  What are the implications for the region’s 
employment challenges?
Findings
•  Although employment in South Asia has been 
expanding, employment rates have remained 
steady and are below those in other regions, 
as a result of persistently low female employ-
ment and participation rates. 
•  The majority of workers in the region are 
still engaged in agriculture. Self-employment 
is the predominant type of employment, and 
a high share of wage employment is casual 
labor. Thus, the vast majority of work in 
South Asia—86–95 percent of total employ-
ment and 71–81 percent of nonagricultural 
employment in most countries—is informal 
in nature. This picture is unlikely to change 
signifi cantly in the short to medium term. 
•  Jobs that pay higher wages and are associated 
with lower poverty rates are found outside of 
agriculture. Faster intersectoral reallocation 
of employment into industry and services will 
require the development of not just the urban 
industrial and services sectors but also the 
rural nonfarm sector.
•  Within industry and services, better jobs are 
with large formal fi rms. The majority of work-
ers, however, work in informal micro fi rms, 
where value added per worker is lower and 
which pay lower wages. Creation of better 
jobs will require faster intrasectoral reallo-
cation of labor from lower-productivity—
typically micro and small informal—fi rms to 
higher- productivity—typically medium and 
large  formal—fi rms within manufacturing and 
services. 
•  The educated are more likely to work outside 
agriculture and be employed in regular wage 
or salaried work. Female workers are less 
likely to be in better jobs than men, except at 
the highest levels of education; they also earn 
less, even after controlling for differences in 
educational attainment. Members of ethnic 
minorities are less likely to hold better jobs; 
they also earn less, although much of this dif-
ferential can be explained by differences in 
educational attainment.
CHAPTER 3 A Proﬁ le of South Asia at Work
Questions and Findings
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A Profi le of South Asia at Work
This chapter profiles employment in South Asia. Relying on household survey data from the region’s eight 
countries, it describes the patterns of par-
ticipation, employment, unemployment, and 
earnings in the region. 
Describing the labor market in South 
Asia is a formidable task. The region’s eight 
countries vary widely in size, ranging from 
less than 1 million people each in Bhutan 
and Maldives to 1.2 billion people—about 
three-quarters of South Asia’s population—in 
India. There is diversity in the stages of devel-
opment, economic structures, social and cul-
tural characteristics, and confl ict. Even within 
countries there is signifi cant diversity. 
The profile of South Asia at work pre-
sented is based primarily on microlevel data 
collected by national statistical agencies. 
The analysis relies on labor force surveys in 
some countries and on living standards sur-
veys in others (depending on survey avail-
ability and data quality). The latest surveys 
were conducted between 2004 and 2009/10 
(see appendix table A.1). 
Two caveats should be noted regarding 
analysis across countries. First, there are 
limits to the standardization that is pos-
sible, especially between labor force and 
living standards surveys. In countries that 
conduct labor force surveys (Bangladesh, 
India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka), mea-
surement of labor market indicators such as 
labor force participation, employment, and 
unemployment is common and generally con-
sistent with international standards. In coun-
tries in which other household surveys are 
used (Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Maldives), 
defi nitions of these (and other) indicators can 
differ from international norms. As a result, 
measurement differences explain some of the 
variation across countries presented in this 
chapter (Srinivasan 2010 discusses in further 
detail how labor market concepts are mea-
sured in different surveys). (Annex table 3A.1 
provides more detail on the measurement 
of employment and unemployment from 
the national surveys as used in this book.) 
Second, as South Asian economies are still 
heavily rural, agricultural, and informal, the 
productive activities of many individuals may 
not be fully captured by standard labor mar-
ket indicators. 
This chapter is organized as follows. The 
first section provides an overview of the 
main labor market trends, including employ-
ment, unemployment, and labor force par-
ticipation, for the eight countries in South 
Asia, with a focus on the employment and 
participation patterns of women. The second 
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section takes a closer look at the nature of 
employment in the region, including loca-
tion, sector, employment status, and infor-
mality. The third section examines where 
the better jobs are. The last section analyses 
how gender, caste/ethnicity, and education 
are correlated with access to better jobs.
Overview of employment and 
labor force participation in 
South Asia
This section fi rst examines employment in 
the region. It then addresses labor force par-
ticipation and unemployment.
Employment
Total employment in South Asia is estimated 
at 574 million in 2010, with India account-
ing for 75 percent, Bangladesh 10 percent, 
and Pakistan 9 percent of employment in the 
region (fi gure 3.1). In the region as a whole, 
55 percent of the 1.04 billion working-age 
population is employed. 
Employment rates are low by international 
standards in all countries except Bhutan and 
Nepal. Employment growth looks favorable 
because of the region’s growing  working-age 
population, as discussed in chapter 2. The 
picture is less positive in terms of employ-
ment rates. Employment rates among people 
age 15–64 range from 48 percent in  Maldives 
(2004) to 80 percent in Nepal (2008) (the 
other countries in the region have employment 
rates of 50–65  percent). Analysis within coun-
tries shows moderate differences in regional 
employment rates within countries (see annex 
3B). Internationally, the average employment 
rate is 60–70 percent for low- and lower-
middle-income countries (figure 3.2). The 
employment rate in the three largest countries 
in South Asia (India,  Bangladesh, and Paki-
stan) is signifi cantly below the average rate for 
countries at similar levels of development. 
These relatively low employment rates in 
South Asia refl ect persistently low female 
employment rates in all countries except 
 Bhutan and Nepal (figure 3.3). Employ-
ment rates among men are not low by 
international standards. The (unweighted) 
national average for male employment in 
South Asia is 77 percent, which is almost 
identical to the male average for compara-
tor countries ( Bolivia, Cambodia, China, 
Ghana, Guatemala,  Indonesia, Lao Peo-
ple’s Democratic Republic, Nigeria, and 
the  Philippines). In contrast, the aver-
age employment rate for women in South 
Asia is 21 percentage points lower than in 
comparator countries. The male-female 
employment rate ratio is 2.2 in the region 
and just 1.3 in comparator countries.
There is no consistent evidence of an 
upward trend in employment rates in South 
Asian countries (fi gure 3.4). Total employment 
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FIGURE 3.1 Total employment in South Asia, by country, 2010
Sources: Authors, based on working-age population ﬁ gures from UN 2010 and employment rate data from national labor force surveys.
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FIGURE 3.2 Employment rates in lower- and lower-middle-income countries
Source: Authors, based on data from World Bank 2011b and national labor force and household surveys.
Note: Employment rates are for population age 15 years and above. For all countries, gross national income per capita in 2008 is adjusted for purchasing 
power parity. Employment rates for countries in South Asia are for latest survey year; employment rates for other countries are for 2008.
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rates increased in Maldives and Pakistan, 
declined moderately in India and Nepal and 
signifi cantly in Bhutan, and remained fairly 
constant in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.1 These 
trends mirrored those of female employ-
ment rates, which increased in Maldives and 
Pakistan, declined in Bhutan and India, and 
changed little in the other countries.
These employment figures are for the 
working-age population (15–64). Child labor, 
which this book does not address, remains an 
important aspect of the overall employment 
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FIGURE 3.4 Trends in employment rates in South Asia, by country
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys. 
Note: Trend analysis does not take into account cyclical factors. Although the analysis attempted to use standard, consistent deﬁ nitions of employment over time, diﬀ erences may 
reﬂ ect diﬀ erences in the questions used to deﬁ ne employment in diﬀ erent survey rounds (see annex table 3A.1 for details). 
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picture in South Asia, as it is in many parts of 
the developing world (box 3.1).
Labor Force Participation and 
Unemployment 
Employment rates in South Asia closely 
track labor force participation rates, 
because measured unemployment is very 
low in most countries in the region (table 
3.1). Open unemployment rates in low-
 income countries tend to be low, even if 
labor market conditions are unattractive. 
For the region as a whole, 3.2 percent of the 
labor force—19 million people in a labor 
force of 593 million—was unemployed in 
2010. The reported unemployment rate 
was high only in Maldives (15.3 percent), 
where it mainly reflects the methodology 
used to calculate unemployment.2 Unem-
ployment in other countries ranged from 
1.1 percent in  Pakistan to 5.6 percent in Sri 
Lanka. In  Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and espe-
cially  Maldives, women have higher unem-
ployment rates than men. In the rest of the 
region, there is little gender difference.
Although open unemployment is low in 
South Asia, underemployment—the under-
utilization of labor—may be prevalent. 
Underemployment is conventionally defi ned 
as working fewer hours than desired in 
mature labor markets. This may not be an 
appropriate definition in developing coun-
tries, where people often work for long hours 
even if earnings are very low. In addition, 
data limitations do not permit a consistent 
estimate of underemployment.
Estimates of the magnitude of underem-
ployment in South Asia vary, based on dif-
ferent definitions. Underemployment was 
 estimated at 48 percent of the total  workforce 
in Afghanistan in 2008 (Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan and World Bank 2010) and 
24.5 percent in  Bangladesh in 2006 (Rahman 
2008). These fi gures are based on a defi nition 
that classifi es as underemployed workers who 
work 35 or fewer hours a week on average. In 
India one measure used by the National Sam-
ple Survey organization (which defi nes under-
employment as the proportion of the usually 
employed according to the usual status crite-
ria not employed the previous week) estimates 
underemployment at 9–17 percent for women 
and 2–4 percent for men in 2004/05 (Gov-
ernment of India 2006). One problem with 
these measures is that they may overestimate 
underemployment, because they do not take 
into account individuals who did not wish to 
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BOX 3.1 Child labor in South Asia
According to the International Labour Organization 
(ILO 2010), 215 million children between the ages of 
5 and 14 were working in South Asia in 2008, with 
115 million engaged in hazardous work. These fi g-
ures indicate that 13 percent of all working children 
in the world live in South Asia; among these children, 
7 percent are engaged in hazardous work. According 
to these fi gures, the incidence of child labor in Asia is 
the second highest of all regions, behind Africa. (The 
ILO statistics do not separate South Asia from the 
rest of the continent). 
Child labor has long played an important role in 
many traditional and agriculturally based societies. 
It can also be a product of poverty and inequality, 
poor education, and confl ict. In South Asia, as in 
some other regions, concerns about child labor are 
heightened by the presence of practices such as child 
traffi cking and bonded child labor (ILO 2010). 
How prevalent is child labor in South Asia? Many 
of the surveys used for this book include questions 
that provide data on the incidence of child labor. 
The employment rates for children can be computed 
in the same way they have been calculated for the 
 working-age population. However, surveys differ in 
their age coverage: in some countries, employment 
rates can be computed for the 5- to 14-year age group; 
in others, surveys do not cover children under 10. 
Survey evidence suggests that the incidence of 
child labor varies across the region (box table 3.1.1). 
Nepal has the highest incidence, with about 3 in 
10 children between the ages of 5 and 14 working. 
Significant numbers of children are also working 
in Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Pakistan. Bangladesh, 
India, and Sri Lanka report lower incidences. 
Additional dimensions of the statistical picture of 
child labor in South Asia include the following:
•  In most countries, boys are somewhat more likely 
than girls to work. However, in Bhutan and Nepal, 
two countries with high child labor rates, employ-
ment is higher among girls. 
•  Child labor is much more prevalent in rural areas 
than in cities. The vast majority of working chil-
dren are engaged in agriculture and fi shing. Other 
sectors with some child labor are commerce (retail 
trade) and manufacturing.
•  Although some children are employed as wage 
workers (in Bangladesh and, to a lesser extent, in 
India), most are household enterprise workers. In 
Nepal, for example, 96 percent of working children 
work in household enterprises.
•  The incidence of child labor continues to decline 
gradually in Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka. 
In Nepal and Pakistan, where the incidence of 
child labor is higher, there is no clear evidence of 
decreases in child labor over time. 
The nefarious effects of child labor can be miti-
gated when working children continue their studies. In 
Nepal, for example, the country with the highest child 
BOX TABLE 3.1.1 Incidence of child labor in South Asia, by age group and country
(percentage of age group)
Country Year
Age group
5–9 10–14 5–14
Afghanistan 2008 8.5 23.2 16.1
Bangladesh 2005 0.7 7.1 4.1
Bhutan 2003 — 19.7 — 
India 2008 0.2 3.4 1.8
Nepal 2008 10.9 47.0 29.7
Pakistan 2009 — 11.8 — 
Sri Lanka 2008 — 1.1 — 
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys. 
Note: — = Not available. No data on child labor are available for Maldives.
(continues next page)
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TABLE 3.1 Male and female labor force participation, employment, and unemployment rates in South Asia, by country
Country Year
Participation rate Employment rate Unemployment rate
All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
Afghanistan 2008 65 85 45 64 83 44 2 3 2
Bangladesh 2009 60 89 31 57 85 29 5 4 8
Bhutan 2007 69 76 62 67 75 61 2 2 2
India 2010 57 82 30 55 80 29 3 3 4
Maldives 2004 57 72 46 48 67 35 15 8 24
Nepal 2008 84 88 80 82 86 79 2 2 1
Pakistan 2009 52 82 22 52 81 22 1 1 1
Sri Lanka 2008 60 81 41 57 78 38 6 4 8
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
Note: See annex table 3A.1 for deﬁ nition of employment and unemployment used in each country. The term participation refers to the formal deﬁ nition of labor force participation 
according to international norms. Application of these norms can be problematic in South Asia, because they do not take into account nonmarket activities of women.
BOX 3.1 Child labor in South Asia  (continued)
labor rates in the region, almost 90 percent of chil-
dren who are working also attend school. In contrast, 
although a smaller percentage of children in Afghani-
stan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and  Pakistan work, 
most are not in school (box fi gure 3.1.1). 
The international community has passed a num-
ber of conventions designed to protect the rights of 
children in the labor market, through both mini-
mum working ages and protection from hazardous 
and other harmful forms of employment. The three 
most important conventions are the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and ILO Conventions 138 
(minimum age of employment) and 182 (Elimination 
of the Worst Forms of Child Labor). All eight coun-
tries in South Asia have ratifi ed the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child; only Afghanistan, Nepal, 
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have ratifi ed the two ILO 
conventions (see chapter 6).
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work additional hours. In India, defi ning the 
underemployed as people who worked at least 
three days during the week and spent at least a 
half day searching for work, results in an esti-
mated underemployment rate of 5 percent.3 
Low female employment rate is primar-
ily a result of low levels of labor force par-
ticipation among women. The lowest female 
labor force participation rates are in the 
three large South Asian countries: Pakistan, 
where almost four out of every fi ve women 
do not participate in the labor force, and 
Bangladesh and India, where slightly more 
than two out of every three women do not 
participate.4 
Because female participation is such an 
important factor in defining the region’s 
employment picture and its evolution over 
time, this issue merits a more detailed look. 
Before proceeding, a caveat about labor 
force statistics and the concept of partici-
pation is needed. All of the surveys collect 
data that make it possible to measure labor 
force participation according to international 
norms, but the application of these norms to 
 low-income, traditional societies can be prob-
lematic. For this reason, it seems unlikely that 
the actual participation of women, especially 
in the region’s large countries, is as low as the 
rates of participation in the surveys indicate. 
In what follows, the term participation needs 
to be understood as referring to the formal 
defi nition of labor force participation; it does 
not take into account other activities of South 
Asian women, including reproduction and 
household labor. 
Except in Bhutan and Nepal, South Asian 
countries generally have low female participa-
tion rates across age groups (fi gure 3.5). This 
is especially true in Pakistan and, to a lesser 
degree, Bangladesh, where even in the prime-
age groups, the large majority of women are 
not in the labor force. 
In all three countries in which data on 
caste/ethnicity are collected (India, Nepal, 
and Sri Lanka), there is considerable variation 
in female labor force participation along this 
dimension; differences in male labor force 
participation are small. The fi nding on caste/
ethnicity is not surprising, as cultural factors 
can be important determinants of whether 
women participate in the labor market. In 
India, for example, where the overall female 
participation rate was 30 percent in 2010, 
the rate among women from scheduled tribes 
(46 percent) was 16 points higher and the rate 
among Muslim women (18 percent) almost 
12 points lower. In Sri Lanka, where aggre-
gate female participation was 41 percent in 
2008, the rate for Indian Tamil women was 
62 percent and the rate for Sri Lankan Moors 
just 17 percent. 
Female participation is especially low in 
urban areas. Overall labor force participa-
tion is generally lower in cities than it is in 
rural areas, where labor-intensive, family-
 oriented agricultural production still domi-
nates, but this gap is especially striking for 
women. Female rural participation rates are 
higher than urban participation rates in all 
countries except Bangladesh (where female 
participation is low everywhere); in Afghani-
stan and Pakistan, the participation rate 
FIGURE 3.5 Female labor force participation rates in South Asia, 
by age group and country
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
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for rural women is nearly three times that 
for urban women. The most recent female 
urban participation rates are just 10 percent 
in Pakistan, 18 percent in Afghanistan, and 
19 percent in India. Moreover, there is little 
evidence of any signifi cant change, with the 
(unweighted) average female urban participa-
tion in the region increasing from 30 percent 
to 33 percent over the periods studied. 
What factors are associated with female 
labor force participation? The labor force 
participation status of working-age women 
was regressed on individual and family char-
acteristics, using separate logit models for 
rural and urban women in each country. 
Table 3.2 summarizes the key determinants 
of participation in urban areas. 
The negative relationship between edu-
cation and the labor force participation of 
women has been noted by others studying 
the region’s labor market (World Bank 2010). 
Various explanations have been put forward 
to explain this relationship. One hypothesis 
is that better-educated women may opt out 
of the labor market because of the scarcity of 
good jobs that are available to them and that 
an income effect may be at play, with rela-
tively high family incomes reducing the incen-
tives for well-educated women to participate 
in the labor force. Sociocultural explanations 
have also been put forward, based on the 
possible stigma attached to educated women 
who choose to work.
In all countries except India, the surveys 
ask women not participating in the labor force 
why they were not employed or searching for 
work. In all countries, household duties were 
the number one reason cited for nonpartici-
pation (table 3.3). This is especially true of 
countries with very low rates of female labor 
force participation (Afghanistan,  Bangladesh, 
and Pakistan). This finding is consistent 
with the fact that women in South Asia, like 
women across the world, bear a dispropor-
tionate share of household and care respon-
sibilities and therefore face high opportunity 
costs when they work in the marketplace. 
Social norms also affect these tradeoffs.
Education was the second-most fre-
quently cited reason, but there are large 
cross-country differences. Substantial num-
bers of young women in Bhutan, Nepal, and 
Maldives report being in school instead of 
the labor force. In contrast, in Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, fewer 
than 2 in 10 urban women not participating 
in the labor force cite education as the main 
reason.
TABLE 3.2 Factors associated with participation of women in urban areas
Factor Eff ect
Age •  Age increases probability of female participation in all countries. Eff ect weakens later in age distribution. 
Education •  More years of schooling decreases the probability of female participation in all countries except Bhutan. Participation 
rates tend to be lowest for women who complete secondary or lower-secondary school; they rise only at higher-
secondary levels and tertiary levels.
Household 
characteristics
•  Living in a larger household reduces the probability of female participation in all countries except Afghanistan, Nepal, 
and Maldives (where there is no eff ect).
•  The number of children under the age of six reduces the probability of female participation in all countries except 
Afghanistan and Bhutan.
•  Ethnic minority or lower caste status increases the probability of female participation in countries for which data are 
available (India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka).
Marital status •  Being married reduces the probability of female participation in all countries except Bangladesh (one of two surveys) 
and Nepal.
Characteristics of other 
adults in the household
•  More years of schooling of the best-educated male in the household reduces the probability of female participation 
in all countries, presumably because it signals an income eff ect.
•  Having males in the household who are employed increases the probability of female participation in all countries.
•  Having a migrant away from the household increases the probability of female participation in India and Nepal but 
not Maldives (no data on other countries).
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
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Improving economic opportunities for and 
educational attainment of women could con-
tribute to improved utilization and allocation 
of South Asia’s female labor force. Women’s 
decision to participate in market work is not 
independent of the occupational and earn-
ings opportunities available to women in the 
labor market as these impact incentives to 
participate. Consistent with global evidence 
on employment segregation by gender (World 
Bank 2012), women in South Asia are less 
likely to access the better jobs (see last section 
of this chapter). They also earn signifi cantly 
less for the same type of job, even after con-
trolling for differences in education. Improv-
ing opportunities requires interventions that 
relax time constraints, increase access to pro-
ductive inputs, and correct institutional and 
market failures that contribute to employment 
segregation. (For a comprehensive discussion 
of options to improve economic opportuni-
ties for women, see World Bank 2012.) 
The nature of employment
This section begins by describing employ-
ment patterns by location and sector in 
South Asia. It then looks at employment sta-
tus and informality.
Employment patterns by location 
and sector
Most South Asians work in rural areas 
(table 3.4). The concentration in rural areas 
refl ects the fact that more than 70 percent 
of the region’s working-age population lives 
in rural areas and rural employment rates 
are higher than urban rates in all countries 
except Maldives. 
In Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, and Nepal, 
at least half of all employment remains in 
agriculture. Only in Maldives is this sector 
a relatively minor source of employment. 
Services are important in most countries, 
representing more than 40 percent of total 
employment in Bangladesh, Maldives, and 
Sri Lanka. The industrial sector, including 
manufacturing, utilities, and construction, is 
relatively small, despite the great importance 
attached to industrialization since indepen-
dence (Srinivasan 2010). In Bangladesh, 
India, Maldives, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, 
20–27 percent of the employed workforce 
works in industry, with most of them in 
manufacturing. As expected, these sectoral 
patterns differ substantially between rural 
and urban areas. Agriculture is the largest 
sector of employment in rural areas in all 
countries except Maldives and Sri Lanka. In 
urban areas, most workers are in the service 
sector. Manufacturing accounts for about 
a quarter of urban workers in Bangladesh, 
India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
Sectoral employment patterns are chang-
ing. The share of agriculture employment 
in total employment has been declining by 
about 0.5 percentage points a year in recent 
decades in countries where statistics are 
available over time. In the fi ve largest coun-
tries in the region, employment growth in 
agriculture was slower than other sectors in 
the fi rst decade of this century (fi gure 3.6). 
TABLE 3.3 Reasons why urban women in South Asia do not participate in the labor force, by country 
(percent)
Country/year Old age Illness Household duties Education Discouraged Other
Afghanistan, 2008 0.2 0.6 81.0 12.9 2.2 3.2
Bangladesh, 2005 0.3 2.2 81.1 15.0 0.2 1.0
Bhutan, 2007 3.6 2.7 60.4 26.9 2.6 3.8
Maldives, 2004 — 11.1 46.7 22.8 — 19.5
Nepal, 2008 7.0 0.7 51.6 29.6 4.7 6.3
Pakistan, 2009 1.3 1.0 81.1 16.2 0.1 0.4
Sri Lanka, 2008 5.3 1.8 75.5 15.8 0.4 1.3
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
Note: — = Not available.
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TABLE 3.4 Distribution of employment in South Asian countries, by location and sector
(percent)
Country/
year
Total Total Rural Urban
Agriculture Industry Services Rural Urban Agriculture Industry Services Agriculture Industry Services
Afghanistan, 
2007 59 13 29 85 15 68 12 21 9 19 72
Bangladesh, 
2009 39 21 40 76 24 47 18 35 12 30 57
Bhutan, 
2007 68 7 24 78 22 85 4 11 9 19 72
India, 
2010 50 23 27 74 26 65 19 16 7 34 59
Maldives, 
2004 17 27 55 66 34 24 33 43 5 16 79
Nepal, 
2008 73 11 16 87 13 80 9 11 31 21 48
Pakistan, 
2009 43 21 36 69 31 60 16 24 6 32 62
Sri Lanka, 
2008 31 27 42 90 10 34 26 39 2 31 68
Source: Authors, based on national labor force and household surveys.
Note: These data pertain to the area in which the worker’s main employment is located. The classiﬁ cation of the area is based on each country’s classiﬁ cation of rural and urban. 
Sri Lanka’s classiﬁ cation of rural areas includes the tea estate sector, where a large number of workers are employed. Diﬀ erences in classiﬁ cation may account for some of the 
variations across countries.
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FIGURE 3.6 Annual percentage increases in number of employed workers in South Asia, by sector and country
Sources: Authors, based on data from ILO 2011and national labor force and household surveys.
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Total agricultural employment increased sig-
nifi cantly in Nepal and Pakistan during this 
period; it remained constant in Bangladesh 
and declined in Sri Lanka and India. 
The major contributors to job creation 
everywhere have been industry and services. 
Industrial employment has grown very rap-
idly in Bangladesh (at almost 7 percent a 
year), Pakistan (just over 5 percent a year), 
and India (just over 4 percent a year). Ser-
vices employment growth has been strongest 
in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan, at 4–5 
percent a year. 
The gradual decline in the shares of agri-
cultural employment refl ects not just rural-
urban migration but also the growth of the 
rural nonfarm sector across the region. The 
rural nonfarm sector employs 12–59 percent 
of the total workforce (15–65 percent of the 
rural workforce) in South Asia (fi gure 3.7). 
Countries that are still primarily rural and 
agricultural (Bhutan, Nepal) have the small-
est rural nonfarm sectors. 
The pace of development of the rural non-
farm sector varies widely across countries 
and time (fi gure 3.8). In Nepal, the nonfarm 
sector share of the rural workforce increased 
by only 1 percentage point over nine years. 
In contrast, in Bhutan, Maldives, Pakistan, 
and Sri Lanka, it increased 5–11 percentage 
points over six to nine years. 
In India, employment in the nonfarm sec-
tor increased steadily for 25 years, rising from 
20 percent of the rural workforce in 1983 to 35 
percent in 2009/10. The pace of diversifi cation 
away from agriculture increased over time. 
During 1983–1993/94, the average annual 
growth in nonfarm jobs was just over 2 per-
cent. During 1993/94–1998/99, it increased 
to 3 percent; between 1999 and 2004/05, it 
increased to 4 percent. In the 1980s, of the 
nearly 40 million additional rural jobs gener-
ated in India, 6 out of 10 were in the farm sec-
tor. In contrast, of the 56 million new rural 
jobs created between 1993 and 2004, 6 out 
of 10 were in the nonfarm sector (World 
Bank 2011a). This trend has continued in 
recent years: between 2004/05 and 2009/10, 
the nonfarm sector increased from 30 percent 
to 35 percent of the rural workforce. 
According to data from the 2000 and 
2008 China National Rural Surveys, trans-
formation of the rural labor market has been 
one of the most salient trends in China’s 
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development since the 1980s. India’s over-
all pace of transition has been slower than 
China’s. The share of rural labor force off 
the farm in China was lower than in India in 
the early 1980s (a few years after the start of 
the major rural reforms adopted in 1978 that 
abolished the commune system and intro-
duced the household responsibility system). 
However, by 2000 the share had become 
significantly greater than India’s, at 43.5 
percent; by 2008 the share of China’s rural 
labor force that worked off the farm was 62 
percent—twice that of India (fi gure 3.9). 
Mukherjee and Zhang (2007) offer a 
number of explanations for the faster pace of 
rural nonfarm sector development in China:
•  Local governments in China were incentiv-
ized to support the town and village enter-
prises, as they generated revenue for them.
•  China’s rural nonfarm sector was less 
protected than India’s. When the sector 
was liberalized, it was more competitive 
than the protected small-scale sectors in 
India, which were not able to compete 
after liberalization.
•  Rural literacy was higher, making it eas-
ier for workers to move into the nonfarm 
sector.
•  Local public rural infrastructure provision 
was superior (as a result of higher levels of 
decentralization in China).
Unlike in East Asia, most nonfarm jobs 
in South Asia are in the service sector, with 
commerce the largest subsector, employ-
ing 12–33 percent of nonfarm rural work-
ers (figure 3.10). The manufacturing sec-
tor—which in other developing countries, 
especially East Asia, was the major source 
of employment for workers moving out of 
agriculture—provides less than 30 percent 
of nonfarm jobs.
Employment Status
South Asia is far from a typical, modern 
labor market dominated by wage or salaried 
employees. In all countries except  Maldives 
and Sri Lanka, most workers are self-
 employed (box 3.2). The dominance of self-
employment is most extreme in Afghanistan, 
Bhutan, and Nepal, where more than three 
out of every four workers are self-employed. 
The scarcity of secure work forms is even 
more striking when wage employment is 
broken down into regular wage or salaried 
workers and casual workers. In Afghanistan, 
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BOX 3.2 Composition of the labor force by employment status
Regular wage or salaried workers are defi ned as regu-
larly paid wage employees in the public or private sec-
tors. These workers are usually on the regular payroll 
of the enterprises for which they work and usually 
earn leave and supplementary benefi ts. A signifi cant 
proportion of regular wage or salaried work is in the 
public sector, ranging from 27 percent in India (2010) 
to 66 percent in Afghanistan (2007) (the proportions 
in other countries were 29 percent in Bangladesh in 
2005; 42 percent in Nepal in 2008; 40 percent in Pak-
istan in 2009; and 52 percent in Sri Lanka in 2008). 
Casual laborers are defi ned as wage workers who 
are paid on a casual, daily, irregular, or piece-rate 
basis. These workers typically do not have access 
to formal instruments of social protection. In rural 
areas, casual laborers are often landless agricultural 
help, though a signifi cant number of casual workers 
work in the rural nonfarm sector (in, for example, 
construction). 
Self-employed workers consist of employers, 
own-account workers, and unpaid family enterprise 
workers. They represent the largest group of work-
ers in most South Asian countries, ranging from 
43 percent in Sri Lanka to 82 percent in Nepal. 
The majority of the self-employed are own-account 
 workers or family enterprise workers. In rural areas, 
self- employed workers are typically farmers work-
ing their own land, though many self-employed 
workers work in the rural nonfarm sector. There 
are signifi cant gender differences in the type of self-
 employment, with women much more likely than 
men to be classifi ed as family enterprise workers. In 
most countries in the region, men are more likely to 
work as own-account workers.
The category of the self-employed is very hetero-
geneous. It can be split into two groups:. 
•  The high-end self-employed subgroup consists of 
all employers and other self-employed workers 
who work as offi cials, managers, professionals, 
technicians, and clerks. On average, these work-
ers are more educated than other self-employed 
workers. Their consumption distribution pro-
fi le is more similar to regular wage or salaried 
workers.
•  The low-end self-employed subgroup consists 
of own account and unpaid family workers who 
work as service workers, skilled agricultural work-
ers, craftspeople, machine operators, and workers 
in elementary occupations. Their consumption 
profi les are similar to those of casual laborers (box 
fi gure 3.2.1).
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Bangladesh, India, and Nepal, more than 
half of wage earners are casual workers. 
Only in Bhutan is wage employment domi-
nated by regular wage or salaried workers. 
The pattern of employment differs by 
location. A larger share of rural workers than 
urban workers is self-employed. The major-
ity of rural wage earners are casual laborers, 
whereas the majority of urban wage earners 
are regular wage or salaried workers.
The distribution of workers by employ-
ment status changed very little, if at all, in 
the past decade (table 3.5). Only in Bhutan 
and Maldives did employment shift mark-
edly toward wage work, and it is not known 
if the increase there was in regular wage or 
salaried work, casual labor, or both. In the 
other countries, self-employment continues 
to dominate, with the share of wage employ-
ment growing very little in the past decade. 
Within wage employment, there was a slight 
shift toward regular wage work in Nepal 
and Pakistan. In contrast, within the rural 
nonfarm sectors in Bangladesh (2002–05) 
and India (1983–2010), there was an 
increase in the share of casual labor, both 
as a share of total rural nonfarm employ-
ment and as a share of rural nonfarm wage 
employment.
Informality
The issue of informality is a prominent one 
in South Asia. Since the term informal sec-
tor was coined, about 40 years ago, consid-
erable efforts have been made to defi ne and 
measure informality. (For a comprehensive 
discussion of measurement and statistics, 
see ILO 2002. For a defi nition of informal 
employment in India, see the National Com-
mission for Enterprises in the Unorganised 
Sector 2009.)
TABLE 3.5 Distribution of employment in South Asian countries, by type of employment
(percent)
Country/year
Wage employment Self-employment
Regular wage or 
salaried Casual labor Employer Own account Family enterprise
Latest year
Afghanistan, 2008 9 14 0.5 44 33
Bangladesh, 2005 14 22 0.3 41 22
Bhutan, 2007 21 4 0.2 25 50
India, 2010 17 32 1 33 17
Maldives, 2004 55 4 31 10
Nepal, 2008 8 10 1 35 46
Pakistan, 2009 21 17 1 34 28
Sri Lanka, 2008 57 3 29 11
Earlier year
Bangladesh, 2002 14 22 0.4 44 19
Bhutan, 2003 14 0.2 18 68
India, 2000 15 31 1 31 21
Maldives, 1998 48 6 37 9
Nepal, 1999 6 10 1 39 44
Pakistan, 2000 19 18 1 41 21
Sri Lanka, 2000 57 2 28 13
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
Note: Labor force surveys in Bhutan, 2003; Maldives; and Sri Lanka do not allow the separation of wage employment into regular wage workers and casual 
laborers. Afghanistan has only one survey.
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Information on employment status and 
sector, fi rm characteristics, and worker edu-
cation from national labor force surveys is 
used to compare levels of informal employ-
ment across the region. Informal workers 
include all workers in the informal sector as 
well as workers in the formal sector perform-
ing informal jobs: all workers in agriculture; 
wage workers in informal enterprises; and 
casual laborers, family enterprise workers, 
and self-employed workers with less than 
senior-secondary education in the nonagri-
cultural sectors. (Annex table 3A.2 shows 
country details.) Based on this defi nition, an 
estimated 86–95 percent of employment is 
informal in all countries except Maldives and 
Sri Lanka, and 71–81 percent of nonagricul-
tural employment is informal in all countries 
except Bhutan, Maldives, and Sri Lanka 
( fi gure 3.11). 
The estimated rates are consistent with 
other studies showing that the vast major-
ity of employment in South Asia is infor-
mal.5 Using lack of pension coverage as a 
proxy, Loayza and Wada (2011) estimate 
that 91 percent of the labor force in South 
Asia is informal (figure 3.12). Informal-
ity rates based on pension coverage in all 
South Asian countries except Sri Lanka are 
higher than in other countries with simi-
lar levels of gross domestic product (GDP). 
Together with Africa, South Asia has the 
highest rate of informal employment in the 
world (fi gure 3.12).
Although informal employment has 
traditionally been seen as a labor market 
problem—because informal workers tend to 
have low earnings and little access to formal 
social protection systems—recent research, 
especially in Latin America, suggests that in 
some situations, individuals may choose to 
work informally. Analysis in South Asia has 
emphasized the vulnerability and involuntary 
nature of informality in the region (Chen 
and Doane 2008; National Commission for 
Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector 2009). 
The next section of this chapter shows that 
informal workers in South Asia are less 
skilled, earn less, and have higher poverty 
rates than formal workers and that informal 
manufacturing and services fi rms have lower 
labor productivity and pay lower wages than 
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formal fi rms in the same size class. Loayza 
and Wada (2011) also point out that labor 
informality is higher than predicted by the 
level of production informality, suggesting 
that the productivity of informal workers in 
South Asia is relatively low compared with 
that of informal workers in other countries.
The pervasiveness of informality in South 
Asia is likely to remain a core feature for a 
long time. Informality is a complex, multi-
faceted phenomenon that is shaped by both 
the modes of socioeconomic organization 
and the relationship the state establishes with 
private agents through regulation and moni-
toring. Loayza and Wada (2011) show that 
the actual rates of labor informality in South 
Asia are similar to predicted levels based on 
the determinants of informality: the legal and 
regulatory framework, educational achieve-
ment, the share of youth or rural popula-
tion, and the sectoral production structure 
(box 3.3). Most of these determinants are 
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BOX 3.3 Determinants of informality
Using two labor informality measures (self-
 employment and lack of pension coverage), Loayza 
and Wada (2011) show that in cross-country regres-
sions, labor informality is negatively and  signifi cantly 
related to the strength of law and order, business 
freedom from regulations, and average years of sec-
ondary schooling and positively and significantly 
 associated with sociodemographic transformation 
factors (the share of agriculture, youth population, 
and rural population). All correlation coeffi cients are 
highly statistically signifi cant (p-values of less than 
1 percent) and of large magnitude (0.68–0.83). The 
predicted levels of informality for South Asian coun-
tries are similar to actual levels.
These results have several implications. First, 
informality is more prevalent when the regulatory 
framework is burdensome, the quality of government 
services to formal fi rms is low, and the state’s moni-
toring and enforcement power is weak. Second, the 
structural characteristics of underdevelopment play an 
important role in explaining informality. Other things 
equal, a higher level of education is likely to reduce 
informality by increasing productivity, potentially 
increasing returns to formalization. A production 
structure tilted toward agriculture favors informality 
by making legal protection and contract enforcement 
less relevant and valuable. Third, larger shares of 
youth or rural populations are likely to increase infor-
mality, make monitoring more diffi cult and expensive, 
place greater demands on resources for training and 
the acquisition of abilities, create bottlenecks in the 
initial school-to-work transition, and make it more 
diffi cult to expand formal public services. 
Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have 
larger predicted informality levels than the grow-
ing East Asian countries (the Republic of Korea, 
 Malaysia, and Singapore). Sociodemographic factors, 
in particular the region’s high ratio of rural popula-
tion, are the largest contributors to the differences 
in predicted informality levels between South Asian 
and East Asian comparator countries. Lower busi-
ness regulatory freedom (for all countries) and low 
levels of education (for all countries except Pakistan) 
play a moderate but consistent role in explaining dif-
ferences in informality. Law and order does not play 
a major role in explaining the differences.
Source: Loayza and Wada 2011.
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structural and take time to change. For this 
reason, large informal sectors continue to 
exist even after economies have experienced 
rapid growth.6 In South Asia, despite grow-
ing labor productivity and increasing qual-
ity of jobs, there is little evidence from labor 
force or industrial surveys that labor infor-
mality is decreasing.7
As the correlates of informality are largely 
structural, the book assumes that formaliza-
tion will be a slow process. Easing restric-
tive labor legislation and other interventions 
to improve the business regulatory envi-
ronment can contribute to lower informal-
ity, but large increases in formality are not 
expected to occur immediately. Therefore, 
the approach taken in this book is to aim to 
improve the quality of all types of jobs by 
addressing constraints to the productivity of 
all workers and fi rms, formal or informal. 
Such an approach is likely to have a positive 
effect on reducing informality, as increasing 
productivity may increase the returns to for-
malization. As the majority of workers will 
remain informal at least in the near term, 
efforts should be made to increase their 
access to programs that help manage labor 
market shocks (see chapter 6). 
Where are the better jobs?
This book defi nes “better jobs” as jobs asso-
ciated with higher wages (for wage workers), 
lower poverty, and a lower risk of low and 
uncertain income. This section examines 
which sectors, types of employment, and 
types of fi rms are associated with better job 
quality.
By sector
Employment in industry and services—in 
urban areas or the rural nonfarm sector—
yields higher wages and is associated with 
lower poverty rates than agricultural casual 
labor. Chapter 2 showed that labor produc-
tivity (measured as output per worker) is 
much higher in industry and services than in 
agriculture. The higher productivity in these 
sectors is manifested in higher earnings. 
Among South Asian countries in which 
headcount poverty rates by employment sec-
tor and status of household members can be 
analyzed, agricultural casual workers have 
the highest poverty rates in Bangladesh and 
Nepal and the second highest in India (after 
urban casual labor) (fi gure 3.13).8 Agricul-
tural self-employment provides a relatively 
good source of income (as proxied by pov-
erty rates) in Bangladesh and India but not 
in Nepal. The jobs associated with the low-
est poverty rates in all countries are regu-
lar wage work outside of agriculture in the 
urban or rural nonfarm sectors. Urban self-
employment in Bangladesh and Nepal is also 
associated with lower poverty rates.
The wage data tell a consistent story: work-
ers in industry and service sectors are better 
paid than workers in agriculture  (fi gure 3.14). 
Rural nonfarm employment (regular wage 
and casual labor) and urban regular wage 
employment offer higher wages than agri-
cultural casual labor in Bangladesh, India, 
Nepal, and Pakistan (the countries for which 
wage employment can be split into regular 
wage or salaried and casual labor in all time 
periods observed): 
•  Rural nonfarm and urban regular wages 
are 30–100 percent higher than wages for 
agricultural labor. 
•  Wages for rural nonfarm casual labor 
are 10–50 percent higher than wages for 
agricultural labor. Even with the consis-
tent increase in the share of rural nonfarm 
jobs, nonfarm casual labor wages in India 
have remained about 30–50 percent higher 
than agricultural wages since 1983.
•  Wages for urban casual labor are higher 
than wages for agricultural casual labor 
in Nepal and Pakistan (20–30 percent) but 
the same in Bangladesh and India. This 
evidence is consistent with the high pov-
erty rates observed among urban casual 
labor in Bangladesh and India.
Wage differentials between services and 
agriculture are especially large (fi gure 3.15). 
In India, average hourly wages in services 
were 135 percent higher than in agriculture in 
2010. In Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, the 
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ratio of wages in services to wages agricul-
ture was also very high (112 percent higher 
in Nepal, 84 percent higher in Pakistan, and 
99 percent higher in Sri Lanka). 
Industry and service jobs are better paid 
partly because they are higher-skilled jobs. 
Nonagricultural workers have higher average 
levels of education than agricultural work-
ers. Within the nonagricultural sector, regu-
lar wage workers are more educated than 
casual workers, with a signifi cant proportion 
of workers having secondary education or 
above. The higher wages observed in industry 
and service employment partly refl ect higher 
levels of education.
However, the majority of industry and ser-
vice jobs pay more than agricultural casual 
labor even after accounting for higher levels 
of education (and other individual and house-
hold characteristics that can affect wages, 
such as age, gender, caste/ethnicity, religion, 
and household wealth).9 The wage premium 
is highest for public sector regular wage or 
salaried workers, where the premium over 
the agricultural wage is 41–50 percent in 
Bangladesh, India, and Nepal. Private sector 
nonfarm sector jobs also offer a wage pre-
mium. In India, for example, the wage dif-
ferential between nonfarm casual labor and 
agricultural casual labor without controlling 
for other factors was 40 percent in 2000 and 
50 percent in 2008; after controlling for other 
factors, including educational attainment of 
the workers, it was 24 percent in both years. 
There is thus a reallocation gain even without 
additional investment in education. 
By employment status and ﬁ rm type 
Within industry and services wage employ-
ment, better jobs can be defined from two 
main angles: by worker’s employment status 
and by type of fi rm. Regular wage or salaried 
workers have considerably higher average 
hourly wages than casual laborers (see fi gure 
3.14). The two types of wage employment 
correspond roughly to formal and informal 
employment in the wage sector.10 In Bangla-
desh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan, regular 
wage workers earn 20–48 percent more than 
casual workers in the rural nonfarm sector 
and 14–74 percent more than casual workers 
in the urban sector. These wage differentials 
partly refl ect differences in education levels 
between regular wage workers and casual 
laborers. Casual labor has the highest pov-
erty rates; poverty rates are generally lowest 
for regular wage or salaried workers, among 
whom poverty rates are on average one third 
or less those for casual labor.
In addition to lower wages, casual labor 
employment offers less stability than regular 
wage work. In India in 2009/10 (depending 
on the sector of employment), 31–49 percent 
of casual laborers, 8–23 percent of the self-
employed (own- account and family helper), 
and 4–7 percent of regular wage or salaried 
workers reported spending at least one month 
looking for work in the past year. Casual 
laborers spent an average 0.9–1.4 months 
without work the past year. Self-employed 
workers reported 0.2–0.7 months of unem-
ployment; regular wage or salaried workers 
reported virtually no time without work.11 
It is more diffi cult to assess the quality 
of self-employment because there are no 
wage data and self-employed workers are a 
very heterogeneous group. The small pro-
portion of workers classifi ed as “high-end” 
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self-employed have poverty rates that are 
similar to those of regular wage or salaried 
workers. Most self-employed workers—who 
are typically involved in small-scale enter-
prises (enterprises with no more than five 
workers) as own-account workers or family 
enterprise workers—have lower poverty rates 
than casual workers but higher rates than reg-
ular wage workers in India and Nepal. The 
India poverty assessment (World Bank 2011a) 
reports that only about half of nonfarm self-
employed workers regard their earnings from 
self-employment as remunerative. 
Analyzing the question from the point of 
view of the fi rm is more challenging because 
of the lack of nationally representative fi rm-
level industrial data. Only India conducts 
national surveys that cover all fi rms in the 
manufacturing and services sectors, infor-
mal and formal, rural and urban. Based on 
the estimated level of informality and self-
employment (especially own-account and 
family enterprise work) indicated in national 
labor force surveys, there is reason to believe 
that the statistics presented below for India 
are typical of other South Asian countries.12
Among Indian manufacturing and services, 
workers in larger formal firms earn higher 
wages, which refl ect higher value added per 
worker. However, the majority of manufactur-
ing and services employment is in micro/small 
informal fi rms, which have lower value added 
per worker and, hence, pay lower wages. 
India’s manufacturing sector
In 2005, 99 percent of the 17.1 million man-
ufacturing fi rms in India were informal (the 
term used in India is unorganized); nearly 
all fi rms were micro/small enterprises (1–49 
workers) (table 3.6). Even in the formal sec-
tor (referred to in India as the organized sec-
tor), 74 percent of fi rms were micro/small.13 
Seventy-one percent of all fi rms were rural. 
Average productivity (value added per 
worker) and average wages are lower in 
smaller fi rms than in larger fi rms and much 
lower in informal fi rms than in formal fi rms 
the same size. Value added and wages per 
worker in formal firms with one to four 
employees are on average one-quarter the 
levels of firms employing more than 200 
workers (fi gure 3.16). Informal fi rms with one 
to four employees have 25 percent of the value 
added per worker and less than 50 percent of 
the wages per worker of formal fi rms the same 
size. Although productivity is lower in rural 
firms than in urban firms of the same size 
class and type, especially in the informal sec-
tor, real wages (adjusted using consumption-
based household defl ators rather than indus-
try defl ators) in rural and urban fi rms of the 
same size and type are similar.14
Although the fi rm size productivity/wage 
differential exists in other regions, it is par-
ticularly high in India. In East Asia (China; 
Indonesia; Korea; Malaysia; the  Philippines; 
Taiwan, China; and Thailand), the produc-
tivity of small enterprises (enterprises with 
5–49 workers) is about 20–40 percent that of 
enterprises with more than 200 workers (ADB 
2009). In India, small fi rms have 12 percent 
of the productivity and pay 19 percent of the 
wages of large fi rms.
A number of factors may accounts for 
the fi rm size productivity/wage differentials 
observed everywhere: 15
•  Smaller and informal fi rms are less capital 
intensive. In India, for example, informal 
fi rms have less than a quarter of the capi-
tal per worker of formal fi rms in the same 
size class.
TABLE 3.6 Distribution of formal and informal 
manufacturing ﬁ rms in India, by location and size, 
2005 
(percent)
Firm 
characteristic 
Formal 
sector
Informal 
sector Total 
Percentage 
of all fi rms 0.7 99.3 100.0 
Location
Urban 60.2 29.0 29.2 
Rural 39.8 71.0 70.9 
Firm size
1–49 74.4 100.0 99.8 
50–99 11.9 0.0 0.1 
100+ 13.7 0.0 0.1 
Sources: Authors, based on data on formal ﬁ rms from the Annual Survey 
of Industries and data on informal ﬁ rms from the National Sample Survey 
manufacturing surveys.
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FIGURE 3.16 Average wage, value added, and capital per manufacturing worker in India, by ﬁ rm size and type, 2005
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Sources: Authors, based on data on formal ﬁ rms from the Annual Survey of Industries and data on informal ﬁ rms from the National Sample Survey manufacturing surveys. 
Note: Formal ﬁ rms with 200 or more employees = 100 percent. 
•  Workers in larger formal enterprises are 
more skilled.
•  Large formal enterprises are more produc-
tive with the labor and capital they have 
(their total factor productivity is higher), 
perhaps as a result of economies of scale, 
and they may pay “effi ciency wages” (higher 
than market-clearing wages paid to encour-
age higher output, raise worker morale, and 
discourage absenteeism and shirking). 
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Eighty-one percent of workers in India 
work in informal firms, and 83 percent of 
workers are in micro or small firms, with 
most working in own-account manufactur-
ing enterprises with fewer than fi ve workers. 
Combined with the large productivity and 
wage differentials observed, these figures 
translate into low-productivity and low-wage 
jobs for the majority of the 45.1 million man-
ufacturing workers in India in 2005.
The distribution of employment across 
fi rm size groups has not shifted over time: 
the share of employment in micro/small fi rms 
and the informal sector in 2005 is almost 
the same as it was in 1994 (figure 3.17). 
Between 1994 and 2000, employment in the 
informal sector increased 4 percent a year, 
from 28.8 to 37.0 million, whereas employ-
ment in the formal sector remained stagnant 
at 7.7 million (employment in the largest 
fi rms actually fell 1 percent a year). Between 
2000 and 2005, employment in the formal 
sector became more dynamic, growing at 3 
percent a year to 8.7 million. At the same 
time, employment in the informal sector 
declined by 0.3 percent a year. The opposing 
dynamics of the two periods resulted in very 
similar share of employment in the informal 
sector and in micro/small fi rms in 1994 and 
2005. 
The share of employment in micro and 
small fi rms is much larger in India than it is in 
East Asia (fi gure 3.18). A number of  factors can 
affect the enterprise size  distribution, includ-
ing industrial composition,  infrastructure, 
product market segmentation,  coordination 
failures, credit constraints for small firms, 
regulations that differ according to enterprise 
size, and industrial policy (ADB 2009). Lower-
income countries tend to produce less complex 
goods, which are better suited to small-scale 
production. 
Part but not all of India’s concentration of 
employment in small fi rms can be explained 
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by its level of income and industrial composi-
tion. For example, India’s apparel industry is 
dominated by small fi rms, whereas China’s 
industry is dominated by medium-size and 
large fi rms (ADB 2009). It is possible that 
past industrial policies in India, particularly 
the policy of reserving production of certain 
products for small-scale industries, which 
started in the late 1960s, has had signifi cant 
effects on fi rm size distribution that are still 
being felt today.
Data from the Annual Survey of Indus-
tries since 2005 show continued dynamism 
in the growth of employment in the for-
mal sector, suggesting that a J-curve effect 
may be at work: reforms in the 1990s led 
to an initial decline of employment in the 
formal sector in medium-size and large 
fi rms before increasing from 2000 onward 
(box 3.4). (National Sample Survey data 
on the informal sector are not available 
after 2005, making it impossible to analyze 
the growth of the informal manufacturing 
employment and determine how the overall 
distribution of manufacturing employment 
has evolved since then.) 
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Sources: Authors, based on data from ADB 2009, India Annual Survey of Industries, and National 
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Note: Data for India are for 2005. Data for East Asia data are for latest year available between 2004 
and 2007. 
India’s service sector
India had 16.5 million services fi rms in 2006, 
15 percent of which were establishments and 
85 percent were own-account enterprises.16 
Ninety-eight percent of own-account enter-
prises and 73 percent of establishments have 
one to four workers, and nearly all fi rms are 
micro or small (table 3.7). In contrast to the 
manufacturing sector, India’s service sector 
has very few establishments with 50 or more 
workers. Sixty percent of all services fi rms 
are rural.
Average productivity (value added per 
worker) and average wages are lower in 
smaller fi rms than in larger fi rms (fi gure 3.19). 
For example, mean wages at fi rms with fewer 
than 19 employees are 20–47 percent those 
of fi rms with 20–49 workers. Although the 
average wage monotonically increases with 
fi rm size, average productivity and capital per 
worker do not always increase among fi rms 
with 5–9 and fi rms with 10–19 employees.
Productivity and wages are also much 
lower in own-account enterprises fi rms than 
in establishments of the same size class. 
Own-account enterprises with one to four 
employees (the vast majority of such enter-
prises) have less than half the value added 
per worker and less than 15 percent of the 
mean wage per worker of establishments the 
same size. One reason for this differential is 
that own-account enterprises are less capital 
intensive.
An estimated 27.5 million workers were 
employed in the service sectors covered in 
India’s 2006 National Sample Survey. Sixty 
percent of service workers worked in own-
account enterprises and 40 percent in estab-
lishments. The majority of workers worked 
in lower-productivity and lower-wage micro 
fi rms (own-account enterprises and establish-
ments with fewer than fi ve workers). The con-
centration of employment in micro and small 
enterprises (enterprises with 1–49 workers) is 
even higher in the service sector (96 percent of 
workers) than in manufacturing (83 percent).
The employment pattern in services has 
not changed significantly over time, with 
the share of employment in micro/small and 
own-account enterprises remaining fairly 
stable between 2001 and 2006 (fi gure 3.20). 
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Total employment in India’s formal manufacturing 
sector follows a U-shaped path, declining from 1998, 
reaching a trough between 2001 and 2003, and growing 
rapidly thereafter. This path was driven by employment 
in large fi rms; employment in small and medium-size 
fi rms (enterprises employing fewer than 100 workers) 
was fairly stable through 2003 and grew thereafter.
The U-shaped pattern in employment can be 
explained by the large compositional change over 
the decade, with employment in nonprivate/state sec-
tor fi rms (mostly large fi rms) declining steadily and 
signifi cantly as the public sector downsized. Initially, 
this pattern led to a decline in overall employment, as 
private sector employment remained stable through 
2003. Beginning in 2003, private sector employment 
rapidly increased, more than offsetting the continuing 
decline in the state sector.
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BOX FIGURE 3.4.1 Employment in India’s formal manufacturing sector, by ﬁ rm size, type, and location, 
1998–2007 
Source: Authors, based on data from Annual Survey of Industries.
Note: Annual data on the formal manufacturing sector are available for 1998–2007. The year refers to the reference period in the survey. For example, the reference 
period in the 2000/01 survey is the accounting year ending March 31, 2001. As three-quarters of the reference period fell in 2000, the survey is labeled 2000.
SME = small to medium enterprise.
BOX 3.4 Trends in India’s formal manufacturing sector, 1998–2007
TABLE 3.7 Distribution of service ﬁ rms in India, by location and size, 
2006 
(percent)
Firm characteristic Establishments
Own-account 
enterprises Total 
Percentage of all fi rms 14.7 85.3 100.0
Location
Urban 63.0 36.1 40.0 
Rural 37.0 63.9 60.0 
Number of employees
1–49 99.7 100.0 99.96 
50–99 0.17 0.00 0.03 
100 + 0.04 0.00 0.02 
Source: Authors, based on data from National Sample Survey service sector surveys.
Employment in establishments increased 1.2 
percent a year, from 10.7 million in 2001 to 
11.4 million in 2006; employment in own-
account enterprises increased 0.4 percent a 
year, from 15.9 to 16.2 million. Data after 
2006 are not available.
Although industrial surveys with the 
same coverage of the manufacturing and 
service sectors are not available for other 
South Asian countries, other enterprise 
and fi rm surveys suggest a similar picture 
elsewhere. Rural nonfarm enterprise sur-
veys conducted in Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
and Sri Lanka show large numbers of rural 
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nonfarm enterprises and large numbers of 
workers employed in the sector. The major-
ity of rural nonfarm enterprises are micro 
family enterprises with few hired workers, 
low use of capital, and lower productivity 
than urban formal fi rms.
Who holds better jobs? 
This section examines the factors that affect 
access to better jobs in South Asia. These 
factors include education, gender, and caste 
and ethnicity.
Education
Education is an important determinant of 
access to better jobs. It is strongly correlated 
with the sector of employment in South 
Asian labor markets. Industry and services 
rely on workers who are considerably more 
educated than workers in agriculture (table 
3.8). The average educational attainment is 
particularly high in service sector industries 
such as utilities, fi nance, and public admin-
istration. Although manufacturing and 
construction jobs do not usually require as 
much education as these service industries, 
their workforces have much more education 
than workers in agriculture.
Within industry and services, education 
is correlated with better jobs. Regular wage 
or salaried workers are more educated than 
self-employed or casual workers. Almost all 
have some education, and a signifi cant pro-
portion have secondary education or above. 
The self-employed are better educated than 
casual workers. The relative educational lev-
els of employment types are found in both the 
urban and rural nonfarm sectors and across 
all South Asian countries (fi gure 3.21). These 
data suggest that education is an important 
determinant of access to better jobs and that 
lack of education is likely to be a barrier to 
mobility to moving into better jobs. (For an 
analysis of the effect of education on work-
ers’ ability to access and move into better 
jobs, see chapter 5.)
Gender
Labor force participation rates for women are 
low in South Asia, particularly in urban areas. 
Among women who do participate in the labor 
force, the majority live in rural areas, where 
70 percent of South Asians of working age 
live. Most rural female workers are employed 
in traditional agricultural activities. The more 
modern and better-paid rural nonfarm sector 
employs mostly men. In all countries except 
Maldives, a higher percentage of male rural 
workers are in the nonfarm sector. Although 
more female rural workers are entering the 
TABLE 3.8 Average years of education in South Asian countries, by sector of employment
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Afghanistan, 2008 0.9 1.9 1.4 — 2.0 3.5 3.5 — 9.8 4.2
Bhutan, 2007 0.9 3.8 3.5 8.2 4.2 4.2 4.3 9.9 5.7 7.2
India, 2010 4.1 6.1 6.4 10.1 4.4 7.7 6.9 12.9 11.2 9.7
Maldives, 2004 3.5 4.4 3.5 6.8 4.7 7.2 7.8 9.2 7.8 8.2
Nepal, 2008 3.1 2.9 4.5 6.3 3.5 6.2 5.4 9.6 9.8 9.6
Pakistan, 2008 2.7 5.5 5.7 10.4 4.0 6.8 5.6 11.7 9.9 9.9
Sri Lanka, 2008 7.1 7.6 9.4 10.9 8.6 9.3 9.9 12.2 11.6 10.9
South Asia unweighted mean 3.2 4.6 4.9 8.8 4.5 6.4 6.2 10.9 9.4 8.5
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
Note: Bangladesh is not included, because its surveys do not permit comparable calculations. — = Not available.
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FIGURE 3.21 Percentage of workers with some education and percentage of workers with secondary education or above 
in South Asia, by employment type and country
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
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sector, the gender gap has widened over time, 
increasing from 10 percentage points in 1983 
to 16 percentage points in 2010 in India, for 
example (fi gure 3.22). 
A cohort analysis for India, Nepal, and 
Pakistan provides further evidence that 
women are generally stuck in agriculture 
across all countries in the region (fi gure 3.23). 
This analysis tracks participation in the rural 
nonfarm sector for the same age groups of 
male and female workers for 8–10 years 
beginning in 1999/2000. 
Several findings emerge. First, for every 
age cohort, women were less likely than men 
to work in the rural nonfarm sector. Second, 
younger men were more likely than older 
men to leave agriculture for the nonfarm sec-
tor and stay there. In all countries, the cohort 
of men that was 15–24 in 1999/2000 had the 
largest share of nonfarm labor by 2009/10 
(40–55 percent), followed by the 25–34 
cohort. Among men in cohorts other than 
15–24, and in some cases 25–34, the share 
of workers in the nonfarm sector by the end 
of the period declined or remained the same. 
Third, younger women were more likely than 
older women to exit agriculture in India 
and Nepal, but less than 30 percent of rural 
women in India and less than 20 percent in 
Nepal worked in the nonfarm sector at the 
end of the period. 
A multinomial logit analysis that looks 
at the determinants of labor participation 
and occupational choice shows that among 
workers with less than upper-secondary edu-
cation, men are more likely than women to 
hold regular wage jobs within the rural non-
farm and urban sectors. In contrast, female 
workers with upper-secondary education 
are more likely than male workers to hold 
regular wage jobs (see chapter 5). Given the 
small percentage of women who participate 
in the labor force, the share of working-age 
women in better jobs is still much lower than 
the share of working-age men in better jobs, 
even at the highest levels of education.
The lower level of educational attainment 
among women is one reason why they are 
less likely than men to be in better jobs. More 
than half of the female workforce in fi ve of 
the eight countries in the region has no educa-
tion. Occupational segregation and lower pay 
for the same jobs and qualifi cations are other 
likely factors. 
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Women earn wages that are 20–40 per-
cent lower than those of men, even after con-
trolling for education levels, type of employ-
ment, and other individual and household 
characteristics associated with productivity. 
This result holds true for all countries and 
almost all types of wage employment. The 
lower wages could be a result of unobserved 
or unmeasured characteristics in the wage 
regressions; they are also consistent with 
some other type of discrimination in the mar-
ket that is not associated with productivity 
differentials. If discrimination in the labor 
market is a major factor behind the observed 
wage gap, a policy focus on increasing the 
skill levels of women will not be suffi cient. 
It is important to determine how much of 
the observed wage gap is a result of produc-
tive characteristics, such as education. The 
technique proposed by Blinder and Oaxaca 
(1973) has been used to decompose the wage 
gap into the part explained by differences in 
levels of observable characteristics (includ-
ing education) and the part not explained 
by these differences. The unexplained por-
tion refl ects in part differences in returns to 
skills.17 Figure 3.24 plots the decomposition 
for rural and urban workers for all survey 
years. It indicates that part of the wage gap is 
the result of differences in observable produc-
tive characteristics but that most of the wage 
gap is unexplained.
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Caste and ethnicity
Caste and ethnicity have long been impor-
tant factors shaping employment in South 
Asia. Female labor force participation and 
employment rates in India, Nepal, and Sri 
Lanka vary by ethnic/caste groups. 
The multinomial logit analysis shows that 
workers from ethnic minority groups, par-
ticularly women, are less likely to be in bet-
ter jobs even after controlling for education 
and other factors. Among men in rural areas, 
members of ethnic minority groups are more 
likely to be involved in agriculture. In urban 
areas, men from ethnic minority groups are 
more likely to be involved in casual work and 
self-employment. 
Similar trends appear for women, and 
the differences appear larger in magnitude. 
Women are more likely to work, particularly 
in rural areas, if they belong to an ethnic 
minority. Among women who work, women 
from ethnic minority groups are more likely 
to be in casual or self-employment in urban 
areas and agriculture in rural areas. 
Ethnic minority groups earn lower wages 
than other groups, after controlling for edu-
cation levels and employment type. The dif-
ference, though smaller in size than gender 
differentials, appears signifi cant in India but 
not in Nepal.18 
The results of the decomposition of the 
wage differential show that in India and 
Nepal, much of the wage gap is explained 
by differences in observable characteristics, 
including education (fi gure 3.25). In contrast, 
in Sri Lanka most of the wage differential is 
unexplained. 
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Annex 3A Deﬁ nitions and criteria used in proﬁ le of South Asia 
at work 
Criteria used to deﬁ ne formal and 
informal workers 
Table 3A.2 provides information on how the 
national surveys are used to estimate infor-
mal employment for each country.
Deﬁ nitions of employment and 
unemployment
Table 3A.1 provides the specifi c defi nitions 
for employment and unemployment used 
for each country based on the national 
surveys.
TABLE 3A.1 Deﬁ nition of employment and unemployment used based on national surveys
Country Year Defi nition of employment
Defi nition of unemployment (for people 
who are not employed)
Afghanistan 2007/08 In past 30 days, did any one of the following: 
• Worked for any organization or any individual
•  Performed any agricultural work, even without pay, 
on land owned, rented, or used by household
•  Performed any nonagricultural work, on own 
account, in a business enterprise
•  Performed occasional paid work, such as helping 
someone in his or her business
•  Has a permanent or long-term job from which he or 
she will be temporarily absent
In past 30 days, did any of the following: 
•  Attempted to fi nd a job or start a business
•  Found a job that has not yet started
•  Awaited recall from an employer
Bangladesh 2002/03 In past seven days, did either of the following:
•  Worked for at least one hour on any day for pay or 
profi t, family gain, or fi nal use or consumption
•  Even if did not work in past seven days, has a job, 
business, enterprise, or attachment to a job such as a 
business, farm, or shop
•  Was available for work in past seven days and tried to 
fi nd a job during past two months
2005/06 Same as Bangladesh 2002 In past seven days, did any of the following:
•  Was prepared for and tried to fi nd a job 
•  Was waiting for reappointment
•  Was waiting to start work after appointment
2009 In past seven days, did either of the following:
•  Engaged in any economic activity for at least one 
hour as paid worker, for family gain or profi t, or own 
use or consumption
•  Was temporarily absent from work 
• In past seven days, looked for job
Bhutan 2003 In past seven days, did any of the following:
•  Any farming, fi shing, hunting, or gathering of fruits
•  Worked for money or have profi table business
•  Performed unpaid work on enterprise or farm of 
friends or relatives
In past seven days, did any of the following: 
•  Actively looked for a job or tried to start a new 
business
•  Was waiting for a job to start
•  Was waiting for employer’s reply
2007 Same as 2003 In past seven days, did any of the following:
•  Actively looked for a job or tried to start a new 
business 
•  Did not actively look for a job because was waiting 
for employer’s reply
•  Did not actively look for a job because was waiting 
for employers recall
(continues next page)
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India 1999/2000, 
2004/05, 
2007/08, and 
2009/10
In past seven days, did any of the following:
•  Worked or helped in household enterprise
• Worked as regular or casual wage labor
•  Was involved in public or other works
•  In past seven days, sought work and/or was available 
for work
Maldives 1998 and 
2004
In past 30 days, did either of the following:
•  Was involved in economic activity most of the time
•  Engaged in any activity that generated income
•  Not currently working because unable to fi nd a 
suitable job, but if hired, would be available to work
Nepal 1998/99 and 
2007/08
In past 7 days, did either of the following:
•  Was involved at least one week in any economic 
activities
•  Did not work but have a permanent job he or she 
will return to
In past 7 days, did either of the following:
•  Was available and looked for work in past 30 days
•  Awaited reply on earlier inquiries or start of 
prearranged job or business
Pakistan 1999/2000 
and 2008/09
In past 7 days, did any of the following:
•  Performed any work for pay, profi t, or family gain 
during for one hour on any day
•  Did not work but has a job or enterprise to return to
•  Worked/helped in family business or family farm for 
family gain
In past 7 days, did any of the following:
•  Looked for job
•  Did not work but will take a job within a month
•  Was temporarily laid off  and awaiting recall
Sri Lanka 2000 In past 7 days, did either of the following:
•  Engaged in economic activity during past 7 days
•  Did not engage in economic activity but had an 
economic activity to return to
In past 7 days, was available or looking for work.
2008 In past 7 days, did either of the following:
• Engaged in economic activity
• Had an economic activity to return to
•  Already obtained a job or made arrangements to 
start self-employment activity
OR
•  Took some steps to fi nd a job or start self-
employment activity within the last four weeks
OR
•  Awaited results of interview for work
Source: Authors’ compilation.
TABLE 3A.1 Deﬁ nition of employment and unemployment used based on national surveys (continued)
Country Year Defi nition of employment
Defi nition of unemployment (for people 
who are not employed)
TABLE 3A.2 Deﬁ nition of formal and informal workers used based on national surveys
Country Year Informal workers Formal workers
Afghanistan 2007/08 •  Daily laborers •  Workers in public sector
•  Workers who receive pensions
Bangladesh 2002/03 •  Casual workers and day laborers 
•  Domestic workers
•  Workers in private informal sector
•  Workers in public sector
•  Workers in private or nongovernmental formal 
sector
2005/06 •  Domestic workers and apprentices 
•  Workers working in personal households
• Casual workers and day laborers
•  Workers in public sector
• Workers in private formal sector
Bhutan 2003 a •  Workers in public sector
2007 •  Casual paid employees •  Workers in public sector
India 1999/2000 •  Workers in fi rms that do not keep written accounts 
•  Workers in fi rms with fewer than 10 employees
•  Workers in public and semipublic sector
•  Workers covered under a provident fund
•  Workers in fi rms that keep written accounts
•  Workers in fi rms with more than 10 employees
(continues next page)
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2004/05 and 
2009/10
• Casual workers
•  Workers without written contracts 
•  Workers working in fi rms with fewer than 
10 employees
•  Workers not receiving any social security benefi ts
•  Workers in public sector
•  Workers receiving social security benefi ts
•  Workers with written job contracts 
• Workers in fi rms with more than 10 employees
Maldives 2004 a •  Workers in public sector 
Nepal 1998/99 •  Workers in unregistered organizations
•  Workers in fi rms with fewer than 10 employees
•  Workers in public sector
•  Workers in fi rms with 10 or more employees
2007/08 •  Workers who are not eligible for paid leave and do 
not receive social security contributions
•  Workers in establishments with fewer than 
10 employees
•  Workers in public sector
•  Workers for whom employers pay social security 
contributions
•  Workers who are eligible for paid leave
•  Workers working in establishments with 10 or more 
employees
Pakistan 1999/2000 
and 2008/09
•  Casual and day laborers
•  Workers in enterprises that do not keep written 
accounts
•  Workers in establishments with fewer than 
10 employees
•  Workers in public sector
•  Workers in enterprises that keep written accounts
•  Workers in establishments with 10 or more 
employees
Sri Lanka 2000 •  Daily laborers •  Workers in public sector
2008 •  Casual workers
•  Workers whose employers do not contribute to 
pension scheme or provident fund and do not 
provide paid annual leave
•  Workers in unregistered enterprise
•  Workers in enterprise that does not maintain formal 
written accounts
•  Workers in fi rms with fewer than 10 employees
• Workers in public sector
•  Workers for whom employer contributes to pension 
scheme or provident fund or provides paid leave
•  Workers in registered enterprise
•  Workers in enterprise that maintains formal written 
accounts
• Workers in fi rms with 10 or more employees
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Note: All family enterprise workers are in the informal sector. All self-employed workers with less than senior-secondary education are considered informal, and all self-employed 
individuals with higher education are considered formal. All workers involved in agriculture are informal. Some workers could not be identiﬁ ed as formal or informal. In all countries 
except Maldives, the unclassiﬁ ed portion was 10 percent or less. In Maldives 32 percent could not be classiﬁ ed. For the subsample of workers that could not be identiﬁ ed as formal 
or informal in each country, their status was allocated according to the formal/informal split for the employment that could be classiﬁ ed. The assumption that the distribution of 
formality/informality is the same for classiﬁ ed and unclassiﬁ ed workers may lead to some overestimation of informality, as the classiﬁ ed portion includes some block assignments, 
such as agriculture to the informal sector. Because the unidentiﬁ ed portion is small in most countries, this should not be a major issue, except perhaps in Maldives. a = No additional 
criteria speciﬁ c to the survey.
TABLE 3A.2 Deﬁ nition of formal and informal workers used based on national surveys (continued)
Country Year Informal workers Formal workers
Annex 3B Regional employment patterns
Figure 3B.1 shows how employment rates 
vary within each of the South Asian coun-
tries. The overall picture is one of relatively 
moderate differences in regional rates. 
Unweighted coefficients of variations are 
5–10 percent for all countries except Afghan-
istan, where regional differences are much 
larger. For all countries except Afghanistan, 
the range is fairly narrow: in most cases, the 
difference in employment rates between the 
regions with the highest and lowest rates is 
only about 10 percentage points. Although 
the disparities in employment rates may not 
be large, there are major differences in the 
nature and quality of employment across 
regions (for example, the share of employ-
ment that is in the formal wage-earning 
sector). 
1 2 0   M O R E  A N D  B E T T E R  J O B S  I N  S O U T H  A S I A  
Central
Chittagong
Western
Western
Western
Central
Punjab
Eastern
NWFP
Lagging Central
Mid -Western
North-Central
Sylhet
South
West Central
67 (16.7)
58 (4.7)
69 (9.0)
61 (5.7)
48 (8.8)
84 (5.9)
50 (7.8)
58 (6.7)
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
pe
rc
en
t
85
90
Afghanistan
2008
Bangladesh
2005
Bhutan
2007
India
2005
Maldives
2004
Nepal
2008
Pakistan
2009
Sri Lanka
2008
FIGURE 3B.1 Regional variations in employment rate in South Asia, by country
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
Note: Each diamond represents the employment rate in a region. The regions with the highest and lowest employment rates are named. Each box 
represents the average employment rate of all regions in the country; ﬁ gures in parentheses are coeﬃ  cients of variation, calculated as the standard 
deviation of the regional employment rates normalized by the mean of these rates.
Notes
 1.  The labor force participation rate and the 
employment rate in India in 2009/10 were 
56.6 percent and 54.8 percent, respectively. 
There is a sharp decline from 2004/05, lead-
ing to only a very small increase (in absolute 
terms) in the labor force and total employ-
ment between 2004/05 and 2009/10. The 
decline has been driven by a sharp fall in 
female labor force participation and employ-
ment rates (male rates have also declined, 
but far less sharply), which led to a signifi -
cant decrease in rural female labor force and 
employment in absolute terms. The decline in 
female participation was observed in all age 
groups including school age cohorts (15–19 
years old and 20–24 years old) but also older 
cohorts. Rural female employment declined 
particularly in agriculture. Self-employment 
declined both in number and as a share of 
total employment, while casual wage labor 
accounted for nearly 80 percent of net addi-
tional employment in those sectors that 
expanded employment between 2004/05 and 
2009/10. Usual subsidiary employment rates 
(identifi ed as activity pursued by the individ-
ual for a relatively minor time, but not less 
than 30 days during the past year) fell sharply 
compared to previous years. Usual principal 
employment status (defi ned on the basis of the 
activity pursued for the longest—major—time 
during the reference year) only experienced a 
modest decline. The reasons for the decline 
in labor force participation and employment 
rates remain to be analyzed fully, but possible 
reasons include (a) younger workers, espe-
cially women, staying longer in education; 
(b) rising family incomes reducing the need for 
women to work; and (c) shocks in the agricul-
ture sector. It is important to note that over 
the longer period between 1983 and 2010 
labor force participation and employment 
rates have increased and decreased without 
a consistent trend, although the employment 
and participation rates in 2010 are lower 
than in any previous period. Using current 
weekly status, the labor force participation 
rate was 59.7 percent, 62.0 percent, 60.4 per-
cent, 62.2 percent, and 56.6 percent in 1983, 
1994, 2000, 2005, and 2010, respectively, 
and the employment rate was 57.5 percent, 
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60.1 percent, 58.2 percent, 59.8 percent, and 
54.8 percent in 1983, 1994, 2000, 2005, and 
2010, respectively. It may thus be premature 
to see the past fi ve years as necessarily being 
evidence of a longer-term trend.
 2.  In the absence of better questions in the sur-
vey in Maldives, the criterion “available for 
work, conditional on getting a job” was 
use to defi ne unemployment. This criterion, 
which is much broader than that used in 
other countries, yielded a much higher unem-
ployment rate. 
 3.  This measure, based on current weekly sta-
tus questions, is an adjusted version of the 
defi nition of underemployment used by the 
National Commission for Enterprises in the 
Unorganised Sector (2009). 
 4.  Using household survey data, Srinivasan 
(2010) reviews labor market indicators over 
the longer term for Bangladesh (from 
1983/84), India (from 1972/73), and Pakistan 
(from 1990). He fi nds that female participa-
tion rates in Bangladesh rose from 8 percent 
to 30 percent between 1983/84 and 2005/06, 
female participation rates in India were posi-
tive in rural but not urban areas, and female 
participation in Pakistan has been essentially 
stagnant since 1990. 
 5.  The informality shares in fi gure 3.11 are simi-
lar to those in Chen and Doane (2008).
 6.  For example, more than a third of total 
employment in the Republic of Korea is infor-
mal (OECD 2007).
 7.  Based on the defi nition of informality used in 
this book, there is no clear pattern of increas-
ing or decreasing informality. In Bangladesh 
(2002–05), India (2000–05), and Pakistan 
(2000–09), there have been no signifi cant 
changes. In Maldives (1998–2004) and Sri 
Lanka (2000–08), informal employment 
declined signifi cantly. In Bhutan (2003–07) 
and Nepal (1998–2008), it increased sig-
nifi cantly. However, because the concepts 
used to measure informality changed from 
the earlier to the later year in the countries 
in which changes were observed, it is not 
clear how much of the observed increase 
or decrease was real. In Bangladesh and 
Pakistan, where there was no change in the 
way of measuring informality, no change 
in the degree of informality was observed. 
Other studies, using alternative defi nitions, 
have found increasing informality in India 
(NCEUS 2009).
 8.  Poverty rates for India are based on the 
 offi cial poverty lines prevailing until 2010. 
Using the new offi cial poverty lines for 
2004/05 (revised in 2011) would increase 
the poverty rates in rural areas, causing 
rural poverty rates to exceed urban work-
ers for the same employment type. The hier-
archy in terms of employment type would 
remain the same, however: agricultural 
casual labor would have the highest pov-
erty rate, followed by rural nonfarm casual 
labor and urban casual labor. Agricultural 
and rural nonfarm self-employment would 
have higher poverty rates than urban self-
employment. The lowest poverty rates 
would be among urban regular wage or 
salaried workers.
 9.  Results are based on regressions for each 
country-survey year. Log hourly wages were 
regressed on individual and household char-
acteristics, including educational attainment 
and sector and type of employment.
10.  All casual labor is classifi ed as informal in 
this book. Some regular wage work is also 
classifi ed as informal (see annex table 3A.2 
for details of defi nition used in each country’s 
labor force survey). 
11.  The India poverty assessment (World Bank 
2011a, p. 133) also highlights the transient 
nature of rural nonfarm casual labor work: 
“Casual workers tend not to have year-round 
employment and make ends meet by working 
at several jobs, often combining agricultural 
and nonfarm activities. In 2004/05, more 
than half (55 percent) of casual nonfarm 
workers report that they are without work 
for one or more months in the year compared 
to 8 percent of salaried workers or 12 percent 
of self-employed. Fourteen percent of casual 
nonfarm workers report that they were seek-
ing or available for additional employment 
even when working.”
12.  Estimates from labor force surveys of infor-
mality in the nonagricultural sector indicate 
that Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nepal have 
a higher proportion of informal nonagricul-
tural employment (about 80 percent) than 
Bangladesh (74 percent), India (72 percent), 
and Sri Lanka (68 percent).
13.  “Organized” (formal) manufacturing fi rms 
are registered fi rms, typically with more than 
10 workers. The most commonly used defi ni-
tion of the unorganized (informal) sector fl ows 
from the Indian Factories Act (1948), which 
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requires that an enterprise register with the 
state government if it employs 10 or more 
workers and uses power or employs 20 or 
more workers and does not use power. Units 
that do not come under the purview of this law 
constitute the unorganized sector. Businesses 
that are organized are required to comply 
with health, safety, and welfare requirements. 
Firms are required to contribute toward insur-
ance against sickness, disability, and maternity 
and to deposit linked provident funds or pen-
sion schemes. The state monitors compliance 
through a system of inspections. Unorganized 
fi rms largely fall outside this system. The unor-
ganized manufacturing sector comprises own-
account manufacturing enterprises, directory 
manufacturing enterprises, and nondirectory 
manufacturing enterprises subcategories. Own-
account manufacturing enterprises are informal 
fi rms that operate without any hired worker 
employed on a regular basis. Nondirectory 
manufacturing establishments are informal 
fi rms that employ fewer than six workers 
(with at least one hired worker); directory 
manufacturing establishments employ six or 
more workers (with at least one hired worker). 
Ninety-nine percent of unorganized manufac-
turing fi rms have fewer than 10 workers.
14.  Among fi rms in the formal sector, real wages 
are slightly higher in rural fi rms than urban 
fi rms of the same size class. Among fi rms with 
one to nine employees in the informal sector 
(the vast majority of the unorganized sector), 
wages in urban and rural unorganized fi rms 
are very similar.
15.  Assessing the contribution of each factor is 
challenging, given the diffi culty in matching 
information across workers and fi rms. For 
example, the industrial surveys for India, 
which provide fi rm productivity and wage 
data, do not survey the education and skills 
levels of workers. See ADB (2009) for a dis-
cussion of fi rm-size wage differentials.
16.  The National Sample Survey service sector 
survey classifi es fi rms as either establishments 
or own-account enterprises. Own-account 
enterprises do not employ hired workers on a 
regular basis; establishments do. Own-account 
enterprises belong to the informal sector; estab-
lishments are a mix of informal and formal 
sector fi rms. As services fi rms are not required 
to register under the Factories Act unless they 
are engaged in manufacturing, most private 
sector service enterprises, whether small or 
large, are offi cially in the informal sector. The 
service sector survey covers service fi rms in 
rural and urban locations for a large number 
of service sectors but excludes trade. Dehejia 
and Panagariya (2010) estimate that the sur-
vey covers about half of output and employ-
ment in the service sector. 
17.  This interpretation becomes problematic if 
the observable characteristics are improp-
erly measured or omitted or unobservable 
characteristics, such as motivation, could be 
infl uencing wages. Such characteristics will 
bias the results if the errors and omissions 
are systematically different for men and 
women.
18.  Ethnic minorities are scheduled caste and tribes 
in India and Dalits and Janajatis in Nepal.
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Questions
•  What are the business environment con-
straints affecting fi rms in South Asia?
•  Do these constraints vary by sector and fi rm 
characteristics? 
•  What are the main policy priorities for over-
coming the identifi ed business constraints?
Findings
The chapter identifi es constraints facing fi rms 
and four areas of policy focus.
Constraints
•  The most binding constraints facing all types 
of urban formal firms (where the highest-
productivity and highest-paid jobs are) are 
electricity, corruption, and political instability. 
Job-creating fi rms are more severely affected 
than other fi rms by virtually the entire range 
of constraints. Labor regulations rank high in 
India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.
•  The rural nonfarm sector is an important route 
out of low-paid agricultural work. For fi rms in 
this sector, electricity and political instability 
also rank high on the list of constraints. Trans-
port (poor road quality and inaccessibility) 
ranks much higher as a constraint for rural 
fi rms, as it affects access to larger markets. 
•  Increasing the productivity of informal fi rms 
is fundamental, as they employ the majority 
of workers. Electricity is the top constraint 
for informal urban fi rms in India. Relative to 
formal urban fi rms, they are less concerned 
about corruption, taxes, and labor regulations 
and more concerned about access to land.
•  Firms cite inadequate access to finance as 
one of the top fi ve constraints in every sec-
tor; this  constraint is particularly severe for 
informal fi rms. However, without informa-
tion on whether inadequate fi nance refl ects 
the lack of bankable projects, one cannot 
infer directly that access to fi nance is a bind-
ing constraint. Other evidence suggests that 
access to fi nance may be an issue for micro 
and small fi rms in some countries.
Policy focus areas
•  The severity of the electricity constraint for all 
types of fi rms refl ects the large gap in the region 
between demand for and supply of power. Clos-
ing the gap requires a substantial increase in 
investment, which in turn requires that power 
sector reforms be sustained and deepened.
•  South Asian fi rms face high levels of corrup-
tion in a range of interactions with public offi -
cials, particularly for utilities and tax inspec-
tions. Simplifying processes in, for example, 
tax administration and reducing unnecessary 
interaction with local officials could be an 
effective way of tackling corruption, as it has 
the additional benefi t of reducing the cost of 
red tape on fi rms. 
•  Key policy options for improving access to 
finance for micro and small firms include 
strengthening the institutional environment 
(secured transactions registry, credit informa-
tion); creating a conducive environment for 
downscaling commercial banks and upscal-
ing microfi nance institutions; and providing 
fi nancial literacy and training to micro and 
small fi rms.
•  Easing business registration could benefit 
potential fi rm entrants. Signifi cant improve-
ments in the registration process would help 
entrepreneurs who were previously in wage 
employment or out of the labor force start 
new activities and create new employment.
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What Is Preventing Firms from 
Creating More and Better Jobs? 
This chapter looks at the constraints faced by South Asian firms in the manufacturing and service sectors 
where, as shown in chapter 3, jobs are more 
productive and better paid. Addressing con-
straints to the operations of fi rms in these 
sectors is therefore important for creating 
more and better jobs. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The 
first section describes the methodologi-
cal framework. The second section looks at 
constraints facing fi rms in the urban formal 
sector. The third section extends the  analysis 
to the rural nonfarm and urban informal 
sectors. The fourth section suggests policy 
options for overcoming the most binding 
constraints. The last section examines the 
regulatory constraints faced by potential fi rm 
entrants. 
Methodological framework 
This chapter is based on fi ndings from three 
background studies by Carlin and Schaf-
fer (2011a, 2011b, 2011c), who draw on 30 
country enterprise surveys, covering more 
than 26,000 fi rms, conducted in South Asia 
between 2000 and 2010.1 The method-
ological approach taken to identify binding 
business environment constraints uses the 
reported severity of constraints and reported 
mitigation behaviors by fi rms in the enter-
prise surveys. The business environment is 
considered external to the fi rm; its compo-
nents resemble public goods and are consid-
ered common to all fi rms in the economy. 
All enterprise surveys include a standard 
question that asks firms to rate the sever-
ity of different business environment con-
straints.2 The question takes the form: “How 
much of an obstacle is X to the operation 
and growth of your business?” The firm’s 
response regarding its severity, rated on a 
fi ve-point scale, with 0 being no obstacle and 
4 being a very severe obstacle, is a measure of 
the marginal cost imposed by the constraint 
on the operation and growth of its business. 
The cost can be interpreted as the difference 
between the fi rm’s profi t in the hypothetical 
situation in which the business environment 
poses no obstacle to the firm’s operations 
and the fi rm’s actual profi t given the existing 
quality of the business environment. 
Differences in firms’ perceptions of the 
severity of constraints and mitigation behav-
iors refl ect the different costs of the constraint 
to fi rms, which may refl ect differences in the 
quality of the business environment faced 
by fi rms or differences in the fi rms’ charac-
teristics. Differences in fi rm characteristics 
are more likely if the business environment 
is shared. For example, almost all firms in 
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Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal report 
at least one power cut per month, but the 
valuations of the electricity constraint vary 
across firms. A higher-productivity firm 
should report higher severity of a constraint 
than a lower-productivity fi rm, because the 
marginal cost/forgone profi ts are higher. The 
data confi rm this prediction.
In addition to subjective perceptions of the 
severity of constraints, this chapter examines 
objective measures, such as the frequency 
of power outages and mitigation behaviors, 
including the use of generators and payment 
of bribes. Mitigation behaviors are a fi rm’s 
reaction to the poor quality of the business 
environment. According to Carlin and Schaf-
fer’s methodological framework (2011c), 
expenditures on mitigation behavior are 
decreasing in the quality of the external busi-
ness environment (the better the environment, 
the less mitigation is needed) and increasing 
in the productivity of the fi rm (more produc-
tive fi rms undertake more mitigation actions, 
because their marginal costs/forgone profi ts 
are higher). The fi ndings from these objective 
measures are largely consistent with those 
from the analysis of subjective constraints: 
countries in which fi rms report higher sever-
ity of the electricity constraint also report 
higher frequency of power outages.
The average reported severity of con-
straints and the average reported level of 
 mitigation activities are measured for a 
“benchmark fi rm” in each country individu-
ally and for the region as a whole (by pooling 
the country sample data), in order to account 
for differences in the composition of firms 
in the enterprise surveys and facilitate cross-
country comparisons. A benchmark fi rm is 
a medium-size manufacturing fi rm with 30 
employees that is domestically owned, does 
not export or import, is located in a large city, 
and did not expand employment in the pre-
ceding three years. The reported  severity of 
each element of the business environment was 
regressed on the fi rm’s characteristics. Hence, 
the average reported severity of a constraint 
for a benchmark fi rm is a conditional mean 
for the period covered by the surveys avail-
able for each country (2000–10). The country 
surveys were pooled across time to generate 
sufficiently large samples to analyze. The 
sample size of individual surveys generally did 
not allow analysis of how the reported sever-
ity of constraints changed over time.
The ranking of constraints for individual 
countries as well as the region as a whole 
guides the prioritization of constraints to 
tackle. Some countries, notably India, report 
lower absolute levels of severity of constraints 
across the board. It is unlikely that there are 
no significant business environment con-
straints in India. Therefore, it is important 
to look at the ranking of constraints, not just 
the reported absolute severity level.
The average severity of constraints 
reported by a benchmark fi rm in the urban 
formal sector is compared across countries 
at similar levels of per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP).3 These data indicate whether 
the severity reported by South Asian fi rms is 
greater than expected given their country’s 
level of development.
The framework reveals how the reported 
level of severity (and ranking) of constraints 
and mitigation activities varies for nonbench-
mark fi rms (for example, how the reported 
severity of constraints changes with fi rm size, 
sector, location, formality, history of job cre-
ation, and so forth). This book is particularly 
interested in fi rms that expanded employment 
in the past three years (job-creating firms), 
because identifying and addressing constraints 
to their operations and growth is likely to lead 
to the creation of more and better jobs.
Application of methodology to rural 
nonfarm and informal ﬁ rms
One of the main drawbacks of standard 
enterprise surveys is that their sampling 
frames are generally limited to the formal 
urban sector. This bias is problematic in 
South Asia, given the high levels of informal-
ity. Enterprise surveys also omit the rural 
nonfarm sector, an important source of bet-
ter jobs in South Asia. The constraints anal-
ysis is conducted here for four South Asian 
countries that conducted enterprise surveys 
of the rural nonfarm and informal sectors.
For the rural nonfarm sector, the analysis 
examines the severity of constraints reported 
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by a benchmark fi rm in Bangladesh,  Pakistan, 
and Sri Lanka, where rural enterprise surveys 
have been conducted.4 These results are then 
compared with those of an urban benchmark 
fi rm in these countries. 
For the urban informal sector, the severity 
of constraints reported by benchmark fi rms 
is compared with that of the urban formal 
sector. (The informal survey in India was the 
only one with a large enough sample size to 
facilitate this comparison. The comparison is 
therefore limited to India’s formal and infor-
mal urban manufacturing sector.5)
Rural nonfarm and informal sector fi rms 
are typically microenterprises: in the surveys, 
the median employment in rural nonfarm 
sector fi rms in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka is 1.5 (compared with a median of 35 
employees in the urban formal sector in these 
countries); in India, the median employment 
in the informal (urban) survey is 4 (compared 
with 20 for all fi rms in the urban formal sec-
tor). As the median size of fi rms in the rural 
and informal sectors is much smaller, the 
benchmark firm in the rural nonfarm and 
informal sector analyses is defi ned as having 
fi ve employees.6
In the analysis of the rural nonfarm and 
informal sectors, the focus is on the con-
straints to the benchmark firm, which is a 
nonexpanding fi rm. The average rural and 
informal sector firm reported very little 
employment growth: 
•  In the Bangladesh rural survey, 81 per-
cent of firms experienced no growth in 
employment between 2005 and 2007 
(World Bank 2008c).
•  In the survey of informal fi rms conducted 
in India in 2005, 40 percent of fi rms had 
not grown since they started operations 
(Ferrari and Dhingra 2009).
•  In the Sri Lanka rural survey, 90 percent 
of firms had not increased employment 
the previous year (World Bank 2005). 
For this reason, it was not possible to ana-
lyze the constraints facing an expanding fi rm 
in these sectors. 
Even if addressing the constraints reported 
for a benchmark fi rm in the rural nonfarm 
and informal sectors does not lead to substan-
tial creation of new jobs, it is still important 
for increasing the productivity and job qual-
ity of a large proportion of existing workers 
in manufacturing and services. 
Limitations of the methodology
The methodology allows the costs of differ-
ent business environment constraints to be 
assessed and compared. Two constraints that 
many fi rms in South Asia frequently report 
as severe—access to fi nance and tax rates—
cannot be analyzed in the same framework 
as the others, as neither has the character of 
a public good. Even when the fi nance sys-
tem is working well, one would expect that 
access to fi nance would be a constraint to 
potential borrowers with low-quality proj-
ects. Indeed, less productive firms report 
more severe problems with access to fi nance. 
A high reported severity does not necessarily 
mean that access to fi nance is a problem or 
that increasing access to fi nance would nec-
essarily boost output and productivity. 
With respect to taxes, managers do not take 
into account the social benefi ts of taxation. 
In virtually all countries, irrespective of their 
level of development, managers consider high 
tax rates a constraint, but cutting taxation 
is not a priority everywhere. As the reported 
severity cannot be used to assess whether 
access to fi nance and tax rates are binding 
constraints, other indicators of the fi nancial 
sector and tax system are examined. 
A second limitation with the methodol-
ogy is that it identifi es binding constraints to 
existing fi rms. It does not identify constraints 
facing potential entrants. Regulatory con-
straints faced by potential entrants are exam-
ined later in this chapter.
Constraints in the urban 
formal sector
This section examines constraints fac-
ing urban formal sector fi rms. It compares 
benchmark fi rms across countries and iden-
tifi es the constraints facing both expanding/
job-creating fi rms and other types of non-
benchmark fi rms.
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Constraints facing benchmark ﬁ rms 
The three most common binding constraints 
facing urban formal fi rms in South Asia are 
electricity, corruption, and political instabil-
ity (fi gure 4.1 and table 4.1). Although the 
ranking of these constraints varies across 
countries, most countries identify the same 
top three constraints. In every country 
except Bhutan and Maldives, electricity 
is one of the top two constraints. It is the 
highest-ranked constraint in India and Sri 
Lanka. Political instability is among the 
top three constraints in all five countries 
where it was included in the survey except 
Bhutan. This fi nding is not surprising given 
that South Asia contains some of the most 
confl ict-affected areas in the world. In fi ve 
of the eight countries, corruption is among 
the top four constraints. 
Though not as binding as electricity, 
 corruption, and political instability, tax 
administration is a severe concern in some 
countries, especially India and Pakistan. 
Labor regulations are important in Bhutan, 
India, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. (Chapter 6 
analyzes labor regulations and other labor 
market institutions in more detail). Firms in 
most countries report tax rates and access 
to fi nance as one of the top fi ve most severe 
constraints. However, because of endogeni-
ety issues described in the methodology, their 
reported severity cannot be interpreted in the 
same way as the other constraints or ranked 
alongside them.
Given the heterogeneous nature of India, 
separate analyses of firm constraints were 
conducted for higher- and lower-income states 
(see annex 4A).7 The top three constraints 
(corruption, electricity, and tax administra-
tion) are the same for low- and high-income 
states. Firms in low-income states complain 
more about inadequate physical infrastruc-
ture (electricity, transport, access to land) 
and crime; fi rms in high-income states com-
plain more about policy uncertainty and 
labor regulation. These results parallel cross-
country results that show that fi rms in poor 
countries tend to complain more about physi-
cal infrastructure and fi rms in rich countries 
complain more about labor regulation  (Carlin 
and Schaffer 2011b). 
Electricity 
Most South Asian countries rank electricity 
as one of the top constraints. The reported 
severity of the constraint in Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, and Nepal is higher than in 
other countries at similar GDP levels and 
among the highest in the world. The down-
ward slope in fi gure 4.2 implies that although 
FIGURE 4.1 Severity of constraints reported by South Asian 
benchmark ﬁ rm in the urban formal sector 
Source: Authors, based on Carlin and Schaﬀ er 2011b (from World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: A benchmark ﬁ rm is a medium-size manufacturing ﬁ rm with 30 employees that is domesti-
cally owned, does not export or import, is located in a large city, and did not expand employment 
in the preceding three years. Analysis is based on pooled sample of enterprise surveys conducted 
between 2000 and 2010. The severity of constraint is rated by ﬁ rms on a 5-point scale, with 0 being 
no obstacle, 1 being a minor obstacle, 2 being a moderate obstacle, 3 being a major obstacle, and 
4 being a very severe obstacle. Access to ﬁ nance and tax rates constraints are excluded.
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TABLE 4.1 Top ﬁ ve constraints reported by South Asian benchmark ﬁ rm in the urban formal sector, by country
South Asia region Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
Electricity 2 2 1 1 2 2 1
Political instability 1 1 2 n.a. n.a. 1 3 n.a.
Corruption 3 3 3 2 3 4
Tax administration 4 5 5 3 1
Labor regulations 3 4 5 5
Inadequately educated labor 2 5 2
Access to land 4 4 1
Transport 1 3
Government policy 
uncertainty 5 4 2
Courts 4 5
Crime, theft, and disorder 5 5
Business licensing 4
Macro instability 3
Competition 4
Source: Authors, based on Carlin and Schaﬀ er 2011b (from World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: A benchmark ﬁ rm is a medium-size manufacturing ﬁ rm with 30 employees that is domestically owned, does not export or import, is located in a large city, and did not expand 
employment in the preceding three years. n.a. = Not applicable (question was not asked). Analysis is based on pooled sample of enterprise surveys conducted between 2000 and 2010. 
Access to ﬁ nance and tax rates constraints are excluded.
FIGURE 4.2 Cross-country comparisons of reported severity of the electricity constraint 
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Source: Carlin and Schaﬀ er 2011b (based on World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: The cross-country regression line shows the relationship between the reported severity of the constraint for a benchmark ﬁ rm and the log of per capita GDP. The shaded 
area is the 95 percent conﬁ dence interval band around the regression line. Vertical bars show conﬁ dence intervals of 95 percent around the reported severity of the constraint 
for countries in South Asia. The lack of overlap between the South Asian country conﬁ dence interval and the regression line conﬁ dence interval is a conservative test of the 
statistically signiﬁ cant diﬀ erence between the reported severity of a constraint for the South Asian country and the average reported severity of constraint for countries at the 
same level of per capita GDP. The reported severity could still be signiﬁ cantly diﬀ erent even when there is an overlap. Analysis is based on pooled sample of enterprise surveys 
conducted between 2000 and 2010. The severity of constraint is rated by ﬁ rms on a 5-point scale, with 0 being no obstacle, 1 being a minor obstacle, 2 being a moderate 
obstacle, 3 being a major obstacle, and 4 being a very severe obstacle.
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Source: Carlin and Schaﬀ er 2011b (based on World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: The cross-country regression line shows the relationship between the percentage of ﬁ rms experiencing more than one power outage per month and 
the log of per capita GDP. The percentage of ﬁ rms is a conditional mean for benchmark ﬁ rms in each country. As the conditional means are calculated by 
holding constant the eﬀ ects of the ﬁ rm controls (ﬁ rm characteristics) using a simple linear procedure, the eﬀ ect of this can be, for unconditional country 
values that are at or close to 0 percent or 100 percent, to push the conditional mean under 0 percent or over 100 percent. The shaded area is the 95 percent 
conﬁ dence interval band around the regression line. Vertical bars show conﬁ dence intervals of 95 percent around the percentage of ﬁ rms experiencing 
power outages for countries in South Asia. The lack of overlap between a South Asian country conﬁ dence interval and the regression line conﬁ dence inter-
val is a conservative test of the statistically signiﬁ cant diﬀ erence between the share of ﬁ rms experiencing power outages in the South Asian country and the 
average share of ﬁ rms experiencing power outages in countries at the same level of per capita GDP. The share of ﬁ rms could still be signiﬁ cantly diﬀ erent 
even when there is an overlap. Analysis is based on pooled sample of enterprise surveys conducted between 2000 and 2010.
FIGURE 4.3 Cross-country comparisons of power outages
fi rms in richer countries can be expected to 
make more demands on the electricity grid, 
which would lead to rising severity of com-
plaints, those countries are better able to 
meet increased demand, resulting in lower 
levels of reported severity at higher incomes 
per capita. The severity of the constraint 
increased over time in India (between 2005 
and 2010), Nepal (between 2000 and 2009), 
and Pakistan (between 2002 and 2007 and 
between 2007 and 2010). 
This analysis covers only the urban for-
mal sector. Electricity is also one of the top 
binding constraints in the rural nonfarm and 
informal sectors, as discussed later in this 
chapter. 
Reported frequency of power outages—a 
direct fi rm-level estimate of the shared busi-
ness environment—is consistent with the 
reported severity of the constraint. Indeed, in 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal, virtu-
ally 100 percent of fi rms experience outages 
(fi gure 4.3). In Bangladesh, urban fi rms face 
an average of 98.5 power outages a month—
more than three a day (World Bank 2008c). 
Predictably, the use of generators to miti-
gate the effects of uncertain power supply is 
higher in South Asia than elsewhere, with 87 
percent of fi rms in Afghanistan, 52 percent 
in Sri Lanka, and 49 percent in India having 
generators. 
The high reported severity of the electricity 
constraint and level of power outages refl ect 
the signifi cant demand-supply gap in electric-
ity across the region caused by the failure of 
electricity supply to expand rapidly enough 
to keep up with robust economic and popula-
tion growth (box 4.1).
The unreliability of power supply and the 
frequency of power outages causes fi rms to 
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Access to and consumption of electricity are low in 
South Asia, where some 600 million people—more 
than 40 percent of the worldwide total—lack access to 
electricity. Access rates range from 44 percent of the 
population in Nepal to 77 percent in Sri Lanka (box 
table 4.1.1). Annual per capita electricity consump-
tion is highest in Bhutan (1,174 kilowatts [KWh]) 
and lowest in Nepal (KWh 89). India consumes 566 
KWh,  Pakistan 436 KWh, and Sri Lanka 409 KWh. 
The average annual per capita consumption for the 
region is 500 KWh—lower than in Africa (513 KWh) 
and China (2,500 KWh) and just 3.8 percent of con-
sumption in the United States (13,000 KWh) (World 
Bank 2011e). 
Robust economic and population growth over the 
past two decades have led to rapidly rising energy 
demand. Although the 2008 global fi nancial crisis 
slowed economic activity, regional growth prospects 
remain strong, with annual growth forecast to aver-
age 6 percent until 2015 (IMF 2010). Electricity 
consumption is likely to increase at an annual rate 
of about 6.0 percent in Bangladesh, 7.0 percent in 
India, and 8.8 percent in Pakistan, the region’s larg-
est power markets (by comparison, annual growth 
in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development countries is projected at 0.7 percent). 
The demand-supply gap is particularly wide in 
some countries. In addition, industrial  consumers 
typically pay high tariffs and cross-subsidize other 
consumer categories. In Bangladesh, the gap is esti-
mated to be 1,000 megawatts (MW). About 90 
percent of generation is fired by gas, which itself 
is in short supply. Power outages are estimated to 
cost Bangladesh about $1 billion a year, reducing 
GDP growth by about 0.5 percent (USAID 2007). 
In India, the gap between peak demand and supply 
is about 10 percent (World Bank 2010a). Industrial 
consumers in India pay 30–60 percent above the 
average level of tariffs, subsidizing agricultural and 
domestic consumers (KPMG 2009). Nepal’s grid-
connected installed generation capacity stands 
at 698 MW, but available capacity falls to nearly 
 one-third of installed capacity during the dry sea-
son. Peak demand stands at 885 MW, and consum-
ers face 16 hours of load shedding in dry winter 
months. In Pakistan, installed capacity is about 
22 gigawatts (GW), but technical problems, includ-
ing lack of fuel and inadequate maintenance of 
public sector thermal generation companies over 
prolonged periods, reduced actual available capac-
ity to 18 GW in 2010. Electricity demand exceeds 
supply by about 2–4 GW, and rolling blackouts 
can stretch up to 8–10 hours a day. The Ministry 
of Finance estimates the cumulative effect of the 
energy crisis on the economy at more than 2 per-
cent of GDP (Government of Pakistan 2010). An 
independent study conducted in 2008 estimated 
the cost of industrial load shedding to the economy 
at PRs. 210 billion, resulting in the loss of 400,000 
jobs and $1 billion worth of exports (IIP 2009). 
Industrial consumers typically pay high tariffs, 
subsidizing other consumers. The share of indus-
trial consumption is about 26 percent, but indus-
tries contributed 30 percent to revenue, indicating 
the extent of cross-subsidy. In Sri Lanka, the aver-
age customer paid $0.12/KWh in 2009, consider-
ably more than the average tariff in Bangladesh, 
India, Pakistan, or  Thailand of $0.05–$0.09/KWh 
(World Bank 2010b).
Sector fi nancial losses across the region are high, 
largely as a result of the misalignment of tariffs with 
the cost of supply and high transmission and distri-
bution losses, which arise from theft, faulty meter-
ing, and poor technology in transmitting power. 
The total sector defi cit in Bangladesh amounts to 
almost $300 million a year. In India, the combined 
BOX 4.1 Electricity challenges facing South Asia 
(continues next page)
lose production and incur high costs of self-
generation. Firms in South Asia lose a larger 
share of their output to power losses than 
fi rms in other regions—10.7 percent of sales 
for the region as a whole, up to 27 percent 
for Nepal—and spend more on generators 
(table 4.2). In addition to using generators, 
there is growing evidence that to cope with 
unreliable supply, firms adopt second-best 
production technologies, which imply large 
efficiency gaps (Alby, Dethier, and Straub 
2010). The persistent shortage of electricity 
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TABLE 4.2 Electricity constraints faced by ﬁ rms, by developing region 
Region/country
Percentage of fi rms 
citing electricity 
as major or severe 
constraint 
Average total 
time of power outages 
per month
Value lost due to 
power outages 
(percent of sales)
Percentage of fi rms 
owning generators
Africa  49.7 69.5 6.2 42.2
East Asia and Pacifi c  24.1 14.4 3.1 29.6
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 35.1 23.3 3.8 16.9
Latin America and the Caribbean  39.0 8.7 4.2 19.5
Middle East and North Africa  42.9 45.9 5.6 36.3
South Asia 53.4 139.4 10.7 42.8
 Afghanistan 66.2 280.3 6.4 71.1
 Bangladesh 78.4 113.2 10.6 52.3
 Bhutan 5.8 8.5 4.3 17.8
 India 32.0 — 6.6 41.4
 Nepal 75.6 226.2 27.0 15.7
 Pakistan 74.5 69.0 9.2 26.3
 Sri Lanka 41.3 — — 75.1
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys. 
Note: Regional averages are unweighted. Country averages are unconditional (that is, not for the benchmark ﬁ rm). — = Not available.
cash loss of state-owned distribution companies 
rose by nearly $22 billion a year, $9 billion attrib-
utable to transmission and distribution losses and 
the rest attributable to tariffs that did not cover the 
cost of generation (Mint 2011). The annual sector 
defi cit in Pakistan resulting from noncollection by 
distribution companies and below-cost recovery 
tariff is estimated at about $2 billion. These defi cits 
are met through subsidy payments by the govern-
ment,  short-term borrowing by companies, and the 
accumulation of receivables and payables on bal-
ance sheets.
BOX 4.1 Electricity challenges facing South Asia (continued)
BOX TABLE 4.1.1 Selected energy indicators in South Asia, by country 
Country 
Per capita 
electricity 
consumption 
(KWh per capita)
Percentage 
of population 
with access to 
electricity
Installed 
capacity 
(MW)
Estimated defi cit or surplus 
Estimated investment 
required in the medium 
term (billions of dollars)MW Percent
Bangladesh 208 49 6,727 –1,000 –13 15.0 (2015)
Bhutan 1,174 56 1,498 +1,300 +15 3.1 (2020)
India 566 66 159,000 –15,700 –13 280.0 (2015)
Nepal 89 44 698 –200 –30 —
Pakistan 436 62 22,000 –4,500 –20 32.5 (2020)
Sri Lanka 409 77 2,684 +800 +30 10.0 (2020)
Sources: Data on access to electricity and per capita electricity consumption data are from International Energy Agency database 2010. Data on estimated supply gaps 
and investment requirements are from the following sources: Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan: World Bank 2010a; Bhutan: Bhutan Electricity Authority (http://www
.bea.gov.bt); Nepal: Banerjee, Singh, and Samad 2011; Pakistan: Trimble, Yoshida, and Saqib 2011; Sri Lanka: Ceylon Electricity Board 2009; World Bank, 2011d.
Note: Data are for most recent year available. — = Not available.
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for industrial and commercial activities is 
likely to be a major factor limiting the com-
petitiveness of fi rms and dampening employ-
ment growth.8
Corruption 
Corruption is the abuse of power, usually 
for personal gain or the benefi t of a group 
to which allegiance is owed. Corruption in 
government is defi ned as the abuse or mis-
use of public offi ce or authority for private 
gain and benefi t that occurs at the interface 
of the public and private sectors.
Corruption poses serious challenges to 
development: it undermines democracy and 
good governance by subverting formal pro-
cesses, reduces accountability and representa-
tion in policymaking, and erodes the institu-
tional capacity of government as procedures 
are disregarded (Dininio, Kpundeh, and 
Leiken 1988). It may also create distortions 
and ineffi ciencies by diverting public invest-
ment away from priorities and into sectors 
and projects where kickbacks are more likely. 
Corruption also shields fi rms with access to 
infl uence from competition and may prevent 
small companies from growing.
Measuring the impact of corruption on 
fi rms is challenging because of the diffi culty 
of causal attribution and the fact that corrup-
tion data are subject to measurement error. 
Some observers claim that corruption reduces 
costs by cutting through red tape. In fact, 
corruption may increase red tape, in order to 
allow public offi cials to obtain more bribes. A 
survey of the literature on econometric studies 
that analyze the economic costs of corruption 
suggests that corruption is bad for economic 
growth and bad for a number of factors that 
tend to be correlated with economic growth: 
domestic investment, the quantity and com-
position of foreign direct investment, gov-
ernment expenditures on health and educa-
tion, the quantity and quality of government 
investment in infrastructure, and the returns 
to business and trade. Whatever the econo-
metric and data problems of measuring the 
impact of corruption on fi nal outcomes such 
as growth, corruption affects the perceptions 
of businesses, which in turn leads them to be 
more cautious regarding decisions to invest, 
expand, and hire.
The importance of corruption as a con-
straint for fi rms is refl ected in both the high 
reported severity of the corruption constraint 
and the high prevalence of bribes. The rela-
tionship between the reported severity of the 
corruption constraint and per capita GDP is 
characterized by low levels and low variation 
in rich countries and higher levels and more 
variation in low- and middle-income coun-
tries (figures 4.4 and 4.5). Bhutan and Sri 
Lanka have lower levels of reported severity 
of the corruption constraint than is typical 
at their level of per capita GDP. Of the fi ve 
countries in which corruption was among the 
top five constraints (Afghanistan, Bangla-
desh, India, Maldives, and Nepal), only Ban-
gladesh has higher levels of reported severity 
than typical for countries at the same level of 
per capita GDP. 
The data on the prevalence of bribes are 
consistent with those on corruption. Firms 
in Bangladesh report a very high prevalence 
of bribe payments in absolute and relative 
terms. Pakistan also has a higher preva-
lence of bribes than is typical at its level of 
per capita GDP. 
The high reported severity and prevalence 
of bribes is fairly consistent with the Cor-
ruption Perceptions Index 2010 reported by 
Transparency International (2010), which 
ranks (out of 178 countries) Afghanistan at 
176, Bangladesh at 134, and Pakistan at 143 
(India is 87). Box 4.2 describes in more detail 
the nature of corruption in South Asia.
South Asian fi rms report signifi cant costs 
associated with corruption, including direct 
costs (for example, the value of bribes paid) 
and indirect costs (for example, management 
time spent dealing with offi cials). Enterprises 
in Afghanistan pay more than 2 percent of 
their sales as bribes (World Bank 2008a). 
Firms in India report spending an average 
of 2.2 percent of sales on informal payments 
and an average 8.1 percent of managers’ 
time dealing with government (Ferrari and 
 Dhingra 2009). 
Corruption also distorts the economy 
by creating an unlevel playing field. The 
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FIGURE 4.5 Cross-country comparison of bribe payments
Source: Carlin and Schaﬀ er 2011b (based on World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: The cross-country regression line shows the relationship between the percentage of ﬁ rms reporting having made bribe payments and the log of per 
capita GDP. The percentage of ﬁ rms is a conditional mean for benchmark ﬁ rms in each country. As the conditional means are calculated by holding constant 
the eﬀ ects of the ﬁ rm controls (ﬁ rm characteristics) using a simple linear procedure, the eﬀ ect of this can be, for unconditional country values that are at or 
close to 0 percent or 100 percent, to push the conditional mean under 0 percent or over 100 percent. The shaded area is the 95 percent conﬁ dence interval 
band around the regression line. Vertical bars show conﬁ dence intervals of 95 percent around the percentage of ﬁ rms reporting having made bribe pay-
ments for countries in South Asia. The lack of overlap between a South Asian country conﬁ dence interval and the regression line conﬁ dence interval is a 
conservative test of the statistically signiﬁ cant diﬀ erence between the share of ﬁ rms reporting having made bribe payments in the South Asian country and 
the average share of ﬁ rms reporting having made bribe payments in countries at the same level of per capita GDP. The share of ﬁ rms could still be signiﬁ -
cantly diﬀ erent even when there is an overlap. Analysis is based on a pooled sample of enterprise surveys conducted between 2000 and 2010.
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FIGURE 4.4 Cross-country comparison of reported severity of corruption constraint 
Source: Carlin and Schaﬀ er 2011b (based on World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: The cross-country regression line shows the relationship between the reported severity of the constraint for a benchmark ﬁ rm and the log of per 
capita GDP. The shaded area is the 95 percent conﬁ dence interval band around the regression line. Vertical bars show conﬁ dence intervals of 95 percent 
around the reported severity of the constraint for countries in South Asia. The lack of overlap between the South Asian country conﬁ dence interval and the 
regression line conﬁ dence interval is a conservative test of the statistically signiﬁ cant diﬀ erence between the reported severity of a constraint for the South 
Asian country and the average reported severity of constraint for countries at the same level of per capita GDP. The reported severity could still be signiﬁ -
cantly diﬀ erent even when there is an overlap. Analysis is based on pooled sample of enterprise surveys conducted between 2000 and 2010. The severity 
of constraint is rated by ﬁ rms on a 5-point scale, with 0 being no obstacle, 1 being a minor obstacle, 2 being a moderate obstacle, 3 being a major obstacle, 
and 4 being a very severe obstacle.
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BOX 4.2 Corruption in South Asia 
Enterprise surveys, which asks fi rms if they have 
encountered bribes by different types of interac-
tions with public officials, suggest that firms in 
South Asia face a high level of corruption in a range 
of interactions with public offi cials, particularly for 
utilities and tax inspections. 
The government interactions that have the 
 highest frequency of bribes vary by country (box 
fi gure 4.2.1). The highest frequency occurs in the 
following situations:
•  Afghanistan: Government contracts (43 percent) 
and electrical connection (38 percent)
•  Bangladesh: Utilities (42–76 percent), tax meetings 
(54 percent), and import licenses (51 percent) 
•  India: Construction permits (67 percent), tax meet-
ings (52 percent), operating licenses (52 percent), 
electrical connections (40 percent) 
•  Pakistan: Electricity (71 percent), water con-
nections (62 percent), and tax meetings (59 
percent)
The high frequency of bribes faced in connecting 
to power supply is another dimension of the issue of 
access to electricity. It may be related to businesses 
having to compete to secure much needed power 
(World Bank 2008c). 
More than half of firms in Bangladesh, India, 
and Pakistan are expected to pay bribes during 
tax inspections. These countries also report very 
high severity of tax administration (among their 
top five constraints). The tax systems in these 
countries are complex, creating not only high 
costs of compliance but also opportunities for 
corruption.
Source: Authors, based on data from World Bank enterprise surveys.
Note: Figures show percent of ﬁ rms in South Asian countries citing corruption as one of their top three constraints.
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FIGURE 4.6 Cross-country comparison of reported severity of political instability constraint
Source: Carlin and Schaﬀ er 2011b (based on World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: The cross-country regression line shows the relationship between the reported severity of the constraint for a benchmark ﬁ rm and the log of per 
capita GDP. The shaded area is the 95 percent conﬁ dence interval band around the regression line. Vertical bars show conﬁ dence intervals of 95 percent 
around the reported severity of the constraint for countries in South Asia. The lack of overlap between the South Asian country conﬁ dence interval and the 
regression line conﬁ dence interval is a conservative test of the statistically signiﬁ cant diﬀ erence between the reported severity of a constraint for the South 
Asian country and the average reported severity of constraint for countries at the same level of per capita GDP. The reported severity could still be signiﬁ -
cantly diﬀ erent even when there is an overlap. Analysis is based on a pooled sample of enterprise surveys conducted between 2000 and 2010. The severity 
of constraint is rated by ﬁ rms on a 5-point scale, with 0 being no obstacle, 1 being a minor obstacle, 2 being a moderate obstacle, 3 being a major obstacle, 
and 4 being a very severe obstacle. Enterprise surveys in India, Maldives, and Sri Lanka did not ask ﬁ rms about political instability.
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constraints analysis finds that expanding/
job-creating firms, manufacturing firms, 
importing and exporting firms, and firms 
in larger cities are more constrained by cor-
ruption than other fi rms. The greater sever-
ity probably refl ects the greater use of public 
services, such as electricity for manufacturing 
fi rms; higher levels of interactions with pub-
lic offi cials (to, for example, obtain import 
licenses); and the fact that larger cities have 
higher concentrations of economic resources. 
These firms are also the most productive, 
making the opportunity cost of corruption—
goods and services not produced because of 
resources and time dedicated to overcoming 
corruption activities—even higher. The India 
investment climate assessment (Ferrari and 
Dhingra 2009) indicates that manufactur-
ing firms on average pay a higher percent-
age of sales in bribes and spend more time 
on average dealing with government offi-
cials than do service firms (manufacturing 
fi rms reportedly pay 4.9 percent of sales in 
and devote 12.6 percent of managers’ time 
to bribes). In Pakistan, manufacturing fi rms 
are also more likely than service fi rms to pay 
bribes across a range of interactions with 
public offi cials.
Political instability 
In the fi ve countries in which surveys asked 
about the political instability constraint 
(Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, 
Nepal, and Pakistan), all except Bhutan 
reported it as one of the top three constraints. 
The reported costs of political instability 
are higher in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and 
Nepal than in other countries at similar lev-
els of per capita GDP (fi gure 4.6). These three 
countries have some of the highest reported 
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FIGURE 4.7 Cross-country comparison of reported severity of tax administration constraint
Source: Carlin and Schaﬀ er 2011b (based on World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: The cross-country regression line shows the relationship between the reported severity of the constraint for a benchmark ﬁ rm and the log of per 
capita GDP. The shaded area is the 95 percent conﬁ dence interval band around the regression line. Vertical bars show conﬁ dence intervals of 95 percent 
around the reported severity of the constraint for countries in South Asia. The lack of overlap between the South Asian country conﬁ dence interval and the 
regression line conﬁ dence interval is a conservative test of the statistically signiﬁ cant diﬀ erence between the reported severity of a constraint for the South 
Asian country and the average reported severity of constraint for countries at the same level of per capita GDP. The reported severity could still be signiﬁ -
cantly diﬀ erent even when there is an overlap. Analysis is based on a pooled sample of enterprise surveys conducted between 2000 and 2010. The severity 
of constraint is rated by ﬁ rms on a 5-point scale, with 0 being no obstacle, 1 being a minor obstacle, 2 being a moderate obstacle, 3 being a major obstacle, 
and 4 being a very severe obstacle.
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costs of political instability in the world. 
(Chapter 7 examines the effect of armed 
confl ict, which is one key aspect of political 
instability, on fi rms and workers.) 
Tax administration
Tax administration is a major issue in some 
countries in South Asia (table 4.1). It is the 
top-ranked constraint in Pakistan, where 
the reported severity is above the average for 
countries at similar levels of per capita GDP 
(fi gure 4.7). As annex 4B shows, many tax 
systems in South Asia are complex, making 
tax compliance very costly for fi rms. 
Tax rates
Taxes matter to business and individuals. 
Businesses and people talk about them, 
complain about them, and often try to 
avoid paying them when they can. Taxation 
also affects the ways in which businesses 
organize their activities and produce goods 
and services, which in turn affects the struc-
ture of taxation (Bird and Zolt 2007).
Firms in India and Pakistan report tax 
rates as their top constraint in terms of sever-
ity; Sri Lankan fi rms report tax rates to be 
the third-most severe constraint. However, 
as explained in the methodology, one cannot 
directly infer the real cost of the constraint 
from the reported severity. Other measures 
have been used to assess whether tax rates are 
indeed a binding constraint (see annex 4B). 
It seems likely that it is the complexity and 
lack of uniformity of tax systems rather than 
the tax rates themselves that impose signifi -
cant costs on fi rms. These tax systems create 
distortions in the economy and make it dif-
fi cult to raise adequate revenues. Simplify-
ing the tax regimes (by reducing the number 
of taxes and exemptions) and widening the 
tax base is likely to benefi t fi rms and remove 
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distortions in the economy. By increasing 
compliance, governments can maintain tax 
revenues while reducing statutory rates.
Constraints facing expanding/
job-creating ﬁ rms 
The benchmark fi rm is useful for comparing 
the costs of constraints to fi rms across South 
Asia and the rest of the world. However, the 
main interest here is in understanding how 
these constraints affect employment creation. 
This section therefore examines the reported 
cost of constraints facing expanding/job-
creating fi rms, because relaxing  constraints 
on these fi rms is likely to produce the largest 
increases in employment. Job-creating fi rms 
also perform well: employment growth is 
positively and signifi cantly correlated with 
research and development, introduction of 
new processes and products, sales to mul-
tinational companies, the education level of 
the manager, and in-house training.9 There-
fore, relaxing constraints on job-creating 
fi rms is likely to produce large increases in 
output as well.
Job-creating fi rms—which are similar in 
all respects to the benchmark firm except 
that they expanded employment during the 
preceding three years—report higher levels 
of severity than the benchmark fi rm for 14 
of the 16 constraints (fi gure 4.8). They also 
report higher levels of mitigation activities 
(paying bribes and using generators). This 
pattern holds strongly in India and Paki-
stan, where the difference between the cost 
of constraints facing expanding fi rms and the 
benchmark fi rm is largest.10 
Although the level of severity changes, 
job-creating and benchmark fi rms in most 
countries rank constraints in a similar 
order: electricity, corruption, and politi-
cal stability are the top three constraints 
among both types of fi rms, and the rank-
ings of other constraints are similar (table 
4.3). Only in Pakistan do the rankings by 
the benchmark and job-creating fi rms differ: 
corruption becomes the joint top constraint 
for expanding fi rms. Using alternative per-
formance measures, such as productivity 
and innovation, reveals a similar pattern: 
well-performing fi rms report higher costs 
but similar ranking of constraints as poorly 
performing fi rms.
Constraints facing nonbenchmark ﬁ rms
In general, the ranking of constraints facing 
different types of fi rms in the urban formal 
manufacturing sector is very similar to the 
ranking by the benchmark fi rm, although the 
level of severity differs. The patterns described 
below are consistent across countries in South 
Asia (fi gure 4.9).
Service fi rms generally report lower sever-
ity of constraints than manufacturing fi rms. 
Firms in the service sector are typically less 
capital intensive, more dependent on commu-
nications, and less engaged in trade than man-
ufacturing fi rms. Indeed, service fi rms in South 
Asia report lower constraints for  electricity, 
labor regulations, and custom administration 
(but higher cost for telecommunications). The 
difference between manufacturing and service 
FIGURE 4.8 Severity of constraints reported by South Asian 
benchmark (nonexpanding) and expanding ﬁ rm in the urban formal 
sector 
Source: Authors, based on Carlin and Schaﬀ er 2011b (based on World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: Analysis is based on a pooled sample of enterprise surveys conducted between 2000 and 
2010. A point farther away from the origin indicates that the business constraint is considered more 
severe. The severity of constraint is rated by ﬁ rms on a 5-point scale, with 0 being no obstacle, 1 
being a minor obstacle, 2 being a moderate obstacle, 3 being a major obstacle, and 4 being a very 
severe obstacle. Only statistically signiﬁ cant diﬀ erences in reported severity between benchmark 
and nonbenchmark ﬁ rms are shown. Access to ﬁ nance and tax rates constraints are excluded.
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fi rms is particularly marked in India, where 
service fi rms report far less severe constraints 
than manufacturing fi rms in electricity, labor 
regulations, customs, tax rates and adminis-
tration, and access to fi nance.11
Relative to smaller firms, larger formal 
fi rms which, on average produce higher out-
put per worker (see chapter 3), report more 
severe constraints and a larger number of mit-
igation activities, including management time 
spent on regulations and use of generators.12 
They are also subject to more inspections. 
The difference between the benchmark fi rm 
with 30 employees and a fi rm with the same 
characteristics but with 60 employees is small 
in India and larger in Nepal, Pakistan, and 
Sri Lanka. In Nepal, and to a lesser extent Sri 
Lanka, the cost of labor regulations increases 
signifi cantly with fi rm size (see annex 4C). 
Exporters and importers in South Asia 
report more severe constraints, except in 
Bangladesh. Importers are more constrained 
by customs administration and anticom-
petitive behavior. Macroeconomic instabil-
ity is more problematic for both types of 
fi rms, which is likely to refl ect sensitivity to 
exchange rate movements and uncertainty. 
Exporters in Bangladesh report lower costs 
of constraints relative to nonexporters for 
electricity and most aspects of institutional 
TABLE 4.3 Top ﬁ ve constraints reported by South Asian benchmark (nonexpanding) and expanding ﬁ rm in the urban formal 
sector, by country
Constraint
South Asian 
region Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
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Electricity 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1
Political 
instability 1 1 1 1 2 2 n.a. n.a. 1 1 3 1 n.a. n.a.
Corruption 3 3 3 4 3 3 2 1 3 4 4 4 1
Tax 
administration 4 4 5 5 5 5 3 3 1 4
Labor 
regulations 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 5
Inadequately
educated labor 2 2 5 5 2 2
Access to land 4 5 4 4 1 1
Transport 1 1 3 3
Government 
policy 
uncertainty 5 5 4 3 2 2
Courts 4 5 5
Crime, theft, and 
disorder 5 3 5 3
Business 
licensing 4 4
Macro instability 5 3 3
Competition 4 4
Source: Authors, based on Carlin and Schaﬀ er 2011b (based on World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: Analysis is based on pooled sample of enterprise surveys conducted between 2000 and 2010. n.a. = Not applicable (question was not asked). Access to ﬁ nance and tax rates 
constraints are excluded.
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infrastructure pattern (see annex 4C). This 
pattern may be explained by the large num-
ber of export processing zones in Bangladesh, 
which offer better infrastructure and regula-
tory environments.
In conclusion, addressing the top con-
straints of electricity, political stability, and 
corruption would benefi t all types of fi rms. 
But larger job-creating fi rms in the manufac-
turing sector would benefi t most, as the costs 
of the constraints are higher for them.
Constraints in the rural nonfarm 
and informal sectors
This section looks at the severity of con-
straints on fi rm operations reported by micro 
benchmark fi rms (fi rms with no more than 
fi ve employees) in the rural nonfarm sector 
and informal (urban) sector and compares 
them with those reported by micro bench-
mark fi rms in the urban formal sector. The 
rural nonfarm sector has been shown to 
offer higher-paid jobs to rural workers than 
the agricultural sector, with wages on par 
with or even higher than similar categories 
of employment in the urban sector. The 
growth of rural nonfarm enterprises will 
play an important role in the creation of bet-
ter jobs. Although informal fi rms are smaller 
and less productive than formal fi rms, they 
employ the most workers. Addressing their 
constraints is therefore important in creating 
better jobs.
Rural nonfarm sector 
In general, rural firms face fewer and less 
severe constraints than urban firms (fig-
ure 4.10 and table 4.4). This pattern is not 
unusual in developing countries, where urban 
fi rms are typically more productive and place 
more demands on public services than their 
rural counterparts. Electricity, macroeco-
nomic instability, and political instability 
remain important constraints for rural fi rms. 
Transport is a greater concern for rural fi rms 
than it is for urban fi rms. Rural fi rms are less 
concerned about corruption, taxes, and labor 
regulations than their urban counterparts.
Like urban fi rms, rural fi rms rank electric-
ity as one of their top constraints and report 
similar levels of power outages. In Bangla-
desh, 73 percent of nonmetropolitan nonfarm 
enterprises have an electricity connection. Of 
fi rms without electricity: 32 percent complain 
about high connection costs, 32 percent report 
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FIGURE 4.9 Severity of constraints reported by South Asian 
benchmark (manufacturing) and service ﬁ rm in the urban 
formal sector 
Source: Authors, based on Carlin and Schaﬀ er 2011b (based on World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: Analysis is based on a pooled sample of enterprise surveys conducted between 2000 and 
2010. A point farther away from the origin indicates that the business constraint is considered more 
severe. The severity of constraint is rated by ﬁ rms on a 5-point scale, with 0 being no obstacle, 1 
being a minor obstacle, 2 being a moderate obstacle, 3 being a major obstacle, and 4 being a very 
severe obstacle. Only statistically signiﬁ cant diﬀ erences in reported severity between benchmark 
and nonbenchmark ﬁ rms are shown. Access to ﬁ nance and tax rates constraints are excluded.
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not needing electricity, and 25 percent report 
no supply in their location. Among fi rms with 
connections, 99 percent report outages. In 
Pakistan, the median number of outages per 
month is 20 days in villages and 15 days in 
small towns. In Sri Lanka, the shortage and 
unreliability of power is exacerbated in rural 
areas where less than 70 percent of enter-
prises use electricity from the national grid. 
The propensity for rural households to start 
up a nonfarm enterprise is 14 percent lower in 
areas where electricity is found to be a major 
constraint.13
Rural fi rms also rank macroeconomic and 
political instability as important constraints. 
One should be cautious in interpreting these 
results, however, as the macroeconomic insta-
bility question was asked only in  Bangladesh 
and refers to infl ationary concerns and the 
political instability question was asked only 
in  Bangladesh and Pakistan. 
Rural fi rms (especially microenterprises) 
report access to fi nance as one of the top con-
straints. In Pakistan, more than 30 percent of 
small towns and rural fi rms report access to 
fi nance, cost of fi nance, and loan procedures 
(separately) as a major or severe constraint. 
In contrast, none of the other constraints 
was ranked as major or severe by more than 
16 percent of fi rms. These results cannot be 
interpreted directly as evidence that access to 
fi nance is a constraint to operations, though 
the fi nding is consistent with other evidence 
that suggests that access to fi nance may be 
an issue for micro and small fi rms (including 
rural nonfarm enterprises) (see annex 4D).
In Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, rural 
fi rms perceive low demand for their products 
as one of the top fi ve constraints, refl ecting 
low access to larger markets.14 Rural fi rms 
sell predominantly to local customers, limit-
ing the size of the market for their  products 
and services. In Bangladesh, the majority 
of nonmetropolitan enterprises sell their 
goods and services directly to customers 
located within the same union or ward; less 
than 1 percent of nonmetropolitan enter-
prises have subcontracting arrangements 
with metropolitan firms.15 Infrastructure 
bottlenecks, limited contacts and business 
FIGURE 4.10 Severity of constraints reported by micro 
benchmark ﬁ rm in urban and rural sectors of Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka 
Source: Authors, based on Carlin and Schaﬀ er 2011a (based on World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: Analysis is based on a pooled sample of enterprise surveys conducted in Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
and Sri Lanka between 2000 and 2010. A point farther away from the origin indicates that the 
business constraint is considered more severe. The severity of constraint is rated by ﬁ rms on a 
5-point scale, with 0 being no obstacle, 1 being a minor obstacle, 2 being a moderate obstacle, 3 
being a major obstacle, and 4 being a very severe obstacle. Only statistically signiﬁ cant diﬀ erences 
in reported severity between the micro benchmark ﬁ rms in urban and rural sectors are shown. 
Access to ﬁ nance and tax rates constraints are excluded. The low demand constraint is excluded 
because it was asked only in the rural surveys and is susceptible to endogeneity issues. Crime, theft, 
and disorder as well as competition constraints were not asked in the rural surveys. Macro instability 
was asked only in Bangladesh, and political instability was asked only in Bangladesh and Pakistan.
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TABLE 4.4 Top ﬁ ve constraints reported by micro benchmark ﬁ rm in 
the urban and rural sectors of Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka 
Constraint
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
Urban, formal Rural
Electricity 1 2
Political instability 2 3
Corruption 3
Macro instability 4 1
Access to land 5
Transport 4
Source: Authors, based on Carlin and Schaﬀ er 2011a (based on World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: Analysis is based on a pooled sample of enterprise surveys conducted in Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
and Sri Lanka between 2000 and 2010. Access to ﬁ nance and tax rates constraints are excluded. The 
low demand constraint is excluded because it was asked only in the rural surveys and is susceptible 
to endogeneity issues. Crime, theft, and disorder as well as competition constraints were not asked 
in the rural surveys. Macro instability was asked only in Bangladesh and political instability was 
asked only in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Only the top four constraints are shown for rural ﬁ rms, as the 
remaining constraints were not reported on average as obstacles.
networks, poor contract enforcement, and 
low quality of production are the main fac-
tors behind limited access to larger markets 
and subcontracting. Concerns over quality 
lead to vertical integration of metropolitan 
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fi rms. A quarter of the fi rms that did not 
subcontract cited difficulties in ensuring 
quality control; another quarter cited lack 
of predictability and reliability of supply 
(World Bank 2008c). 
Low market demand does not necessar-
ily reflect market failure. It is affected by 
the fi rms’ characteristics (a poor-performing 
fi rm that does not make goods suitable for 
the market will face low demand). Endogeni-
ety issues make it diffi cult to interpret high 
reported severity as a business environment 
constraint to fi rms. 
Low market demand is consistent with 
fi rms citing transport (road conditions and 
accessibility of roads) as one of their top four 
constraints. Nonmetropolitan enterprises in 
Bangladesh identify inaccessibility of roads 
during certain seasons as a major or severe 
constraint. Regression analysis shows that the 
greater the distance to the nearest medium-
size city (a city with a population of 100,000 
or more), the greater the likelihood that a 
nonmetropolitan manufacturer will identify 
low demand as a major or severe constraint. 
In Pakistan, 16 percent of rural enterprises 
surveyed (far more than small town enter-
prises) cite road quality and 14 percent cite 
availability of transport as a major or severe 
constraint. In Sri Lanka, nearly a third of 
rural enterprises (versus 20 percent of urban 
enterprises) cite transport as a major or severe 
obstacle to operation or growth of business. 
Among fi rms that describe transport as an 
obstacle, 35 percent cite road quality, 33 
percent cite lack of access to roads, and 32 
percent cite lack of available transport as the 
underlying issue. These results are not sur-
prising, as poor transport limits access to 
larger, urban markets.
Good-quality transport infrastructure is 
critical for facilitating urban-rural nonfarm 
sector linkages. The India poverty assess-
ment (World Bank 2011b) uses the varia-
tion in the nonfarm sector across India 
to explore the determinants of rural non-
farm growth. It fi nds that the expansion of 
employment in the nonfarm sector is more 
closely linked to urban than agricultural 
growth. A simple multivariate regression 
analysis using Nepal census data also 
shows that rural nonfarm employment has 
a statistical and practical positive associa-
tion with income growth in nearby urban 
centers.16A one percentage point decline in 
urban poverty is associated with a 0.1–0.2 
percentage point increase in the rural non-
farm employment rate. Urban growth can 
increase the demand for goods and ser-
vices produced by the rural nonfarm sec-
tor, which otherwise might be limited by 
the small size of their local markets. The 
rural nonfarm sector can produce goods 
to be directly consumed by urban consum-
ers or by urban firms through backward 
contracting arrangements. Linkages to 
urban markets are hindered by weak trans-
port infrastructure connecting rural areas 
to urban areas (as well as lack of market 
information and the inability of rural non-
farm firms to produce goods demanded 
in the urban areas). Assessments of rural 
transport in South Asia would help policy 
makers develop specifi c options.
Rural fi rms are much less concerned than 
urban fi rms with corruption, taxes, and labor 
regulations. This fi nding is consistent with the 
fact that rural fi rms report less engagement 
with offi cials than urban fi rms (inspections 
and management time) and that about half 
of rural fi rms are informal (just 40 percent of 
rural fi rms in Bangladesh and 53 percent in 
Sri Lanka were registered).
Informal urban sector
Figure 4.11 and table 4.5 contrast the rank-
ing and severity of constraints reported by 
micro benchmark fi rms in the formal and 
informal sectors of urban areas of India.
Like formal firms, informal firms rank 
electricity as one of their top constraints and 
report similar levels of power outages. For-
mal fi rms in India cite power as their great-
est constraint; informal fi rms cite it as their 
second-greatest constraint (after access to 
fi nance). Power outages and loss of sales as 
a result of outages are very high for informal 
firms (11.3 percent of annual sales lost to 
power outages).
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FIGURE 4.11 Severity of constraints reported by micro benchmark 
ﬁ rm in India’s urban formal and informal sectors 
Source: Authors, based on Carlin and Schaﬀ er 2011a (based on World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: Analysis is based on a pooled sample of enterprise surveys conducted in India between 2000 
and 2010. A point farther away from the origin indicates that the business constraint is considered 
more severe. The severity of constraint is rated by ﬁ rms on a 5-point scale, with 0 being no obstacle, 
1 being a minor obstacle, 2 being a moderate obstacle, 3 being a major obstacle, and 4 being a 
very severe obstacle. Only statistically signiﬁ cant diﬀ erences in reported severity between the 
micro benchmark ﬁ rms in formal and informal sectors are shown. Access to ﬁ nance and tax rates 
constraints are excluded. The low demand constraint is excluded because it was asked only in the 
informal surveys and is susceptible to endogeneity issues. Political instability was not asked in the 
India surveys.
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TABLE 4.5 Top ﬁ ve constraints reported by micro benchmark ﬁ rm in 
India’s urban formal and informal sectors
India
Formal Informal
Electricity 1 1
Corruption 2
Tax administration 3
Crime, theft, and disorder 4
Access to land 5 3
Competition 2
Transport 4
Government policy uncertainty 5
Source: Authors, based on Carlin and Schaﬀ er 2011a (based on World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: Analysis is based on a pooled sample of enterprise surveys conducted in India between 2000 
and 2010. Access to ﬁ nance and tax rates constraints are excluded. The low demand constraint 
is excluded because it was asked only in the informal surveys and is susceptible to endogeneity 
issues. Political instability was not asked in the India surveys.
Informal fi rms cite lack of access to fi nance 
as the top constraint they face: in 2005, more 
than a third of informal fi rms viewed it as the 
single greatest obstacle. In contrast, formal 
fi rms cite access to fi nance as the fi fth- greatest 
obstacle. This finding does not necessarily 
mean that access to fi nance is a binding con-
straint for informal fi rms (see the earlier dis-
cussion of the endogeneity problem), nor does 
it necessarily mean that access to fi nance is a 
greater constraint to informal fi rms than for-
mal fi rms. However, given the overwhelming 
response by informal fi rms, this issue merits 
the analysis reported in the next section. 
Informal fi rms are more concerned about 
access to land and transport than formal 
fi rms and (like rural fi rms) less concerned 
about corruption, taxes, and labor regula-
tions. This finding is consistent with the 
fact that informal fi rms report less manage-
ment time spent with offi cials than formal 
fi rms. 
The concern regarding access to land 
expressed by urban informal fi rms in India 
may reflect the impact of regulations that 
shape the operation of land markets. Den-
sity regulations, which limit the ratio of fl oor 
space to plot area, lead cities to expand out-
ward instead of upward. Together with lim-
ited accessibility of public transport, such 
expansion can make it more difficult for 
informal manufacturing units to locate where 
they should—close to buyers and suppli-
ers. Relaxing density regulations, improving 
urban transport, and increasing the supply 
of property might help reduce the severity of 
the land constraint for informal urban fi rms 
(World Bank 2011a). 
Access to ﬁ nance
A growing body of empirical research has 
established a positive association between 
fi nancial sector and economic development 
(countries with higher levels of credit to the 
private sector relative to GDP experienced 
higher real per capita GDP growth rates 
between 1980 and 2007) and between access 
to external finance and firm productivity 
(see, for example, Banerjee and Dufl o 2008; 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic 
2005). Though in general it is very diffi cult 
to control for endogeniety in these types of 
analyses, the studies suggest that if fi nance 
is indeed a binding constraint, it could have 
a signifi cant adverse effect on productivity 
and growth. 
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Firms in all South Asian countries report 
access to fi nance as one of their top fi ve con-
straints. The reported severity is higher for 
informal, rural, and small fi rms. To circum-
vent endogeniety issues, this book looks at 
alternative indicators, including financial 
depth and outreach/access indicators, to see 
whether there is other evidence suggesting 
that access to fi nance is a severe constraint to 
fi rms (see annex 4D). It does not fi nd strong 
evidence that access to fi nance is a binding 
constraint for all types of firms in South 
Asia. Firm-level data from enterprise sur-
veys show that smaller fi rms in South Asia 
use less external finance (this evidence is 
consistent with evidence from other regions). 
Small firms in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
use less external fi nance than small fi rms in 
other regions. Microenterprises in the infor-
mal and rural sector report even lower use 
of external fi nance than small fi rms in the 
formal sector, refl ecting less access to bank-
ing services in general and the large number 
of fi rms that are unable to apply for credit 
because they cannot meet the loan require-
ments, especially with regard to collat-
eral. The evidence suggests that addressing 
access to fi nance issues for micro, small, and 
medium-size enterprises may be important 
in some countries.17 
After studying the evidence on whether 
small and medium-size enterprises in Asia 
are credit constrained, the Asian Develop-
ment Bank (2009) concluded that studies 
are subject to numerous endogeniety issues. 
It noted that although the evidence may be 
inconclusive, policy makers believe lack of 
credit is an important issue and have already 
introduced many active interventions. The 
next section assesses which of these inter-
ventions is technically appropriate and eco-
nomically justifi ed. 
Demand-side policy options
This section suggests policy options to 
overcome some of the binding constraints 
faced by fi rms in South Asia. Policy options 
are based on experiences from coun-
tries inside and outside the region. The 
relevance of each option for an individual 
country will depend on country-specific 
issues and contexts.
Electricity policy options 
Alleviating the demand gap across all seg-
ments in the value chain requires at least 
$300 billion by 2020 ($280 billion for India 
only) (see box 4.1). The private sector is pro-
jected to continue to be the leading fi nan-
cier. Since 1990, it has invested $121 billion 
in the sector, 85 percent since 2000 (table 
4.6). India has attracted about 90 percent 
of the regional investment in the power sec-
tor with private participation (World Bank 
2011c). The private sector’s contribution to 
total power sector investments in India rose 
from 21 percent under the 10th Plan to 36 
percent under the 11th Plan; it is expected 
to reach about 50 percent in the 12th Plan, 
beginning in 2012 (Economic Times 2011; 
Government of India 2009).
If these improvements in closing the elec-
tricity gap are to be sustained or increased, 
countries will need to continue to create 
enabling environments to improve sector 
performance and foster additional invest-
ment. Key actions include deepening market 
and institutional reforms and improving the 
commercial and financial viability of the 
sector. 
Deepening market and institutional reforms
Beginning in the mid- to late 1990s, coun-
tries put in place overarching policy and 
legal frameworks and restructured power 
utilities to make investments more attrac-
tive and commercialize utilities to enhance 
service delivery. Most countries established 
regulatory bodies; separated segments 
(generation, transmission, and distribu-
tion); and implemented a host of measures 
to attract the private sector, particularly in 
generation. (See table 4.7 for a summary 
of market reforms in the power sector in 
South Asia.) Bangladesh and Pakistan also 
unbundled their power markets to some 
extent, with the prevailing market model 
the single buyer with independent power 
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producers or rental power plants selling 
their power at regulated prices. The unbun-
dling of the Water and Power Develop-
ment Authority in Pakistan into a number 
of generation companies was formalized in 
2001 and 2002. Bhutan unbundled only the 
power generation segment by establishing 
a power company responsible for domes-
tic power (Bhutan Power Corporation) and 
another company responsible for operating 
the export-oriented hydropower projects 
(Druk Green Power Company). In India, 
the generation, transmission, distribution 
segments include a number of players (both 
TABLE 4.6 Private investment in electricity in South Asia, by 
country, 1999–2000 and 2001–10
(millions of dollars)
Country 1999–2000 2001–10 Total
Afghanistan 0 2 2
Bangladesh 573  823  1,397 
Bhutan 0 201 201
India 11,039  97,683 108,722
Nepal 239 34 273
Pakistan 5,937 4,496 10,433
Sri Lanka 177 271 488
Total  17,966 103,510 121,475
Source: World Bank PPI database (http://www.ppi.worldbank.org).
Note: Data on Maldives are not available.
TABLE 4.7 Market reforms in the power sector in selected countries in South Asia 
Country
Market 
structure Regulator
Role of 
public sector Role of private sector Role of competition
Bangladesh Unbundled Bangladesh 
Electricity 
Regulatory 
Commission
Companies created 
after unbundling 
continue to be 
state owned.
Government launched program 
in 2010 to attract independent 
power producers and boost 
private investment in generation. 
Because of gas shortages, most 
independent power producers and 
rental plants are small and oil fi red.
Competition limited and confi ned 
to generation sector
India Unbundled Electricity 
regulatory 
commissions in 
most states
Public sector owns 
large shares of 
the transmission 
and distribution 
segments.
Private sector assets and fi nancing 
are concentrated in generation; 
limited private presence in 
transmission and negligible 
presence in distribution.
Long-term agreements by 
independent power producers, 
public-private partnerships 
in transmission, distribution 
franchisees. Policy framework 
shifting from guaranteed return 
on assets to tariff s based on 
competitive bidding
Nepal Horizontally 
integrated
None Public sector owns 
large shares of 
the transmission 
and distribution 
segments.
Signifi cant participation of 
independent power producers in 
generation.
Competition introduced in 
generation.
Pakistan Unbundled National electric 
power regulatory 
authority
Companies created 
after unbundling 
continue to be 
state owned.
Independent power producers 
own one-third of generation 
capacity.
Further strengthening of the 
regulatory framework envisaged 
to enable competition and market-
oriented systems for power pricing, 
trading, and exchange.
Sri Lanka Horizontally 
integrated
Multisector 
public utilities 
regulatory 
Public sector owns 
large shares of 
the transmission 
and distribution 
segments.
Limitation of private investment 
above 25 MW unless there is 
shareholding by the government. 
Independent power producers 
supply oil-dependent power to 
the grid.
Limited
Source: Authors’ compilation, based on Besant-Jones 2006. 
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public and private) as well as electricity 
traders, who participate in a competitive 
electricity wholesale market. Nepal and 
Sri Lanka retain their vertically integrated 
state-owned company. 
Countries also have to strengthen insti-
tutions in order to effi ciently expand capac-
ity. The region has pursued ambitious plans 
to meet power shortages. In India alone, 
power sector investments have to increase 
from about $7 billion a year to about $30–
$40 billion a year by 2012, under the 11th 
Plan, which calls for total investment of 
$150 billion. Total investment is expected 
to double to $300 billion under the 12th 
Plan (2012–17) (Banerji and Mishra 2010). 
India added 50 GW between 2006 and 2011 
and implemented a series of “ultra mega” 
(4,000 MW) generation projects based on 
competitive bidding by independent power 
producers. It also set up a functioning trad-
ing market for contracts of less than a year. 
In 2010/11, the short-term power market 
constituted 10 percent of the total power 
procured in India (Central Electricity Regu-
latory Commission 2011). 
Bangladesh plans to develop 9,426 MW 
of new generation capacity by 2015, at an 
estimated cost of about $15 billion, includ-
ing associated transmission and distribution 
investments and fuel development and sup-
ply facilities. Bhutan has established public-
private partnerships and secured financing 
on commercial terms for a large export-
 oriented hydropower project (Dagachhu 
HPP). Between 2008 and 2010, Pakistan 
added more than 2,000 MW of capacity. It 
expects to commission 300 MW of hydro-
power by 2012. 
Further improvements in the operating 
environment are needed to increase invest-
ments in generation. Generation shortages are 
caused primarily by procedural bottlenecks 
(land acquisition, environmental and forest 
clearances, and provision of water for ther-
mal plants); limited technical and fi nancial 
capacity to implement large projects; the lack 
of fuel and the inability to import it; and dif-
fi culty in accessing domestic resources (such 
as coal in India, which lies under forests or 
in tribal areas, or hydropower in Nepal, the 
development of which has been limited by 
political instability). 
There is more scope for private players in 
the transmission and distribution sectors, 
where investments have been  considerably 
lower than in generation, reflecting the 
natural monopoly nature of transmission 
and difficulties in tackling longstanding 
underpricing and theft in distribution. In 
India, several public-private partnership 
contracts have been competitively awarded 
on a Build, Own, Operate, and Maintain 
or a Design, Build, Finance, Operate, and 
Transfer basis. India and Pakistan have 
also pursued private participation in power 
distribution as a means of improving the 
commercial orientation and service deliv-
ery. In India, power distribution has been 
privatized in Delhi and the state of Orissa, 
and some states, such as  Maha rashtra, are 
developing “franchise” models akin to lease 
contracts to bring in the private sector. Pak-
istan privatized distribution in the Karachi 
Electricity Supply Corporation. The results 
of these initiatives have been mixed, refl ect-
ing the difficulties in moving to and sus-
taining cost-covering tariffs and reducing 
nonpayment and theft. 
Skill mapping and skill development need 
to appear on top of the business agenda 
among sector players, as the lack of skilled 
manpower is emerging as a constraint hin-
dering massive investment. The active par-
ticipation of private players in the sector has 
resulted in higher attrition rates from the 
public sector and steep competition for talent. 
In India, demand for manpower is expected 
to increase through 2013/14, when the sector 
will require an estimated 85,000 additional 
workers (CRISIL 2011).
Exploiting the signifi cant potential of 
intraregional energy trade
Countries need to build on the unexploited 
potential of interregional trade and improve 
the effi ciency of existing investments, two of 
the most cost-effective options for alleviating 
shortages in the region. Interregional trade, 
particularly hydro exports from  Bhutan to 
India, has increased in recent years. Ini-
tiatives continue, with the government 
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of  Bangladesh signing a memorandum of 
understanding with India in 2010 for cross-
border power trade that will facilitate the 
import of 500 MW of electricity and a new 
Nepal-India electricity and trade project that 
will facilitate the trading of up to 1,000 MW 
of electricity. As a result of transmission 
bottlenecks, electricity exchange between 
Nepal and India was limited to about 70 
MW in 2010. The potential for more effi -
ciently deploying existing generation capac-
ity through rehabilitation, maintenance, and 
technical optimization is also important. 
Improving the commercial and fi nancial 
viability of the sector
Governments in the region have been pro-
active in curbing losses in the power sector. 
India’s power development reform program 
(R-APDRP), launched under the 11th Plan, 
which aims to limit losses to 15 percent, 
focuses on demonstrable and measurable 
performance in reducing distribution losses. 
Pakistan has conducted technical and opera-
tional audits of distribution and generation 
companies, which provide a menu of actions 
for the government and utilities to imple-
ment (for instance, investments to reduce 
losses and improve effi ciency, administrative 
and commercial steps to enhance account-
ability, and upgrading of information sys-
tems and management practices). 
Many states in India have undertaken 
rural feeder segregation programs to reduce 
losses in rural distribution lines and provide 
uninterrupted power to rural nonagricultural 
consumers. These mechanisms have had a 
transformative effect on rural livelihoods in 
Gujarat, the state where the scheme has func-
tioned the longest and been subject to many 
evaluations (box 4.3). 
Tariff rationalization—that aligns tar-
iffs with costs and better targets implicit 
 subsidies—is critical. In Bangladesh, policy 
makers envisage addressing the sector’s 
financial deficit through a combination of 
tariff increases, cost reduction, and demand-
side management. Retail tariffs were raised 
by 5 percent in February 2011, but additional 
tariff increases are required. In Bhutan, the 
government adopted a more cost-reflective 
tariff structure after the corporatization of the 
electricity utility in 2002. During 2004–09, 
the average electricity tariff increased by 
66 percent. Even after the increase, however, 
tariffs need to rise 73 percent for residential 
customers and 28 percent for industrial con-
sumers to cover the cost of production (ADB 
2010). In Pakistan, consumer tariffs were 
not increased at all between 2003 and 2007, 
despite substantial increases in the interna-
tional prices of fuel oil and gas. Changes in 
the tariff level and structure carried out in 
March 2008 were implemented to reduce the 
Although most villages in the Indian state of Gujarat 
were electrifi ed by 2003, the power supply remained 
erratic and unreliable, because the feeders to rural 
areas were joined and utilities had no incentive to sup-
ply 24-hour power to a group of mostly unmetered 
consumers paying below cost-recovery tariff. The 
Jyotigram Yojana (JGY) aimed to segregate agricul-
ture from rural domestic and industrial power supply. 
Feeders were laid to provide 24/7 uninterrupted sup-
ply, and farmers were rationed an uninterrupted, pre-
announced 8-hour supply. The scheme was launched 
in 2003 on a pilot basis and then scaled up to include 
the whole state. The scale-up created 1,888 feeders at 
a cost of $285 million in a record 1,000 days from ini-
tiation to implementation. The scheme was expected 
to provide better quality power supply to nonagricul-
ture consumers, charge farmers for power use, and 
ration the power supply to agriculture consumers. 
The impact of the scheme has been signifi cant: 
both the quantity and quality of power and enter-
prise operations improved. As a result, families can 
now work at night. The Gujurat Electricity Board 
also experienced increases in revenue collection and 
made profi ts in 2010. 
Sources: Devaiah 2010; Mishra 2010.
BOX 4.3 Bringing light to rural consumers in Gujarat, India
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fi scal burden of tariff subsidies and improve 
the benefi t incidence of such subsidies. Tariffs 
have since increased by 75 percent, which has 
helped cut the gap between the cost of supply 
and notifi ed tariffs in half (from 35 percent to 
17 percent). The Public Utilities Commission 
of Sri Lanka announced a new set of electric-
ity tariffs for 2011–15 in late 2010. The tar-
iffs are expected to be gradually restructured 
to refl ect cost-effectiveness by 2015.
More remains to be done, particularly in 
rationalizing industrial tariffs by reducing 
the cross-subsidy and improving targeting. 
Doing so would help industries go back to 
the grid (instead of depending on captive 
generators) and use open access options 
(IDFC 2010).
Regulators with adequate capacity can 
ensure transparency and accountability in 
tariff setting, a process that continues to be 
driven by factors such as political exigen-
cies. In Pakistan, the regulator (NEPRA) has 
exclusive responsibility for determining tar-
iffs after public hearings, but tariffs become 
legally binding only once they have been noti-
fi ed by the government in the offi cial gazette. 
In India, there are instances of tariffs not 
being fi led annually and subsidies not paid 
to utilities in time. New initiatives have been 
implemented, however, particularly the mul-
tiyear tariff, which provides certainty on the 
costs for which utilities can be held account-
able, and the stepping back from regulatory 
interference in day-to-day utility matters. At 
least eight states in India have passed multi-
year tariff orders. Regulators have also made 
attempts to improve the consumer interface 
by enabling consumers to have input into reg-
ulatory decision making. 
Governance and the institutional capac-
ity of utilities need to be strengthened. 
Most countries have unbundled their power 
 sectors, corporatized previously vertically 
integrated power utilities, or both. How-
ever, many newly formed utilities are still not 
empowered to act autonomously and suffer 
from severe institutional capacity constraints. 
Their accountability, effi ciency, and customer 
service are well below industry benchmarks. 
The freedom to make important decisions—
such as setting up performance-based remu-
neration systems and  providing market-linked 
remuneration to new employees—is limited. 
Robust and effective corporate governance is 
widely accepted as the essential foundation 
for performance improvement. Without the 
support of a strong board and high-quality 
senior management, the complete transfor-
mation in organizational culture needed to 
commercialize in the face of a long tradi-
tion of risk-averse top-down bureaucratic 
control will not be achieved. Some states in 
India (such as Andhra Pradesh and West Ben-
gal) have adopted technology initiatives and 
accountability frameworks to improve sector 
performance (box 4.4).
In 1999, the government of Andhra Pradesh under-
took a comprehensive reform program to control 
theft of electricity from state-owned power compa-
nies and improve its revenue collection. The cam-
paign focused on four measures: enacting a new law 
to address electricity theft, strengthening enforce-
ment mechanisms, reorganizing the anticorruption 
function in the utilities, and reengineering busi-
nesses processes to improve management control 
and customer service. 
The distribution companies installed modern 
bulk metering, data-logging equipment, and mil-
lions of digital meters; they automated meter read-
ing and reduced billing cycles. They also consulted 
extensively with customers and communicated with 
the general public about their reforms—a major 
change from previous practice. Under this cam-
paign, the distribution companies regularized large 
numbers of consumers and prosecuted extreme cases 
of theft of electricity. As a result, they reduced losses 
from 38 percent in 1999 to 26 percent in 2003 and 
increased the collection rate to 98 percent.
Source: Bhatia and Gulati 2004.
BOX 4.4 Improving performance of state-owned power suppliers in Andhra Pradesh 
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BOX 4.5 Cutting red tape to reduce corruption
Investment climate assessments conducted by the 
World Bank identify several reforms that have 
reduced corruption by cutting red tape.
Bangladesh port and customs
The port of Chittagong, which handles 85 percent of 
Bangladesh’s trade, was highly ineffi cient, with, for 
example, ship turnaround times of fi ve to six days 
compared with one day at more effi cient ports. Main 
problems included long and complex procedures, 
labor shortages, and lack of accountability of offi -
cers and employees of customs and port, leading to 
rent-seeking behavior and irregularities.
Following the handover of the Chittagong Con-
tainer Terminal to a private operator, there have 
been noticeable improvements in handling opera-
tions. A one-stop service incorporating shipping 
agents, freight forwarders, customs, clearing and 
forwarding agents, and banks has ensured docu-
ment clearance within 20 minutes. The turnaround 
time of ships has decreased to three to four days. 
Port effi ciency has increased 30 percent, and the 
cost of doing business in the port has decreased 
40 percent. 
India land registration
Uncertainty surrounding property titles drives up 
the cost of land acquisition by limiting the supply 
of reliable investments. In many states, land records 
and registration of deeds have not been computer-
ized. Manual transcriptions are more prone to errors 
and misplacement. 
Although recent reforms in some states have 
improved the registration process, it takes on aver-
age 87 days to register a property in India. Because 
of the lengthy and complex land transfer process, 
informal payments are considerable.
Recent reforms include computerization of land 
records in Gujurat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu and computeriza-
tion of the registration of deeds in Andhra Pradesh, 
Karnataka, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Tamil 
Nadu.
These reforms have led to substantial improve-
ments. In cities where reforms have taken place, it 
takes a little more than one month to register land, 
rather than the more than fi ve months in cities with 
no reforms. The reform has also had an impact 
on corruption: computerization of land records in 
 Karnataka reduced informal payments by Rs 800 mil-
lion and saved Rs 66 million in waiting time (Ferrari 
and Dhingra 2009). 
Pakistan tax reform
The recent literature on tax reforms stresses the 
importance of tax administration and the effect it has 
on compliance costs. Recent reforms have focused 
on improving the management and organization of 
 revenue administration; updating information tech-
nology and systems to efficiently process  massive 
information flows from taxpayers;  strengthening 
(continues next page)
Corruption policy options 
Two broad strategies are discussed for 
addressing corruption based on experiences 
from countries in South Asia and other 
regions. The first strategy focuses on cut-
ting red tape and simplifying administrative 
procedures to reduce unnecessary interac-
tion with public offi cials and reduce oppor-
tunities for discretionary abuse by offi cials. 
In addition to reducing corruption, these 
policies should benefit firms by reducing 
the administrative burden on fi rms. Box 4.5 
provides examples of red tape reforms that 
have had an impact on corruption. 
The second broad strategy involves legis-
lative and administrative interventions, such 
as establishing anticorruption laws and set-
ting up anticorruption institutions, such as 
an independent anticorruption commission. 
Direct interventions have had a mixed record, 
with success depending on the governance 
structure of these institutions, their inde-
pendence, and their resources and authority. 
Box 4.6 provides successful examples of direct 
legislative and administrative intervention.
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investigation, so that authorities can develop risk 
analysis to closely follow cases that violate tax laws; 
and credibly conducting audits to improve enforce-
ment. Such reforms signal credibility in the tax 
regime, a critical part of improving the system that 
can in turn increase voluntary compliance.
Reforms that simplify tax procedures and reduce 
interactions between tax offi cials and taxpayers, 
such as the reforms adopted in Chile, Colombia, 
and Latvia (Gill 2003), also reduce opportunities 
for corruption. Other anticorruption measures 
enabled by automation include restricting access of 
employees to scanned copies of original records 
to prevent tampering and creating audit trails of 
administrative decisions and changes to taxpayer 
current accounts.
In an attempt to decrease corruption by reduc-
ing the interaction between tax officials and pri-
vate agents, the government of Pakistan raised the 
threshold for general sales tax registration from 
Rs 0.5 million to Rs 5 million, freeing 42,000 pre-
viously registered taxpayers from corruption-related 
problems. However, this solution came at the cost of 
decreased tax revenue. 
A less costly, and arguably more effective, effort 
was made by the Federal Bureau of Revenue to 
improve the integrity and accountability of its inspec-
tors. It implemented a task force’s recommendations 
to allow only minimal contact between taxpayers 
and tax offi cials; establish end-to-end automation of 
tax fi ling and refunds; improve recruitment policies, 
to weed out potentially corrupt offi cials; simplify tax 
structures; and reduce the discretion of tax offi cials 
in determining tax liabilities. 
These attempts to decrease corruption should 
have an important side benefit in reducing tax 
administration costs, which firms in Pakistan cite 
as their  second-highest constraint (after tax rates). 
Cross-country data on time to prepare and pay taxes 
show fi rms in Pakistan spending 560 hours versus 
an average of 314 hours for South Asia (World Bank 
2011e).
Sources: Ferrari and Dhingra 2009; World Bank 2008c, 2009.
BOX 4.5 Cutting red tape to reduce corruption (continued)
The annual Transparency International Corrup-
tion Perceptions Index ranks countries in terms of 
the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist 
among public offi cials and politicians.a Singapore 
has consistently ranked among the least corrupt 
countries in the index, ranking third in 2010 (after 
Denmark and New Zealand). 
Singapore has a long tradition of fighting cor-
ruption. It implemented a comprehensive anticor-
ruption system aimed at reducing the incentives and 
opportunities for corruption. This system includes 
legislation against corruption, called the Prevention 
Corruption Act; an independent authority called the 
Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, with strong 
powers to implement the law, including functions 
of investigation, prevention, and training in cases 
related to corruption; and public information cam-
paigns that promote whistleblowing and the fi ght 
against corruption.
Several countries in East Asia have tried to follow 
Singapore’s recipe, with varying degrees of success. 
The Republic of Korea introduced the Anticorruption 
Act (2001), the Money Laundering Prevention Act 
(2001), and the Code of Conduct for Maintaining 
the Integrity of Public Offi cials (2003). It also created 
the Korea Independent Commission against Corrup-
tion (later called the National Integrity Commission). 
Korea’s ranking in the Corruption Perceptions Index 
declined from 48 in 2001 to 39 in 2010. However, 
other East Asian countries that introduced similar 
reforms saw their rankings deteriorate (Malaysia 
ranked 44th in 2006 and 56th in 2010). 
BOX 4.6 Legislative and administrative interventions to reduce corruption in East Asia
(continues next page)
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Access to ﬁ nance policy options 
Access to fi nance is an issue for many micro, 
small, and medium enterprises in some South 
Asian countries. Policies to increase access 
to fi nance for such fi rms address the various 
demand- and supply-side constraints and 
the underlying institutional and regulatory 
environment that affects credit. Commercial 
banks face higher costs in lending to small, 
often geographically dispersed businesses, 
because identifying potential borrowers, 
conducting due diligence, and maintaining 
contact after a loan is made are all more dif-
fi cult. For their part, small businesses often 
do not know what is needed to qualify for 
bank financing and lack market informa-
tion. Governments should focus on devel-
oping an enabling environment that makes 
small business lending safer, cheaper, and 
faster rather than on prescriptive measures 
such as directed lending programs, which 
have created distortions and ineffi ciencies 
in fi nancial intermediation in many South 
Asian countries. 
Good practices from countries that have 
been able to expand access to finance for 
micro, small, and medium-size enterprises 
include the following:
•  Establishing efficient secured transac-
tions registries for available movable 
assets, in order to address micro, small, 
and medium-size enterprises’ lack of con-
ventional collateral
•  Strengthening credit bureaus, in order to 
help overcome adverse selection and moral 
hazard related to asymmetric information 
in credit markets
•  Supporting financial intermediation by 
facilitating downscaling of commercial 
banks (for instance, through simplifi cation 
of documentation and collateral require-
ments, reducing the number of days to 
approve a loan, and so forth) and upscal-
ing microfi nance institutions
•  Providing technical assistance and fi nan-
cial literacy training to micro, small, and 
medium-size enterprises. 
Annex 4E expands on these policy options. 
The “how” of tackling constraints: 
public-private collaboration
This chapter so far has identified binding 
constraints to firms and suggests reforms 
that may be needed to facilitate the expan-
sion of employment. The next question is 
how to design and implement successful 
reforms to address these constraints. 
Reforms can be designed and imple-
mented through coordinated public and 
private sector efforts. International experi-
ences of successful industrial development 
BOX 4.6  (continued)
Analysis of the factors that may have led to suc-
cess in Singapore suggests that there must be strong 
political will to fi ght corruption. This political will 
is partially reflected in the issuance of legislation 
and the creation of an independent implementa-
tion authority, but the authority must also have full 
powers, there must be strong political support for 
its actions at the highest level, and it must have the 
budget and personnel to carry out its functions. The 
anticorruption agency must be independent from the 
police and political control and incorruptible itself; 
any corruption within the agency must be subject to 
harsh penalties. Major causes of corruption (includ-
ing low civil service salaries and excessive red tape) 
must be tackled and corrupt offenders punished 
(Quah 2007).
a. The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index is a composite 
index drawing on corruption related data from expert and business surveys 
carried out by a variety of independent institutions. The index ranks more 
than 175 countries in terms of perceived levels of corruption as determined by 
expert assessment and opinion surveys (see http://www.transparency.org/
policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results).
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indicate that such collaboration can play 
an important role in identifying binding 
constraints and designing, championing 
and implementing reform/actions in a coor-
dinated and integrated manner, leading 
to increased competitiveness and growth. 
Efforts often focus on a particular sec-
tor, because many binding constraints and 
market failures are sector specifi c and pri-
vate sector players fi nd it easier to coalesce 
around a particular sector. Box 4.7 looks at 
the role of public-private collaboration to 
implement reforms in the export garment 
industry in Cambodia.
The World Bank’s Financial and Private 
Development Network developed the Com-
petitiveness Partnership Initiative (CPI), 
which is being piloted in several countries, 
including India, Jordan, and Kenya. CPI is 
a collaborative process between the public 
and private sectors around a sector or sectors 
with high growth potential. In Kenya, for 
instance, the selected sectors are tourism and 
business process outsourcing.
The CPI is developed around three broad 
steps:
•  Identify sector opportunities. The fi rst step 
is to use agreed upon selection criteria and 
demand-side/market signals (such as factor 
endowments, which identify where a coun-
try’s latent comparative advantage lies) to 
identify existing sectors that have the poten-
tial to compete in regional and global mar-
kets, attract investment, and create jobs.
•  Conduct sector analyses. The second step is 
to conduct evidence-based technical analy-
ses of the opportunities and constraints of 
the selected sector—by, for example, per-
forming value-chain diagnostics to identify 
constraints at each stage of the chain.
•  Develop action and implementation plans. 
The last step is to create country-level task 
forces and joint public-private working 
groups that develop action plans to remove 
constraints and lead their implementation. 
Types of public, private, and public-private 
collaborative actions that could come out 
of this process include both hard and soft 
infrastructure delivery.
This targeted sector approach has several 
potential drawbacks. First, sectors could be 
Cambodia’s garment industry—the country’s 
top export earner and top employer—consists of 
about 270 export-orientated factories. Total gar-
ment export revenue increased from $1.2 billion in 
2001 to $2.9 billion in 2010, representing 78 per-
cent of exports and 15 percent of GDP. The indus-
try employs 290,000 workers, 92 percent of them 
women, representing 70 percent of formal manufac-
turing employment. 
In 1999, the Government-Private Sector Forum 
(G-PSF) was established. Chaired by the prime min-
ister, the G-PSF comprises eight working groups, 
each made up of government offi cials and private 
sector representatives. The export processing work-
ing group is co-chaired by the Ministry of Com-
merce and the Garment Manufacturers Association. 
The International Finance Corporation (which 
funded G-PSF from 2000 to 2010) ranked it as one 
of the top most effective public-private dialogue 
 mechanisms in the world. By reducing business costs, 
the 11 reforms the forum has implemented have 
saved the private sector an estimated $100 million. 
A wide range of reforms has been implemented 
to improve the competitiveness of the garment and 
other export sectors. These reforms include the 
following:
•  Simplifying import/export procedures, such as 
customs clearance at point of import
•  Reducing export management fees
•  Reducing contributions to the National Social 
Security Fund
•  Developing the Trade Union Law 
•  Establishing joint trade missions between the pri-
vate sector and the government
•  Conducting government negotiations to obtain 
trade preferences and free trade agreements.
Source: Van 2011.
BOX 4.7 Public-private collaboration to implement reforms in the Cambodian garment 
industry 
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chosen arbitrarily or on the basis of noneco-
nomic reasons rather than on latent com-
parative advantage or potential economic 
benefits. To prevent scarce resources from 
being unproductively invested, it is impor-
tant to agree on objective selection criteria, 
use demand-side/market signals to identify 
sectors with comparative advantage, gauge 
trade potential and interest by private inves-
tors, and ensure that a wide set of private 
sector representatives from different sectors 
is consulted during the process of identifying 
priority sectors.
Second, the approach could create an 
uneven playing fi eld between fi rms in dif-
ferent sectors and between fi rms within a 
sector if the reforms benefi t disproportion-
ately certain fi rms. To reduce the risks of 
being captured by vested interests of rent-
seeking firms with privileged access to 
political and governance structures, it is 
important to ensure broad representation 
of private sector players—and not just the 
largest firms—in the public-private dia-
logue process; use objective, evidence-based 
analyses to identify constraints and assess 
costs and benefi ts of proposed actions; and 
establish processes that elicit structured and 
transparent dialogue, analysis, and decision 
making. 
Cameroon provides an example of a com-
petitiveness partnership initially diverted 
into rent-seeking activity. Most of the private 
sector members of the competitiveness com-
mittee, created in 1998, were members of a 
single business lobbying association. In 2007, 
the World Bank and the International Finance 
Corporation helped restructure a new collab-
oration platform, which was more inclusive 
and included a process for selecting proposals 
that followed good practice. The focus of the 
proposals was also narrowed to enable better 
scrutiny of the details (large reform proposals 
tend to provide opportunities to hide details). 
The results have been broader participation 
and wider acceptance of the reforms.
Constraints facing potential 
ﬁ rm entrants: Business entry 
regulations 
One of the limitations of the analysis of 
fi rm constraints is that it does not necessar-
ily identify the constraints facing potential 
entrants. Doing so is important because 
new fi rms create jobs. The ease of business 
entry regulations has been identifi ed as an 
important determinant of new fi rm entry, 
with studies showing that large reductions 
in business entry regulations—by, for exam-
ple, introducing a one-stop shop of business 
registration centers or reducing registration 
fees—can spur the establishment of new 
formal fi rms by individuals who were pre-
viously wage workers or out of the labor 
force. Box 4.8 summarizes the evidence.
Large reductions in the ease of opening a business are 
positively and strongly associated with higher levels 
of business registration and new fi rm entry. A cross-
country study by Klapper and Love (2010) fi nds that 
large reforms—reforms that achieve more than a 40 
percent reduction in costs, days, or procedures of busi-
ness registration—lead to an increase in rates of new 
firm entrance. Multiple and simultaneous reforms 
have a larger impact on business registration. A coun-
try’s initial conditions matter: countries that start out 
with high registration costs need larger reforms to 
induce a signifi cant number of new registrations.
In Mexico, a reform that reduced the average 
number of days needed to start a business from 
30 to 1.4 led to a 5.0 percent increase in the number 
of new businesses and a 2.2 percent increase in wage 
employment (Bruhn 2008). The increase in registra-
tion and employment came from new activities from 
BOX 4.8 Eﬀ ects of easing business entry regulations on ﬁ rm entry, employment, 
and formalization
(continues next page)
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former wage earners. Former unregistered business 
owners were not more likely to register their busi-
ness after the reform.
A field experiment in Sri Lanka by De Mel, 
 McKenzie, and Woodruff (2011) aimed to estimate 
the demand for formality among informal fi rms with 
1–14 workers. The experiment took 500 fi rms and 
divided them into 5 groups, each with 100 fi rms. The 
fi rst group was the control group. The second group 
was given information on how to register with the 
district secretariat and obtain a business registration 
certifi cate and offered reimbursement of the cost of 
doing so. The remaining groups were also given this 
information. In addition, they were offered payments 
of Rs 10,000 (about $88, just under half a month’s 
profi ts for the median fi rm); Rs 20,000; or Rs 40,000 
if they registered within a set timeframe.
The study found that providing information 
and reducing the cost of registering to zero was not 
enough to induce fi rms to register. In contrast, the 
Rs 10,000 and Rs 20,000 payments were enough to 
induce about one-fifth of eligible informal firms 
to register, and the Rs 40,000 payment was enough 
to induce almost half of eligible informal fi rms to 
do so. The fi nding that additional monetary incen-
tives were required supports the “exit” hypoth-
esis, which posits that the net benefi ts to formal-
ization may be very low (if not negative) and that 
fi rms are therefore rational in choosing to remain 
informal, rather than the “exclusion” hypothesis, 
which posits that there are high net positive benefi ts 
to formalization and that it is the upfront costs or 
complexity of registration that keeps fi rms infor-
mal. Firm owners asked about the possible costs of 
registering most often cited paying taxes (corporate 
and employee) and being subject to tax and labor 
inspections. In terms of benefi ts, most mentioned 
being able to obtain a bank account, apply for bank 
loans, operate on a larger and more visible scale, 
and get contracts.
Does formalization of existing informal firms 
result in increased productivity and employment? 
The Sri Lanka study reinterviewed the same fi rms 
12–18 months after formalizing, to see whether there 
was any evidence that formality had benefi tted them. 
Over this time frame it found little evidence of any of 
the main channels through which formality is argued 
to benefi t fi rms: the newly formalized fi rms had not 
received more credit or obtained more government 
contracts, they had not become more visible, and 
they had not hired more workers. There was also no 
signifi cant impact on sales or profi ts (although the 
study could not rule out large negative or positive 
impacts given how noisy the data were). These fi nd-
ings suggest that informal enterprise owners acted 
rationally by formalizing only when provided with 
monetary incentives to do so.
Simplification of entry regulations alone is 
unlikely to be enough to get informal fi rms to for-
malize, although the results show that it does not 
take too much of a change in net benefi ts of formal-
izing to induce formalization (half the fi rms were 
ready to formalize for an amount equal to 1.5–2.0 
months’ profi ts). Moreover, formalization is not suf-
fi cient for increasing productivity. Therefore, rather 
than focusing on inducing existing informal fi rms 
to register their businesses, it may be more effec-
tive to focus on directly easing constraints to their 
productivity. Increasing their productivity is likely 
to have a second-round effect on reducing informal-
ity, as increasing productivity can increase returns to 
formalization.
BOX 4.8 Eﬀ ects of easing business entry regulations on ﬁ rm entry, employment, 
and formalization (continued)
The 2010 World Bank Doing Business 
indicator for starting a business indicates that 
the average number of procedures, time, and 
cost of starting a business in South Asia are 
on a par with or lower than in Africa, East 
Asia, or Latin America and the Caribbean. 
India has the largest number of procedures 
(12) and costs in the region and is ranked 
lowest (165th in the world) for this indica-
tor.18 Nepal ranks 96th, Pakistan 85th, Bhu-
tan 84th, Bangladesh 79th, Maldives 50th, 
Afghanistan 25th, and Sri Lanka 24th.
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Annex 4A Business environment constraints in high- and 
low-income states in India
FIGURE 4A.1 Severity of constraints reported by benchmark ﬁ rm 
in urban formal sector in high- and low-income states in India
Source: Authors, based on Carlin and Schaﬀ er 2011b (based on World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: A benchmark ﬁ rm is a medium-size manufacturing ﬁ rm with 30 employees that is domesti-
cally owned, does not export or import, is located in a large city, and did not expand employment 
in the preceding three years. Analysis is based on a pooled sample of enterprise surveys conducted 
in India between 2000 and 2010. A point farther away from the origin indicates that the business 
constraint is considered more severe. The severity of constraint is rated by ﬁ rms on a 5-point 
scale, with 0 being no obstacle, 1 being a minor obstacle, 2 being a moderate obstacle, 3 being a 
major obstacle, and 4 being a very severe obstacle. Access to ﬁ nance and tax rates constraints are 
excluded. Political instability was not asked in the India surveys.
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TABLE 4A.1 Top five constraints reported by 
benchmark ﬁ rm in the urban formal sector in high- 
and low-income states in India
Constraint
Low-income 
states
High-income 
states
Electricity 1 3
Corruption 2 1
Tax administration 3 2
Transport 4
Crime, theft, and 
disorder 5
Labor regulations 4
Government policy 
uncertainty 5
Source: Authors, based on Carlin and Schaﬀ er 2011b (based on World Bank 
enterprise surveys). 
Note: A benchmark ﬁ rm is a medium-size manufacturing ﬁ rm with 30 
employees that is domestically owned, does not export or import, is 
located in a large city, and did not expand employment in the preceding 
three years. Analysis is based on a pooled sample of enterprise surveys 
conducted in India between 2000 and 2010. Access to ﬁ nance and tax 
rates constraints are excluded. Political instability was not asked in the 
India surveys.
The reported severity of the tax rate con-
straint cannot be interpreted directly as evi-
dence that tax rates are binding constraints 
in South Asia. This annex looks at alterna-
tive indicators. 
Cross-country comparison of reported 
severity
Although comparing the level of severity 
reported for the tax rate constraint with 
Annex 4B Tax rates as a constraint to ﬁ rms
other elements of the business environment 
is problematic, cross-country comparisons 
can be used to show whether the severity 
reported in South Asia is atypical. Figure 
4B.1 shows the reported severity of the tax 
rate constraint for a benchmark fi rm in dif-
ferent countries. It shows that independent 
of the level of income of the country, fi rms 
complain signifi cantly about tax rates. Only 
Pakistan reports higher severity than is typi-
cal of countries at its level of development; 
The division into high-income and low-
income states in India is based on their net 
state domestic product per capita over the 
period 1999/2000 to 2009/10. The high 
income group comprises Andhra Pradesh, 
Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, 
Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Pun-
jab, Tamil Nadu, Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands, Chandigarh, Delhi, and Puducherry. 
The low income group comprises Arunachal 
Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chattisgarh, Jammu 
and Kashmir, Jharkand, Madhya Pradesh, 
Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, 
Orissa, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Tripura, Uttar 
Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and West Bengal.
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FIGURE 4B.1 Cross-country comparison of reported severity of tax rate constraint
Source: Carlin and Schaﬀ er 2011b (based on World Bank enterprise surveys). 
Note: The cross-country regression line shows the relationship between the reported severity of the constraint for a benchmark ﬁ rm and the log of per 
capita GDP. The shaded area is the 95 percent conﬁ dence interval band around the regression line. Vertical bars show conﬁ dence intervals of 95 percent 
around the reported severity of the constraint for countries in South Asia. The lack of overlap between the South Asian country conﬁ dence interval and the 
regression line conﬁ dence interval is a conservative test of the statistically signiﬁ cant diﬀ erence between the reported severity of a constraint for the South 
Asian country and the average reported severity of constraint for countries at the same level of per capita GDP. The reported severity could still be signiﬁ -
cantly diﬀ erent even when there is an overlap. Analysis is based on a pooled sample of enterprise surveys conducted between 2000 and 2010. The severity 
of constraint is rated by ﬁ rms on a 5-point scale, with 0 being no obstacle, 1 being a minor obstacle, 2 being a moderate obstacle, 3 being a major obstacle, 
and 4 being a very severe obstacle.
elsewhere in the region, fi rms consider tax 
rates less of an obstacle than do firms in 
other countries at the same income levels.
Total tax revenues to GDP ratio 
The ratio of total tax revenues to GDP is 
low in many countries in the region—just 9 
percent in Bangladesh, for example, and 10 
percent in Pakistan (fi gure 4B.2). These ratios 
do not necessarily reflect low taxes, how-
ever. Rather, they represent a lower level of 
development and very narrow tax bases. In 
Pakistan, the tax base is very small, and fi rms 
that are in the tax base bear a heavy tax bur-
den. The same is true for Bangladesh, where 
only 1.4 million of the country’s 145 million 
people are registered in the tax base. In 2004, 
only 0.85 million out of a registered tax base 
of 1.25 million are actually taxpayers. 
Statutory and eﬀ ective tax rates
Although tax rates in India, Pakistan, and 
Sri Lanka are lower than they were in the 
1990s, these countries still have the highest 
marginal corporate tax rates in the region. 
Rates are higher than comparator countries 
such as Brazil, China, Ghana, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand (fi gure 4B.3).
Because of poor compliance, however, and 
system of exemptions and loopholes, there 
is a signifi cant divergence between statutory 
and actual average effective tax rates in South 
Asia. There is also a wide variance in effective 
tax rates across activities and sectors, which 
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Source: World Bank 2011e.
Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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FIGURE 4B.3 Highest marginal corporate tax rate in South Asian countries and selected comparator 
countries
Source: World Bank 2011e.
creates distortions, because decisions about 
resource allocation, location, and invest-
ment are driven by tax considerations rather 
than underlying economic reasons. The cases 
of Bangladesh and Pakistan are discussed 
below.
Taxation in Bangladesh is characterized by 
low collections, highly complex rules, a heavy 
administrative burden, and poor compliance 
(World Bank 2008c). It has become the norm 
in Bangladesh to pay minimum taxes (by, for 
example, underreporting profi ts) or to avoid 
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FIGURE 4C.1 Severity of constraints reported by benchmark ﬁ rm and ﬁ rm with 60 employees in the urban formal sector in 
Nepal and Sri Lanka
Source: Authors, based on Carlin and Schaﬀ er 2011b (based on World Bank enterprise surveys). 
Note: A benchmark ﬁ rm is a medium-size manufacturing ﬁ rm with 30 employees that is domestically owned, does not export or import, is located in a large city, and did not expand 
employment in the preceding three years. The ﬁ rm with 60 employees is the same as the benchmark ﬁ rm except for the ﬁ rm size. Analysis is based on a pooled sample of enterprise 
surveys conducted in Nepal and Sri Lanka between 2000 and 2010. A point farther away from the origin indicates that the business constraint is considered more severe. The severity 
of constraint is rated by ﬁ rms on a 5-point scale, with 0 being no obstacle, 1 being a minor obstacle, 2 being a moderate obstacle, 3 being a major obstacle, and 4 being a very severe 
obstacle. Access to ﬁ nance and tax rates constraints are excluded.
Annex 4C Constraints facing nonbenchmark ﬁ rms
them altogether, because of both lax enforce-
ment of laws (tax defaulters are rarely inves-
tigated) and the hassle and cost involved in 
dealing with tax authorities. Only 66 percent 
of metropolitan fi rms were required to pay 
corporate tax, and only 3 percent reported 
actually doing so. Furthermore, the variance 
in actual tax payments shows signifi cant use 
of tax holidays and exemptions. The average 
fi rm paid taxes of about 16 percent of profi ts; 
the median fi rm paid only 7 percent. Among 
private unlisted fi rms, 25 percent paid 84 per-
cent of the taxes collected (the bulk paid by 
foreign companies), and 13 percent paid no 
income tax. Among listed companies, 1.2 per-
cent paid 53.3 percent of taxes, and the top 
40 percent paid almost 100 percent. The top 
10 percent of corporate taxpayers contrib-
uted 80 percent of total corporate income tax 
collection; the top 5 percent contributed 64 
percent. 
In Pakistan, average and marginal corpo-
rate tax rates vary widely by sector, with the 
bulk of the burden falling on large, formal 
manufacturing fi rms. Although formal man-
ufacturing fi rms account for just 23 percent 
of output, they account for half of all federal 
taxes (World Bank 2009).
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The reported severity of the access to fi nance 
constraint cannot be interpreted as evidence 
that access to fi nance is a binding constraint 
in South Asia. This annex looks at alterna-
tive indicators. 
Cross-country comparison 
of reported severity
Figure 4D.1 shows the reported severity of 
the access to finance constraint for bench-
mark fi rms in different countries. It shows 
that in no country in South Asia do fi rms cite 
it as a greater obstacle than in fi rms in other 
countries with the same level of per capita 
GDP. 
Financial depth 
Financial depth measures the availability 
of fi nancial resources for the economy and 
for firms. The financial markets in South 
Asia are not shallow by measures such as 
domestic credit to the private sector as a 
percentage of GDP, and they are generally 
experiencing rapid growth. Indeed, fi nancial 
depth has been increasing in all countries in 
South Asia except Sri Lanka.
In 2008, domestic credit to the private 
sector as a share of GDP was 29 percent in 
Sri Lanka and Pakistan, 30 percent in Bhu-
tan, 39 percent in Bangladesh, 51 percent in 
India, and 56 percent in Nepal (Hoxha 2011). 
Compared with countries with similar levels 
of per capita GDP (which is positively corre-
lated correlation with fi nancial depth), only 
Bhutan is signifi cantly below average. 
Cost of ﬁ nance
Using lending interest rates to assess the cost 
of fi nance is diffi cult, because there is a high 
level of state intermediation in many South 
Asian countries: interest rates in Bangladesh, 
India, and Pakistan are not freely set by the 
market. Nevertheless, lending rates in South 
Asia are not high compared with other coun-
tries at the same level of per capita GDP. 
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FIGURE 4C.2 Severity of constraints reported by benchmark (nonexporting) and exporting ﬁ rm in the urban formal sector 
in South Asia and Bangladesh
Source: Authors, based on Carlin and Schaﬀ er 2011b (based on World Bank enterprise surveys). 
Note: A benchmark ﬁ rm is a medium-size manufacturing ﬁ rm with 30 employees that is domestically owned, does not export or import, is located in a large city, and did not expand 
employment in the preceding three years. The exporter ﬁ rm is the same as the benchmark ﬁ rm except that it exports. Analysis is based on pooled sample of enterprise surveys con-
ducted in South Asia and Bangladesh between 2000 and 2010. A point farther away from the origin indicates that the business constraint is considered more severe. The severity of 
constraint is rated by ﬁ rms on a 5-point scale, with 0 being no obstacle, 1 being a minor obstacle, 2 being a moderate obstacle, 3 being a major obstacle, and 4 being a very severe 
obstacle. Access to ﬁ nance and tax rates constraints are excluded.
Annex 4D Access to ﬁ nance as a constraint to ﬁ rms 
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Financial outreach and access
Outreach is a measure of financial inclu-
siveness; it is captured here by variables 
such as the percent of fi rms with access to a 
loan or other fi nancial products. Enterprise 
surveys show large variation in access to 
external finance for firms both across 
and within countries, with smaller firms 
having less access, leading to claims of a 
small and medium-size enterprise fi nance 
gap, particularly in emerging economies, 
where larger enterprises are frequently the 
main beneficiaries of tax incentives and 
corporate subsidies and aid is targeted at 
microenterprises.19 
Small firms in the urban formal sector 
in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and, to a lesser 
extent, India use external fi nance less than 
small fi rms in other countries (fi gure 4D.2). 
Only 2 percent of fi rms in Afghanistan and 
5 percent of fi rms in Pakistan use banks to 
finance working capital compared with 36 
percent in India, 43 percent in Bangladesh, 
and 52 percent in Sri Lanka. Small fi rms in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan finance a larger 
share of working capital (88–91 percent) 
from internal financial sources than large 
fi rms (63–88 percent).
Moreover, comparable survey data in 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan show 
no clear trend in terms of the share of invest-
ment financed by internal funds (retained 
earnings); external fi nance (banks and non-
bank financial institutions); and informal 
finance (family, friends, moneylenders) in 
the past fi ve years for a benchmark fi rm in 
the urban formal sector. Internal funds con-
tinue to fi nance most investment. 
Use of external fi nance is even lower among 
rural and informal fi rms, which are typically 
microenterprises, and often reflects lower 
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FIGURE 4D.1 Cross-country comparison of reported severity of access to ﬁ nance constraint
Source: Carlin and Schaﬀ er 2011b (based on World Bank enterprise surveys).
Note: The cross-country regression line shows the relationship between the reported severity of the constraint for a benchmark ﬁ rm and the log of per 
capita GDP. The shaded area is the 95 percent conﬁ dence interval band around the regression line. Vertical bars show conﬁ dence intervals of 95 percent 
around the reported severity of the constraint for countries in South Asia. The lack of overlap between the South Asian country conﬁ dence interval and the 
regression line conﬁ dence interval is a conservative test of the statistically signiﬁ cant diﬀ erence between the reported severity of a constraint for the South 
Asian country and the average reported severity of constraint for countries at the same level of per capita GDP. The reported severity could still be signiﬁ -
cantly diﬀ erent even when there is an overlap. Analysis is based on pooled sample of enterprise surveys conducted between 2000 and 2010. The severity 
of constraint is rated by ﬁ rms on a 5-point scale, with 0 being no obstacle, 1 being a minor obstacle, 2 being a moderate obstacle, 3 being a major obstacle, 
and 4 being a very severe obstacle.
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access to banking services. In  Bangladesh, 
only 9 percent of fi rms in nonmetropolitan 
areas have bank accounts, compared with 
95 percent in metropolitan areas, and only 
6 percent of nonmetropolitan enterprises use 
formal fi nance.
In the informal sector in India, 89 percent 
of enterprises had bank accounts, but less 
than 20 percent had a loan (from informal or 
formal sources). Only 6–9 percent of infor-
mal fi rms had a loan from a fi nancial institu-
tion (versus 26 percent of small fi rms in the 
formal sector).
In Pakistan, very few rural firms deal 
with the formal banking sector: only 10–12 
percent of enterprises keep savings, and less 
than 10 percent maintain checking accounts. 
About 43 percent enterprises in villages and 
58 percent in small towns made investments 
the year preceding the survey, but nearly 
90 percent were made with savings. Among 
surveyed business owners in rural areas, 
24–28 percent wanted to apply for a formal 
loan, but only 4–7 percent actually did so. 
Among fi rms in Pakistan that wanted a loan 
but did not apply for one, 40 percent cited 
loan procedures that were too complicated, 
27 percent cited interest rates that were too 
high, 16 percent cited insuffi cient collateral, 
and 8 percent cited the shortness of the loan 
duration. Two-thirds of loan applications 
were approved. Among rejected applica-
tions, 36 percent were refused because of 
insuffi cient collateral. Eighty percent of for-
mal loans require collateral, and the average 
value of the collateral required was 132 per-
cent of the loan amount. The most common 
forms of collateral were property/buildings 
and land. In summary, there is evidence of 
unmet demand for the rural nonfarm sector 
in Pakistan. 
Institutional indicators
Creditors care about the broader institu-
tional environment (Djankov, McLiesh, and 
Shleifer 2007). A World Bank (2008b) study, 
based on an April 2007 survey of commer-
cial banks, addresses the issue of access to 
credit from the perspective of supply. It 
reviews the factors that limit the willingness 
of fi nancial institutions to lend or increase 
their incentives to charge higher interest 
rates. Key concerns were problems with col-
lateral registration and enforcement; lim-
ited information (the result of the lack of a 
well-functioning credit registry); and poor 
accounting and auditing practices, which 
limit verifi able fi nancial information. Some 
countries in South Asia have weak legal and 
property rights, but the region as a whole 
performs better in this regard than Africa 
and the Middle East and North Africa and 
is on par with Latin America and the Carib-
bean and East Asia and Pacific. In terms 
of credit, public and private credit bureau 
coverage in South Asia is lower than in any 
other region, although the depth of credit 
information is better than in Africa and East 
Asia and Pacifi c. 
Annex 4E Policy options for increasing access to ﬁ nance
This annex describes four policy areas that 
can increase access to fi nance, particularly 
for micro, small, and medium-size enter-
prises (Hoxha 2011). 
Operationalize secure transactions 
registeries 
Lack of credit information on custom-
ers and weak contract enforcement means 
that banks are generally not willing to lend 
without secure collateral. Micro, small, and 
medium-size enterprises find it harder to 
meet collateral requirements: in  Bangladesh 
30.8 percent of small firms (compared to 
4.2 percent of large fi rms) found collateral 
requirements too high (World Bank 2008c). 
Banks usually require immovable property, 
such as land, buildings, or an owner’s assets, 
to secure a loan. Most micro, small, and 
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medium-size enterprise fi rms’ property and 
assets are vested in movable property, such 
as machinery and inventory. 
For example, in India an immovable asset 
of the enterprise (60 percent of loans) or a 
personal asset of the owner (25 percent of 
loans) is usually required as collateral. Such 
assets account for a small percentage of the 
total asset value of unorganized fi rms. More-
over, in about half of cases, the collateral 
required was more than twice the amount of 
the loan (Ferrari and Dhingra 2009). In Sri 
Lanka, collateral in the form of land is espe-
cially important for rural enterprises, but 
high levels of public landownership, unclear 
ownership records, and widespread restric-
tions on the use and transfer of land make 
it difficult to use land as collateral (World 
Bank 2005). 
In the absence of a secured transactions 
mechanism, lenders find it risky to accept 
movable property as collateral. A secured 
transactions mechanism facilitates lending by 
eliminating information asymmetries about 
collateral and reducing the risk of lending 
secured by movables. 
Successful models of secured transac-
tions registry include the creation of a reg-
istration database in which a public record 
of obligations secured by movable property 
can be made; the setting of priorities in case 
of multiple obligations of the same security 
giver as secured by the same collateral; and 
the establishment of a means to uniformly 
enforce secure interests in case the security 
giver defaults. 
Deepen the reach of credit bureaus
Credit bureaus promote deeper financial 
systems by helping overcome adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard related to asymmet-
ric information in credit markets (Djankov, 
McLiesh, and Shleifer 2007). As a result of 
the cost savings achieved through more effi -
cient and accurate credit analysis and lower 
expected losses, lenders can increase their 
credit extension. Using cross-country fi rm-
level survey data and survey data of credit 
bureaus, Love and Mylenko (2003) fi nd that 
the existence of private credit bureaus is 
associated with lower fi nancing constraints 
and a larger share of bank financing. In 
addition, small and medium-size enterprises 
tend to have a larger share of bank fi nancing 
in countries where private registries exist. 
Currently, credit bureau coverage in South 
Asia is the lowest of any region. It is par-
ticularly low in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, Nepal, and Pakistan.
Downscale commercial banks and 
upscale microﬁ nance institutions 
Access depends not only on the terms and 
cost of fi nance but also on other barriers, 
such as eligibility criteria; procedural exclu-
sions (high minimum loan size requirements, 
documentation requirements, days to pro-
cess loans); and lack of appropriate fi nancial 
products for micro, small, and medium-size 
enterprises. 
A crucial function of fi nancial intermedi-
aries is to screen borrowers. The number of 
days it takes to process a loan application 
can be a de facto eligibility barrier, because 
some borrowers may be discouraged from 
 applying for bank loans and seek financ-
ing elsewhere to avoid long waiting periods. 
Beck,  Demirgüç-Kunt, and Peria (2007) fi nd 
that on average loan applications by small 
and medium-size enterprise take more than a 
month to process in Bangladesh (43 days) and 
Pakistan (34 days). In contrast, the median 
number of days for the 60 countries in their 
sample was nine days. 
Lack of documentation can create other 
eligibility barriers. Bangladesh and Nepal 
require at least four documents, including 
an identity card or passport, a recommenda-
tion letter, a wage slip, and proof of domicile. 
For the 60 countries Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Peria examine, the average number of 
documents was two. Given the high degree of 
informality in South Asia, only a small pro-
portion of potential borrowers can produce 
these documents. 
Standard financial products offered by 
banks, such as lines of credit, are designed 
for large corporations (the traditional client 
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BRAC Bank Ltd. was established in Bangladesh in 
2001, with a focus on the small business sector. Its 
small and medium-size enterprise banking unit goes 
beyond traditional banking, working with entrepre-
neurs as a business partner by building awareness, 
providing training, and arranging road shows to 
support and develop clients’ businesses. BRAC Bank 
is the number one small business bank in Bangla-
desh in terms of loans outstanding, with nationwide 
coverage (44 percent of coverage is in rural areas). 
The bank’s small business banking model empha-
sizes relationship banking and collateral-free lend-
ing of up to $14,000. 
Upscaling relies heavily on support from inter-
national and domestic fi nancial institutions in the 
start-up phase. Such support is particularly impor-
tant in adapting microfinance institutions’ lend-
ing technologies to serve the new clientele and in 
building the capacity of staff. BRAC Bank’s sec-
ond- and third-largest shareholders are Shorecap 
International Limited and the International Finance 
Corporation.
BOX 4E.2 Scaling up microﬁ nance institutions: The case of BRAC Bank
ICICI Bank is the largest private sector bank in India. 
Its small and medium-size enterprise banking model 
is based on segmentation of the market by industry 
and business linkages; a proprietary risk evaluation 
covering fi nancial and nonfi nancial parameters to 
compensate for enterprises’ lack of fi nancial informa-
tion; and a “beyond lending approach,” which relies 
primarily on deposit products and other banking 
services (used by 95 percent of small and medium-
size enterprise clients) rather than lending products 
(used by just 5 percent of such clients). Client ser-
vicing is done though multiple channels, including 
relationship managers, doorstep banking, branches, 
the Internet, and automatic teller machines.
In 2002, Standard Chartered Bank implemented 
a client-centric model on a global scale, creating a 
separate small and medium-size enterprise bank-
ing operation, with its own resources and credit 
processes, within its consumer bank unit. Today, 
this business unit operates in more than 30 coun-
tries. The bank follows three customer acquisition 
and servicing approaches: relationship managers 
handle larger medium-size enterprises; a portfolio 
team made up of salespeople and virtual relation-
ship managers handle midsize small and medi-
um-size enterprises; and branches handle smaller 
businesses, whose needs are similar to those of 
individuals.
BOX 4E.1 Successful approaches to small and medium-size business banking
for South Asian banks). They are inappropri-
ate for many small businesses, which do not 
deposit their revenues in banks. 
To serve small businesses well and prof-
itably, banks need to simplify procedures 
for small business loans; design appropriate 
fi nancial products for micro, small, and medi-
um-size enterprises; reduce reliance on col-
lateral and modernize lending based on risk 
and credit information; and use technology 
to reduce transaction costs and generate deal 
volume. Some banks have been successful in 
downscaling to the small and medium-size 
enterprise market, achieving high levels of 
outreach, scale, and sustainability (box 4E.1). 
Microfinance institutions need to adapt 
their business model and product offerings 
to the small and medium-size enterprise mar-
ket. One institution that has done so is BRAC 
Bank (box 4E.2).
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Commercial downscaling and microfi-
nance institution upscaling should be led by 
banks themselves. Governments can facilitate 
the process by creating an enabling regula-
tory and institutional environment—by, for 
example, revising rules on provisioning and 
credit bureau reporting, which make it expen-
sive to serve smaller fi rms. Governments can 
also look into using credit guarantee schemes 
and other fi nancial products aimed at reduc-
ing the risk associated with lending to small 
and medium-size enterprises. Such schemes 
would address information asymmetries, the 
high costs of processing small credit transac-
tions, and constraints in the enforcement of 
contracts. 
Provide technical assistance and 
ﬁ nancial literacy training 
Small and medium-size enterprises face sev-
eral nonfi nancial barriers that are related to 
their own capacity. Managers or owners of 
such fi rms usually perform a wider range of 
tasks than their managers or owners of larger 
firms. Moreover, small and medium-size 
enterprises cannot take advantage of econo-
mies of scale related to accounting, business 
planning, and market research to the same 
extent as large fi rms can. Enterprise survey 
data indicate that only 37 percent of small 
fi rms have their annual fi nancial statement 
reviewed by an external auditor, compared 
with 58 percent of medium-size fi rms and 
79 percent of large fi rms (Hoxha 2011). In 
 Bangladesh, a quarter of smaller urban fi rms 
fi nd the procedures for applying for a loan 
too complex (compared with only 1.2 percent 
of large urban fi rms) (World Bank 2008c). 
Only about 5 percent of village enterprises 
and 11 percent of small town enterprises in 
Pakistan prepare fi nancial statements.
Technical assistance and fi nancial liter-
acy training can be provided to small and 
medium-size enterprises to increase their 
capacity to keep better accounts and develop 
and present bankable proposals. Doing so 
would ensure that such enterprises have the 
capacity to successfully apply for loans and 
effectively use loans for the growth of their 
businesses. 
Notes
 1.  The fi rst study sets out the methodological 
framework and tests predictions of how a 
fi rm’s evaluation of the cost of constraints 
imposed by its external environment varies 
with the fi rm’s characteristics. These tests 
confi rm the predictions of the model and 
provide the empirical basis for using, in the 
second and third studies, the reported sever-
ity of constraints to assess which elements of 
the external environment are most problem-
atic for fi rms across South Asia and in each 
country. 
 2.  Eighteen constraints appear in the enter-
prise surveys: electricity; telecommunica-
tions; transport; access to land; inadequately 
educated labor; macroeconomic instability; 
government policy uncertainty; political 
instability; access to fi nance; competition; 
tax administration; tax rates; labor regula-
tions; customs; business licensing; courts; 
corruption; and crime, theft, and disorder. 
Surveys in Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Nepal 
did not ask about macroinstability or gov-
ernment policy uncertainty. Surveys in India, 
Maldives, and Sri Lanka did not ask about 
political instability.
 3.  The World Bank enterprise surveys portal 
contains data on almost 120,000 urban for-
mal fi rms (16,000 in South Asia) from more 
than 230 surveys in 126 countries conducted 
between 2000 and 2010 (see http://www
.enterprisesurveys.org/).
 4.  The Bangladesh rural survey covered peri-
urban areas, small towns, and rural villages. 
The Pakistan rural survey covered small 
towns and rural villages. The Sri Lanka rural 
survey covered rural areas as defi ned by the 
Department of Census and Statistics.
 5.  Only the 2001 survey was used in the formal 
analysis of the severity of constraints, because 
the constraint question in 2005 did not use 
the standard 0–4 scale. The ranking of con-
straints from the 2005 informal survey was 
used to check the results. 
 6.  In addition, to facilitate better comparison, 
fi rms with more than 20 employees were 
dropped from the sample of urban formal 
fi rms. 
 7.  The states were grouped based on net state 
domestic product per capita over the previous 
10 years. 
 8.  Empirical evidence on other developing 
regions indicates that because they lack 
the economies of scale to operate a power 
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 generator effi ciently, small and medium 
enterprises, which create a large share of new 
jobs, are the most affected in areas without 
access to electricity or an unreliable pub-
lic grid (Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier, and 
Pagés 2007). 
 9.  Results reported are from partial correla-
tions with other indicators of fi rm produc-
tivity in the pooled sample of South Asian 
fi rms with country fi xed effects and controls 
for fi rm size, sector, location, exporting and 
importing status, and ownership (Carlin and 
Schaffer 2011c).
10.  Expanding fi rms in Afghanistan and 
Bangladesh fi rms report lower costs than the 
benchmark fi rm. A hypothesis on why this 
may be the case in Bangladesh is that expand-
ing fi rms are located in export processing 
zones, which face especial conditions that 
lower the constraints. 
11.  This fi nding is consistent with a 2007 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) economic survey 
of India that describes the service sector as 
being less dependent on electricity and less 
subject to labor regulations; the sector also 
faces lower indirect taxation and has access 
to better infrastructure and a more condu-
cive business environment. The OECD sur-
vey makes the case that growth in the service 
sector has been more dynamic because these 
constraints are less binding. 
12.  The regression model assumes a linear rela-
tionship between fi rm characteristics and 
reported severity, so that if, on average, larger 
fi rms (more than 30 employees) report more 
severe constraints than the benchmark fi rm 
(30 employees), on average, smaller fi rms 
(fewer than 30 employees) will report less 
severe constraints.
13.  Using the rural enterprise and household sur-
veys, Deininger, Jin, and Sur (2007) fi nd that 
the top fi ve reported constraints among rural 
fi rms in Sri Lanka were also the most signifi -
cant determinants of new nonfarm enterprise 
start-ups. In areas where electricity is a major 
constraint, the propensity to start up a fi rm 
is 14 percent lower. Distance to banks, poor 
road access, credit constraints, and lack of 
market demand are all negatively correlated 
with the probability of starting up a business.
14.  Enterprises that sell to larger fi rms are less 
likely than enterprises that sell directly to 
local consumers to complain about low 
demand (World Bank 2008c).
15.  About 305 urban manufacturing fi rms had 
subcontracting arrangements for input pur-
chases, but only 1 percent purchased inputs 
from fi rms/distributors located in villages. 
16.  Other controls in the ordinary least squares 
regression include the number of urban cen-
ters in the district, the number of urban cen-
ters in a region, distance to district headquar-
ters, the average height and slope of land, and 
the population density in the village.
17.  The second Bangladesh investment climate 
assessment (World Bank 2008c) concludes 
that overall lending to the private sector had 
improved and was adequate in Bangladesh 
but that lending to small fi rms and nonurban 
fi rms remained inadequate because of lack of 
appropriate lending techniques and products 
for micro, small, and medium-size enterprises.
18.  A procedure is defi ned as any interaction 
between the company founders and exter-
nal parties (for example, government agen-
cies, lawyers, auditors, or notaries). Cost is 
measured as a percentage of the economy’s 
income per capita. It is measured in two ways: 
(a) all offi cial fees and fees for legal or profes-
sional services if such services are required 
by law and (b) the amount the entrepreneur 
needs to deposit in a bank or with a notary 
before registration and up to three months 
following incorporation, as a percentage of 
the economy’s income per capita.
19.  A 2008 World Bank enterprise survey of more 
than 50,000 fi rms in more than 70 countries 
indicates that small and medium-size fi rms 
rank access to and cost of fi nance as one of 
their top constraints to growth.
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Questions
•  What are the dimensions of the education 
and skills challenge in South Asia? 
•  What are the policy priorities for improving 
the skills of graduates of education and train-
ing systems?
Findings
•  Increasing wage premiums at the upper-
secondary and tertiary levels of education 
signals increasing demand for more skilled 
workers. In addition to knowledge and spe-
cifi c technical skills for the job, analytical and 
behavioral skills are being demanded. Upper-
secondary and tertiary education also sharply 
increase the ability of workers to access 
 better jobs. Despite considerable recent gains, 
three main dimensions to the education chal-
lenge remain: increasing attainment beyond 
 primary to secondary and tertiary education; 
including all groups in this effort; and going 
beyond attainment to ensuring that individu-
als are equipped with the skills demanded in 
the labor market.
•  The targets and strategies of individual coun-
tries will depend on country-specific out-
comes, constraints, resources, capacity, and 
political imperatives. Although specifi c tar-
gets will differ, there are two common pri-
orities. All countries will need to improve the 
learning outcomes and skills of graduates of 
education and training systems at all levels 
and address market failures that lead to lower 
investment in human capital among disad-
vantaged groups. 
•  The biggest payoffs may come from address-
ing poor nutrition and other factors in early 
childhood—before children enter formal 
schooling—in order to prevent development 
problems that can hinder learning and con-
tribute to early dropout, especially among 
children from poor families.
•  Improving the quality of learning in primary 
and secondary schools calls for measures 
that strengthen incentives and capacity in the 
school system. Priorities include strengthen-
ing national assessment systems, improving 
capacity and accountability at the school level, 
and improving the quality and performance 
of teachers. Improving parents’ understand-
ing of the returns to education, reducing their 
budget constraints through conditional cash 
transfers, and providing subsidies to private 
providers to serve the poorest groups are some 
strategies that have succeeded in increasing 
education investments among disadvantaged 
groups in primary and secondary education. 
•  In tertiary education and preemployment 
training systems, priorities include providing 
information on outcomes and strengthening 
quality assurance; increasing the role of the 
private sector in providing training and edu-
cation and in managing public institutions; 
providing public institutions with greater 
autonomy and incentives for improved per-
formance; and increasing contributions from 
students able to pay while protecting those 
who cannot.
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Education and Skills
Education and training systems have an important role to play in the labor market. They can infl uence the deci-
sions of fi rms to invest, adopt new technol-
ogies or develop new products, and enter 
new markets—decisions that determine 
how the structure of the economy evolves 
as well as the number and productivity of 
the jobs that are created. There is a strong 
association between education and train-
ing, job creation, and fi rm innovation (see 
chapter 4). Job growth takes place in larger 
firms that are internationally engaged; 
these firms are also more likely to intro-
duce new products and processes, engage 
in research and development, have more 
educated managers and workforces, and 
invest in the training of their workforce. 
Education and training systems also affect 
individuals’ decisions to participate in the 
labor force, their ability to access produc-
tive and more secure employment, and 
their earnings and welfare.1 Education is 
an important “sorter” in South Asian labor 
markets, with the less educated overwhelm-
ingly work in agriculture, self-employment 
(mostly low-end own-account or unpaid 
family work), or precarious and irregular 
wage employment (see chapter 3).
This chapter takes a close look at the 
challenges confronting education and train-
ing systems in South Asia. These systems 
need to equip more than 10 million poten-
tial entrants a year into the labor force—
including many from groups that have not 
been suffi ciently included—with skills for 
productive employment. 
The chapter is organized into eight sec-
tions. The first looks at skills in demand 
relative to those available in South Asian 
labor markets. The second looks at how 
education is connected to the ability of 
workers to access better jobs. The third 
discusses the dimensions of the education 
challenge in South Asia. The fourth looks 
at the potential evolution of educational 
attainment in South Asia’s rapidly expand-
ing labor force. The fi fth looks at the role of 
early childhood development in preparing 
children for success in school and the labor 
market. The sixth looks at primary and 
secondary education. The seventh exam-
ines tertiary education and preemployment 
training systems. The last section exam-
ines the extent to which workers in South 
Asia’s formal sector fi rms have opportuni-
ties to upgrade their skills through on-the-
job-training.
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Education and skills in 
South Asian labor markets 
This section reviews employers’ perceptions 
of skills constraints and wage premiums for 
different levels of education. It finds evi-
dence of considerable gaps in the supply of 
skills in the labor force. Improving the skills 
of graduates requires building strong educa-
tion and training systems and strengthening 
institutional capacity. It does not happen 
overnight.
Employers’ perceptions 
of skills constraints
Inadequate skills of the labor force rank 
among the top five constraints enterprise 
managers face in Bhutan and Maldives, 
where it is the second-most important con-
straint, and India, where job-creating fi rms 
rank lack of skills fi fth (comparable in sever-
ity to government policy uncertainty).2 
Firms in Afghanistan and Pakistan rate skills 
constraints among the least problematic. 
Although formal sector fi rms in fi ve of the 
eight countries in South Asia do not report 
skills as a top constraint, the evidence on 
wage premiums for India, Nepal, Pakistan, 
and Sri Lanka suggests that demand for 
workers with secondary or tertiary education 
is increasing. Moreover, in focused surveys 
on skills, employers report dissatisfaction 
with skills. 
Focused employer surveys in particular 
sectors in India and Sri Lanka suggest con-
cerns with the skills of tertiary education 
graduates relative to skills in demand. A 
survey of employers hiring recent engineer-
ing graduates in India shows that 64 percent 
of employers are only somewhat satisfi ed or 
worse with the quality of their new hires 
(Blom and Saeki 2011). Employers evalu-
ated the level of importance of a broad range 
of skills, including behavioral skills (such 
as teamwork,  reliability, leadership, and 
willingness to learn); creative thinking and 
problem-solving skills; communication skills; 
and specifi c knowledge and technical skills 
needed for the job (fi gure 5.1). They reported 
that they considered most of these skills a 
very important but that they were only some-
what satisfi ed with the graduates’ skills. 
A survey in Sri Lanka of the workforce in 
the information technology sector reveals a 
similar picture (table 5.1). Together the two 
surveys provide evidence on the importance 
of behavioral, creative thinking, problem-
solving, communication, and knowledge and 
specifi c skills. Some of the largest perceived 
skills gaps are in these areas. The foundation 
for these skills is developed even before higher 
education, in primary and secondary educa-
tion, as well as outside the education system. 
Changes in demand: Trends 
in wage premiums and the skills 
content of labor
Some evidence from India suggests that the 
skills content of jobs is slowly changing, espe-
cially in urban areas, as demand for analytical 
and interactive skills increases. As countries 
develop and technologies evolve, new occupa-
tions appear and the skills demanded change. 
Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) exam-
ine the evolution of the skills content of the 
U.S. labor force over a 40-year period begin-
ning in 1960. They document the rise of non-
routine cognitive analytical and interactive 
skills (“new economy” skills) and the decline 
in routine cognitive and routine and nonrou-
tine manual skills (see table 5.2).3 
A similar analysis conducted for India 
between 1994 and 2010 for this book fi nds 
that the skills content remained fairly sta-
ble, although there was a slight decrease 
in the importance of routine and nonrou-
tine manual skills. The lack of change is 
not surprising, given the large share of the 
workforce still employed in elementary, 
agricultural, and trade-related occupations. 
A closer look at the proportion of work-
ers in occupations in which the content of 
“new economy skills” is high (4 or 5 on a 
1–5 scale), however, suggests that the share 
of such occupations, although still modest, 
is increasing steadily (see annex table 5A.1). 
For urban wage earners, there has been a 
gradual increase in new economy and rou-
tine cognitive skills and a decline in manual 
skills (fi gure 5.2).
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FIGURE 5.1 Employers’ perceptions of skills of recently graduated engineers in India 
Source: Blom and Saeki 2011.
TABLE 5.1 Perceived demand for and deﬁ ciency in skills in programming and software engineering in Sri Lanka
Rank
Skills in demand
Skills defi cient in employeesEssential skills Complementary skills
1 Programming Team working Communication skills
2 Systems Design Communication skills Creative thinking skills
3 .Net Creative thinking skills Systems design
4 Systems Analyst Interpersonal skills Profi ciency in English 
5 Visual Basic C++ Programming
6 Java SQL server Team working
7 System testing Professional ethics Java
8 Business analysis System testing Interpersonal skills
9 Team working XML Professional ethics
10 Interpersonal skills Systems design .Net
Source: Sri Lanka Information Communication Technology Association 2007.
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Consistent with these patterns, the wage 
premium associated with the more skilled 
occupations has increased relative to elemen-
tary occupations (fi gure 5.3). Sharp increases 
are evident in changes in the premium for 
skilled occupations over elementary occupa-
tions between 1994 and 2010. This pattern is 
consistent with the picture above, which sug-
gests gradually increasing demand for more 
skilled occupations. It is also consistent with 
the fi nding below on increasing returns for 
higher levels of education, especially tertiary 
education. 
The wage premium increased for higher 
levels of education in several countries, even 
as the supply of educated workers increased. 
The premiums shown in figure 5.4 reflect 
the differential between a particular level 
of educational attainment and the level of 
attainment just below. The pattern is one in 
which the premium to lower levels of educa-
tion has been falling while the premium for 
TABLE 5.2 Routine and nonroutine skills categories 
Type of skill Tasks Examples of occupations requiring skills
Nonroutine cognitive: Analytical Analyzing data/information 
Thinking creatively 
Interpreting information for others
Lawyers, professors, doctors, training and 
development managersNonroutine cognitive: Interpersonal Establishing and maintaining personal relationships 
Guiding, directing, and motivating 
subordinates 
Coaching/developing others
Routine cognitive Repeating same tasks 
Being accurate 
Following tasks, priorities, and goals established for 
the job
Telephone operators, bookkeepers, 
accounting and auditing clerks, meter 
readers, cashiers
Routine manual Importance to this job that the pace is determined by 
the speed of controlling machines and processes 
Making repetitive motions  
Industrial truck operators; machine setters, 
operators, and tenders; construction 
carpenters
Nonroutine manual Operating vehicles, mechanized devices, 
or equipment 
Using hands to handle or control objects or tools
Using manual dexterity and
spatial orientation
Source: Acemoglu and Autor 2010.
Note: Acemoglu and Autor use the skills structure in the occupational information network database published by the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training 
Administration to update the results in Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003).
Source: World Bank staﬀ , based on national labor force surveys.
Note: Data cover 21- to 60-year-old urban casual workers and regular wage or salaried workers. 
Changes in skills contents are assessed using the method proposed by Autor, Levy, and Murnane 
(2003) and the skills categories identiﬁ ed in the O*NET database, as suggested by Acemoglu and 
Autor (2010). The skills content level of every worker’s job is assessed in each of the ﬁ ve skills cat-
egories, and a population distribution is created for each of the ﬁ ve skills categories. The process is 
repeated in each period surveyed. The skills content level for the median worker (50th percentile) in 
the distribution is identiﬁ ed, and the percentile corresponding to the same skills content level in the 
base year of 1994 is tracked. Thus, for example, the average intensity of new economy skills for the 
urban wage workers was around 10 centiles more in 2010 versus 1994. “New economy skills” is an 
aggregate of nonroutine cognitive analytical and nonroutine cognitive interpersonal skills. “Manual 
skills” is an aggregate of routine manual and nonroutine manual skills. 
FIGURE 5.2 Evolution of skills content of urban wage workers in 
India, 1994–2010 
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FIGURE 5.3 Wage premiums over elementary occupations in India, 1994–2010
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FIGURE 5.4 Wage premiums in selected South Asian countries, by level of education
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upper-secondary and tertiary education has 
been increasing. This trend is taking place in a 
context in which the educational attainment of 
the labor force has been generally rising, with 
an increase in the share of workers with pri-
mary, secondary, and tertiary education (see 
annex fi gure 5A.1). This pattern is thus con-
sistent with a situation in which the supply of 
workers at lower levels of education is increas-
ing faster than demand while the demand for 
workers with secondary or tertiary education 
is outpacing the increased supply.
There are important differences across 
countries. India and Nepal have seen increases 
in the premium to both upper- secondary and 
tertiary education. Indeed, the wage premium 
for tertiary education more than doubled in 
India between 2000 and 2010, despite an 
increase in the share of the labor force with 
tertiary education from 1 percent to 8 per-
cent over this period. This increase is seen in 
both the public and private sectors, in urban 
and rural areas.4 In Nepal, the largest rela-
tive increases in the wage premium were at 
the upper-secondary level, suggesting that 
demand increases at this level were greater 
than the small increases in supply (from 2 per-
cent of the labor force to 3 percent) between 
1999 and 2008. In Sri Lanka, wage premi-
ums for upper-secondary education increased 
substantially, signaling signifi cant increases 
in demand relative to supply at this level. The 
share of the labor force with lower-secondary 
education rose 10 percentage points between 
2000 and 2008; the increase in the supply of 
workers with upper-secondary and tertiary 
education was much smaller. 
In Pakistan, trends in wage premiums in 
the private sector are different from the trends 
shown in fi gure 5.4. In the private sector, the 
premium to tertiary education over upper-
secondary increased, whereas the premium to 
all other levels fell or—in the case of primary 
education—stayed more or less stable.
Educational attainment 
of the labor force 
With the exception of Afghanistan, for 
which data are available only for 2008, and 
Sri Lanka, where primary attainment has 
long been high, most countries in the region 
have seen rapid declines in the share of the 
labor force that does not have any education 
(fi gure 5.5). Declines were particularly sharp 
in Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan. 
Despite this progress, the share of work-
ers in the labor force without any education 
at all remains high relative to the region’s 
level of development reflecting relatively 
lower attainment at all levels of education 
(see annex fi gure 5A.2). (The main exception 
is primary attainment in Sri Lanka.) Educa-
tional attainment of men in the labor force is 
higher than that of women, but in Afghani-
stan, Bhutan, and Pakistan, the share of the 
male labor force with no education is high 
compared with other countries at similar 
income levels. In the case of women, more 
than half of the labor force in all countries 
other than Sri Lanka and Maldives lacks 
any education at all. Much of this difference 
reflects gaps in educational attainment of 
earlier generations, but gender gaps remain 
even in young cohorts of the population in 
many countries (see annex fi gure 5A.6). 
Education and access to 
better jobs
There is a strong link between education 
and type of employment. A multinomial logit 
model was used to explore the link between 
household and individual characteristics—
including education—and whether and where 
individuals work. It reveals that in all coun-
tries, an individual’s education level is typi-
cally the most important determinant. 
For both working men and women in 
rural and urban areas, the likelihood of being 
in a better job increases with education, par-
ticularly with secondary and higher levels 
(fi gure 5.6). The increases are sharpest begin-
ning with the completion of upper-secondary 
 education, except in Bangladesh, where the 
sharpest increases occur at the tertiary level 
(other exceptions include male workers in 
urban India, where the increases are not as 
sharp at upper- secondary, and female work-
ers in urban Pakistan, where sharp increases 
occur even with  completion of lower-
 secondary school). Disaggregation within 
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FIGURE 5.5 Share of South Asian labor force with no education, with international comparisons
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rural areas (not shown in figure)  indicates 
that this pattern primarily reflects the fact 
that workers with secondary or higher levels 
of education are much more likely to work 
in nonfarm self-employment or regular wage 
or salaried jobs. Among male workers in 
Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan, the likeli-
hood of being in casual nonfarm employment 
increases with some primary education and 
falls at higher levels of education.
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FIGURE 5.6 Predicted probability of working in rural nonfarm and urban regular wage jobs in selected South Asian countries, by level of education 
and gender
0
20
40
60
80
100
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
b. Likelihood of urban workers in Bangladesh
being in regular wage or salaried jobs, 2005
0
20
40
60
80
100
no
 ed
uc
ati
on
pr
im
ary
low
er
se
co
nd
ary up
pe
r
se
co
nd
ary ter
tia
ry
no
 ed
uc
ati
on
pr
im
ary
low
er
se
co
nd
ary up
pe
r
se
co
nd
ary ter
tia
ry
no
 ed
uc
ati
on
pr
im
ary
low
er
se
co
nd
ary up
pe
r
se
co
nd
ary ter
tia
ry
no
 ed
uc
ati
on
pr
im
ary
low
er
se
co
nd
ary up
pe
r
se
co
nd
ary ter
tia
ry
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a. Likelihood of rural workers in Bangladesh
being in nonfarm jobs, 2005
0
20
40
60
80
100
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
0
20
40
60
80
100
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
c. Likelihood of rural workers in India
being in nonfarm jobs, 2008
d. Likelihood of urban workers in India
being in regular wage or salaried jobs, 2008
female male
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
Note: The likelihood of workers being in a particular sector or type of employment is the predicted share of workers in a particular sector or type of employment from a multinomial logit regression of occupational 
choice on household and individual characteristics.
0
20
40
60
80
100
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
e. Likelihood of rural workers in Nepal
being in rural nonfarm jobs, 2008
0
20
40
60
80
100
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
f. Likelihood of urban workers in Nepal
being in regular wage or salaried jobs, 2008
0
20
40
60
80
100
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
h. Likelihood of urban workers in Pakistan
being in regular wage or salaried jobs, 2009
0
20
40
60
80
100
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
g. Likelihood of rural workers in Pakistan
being in rural nonfarm jobs, 2009
no
 ed
uc
ati
on
so
me
pr
im
ary pr
im
ary
low
er
se
co
nd
ary up
pe
r
se
co
nd
ary ter
tia
ry
no
 ed
uc
ati
on
so
me
pr
im
ary pr
im
ary
low
er
se
co
nd
ary up
pe
r
se
co
nd
ary ter
tia
ry
no
 ed
uc
ati
on
so
me
pr
im
ary pr
im
ary
low
er
se
co
nd
ary up
pe
r
se
co
nd
ary ter
tia
ry
no
 ed
uc
ati
on
so
me
pr
im
ary pr
im
ary
low
er
se
co
nd
ary up
pe
r
se
co
nd
ary ter
tia
ry
female male
 
 
179
1 8 0   M O R E  A N D  B E T T E R  J O B S  I N  S O U T H  A S I A  
Working women with less than upper-
secondary education (lower-secondary in 
Pakistan) are generally less likely than men 
to hold better jobs. The main exception is 
in urban Bangladesh, where women who 
work are likely to do as well or better than 
men at all levels of education. Women see a 
sharper increase in the likelihood of being in 
a better job with secondary or tertiary educa-
tion than do men: at these levels of education, 
women are at least as likely to be in a better 
job. In rural Bangladesh and Nepal, unlike in 
Pakistan and India, the likelihood that work-
ing women with upper-secondary or tertiary 
education are in better nonfarm jobs is not 
higher than that of men.
Education also improves labor mobility. 
Multinomial logit regressions provide insights 
into the distribution of workers’ employment 
type with varying educational levels among a 
cross-section of workers, but panel data are 
needed to provide a picture of labor mobility. 
In the absence of panel data for South Asian 
countries, analysis of employment transitions 
was carried out using pseudo-panel data (see 
appendix B). Education emerges as one of the 
strongest correlates of labor mobility in all 
countries and all years considered. 
Secondary and higher levels of education 
increase the ability of workers to move out of 
agriculture, casual wage jobs, and low-end 
self-employment to better jobs. Although 
the analysis was carried out for Bangladesh, 
Nepal, and two time periods for India, in the 
interest of space, figures 5.7 and 5.8 pres-
ent the results only for worker transitions 
between 2004/05 and 2007/08 in India. The 
figures show the probability of transition 
FIGURE 5.7 Conditional probability of moving into and out of better jobs in rural India, by education and 
gender, 2005–08
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FIGURE 5.8 Conditional probability of moving into and out of better jobs in urban India, by education 
and gender, 2005–08
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Note: See note for ﬁ gure 5.7. An upward transition in the urban context is a move from casual wage work or low-end self-employment to regular wage or 
salaried work or high-end self-employment. A  downward transition is a move from regular wage or salaried work or high-end self-employment to casual 
wage work or low-end self-employment.
between the first and second period con-
ditional on type of employment in the fi rst 
period, by education and gender.5 Three 
interesting fi ndings emerge:
•  Rural workers who were in agriculture 
and urban workers who were in casual or 
low-end self-employment in the fi rst period 
were more likely to be able to make the 
transition to a better job (nonfarm employ-
ment in rural areas and high-end self-
 employment or regular wage or salaried 
jobs in urban areas) if they had secondary 
or higher levels of education ( panels a and c 
of fi gures 5.7 and 5.8). This mobility is typ-
ically greater for workers with completed 
upper-secondary education (in Bangla-
desh for workers with tertiary education).6 
Workers with lower levels of education 
were more likely to transition out of better 
jobs (for example, from nonfarm employ-
ment to agriculture in rural areas) than 
workers with higher levels of education.
•  Workers with higher levels of education 
were much more likely to move to better 
jobs than they were to lose them, as shown 
in the lower levels of the transition bars 
for higher levels of education in panels b 
and d of fi gures 5.7 and 5.8 than in panels 
a and c. Workers with lower levels of edu-
cation were more likely to lose better jobs 
than they were to gain them, as shown in 
the higher levels of the transition bars for 
lower levels of education in panels b and d 
than in panels a and c. 
•  These patterns appear to be sharper for 
women in both urban and rural areas, sug-
gesting that education may play a stronger 
role in worker mobility for women. 
The education challenge
The analysis described in the previous 
 sections suggests three dimensions to the edu-
cation challenge in South Asia. First, there is 
a need to increase the educational attainment 
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of the labor force beyond primary to second-
ary and higher levels of education, where 
the payoffs in worker mobility and earnings 
are greatest. Second, it will be important to 
ensure that all groups—including women, 
ethnic minorities, and the poor—have equal 
opportunities to access education. Third, 
although increased opportunities to attend 
educational and training institutions are nec-
essary, they are not suffi cient. It is essential 
that individuals graduate from these institu-
tions equipped with skills that will enable 
them to access better employment opportu-
nities and succeed in the world of work. This 
section examines how South Asia is doing on 
these three dimensions.
Increasing educational attainment 
Despite signifi cant progress by young cohorts, 
educational attainment in young cohorts of 
the population in South Asia remains low, 
refl ecting low attainment of upper-secondary 
and tertiary education in all countries and of 
primary education in Afghanistan. The aver-
age years of education of young cohorts of 
the population (age 15–34) has increased 
in all countries since the late 1990s or early 
2000s (annex table 5A.2). It is still low 
in most countries, however, ranging from 
2.5 years in Afghanistan to 10.2 years in 
Sri Lanka. About 80 percent of youth com-
plete primary education in all South Asian 
countries except Afghanistan, Nepal, and 
Pakistan (fi gure 5.9; see annex fi gures 5A.6 
and 5A.7 for a break-out by gender). Primary 
attainment is especially low in Afghanistan, 
where only a third of youth complete pri-
mary school. Considerable progress has been 
made in most countries in lower-secondary 
attainment, although less than 60 percent of 
recent cohorts completed lower-secondary 
in all countries except India, Maldives, and 
Sri Lanka. Completion of upper-secondary 
and tertiary by young cohorts remains low in 
all countries in the region, with only 21–23 
percent completing upper-secondary even in 
India, Maldives, and Sri Lanka.7 In all coun-
tries, less than 10 percent of youth have com-
pleted tertiary education. 
Including all groups
Figure 5.10 shows mean years of education 
of young cohorts of the population by gen-
der, location, and socioeconomic group.8 
Three facts stand out. First, with the excep-
tion of Sri Lanka, gender, rural, and socio-
economic disadvantages persist even in 
young cohorts. Gender disparities in mean 
years of education in Bangladesh and Mal-
dives are close to being eliminated, but rural 
and socioeconomic disparities remain.9 
Second, rural and low-income women 
are the most disadvantaged, and urban and 
high-income men are the least disadvantaged. 
There are important country differences, but 
the gap is close to or more than four years on 
both dimensions in fi ve of eight countries. 
Third, urban and higher-income women 
have higher educational attainment than 
rural and low- income men in most countries, 
suggesting that the rural and income disad-
vantage dominates the gender disadvantage. 
Ethnic minorities and disadvantaged castes 
also have lower educational attainment, even 
among younger cohorts. In India, scheduled 
castes and tribes and Muslim minorities have 
signifi cantly lower educational attainment. 
In Nepal, the Dalits and Muslims are among 
the most disadvantaged. Ethnic differences in 
education outcomes are also observed in Sri 
Lanka (see annex fi gure 5A.8). These disad-
vantages by gender, location, and socioeco-
nomic status refl ect both a still low likelihood 
of starting school and a high likelihood of 
dropping out, with variations across coun-
tries (see annex fi gure 5A.9.) 
Education disadvantages by gender, socio-
economic status, and ethnicity play out in 
the labor market and are an important rea-
son for the small number of workers from 
disadvantaged groups holding better jobs 
(see chapter 3). 
Equipping children with skills
Children in school in South Asia have very 
low levels of learning, with large numbers of 
children acquiring no more than basic literacy. 
No systematic studies enable comparison of 
FIGURE 5.9 Share of young cohorts with completed primary, secondary, and tertiary education in South Asia, by country 
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(continues next page)
FIGURE 5.10 Mean years of education of 15–34 year olds in South Asia, by gender and country 
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learning outcomes in primary, secondary, or 
tertiary education across South Asian coun-
tries or over time. There is also limited reliable 
information on learning from national asses-
sment systems, particularly on trends over 
time within countries. However,  as discussed 
below, evidence from several in-country stu-
dies and surveys suggests that the low level 
of learning is perhaps the greatest challenge 
facing the education and training systems in 
all countries. For example, 62 percent of chil-
dren in class 4 in India and Pakistan could 
read only at the expected level for class 1: 
after four years of schooling, they could at 
most read a short paragraph. Results in math 
in both countries are also poor (fi gure 5.11). 
In Bangladesh, the vast majority of chil-
dren who complete grade 9 attain only grade 
5 competency in math (93 percent in oral 
math, 80 percent in written math) (Asadul-
lah and others 2009). In India and Pakistan, 
learning levels are signifi cantly below cur-
riculum standards (Das, Pandey, and Zajonc 
2006). There is also evidence that children 
have diffi culties with conceptual thinking 
and problem-solving skills. In Pakistan, less 
than 2 percent of students in a representa-
tive national sample (in the 2006 national 
assessment) were able to reason in settings 
involving the application of concept defi ni-
tions, relationships, or representations of 
either, and less than 1 percent were able to 
demonstrate the choice and application of 
mathematical processes in different situ-
ations. Similar evidence is available from 
India from a sample of elite private schools, 
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FIGURE 5.10 (continued)
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
Note: Socioeconomic group is based on per capita consumption quintile of the household.
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suggesting that concerns of quality are not 
limited to public or low-cost private schools 
(EI 2006). 
Two common priorities 
The strategies and targets of countries will 
depend on country-specifi c outcomes, con-
straints, resources, capacity, and political 
imperatives. In the face of multiple dimen-
sions to the education challenge, countries 
will determine their own priorities and tar-
gets. For example, achieving completion of 
primary remains a priority in Afghanistan 
and in some other countries in the region, 
whereas Bangladesh is concerned about 
 providing equal opportunities for boys and 
girls from low-income households in pri-
mary and secondary school. 
Except in Bangladesh and Pakistan, average 
public education expenditures in South Asia 
are comparable to or higher than in East Asia 
(fi gure 5.12).10 Although countries may chose 
to increase budgetary allocations to meet the 
education challenge, there is also considerable 
room to increase the efficiency with which 
existing resources are used. The solid progress 
in improving educational attainment in recent 
years in South Asia has been achieved by the 
combined efforts of governments, households, 
and the nongovernment and private sector—in 
the face of resource and capacity constraints. 
These efforts will continue to be important 
and, indeed, may be leveraged further.
Although country’s strategies and targets 
will differ, all countries share two priorities. 
First, what is ultimately critical for labor mar-
ket success is what individuals learn. Research 
FIGURE 5.11 Reading and arithmetic achievement in rural India and Pakistan, by class, 2010
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b. Distribution of children by arithmetic level, India
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c. Distribution of children by reading level, Pakistan
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d. Distribution of children by arithmetic level, Pakistan
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FIGURE 5.12 Public expenditure on education as a share of GDP, in South Asia and other regions
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Note: Public expenditure on education is reported to be about 11 percent of GDP in the Maldives (not shown in ﬁ gure). GDP = gross domestic product.
suggests that the level of skills—as measured 
by performance on international student 
assessments such as the Programme for Inter-
national Student Assessment (PISA) and the 
Trends in International Mathematics and 
Science Study (TIMSS)—predicts economic 
growth far better than do average schooling 
levels (Hanushek and Woessman 2008).11 
Thus an important focus for governments is 
to establish and strengthen the systems that 
will lead to improved learning outcomes and 
skills of graduates at all levels. Second, gov-
ernments have an important role to play in 
addressing market failures that lead to lower 
investment in human capital among disadvan-
taged groups. 
The next 20 years: Can South 
Asian countries improve the 
educational attainment of their 
labor forces?
Should all South Asian countries increase 
education attainment at the highest pace 
observed among countries in the region, the 
composition of the labor force could change 
dramatically. Figure 5.13 shows the composi-
tion of the labor force in 2010 and what it 
could look like under an optimistic but feasi-
ble scenario of progress in educational attain-
ment in 203012 (see annex 5B for assumptions 
and more details). This scenario corresponds 
to one in which primary attainment of young 
cohorts is based on the six best-performing 
South Asian countries over the previous 
10 years and secondary attainment follows 
the trends of a smaller subset of countries in 
South Asia with the highest progression.13 
With effort, South Asian countries could 
dramatically improve educational attainment 
of their workforces over the next 20 years. 
Many countries should be able to more than 
halve the share of the labor force with no 
education; in all countries, the percent of the 
labor force with only primary education or 
less will fall. The share of individuals with 
at least some secondary education could rise 
dramatically. Under this scenario, the per-
centage of the labor force with some second-
ary education could reach almost 30 percent 
in Afghanistan and over 50 percent in India, 
Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Tertiary attainment 
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FIGURE 5.13 Educational attainment of the South Asian labor force in 2010 (estimated) and 2030 
(projected), by country
Sources: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys; UN 2009, 2010; KC and others 2010.
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remains under 12 percent in all countries 
except Maldives and Sri Lanka, although 
under a more ambitious scenario, most coun-
tries could raise the percentage of the labor 
force with tertiary education to at least 20 
percent (see annex table 5B.2). 
Progress will be made by younger cohorts 
and new labor market entrants; a large stock 
of prime-age and older workers will still 
have lower levels of education. Except in Sri 
Lanka, the majority of prime-age (35–49) 
and oldest (50–64) adults in the labor force 
will continue to have no more than primary 
attainment in 2030 (fi gure 5.14). The share 
of prime-age adults with primary attainment 
or below ranges from 30 percent of the labor 
force in Sri Lanka to 88 percent in Afghani-
stan; the picture is worse in rural areas. These 
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FIGURE 5.14 Projected shares of prime-age (35–49) and oldest (50–64) labor force participants in South Asia with no 
education or only primary attainment in 2030, by country 
Sources: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys; UN 2009, 2010; KC and others 2010. 
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poorly educated will be likely hold informal 
jobs, with lower earnings and higher labor 
market risks. (Chapter 6 discusses programs 
that can help informal workers adjust to 
labor market shocks and improve their pro-
ductivity and future earnings potential.) Pol-
icy options and promising interventions for 
improving the skills of potential new entrants 
into the labor force (from education and 
training systems), and including individuals 
from disadvantaged groups in these efforts, 
are discussed in the next few sections of this 
chapter. Some of the constraints education 
and training systems face in improving the 
skills of potential new entrants into the labor 
force and policy options and promising inter-
ventions for addressing them are discussed 
later in this chapter.
Addressing disadvantages 
before school: The role of early 
childhood development
The first years of life—long before for-
mal schooling begins—are a key period 
for building human capital.14 The benefi ts 
of health and nutrition early on can have 
effects that persist throughout life; damage 
from childhood disease and malnutrition 
can be  diffi cult to undo. 
There are critical periods in childhood 
for acquiring different skills.15 Three types 
of outcomes in early years are critical for 
future development: physical growth and 
well-being, cognitive development, and 
socioemotional development. The context in 
which a child develops and is either stimu-
lated or shocked can have a signifi cant infl u-
ence on how much of his or her potential is 
eventually realized.
Developmental delays often begin early in 
life and accumulate quickly over time, espe-
cially for the poorest children. Low  levels of 
cognitive development in early childhood are 
often strongly correlated with low socioeco-
nomic status, as measured by wealth, parental 
education, and malnutrition. Evidence from 
Cambodia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Madagascar, 
and Mozambique shows that children from 
low-income households begin to fall behind 
on various measures of cognitive develop-
ment starting from about 36 months (Nadeau 
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and others 2011). Falling behind is evident 
not only in language development but also 
in behavioral (sometimes termed “noncog-
nitive”) abilities, such as sustained attention 
(Fernald, Galasso, and Ratsifandrihamanana 
2011). The factors behind these shortfalls are 
still being delineated (for a recent review of 
risk factors, see Walker and others 2011). 
Beyond nutrition and infectious diseases, 
early learning opportunities and caregiver-
child interactions, which vary with parental 
education and wealth, also play a role. 
There is considerable evidence, including 
from South Asia, that improved nutrition 
enhances lifetime learning and labor mar-
ket productivity (Behrman, Alderman, and 
 Hoddinott 2004). In a study that tracked 
birth cohorts of Indians since 1969, research-
ers conclude that both birthweight and weight 
gain in the fi rst two years of life are strong 
predictors of schooling outcomes (Martorell 
and Horta 2010).16A study of Pakistan fi nds 
that malnourished girls—but not boys—were 
less likely to enter school (Alderman and oth-
ers 2001). Consistent with these fi ndings, a 
study from Guatemala fi nds that adult men 
and women who were better nourished in 
the fi rst three years of life (having received 
nutritional supplements) had significantly 
higher schooling attainment, higher scores 
on cognitive tests, and greater likelihood of 
employment in higher-paying and white col-
lar jobs and were less likely to live in poor 
households (Hoddinott and others 2011). 
These and a number of other studies indicate 
high returns to preventing malnutrition. 
Micronutrient deficiencies, which often 
begin during the prenatal period, can also 
impair cognitive and motor development in 
children. Evidence from India and Nepal is 
consistent with global evidence. In India, 
for example, provision of iron supplementa-
tion and deworming medicine to preschool 
children had positive impacts on school 
attendance, with much stronger responses 
among children who were anemic at baseline 
(Bobonis, Edward, and Puri-Sharma 2006). 
 Children of Nepali mothers provided with 
iron and zinc during pregnancy performed 
better on cognitive measures as well as on tests 
of working memory, inhibitory control, and 
fi ne motor functioning (Christian and others 
2010). Addressing micronutrient defi ciencies 
long before school begins, often with prenatal 
micronutrient fortification or supplementa-
tion, is often the most effi cient response.
South Asia has some of the highest rates of 
malnutrition in the world as well as high lev-
els of anemia and iodine defi ciency. It has the 
highest prevalence of malnutrition in children 
under fi ve across all indicators (fi gure 5.15).17 
Indeed, malnutrition rates are higher than in 
FIGURE 5.15 Percentage of children under ﬁ ve with malnutrition, by region and country 
Source: Authors, based on data from World Bank 2011b.
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Africa. Rates of malnutrition, anemia, and 
iodine defi cits decrease with wealth, but only 
modestly (annex fi gure 5A.10). 
Three conclusions can be drawn from this 
evidence. First, high malnutrition and micro-
nutrient deficiencies are likely important 
contributors to developmental delays in low-
income groups in South Asia. Second, they 
may also be important factors for overall cog-
nitive development of the broader population. 
Third, income growth alone will not eliminate 
malnutrition; focused attention is needed.
Insuffi cient cognitive stimulation among 
low-income children in South Asia may also 
be a factor. Some evidence from Bangladesh 
and Sindh (Pakistan) suggests that moth-
ers’ limited understanding of when children 
respond to communication, for example, and 
low levels of learning materials and involve-
ment could be contributing factors.18 In 
Bangladesh, parents have been found to be 
more interactive with their sons than their 
daughters, even at a very young age. Lack of 
time and maternal depression can also limit 
stimulation. 
Many children in South Asia come to 
school with signifi cant disadvantages, which 
hinder learning, contribute to early drop out, 
and can be difficult or costly to reverse in 
later years. Although outcomes and activities 
at home play a key role, they can be enhanced 
by programs in health and education that 
take place in communities and preschools. 
Most countries in South Asia do not 
have integrated policy frameworks for early 
childhood development. Early childhood 
interventions—nutrition, hygiene, early cog-
nitive stimulation, preschool programs—are 
among the most cost-effective investments to 
improve the quality and effi ciency of basic 
education, as well as labor market outcomes. 
Table 5.3 provides an overview of the key 
issues for early childhood development policy 
and some types of programs that can help 
prepare children for school. 
National nutrition policies and programs in 
Bangladesh and some aspects of public health 
campaigns related to nutrition in Pakistan 
have contributed to improvements in nutri-
tion. Neither country has a national policy on 
early childhood development, however. 
India has the region’s strongest enabling 
policy framework, which derives it founda-
tion from the constitution. Its centrally spon-
sored Integrated Child Development Services 
(ICDS) program, which emanated from the 
Fifth Five-Year Plan (1969–79), remains the 
cornerstone for implementing its early child-
hood development policy. ICDS is one of 
the few programs at scale in the region that 
seeks to integrate early childhood interven-
tions. The program—one of the largest 
TABLE 5.3 Main issues, interventions, and expected outcomes in early childhood development 
Main issue/age
Key nutrition/early childhood 
development interventions Expected outcomes 
Lack of nutrition, health, and cognitive 
stimulation (0–3)
•  Protein-energy malnutrition and defi ciencies 
in key micronutrients
• Infectious diseases and parasites
•  Promotion of good nutritional practices, 
including feeding and personal hygiene
•  Deworming and provision of micronutrients 
for young children (vitamin A, zinc, iodine) 
and their mothers (iron folate) 
•  Provision of micronutrients through food 
fortifi cation
•  Better physical well-being and health
•  Preschool readiness
•  Improved cognitive and noncognitive 
development 
Lack of cognitive stimulation and parental 
interaction (0–5)
•  Parental enrichment training
•  Home visits in high-risk cases 
•  Improved cognitive and noncognitive 
development
Insuffi  cient age-appropriate stimulation 
and development of social skills (4–5)
•  Preschool programs with appropriate 
curricula
•  School readiness
•  Improved cognitive and noncognitive 
achievement
•  Lower dropout
Source: Alderman 2011.
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child development programs in the world— 
integrates health and nutrition services, early 
stimulation and learning, and nonformal pre-
school education. Although well conceived 
as an approach to holistic child development, 
the program has not had the desired impact 
on promoting cognitive development or 
improving child nutrition. Inadequate cover-
age of children under three, an overempha-
sis on food supplementation, and substantial 
operational challenges (such as inadequate 
program stewardship and delivery capacity, 
weak monitoring and evaluation and supervi-
sion, and the lack of community ownership) 
have undermined its potential impact. There 
is, however, wide variation in implementa-
tion of the program across states, with some 
states having demonstrated good results. Sev-
eral localized innovations have the potential 
to be scaled up. 
In part, the absence of programs at scale 
reflects still limited understanding of what 
constitute cost-effective designs in South 
Asia. Several pilot projects can serve as a lab-
oratory for designing cost-effective programs, 
but many lack careful plans for evaluation. 
Potentially promising efforts are under way, 
however. Pilots run by the International Cen-
ter for Diarrheal Disease Research (ICDDR) 
in Dhaka, for example, have stronger evalua-
tion designs and have proven the feasibility of 
promoting better parenting and mother-child 
interactions through home  visits. The Lady 
Health Workers Programme in Pakistan, a 
community-based preventive care government 
program, holds promise for promoting nutri-
tion and child care through scaling up of care-
fully evaluated cost-effective pilot designs. 
Primary and secondary 
education
This section begins by examining constraints 
to—and priorities for—strengthening pri-
mary and secondary education systems in 
order to improve the quality of learning of 
graduates. It then discusses some innovative 
interventions that have had increased invest-
ment in primary and secondary education of 
disadvantaged groups. 
Improving the quality of learning
Improving the quality of learning in pri-
mary and secondary school calls for mea-
sures that strengthen incentives and capacity 
in the school system. Poor quality, particu-
larly in public schools, can be attributed to 
several governance challenges. First, under-
developed assessment systems limit monitor-
ing by stakeholders on what children learn 
and the extent to which they master needed 
competencies. This lack of information is a 
serious constraint to introducing reforms to 
improve quality. Second, with some notable 
exceptions—such as the community-based 
management of schools in Nepal— education 
systems are still very centralized; decision-
making authority, especially at the school 
level, is limited. Third, neither government 
education management nor parents hold 
schools accountable for education outcomes. 
The potential of efforts to increase local 
autonomy and accountability has not been 
fully realized, as a result of limited capacity 
and information of school and village man-
agement committees. Fourth, fi nancing of 
providers is not typically based on objective 
measures of performance; it tends to be his-
torical and based on inputs. Fifth, political 
interference in teacher hiring and still under-
developed career and pay incentives may be 
affecting teacher performance. This human 
resource management challenge extends 
beyond teachers to education management. 
Information, capacity, and incentives can 
also be important for private provision. The 
private sector is playing a signifi cant role in 
providing even primary education in many 
countries; it has already contributed to sig-
nificant expansion in enrollments (figure 
5.16).19 Private provision offers the poten-
tial for increasing access at lower cost, often 
with comparable or better outcomes than 
public schools. 
A study in two states in India shows that 
although private schools do not always achieve 
higher learning outcomes than public schools 
(especially after controlling for observable 
differences in children) and achievement gaps 
vary between states, private schools are more 
cost-effective than public schools (Goyal and 
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FIGURE 5.16 Share of primary and secondary enrollments in public and private institutions in selected 
South Asian countries 
Source: Authors, based on national labor force and household surveys. 
Note: “Other” includes private-aided schools in India; technical schools in Nepal; and madrasas in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Public schools in 
Nepal are, for the most part, under community management.
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Pandey 2009b).20 A study in rural Punjab 
(Pakistan) fi nds that private school students’ 
test scores are 1.5–2.5 years ahead of their 
public school counterparts and that a sig-
nifi cant achievement gap remains even after 
controlling for the fact that more affluent 
children attend private schools (Andrabi and 
others 2007). In Bangladesh, where second-
ary education is almost entirely provided by 
the private sector with government financ-
ing, the majority of fi nancing is on the basis 
of inputs, and serious concerns about quality 
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remain. Insuffi cient attention has been paid 
in most South Asian countries to developing 
quality assurance systems for the public and 
private sectors and strengthening incentives 
and capacity in the school system as a whole. 
The global knowledge base on interven-
tions to improve quality is still being built. 
More is known on how to improve access and 
to include disadvantaged groups. An ongoing 
regional study on the quality of education in 
South Asia will provide a more comprehen-
sive look at the region’s education systems 
and a more in-depth discussion of interven-
tions to improve quality. Addressing gover-
nance challenges will need to be at the center 
of all country strategies, as discussed below.
Improving governance and 
accountability through information
A key missing element in the accountabil-
ity regimes in the region is data on student 
learning outcomes. Only India, Pakistan, and 
Sri Lanka have national systems of  student 
assessment, and even they are at the primary 
level only. Only India has participated in an 
international assessment of student achieve-
ment (two Indian states participated in the 
Programme for International Student Assess-
ment [PISA 2009+], the results of which will 
be available at the end of 2011). Although all 
countries have an extensive system of public 
examinations at the end of secondary edu-
cation and often also at the end of primary 
education, the tests are usually not a good 
basis for accountability.21 
Even on a sample basis, national assess-
ments can yield important information about 
the strengths and weaknesses of the system, 
which provides guidance for policy makers 
and other institutional actors (such as teacher 
training institutions) in designing interven-
tions. Establishing such assessment is a pri-
ority area for education systems in South 
Asia. Countries with assessment systems are 
working on strengthening them. India, for 
example, is modernizing its system to bring it 
to international standards. Nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) such as Pratham have 
played a key role in contributing to the edu-
cation debate in India (and now in Pakistan) 
through their annual status of education 
reports (Pratham 2010).
Providing information to local stakehold-
ers on roles, responsibilities, and learning 
outcomes can improve accountability and 
outcomes in schools. Many countries (includ-
ing Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan) are 
increasing efforts to address the limited infor-
mation and capacity of school management 
committees and to increase the involvement 
of parents and communities. Rigorous evalu-
ations of some pilot interventions suggest that 
such efforts hold promise, although capacity 
building requires sustained effort and results 
can take time. 
In India, a study in 12 districts in 3 states 
evaluated the impact of an intervention that 
provided information to villagers about the 
roles and responsibilities of school or vil-
lage management committees. Although 
the magnitude and channels of impact (for 
example, increased knowledge, engage-
ment, and monitoring) varied across states, 
math competencies increased 10–30 percent 
and teacher absenteeism fell 9–12 percent 
(Pandey, Goyal, and Sundararaman 2009). 
In Pakistan, school report cards were 
distributed to parents and teachers, and 
discussion groups took place to ensure that 
participants understand the information 
reported. Average test scores increased in 
villages in which report cards were distrib-
uted. Increased local competition appeared 
to have spurred the poorest-quality private 
schools to improve (Andrabi, Das, and 
Khwaja 2009). 
Strengthening school management 
Most South Asian countries have started 
devolving greater responsibilities to schools, 
although the extent of the devolution varies 
across countries. Nepal has undertaken the 
most sweeping reforms. Bangladesh, India, 
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have all begun to 
engage school committees in the school plan-
ning process, increase the availability of funds 
to schools, and strengthen the role of school 
leadership. Although the global evidence on 
school-based management reforms is still 
limited, studies find that they can change 
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the dynamics of the school, because parents 
become more engaged, teachers’ behaviors 
change, or both. The studies document a pos-
itive impact on repetition and failure rates, 
although evidence on learning outcomes is 
mixed (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos 2011). 
The evidence from initiatives in South 
Asian countries is promising. In Nepal, 
where the devolution of responsibility for 
managing schools to communities is one 
of the most extensive in the world, positive 
impacts include increased participation of 
disadvantaged children and improved grade 
progression (see box 7.5 in chapter 7). Sri 
Lanka’s Program for School Improvement 
empowers school management committees 
to develop and implement school improve-
ment plans. The program, which has 
improved math and English language test 
scores of grade 4 students, is expected to be 
expanded nationally. 
Improving the quality and 
performance of teachers 
Recruiting, motivating, and supporting the 
right teachers have to be critical components 
of any strategy to improve education out-
comes. South Asian countries have started 
taking bold steps to reduce the politicization 
of recruitment and placement, improve the 
quality of teachers recruited, and increase 
motivation through various approaches, 
such as incentive pay and the development 
of career paths. 
Moving away from patronage-based 
recruitment to merit-based recruitment of 
teachers is key. Political interference in recruit-
ment and school postings reduces the qual-
ity and accountability of teachers, affecting 
student attendance and learning. In the past 
few years, the region has made considerable 
progress toward transparent and merit-based 
recruitment of teachers. Bangladesh developed 
a teacher registration and certifi cation author-
ity, which administers examinations to certify 
teachers, who are then assigned on the basis 
of demand from schools. Pakistan introduced 
new policies in various provinces requiring 
the use of transparent and merit-based criteria 
and school-specifi c contracts (box 5.1). 
Some studies from South Asia suggest that 
well-designed schemes that provide incentives 
Patronage-based hiring of teachers has long been prev-
alent throughout South Asia. In Sindh, Pakistan’s sec-
ond most populous province, hiring has historically 
been patronage based, potentially compromising the 
quality of incoming teachers and their accountability, 
as evidenced by rates of teacher absenteeism estimated 
as high as 25 percent. Teacher absenteeism further 
undermines the regularity and quality of teaching, 
and, in turn, student attendance and learning. 
To improve the quality of incoming teachers, the 
government of Sindh is administering a program 
for transparent merit-based recruitment. In a major 
shift from past recruitment policies and practices, 
the government now fi rst screens candidates through 
an externally developed and administered content-
based examination. Higher priority in placement is 
given to candidates who score higher on the entrance 
exam and have better academic and professional 
qualifi cations, candidates who live close to the pro-
posed placement, and women. Qualifying candi-
dates are then placed in understaffed schools under 
school-specifi c and fi xed-term contracts in an effort 
to enhance accountability, reduce absenteeism, and 
place teachers according to need. 
About 13,500 teachers have been hired over two 
rounds of recruitment. The fi rst round emphasized 
merit-based recruitment; the second round also 
introduced needs-based placement. Both rounds 
were validated by an external third party. Early fi nd-
ings show the rate of absenteeism of newly recruited 
teachers to be 16 percent, compared with 22 percent 
for regular teachers. A rigorous impact evaluation of 
the program is underway to determine the effects of 
the program on teaching and learning quality. 
Source: World Bank staﬀ  reports. 
BOX 5.1 Recruiting teachers based on merit in Sindh, Pakistan
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through the nature of the contract or pay can 
lead to learning gains. There are a few good 
studies from developing countries, but the 
knowledge base is still limited. Moreover, 
evidence on incentive pay varies across coun-
tries and scheme designs (see annex table 
5A.3). The evidence is still based on relatively 
short periods of time, with much less known 
on longer-term impacts. 
These caveats notwithstanding, some stud-
ies show promising results. The use of con-
tract teachers appears to have led to learning 
gains for students in India, in part because 
contract teachers exhibit more effective 
work habits, such as better attendance and 
greater effort (Dufl o, Hanna, and Ryan 2010; 
Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2010). 
These improved outcomes come at consider-
able savings, as the cost of hiring teachers on 
civil service terms and conditions is four to 
seven times greater than the cost of recruiting 
contract teachers (Goyal and  Pandey 2009a). 
Few countries have fi gured out how to cre-
ate career paths for contract teachers; doing 
so will be important for ensuring the sustain-
ability of such policies. 
Evaluations from the states of Rajasthan 
(Dufl o, Hanna, and Ryan 2010) and Andhra 
Pradesh (Muralidharan and Sundararaman 
2011) show positive impacts of teacher incen-
tives on attendance and student learning. 
Box 5.2 provides additional information on the 
In a statewide representative sample of 500 schools, 
four different approaches to improving learning 
were tried. The schemes included two incentives 
schemes (an individual teacher bonus and a group 
teacher bonus) and two input schemes (provision 
of an additional contract teacher and provision of 
a block grant to the school) as well as a compari-
son group of 100 schools. All schools, including 
the control schools, were monitored, with students 
tested at the beginning and end of the school year. 
Teacher bonuses were awarded on the basis of aver-
age improvement of student test scores over each 
school year. In the group incentive schools, bonuses 
were awarded on the basis of the average gains of 
all students in the school, and were equally distrib-
uted among teachers. In the individual incentive 
schools, the bonuses were awarded to each teacher 
on the basis of the average gains in scores of students 
taught by that particular teacher. 
After two years, all four schemes improved stu-
dent learning. However, the schools receiving the 
teacher incentive programs improved their test scores 
by signifi cantly more than those receiving additional 
inputs. Students in incentive schools scored 0.27 
standard deviations higher in math, and 0.16 stan-
dard deviations higher in language than students 
in the control schools (while the students in input 
schools scored 0.09 and 0.08 standard deviations 
higher in math and language than those in control 
schools). The main mechanism for the effectiveness 
of the teacher incentive program was not higher 
teacher attendance in the incentive schools, but 
greater teacher effort conditional on attendance 
(teachers report that they assigned more homework, 
held extra classes, gave practice tests, and helped 
weaker students).
After two years, the individual incentive 
schools performed better than the group incentive 
schools. Averaged across subjects, students in indi-
vidual incentive schools scored 0.28 standard devia-
tions higher than the control group, while students 
in group incentive schools scored 0.16 standard devi-
ations higher. However, because the bonuses were 
paid as a function of actual improvement in test 
scores, the bonuses paid out under the group incen-
tive  program were lower, and so the cost per unit 
of increase in test scores of the two programs was 
similar (though the individual incentive program 
was more cost effective after including fi xed admin-
istrative costs).
Although there was no incentive for performance in 
science and social studies, scores in these subjects also 
rose. It seems likely that weak literacy and math skills 
were preventing students from doing well in other sub-
jects, and the results suggest positive spillovers from 
gains in math and language to other subjects.
Source: Murlidharan and Sundararaman 2011.
BOX 5.2 Teacher incentives schemes in Andhra Pradesh
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intervention in Andhra Pradesh and the rela-
tive cost-effectiveness of various interventions. 
 Countries in South Asia are taking steps 
to improve incentives and performance 
through capacity building linked to career 
progression of teachers. Although this is still 
an underdeveloped area of reform in South 
Asia, recent initiatives by several governments 
suggest that they recognize the importance of 
this issue. For example, to address the serious 
defi ciencies in teacher education and profes-
sional development, the Sindh government 
is gradually implementing a comprehensive 
teacher education development program. The 
program envisions an integrated and coher-
ent system for preservice and systematic in-
service training (continuous professional 
development) linked to entry and career pro-
gression. Reforms in Nepal are focusing on 
developing separate professional career paths 
for basic and secondary-level teachers and 
provision of preparatory and in-service train-
ing. The plan is to link career progression to 
pedagogical effort/time, seniority, qualifi ca-
tion, training, and student achievement.
Increasing human capital investment 
in disadvantaged groups
In addition to strengthening the school sys-
tem to improve the quality of learning, gov-
ernments have a role to play in addressing 
market failures that lead to lower investment 
in human capital in disadvantaged groups. 
On the demand side, inadequate information 
and budget constraints are two reasons for 
low investment in human capital among low-
 income households. There is some evidence 
that inaccurate perceptions on returns reduces 
investment in education. Direct and indirect 
costs associated with schooling also reduce 
investment (distance to schools is a problem 
for girls in Afghanistan and Pakistan). On the 
supply side, in many remote and rural parts 
of South Asia, latent demand for schooling 
is going unmet in underserved communities. 
The following sections discuss some innova-
tive interventions on the demand and supply 
sides that have shown promise in increasing 
participation among disadvantaged groups.
Increasing demand from households
As the demand for more educated workers 
increases, improving parents’ understand-
ing of the returns to education can lead to 
increased investment in the education of their 
children. In a study of three states in India, 
Oster and Millet (2011) show that opening 
an information technology–enabled service 
center increased knowledge of improved job 
opportunities and perceived returns from 
higher schooling, leading to a 5.7 percent 
increase in the number of children enrolled 
in a primary school. They find that the 
very localized effects were a result of lim-
ited information diffusion outside the areas 
where the call centers were opened, suggest-
ing that policies that improve understanding 
of job opportunities could play an impor-
tant role in increasing enrollments. Consis-
tent with this fi nding, an intervention that 
provided three years of recruiting services 
for business process outsourcing opportuni-
ties for women in randomly selected rural 
villages in India was associated with large 
increases in enrollment as well as subsequent 
employment (Jensen 2010). 
Reducing the costs of schooling or other-
wise reducing household income constraints 
can also contribute to increased participa-
tion. In Afghanistan, and Pakistan, reducing 
indirect costs by reducing distance to school 
has increased enrollment, especially for girls. 
In Afghanistan, enrollment of girls in com-
munities randomly selected to receive schools 
increased by 15 percent more than overall 
enrollment (a 50 percent increase for all stu-
dents versus a 65 percent increase for girls) 
(Burde and Linden 2010). After six months, 
girls in villages with community schools also 
reported far higher test scores than boys. 
Around the world and in South Asia, 
conditional cash transfer programs, which 
help households address budget constraints, 
have a strong record in increasing enrollment 
(Fishbein and Schady 2009). Enrollment 
and attendance of girls in secondary schools 
increased substantially in Bangladesh after 
the government introduced cash stipends to 
rural girls under the Female Secondary School 
Stipend (FSSS) program in the 1990s. Female 
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enrollment rates in lower secondary (grades 
6–10) rose from about 25 percent in 1991 to 
about 60 percent by 2008, leading to gender 
parity at this level. A follow-up program is 
targeting poor children. Early evaluation of 
this program shows an estimated average net 
increase in retention of 20 percentage points 
(Asadullah and others 2011). 
In Pakistan, both Sindh and Punjab prov-
inces have large-scale conditional cash trans-
fer programs targeting girls in secondary 
grades in government schools. Evaluations of 
the program in Punjab fi nd enrollment gains 
(of about 9 percent), delayed marriage and 
pregnancy, and no negative spillover effects 
on boys’ enrollment (Adam, Baez, and del 
Carpio 2011; Chaudury and Parajuli 2010). 
Providing accountability-based 
subsidies to private providers
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are prov-
ing to be a cost-effective means of reaching 
underserved children. Although low-cost pri-
vate schools are emerging, including in rural 
areas, they are less likely to locate in the most 
underserved areas or to serve the poorest 
groups. Governments in the region are there-
fore innovating with programs that use subsi-
dies to address this market failure. 
A PPP program in Punjab (Pakistan) pro-
vides per student subsidies to low-cost private 
schools for enrolling and raising learning lev-
els among children from low-income house-
holds. An evaluation of the program finds 
large effects (of 0.3–0.5 standard deviation) 
on student learning—far greater than the 
0.1–0.2 standard deviation gains from most 
interventions that have been evaluated in the 
literature—across two different tests, sug-
gesting that teaching to the test is likely not 
at play (Barrera-Osorio and Raju 2010). In 
Sindh, Pakistan, a pilot program that offers 
public per student subsidies to support the 
set-up and operation of private coeducational 
primary schools in underserved rural com-
munities increased school participation by 
51 percentage points in program communi-
ties. The growth in school participation was 
The Reaching Out-of-School Children (ROSC) 
project has increased access to learning opportu-
nity for out of school children ages 7–14 in about 
60 targeted upazilas (subdistricts). It combines 
 accountability-based subsidies to providers (learn-
ing centers) with demand-side fi nancing of students 
(stipends). Key features include public financing of 
stipends and grants to learning centers, community 
management of learning centers, and public- private 
partnerships (of community,  government, and NGOs) 
in implementation. Grants to learning centers are 
provided on a per capita basis, and continuation 
of financing of learning centers as well as stipends 
is contingent on achieving minimum levels of stu-
dent attendance and performance. The community-
driven approach focuses on establishing learning 
 centers through a functional center management 
committee that is directly accountable to parents and 
 students, with support from NGOs as implementation 
partners. Operational program delivery differs from 
the norms in primary schools in order to cater to spe-
cifi c needs of students (through, for example, fl exible 
school timing, multigrade teaching, and entry at an 
older age).
Initial findings from an independent impact 
evaluation fi nd that ROSC has succeeded in target-
ing intended benefi ciaries (children from the poorest 
households); reducing the proportion of out-of-school 
children; and improving learning levels, as measured 
by student test scores in math and language (Bangla). 
Compared with the regular primary schooling sys-
tem, the ROSC project is achieving similar outcomes 
in access and equity at less than half the per student 
spending, implying impressive cost-effectiveness.
Source: Asadullah and others 2011.
BOX 5.3 The Reaching Out-of-School Children project in Bangladesh
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larger for girls than for boys, eliminating the 
gender gap. The cost for this intervention of 
inducing a 1 percent increase in school par-
ticipation lies at the bottom of the range of 
estimates for interventions in developing 
countries subject to rigorous evaluations (Bar-
rera-Osorio and others 2011). Early results 
indicate learning gains of two standard devi-
ations. Bangladesh has also demonstrated the 
potential of innovative partnerships with the 
private sector (box 5.3).
Tertiary education and 
preemployment training 
systems 
Preemployment vocational training  provides 
an alternative for students who do not  pursue 
tertiary education. It is provided in institu-
tions outside the general schooling system, 
often targeting early school leavers with 
the objective of directly preparing partici-
pants for the labor market. Preemployment 
training includes formal accredited courses 
and can be part of a national qualifi cation 
framework requiring a minimum entry qual-
ifi cation. It is typically provided in special-
ized training centers, training colleges, or 
polytechnics. 
Minimum entry qualifi cations vary across 
countries. In most countries, premploy-
ment training requires completion of grade 
10; it starts after grade 8 in Bangladesh and 
 Pakistan and after grade 9 in Afghanistan 
and Sri Lanka. Depending on entry qualifi ca-
tions, courses can range from less than a year 
to five years, with multiple entry and exit 
points. Courses range from those aimed at 
future tradespeople and technicians to those 
providing higher levels of skills.
Tertiary education refers to academic and 
professional degree and diploma courses pro-
vided by universities, colleges, and profes-
sional schools (such as medical schools). The 
minimum entry qualifi cation is completion of 
higher-secondary education or its equivalent.
This section discusses the challenges and 
priorities for strengthening preemployment 
training and tertiary education systems. 
Although the students targeted by these 
two systems are different, as is the focus of 
the knowledge and technical skills, many 
of the challenges are similar. Three coun-
tries in the region—Bangladesh, India, and 
Pakistan—also have small vocational edu-
cation streams within the secondary school 
system (box 5.4). 
Policy makers are keen to expand the small 
preemployment training and tertiary educa-
tion systems. Participation in preemployment 
training ranges from about 1.0 percent of 
secondary enrollment in Afghanistan to 8.1 
percent in Sri Lanka. India ranks second in 
the region, with 4.5 percent (see annex fi gure 
5A.4). Gross enrollment rates for tertiary edu-
cation range from 4 percent in Afghanistan to 
about 13 percent in India and 12–21 percent 
in Sri Lanka (depending on whether exter-
nal degree programs are included) (see annex 
fi gure 5A.5). In most South Asian countries, 
policy makers see expansion of these sectors 
as an important element of their strategy 
for increasing the skills of the large number 
of new entrants into the labor force. Bhutan 
seeks to increase the number of its preemploy-
ment training graduates by a factor of 12 by 
2013. India is targeting training 500 million 
people over the next 10 years through a com-
bination of preemployment training, in-service 
training, and tertiary education (Government 
of India 2009). Nepal and Pakistan are also 
signifi cantly increasing their investments in 
preemployment training. All South Asian 
countries are targeting substantial expansion 
of their tertiary education systems.
Expansion should not come at the 
expense of strengthening the systems for 
better outcomes. As with concerns about 
skills of graduates of tertiary education dis-
cussed earlier, there are concerns with the 
quality and relevance of preemployment 
training. A 2006/07 tracer study of labor 
market outcomes for graduates of preemploy-
ment training in Bangladesh fi nds that only 
9.7 percent of male participants and just 5.2 
percent of female participants were employed 
(World Bank 2008). A tracer study conducted 
by the International Labour Organization 
in three states in India in 2002/03 notes 
very low employment of graduates of the 
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In Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, students who 
do not fare well in the general (academic) education 
stream are often tracked into vocational education 
streams, typically at the senior-secondary level (and 
sometimes earlier). Vocational schools are supposed 
to equip students with skills that will allow them to 
join the labor market or preemployment training 
programs. 
The experience with secondary vocational pro-
grams in South Asia, as in many other regions, has 
been poor. In India, for example, studies show that 
60–70 percent of graduates fail to obtain employ-
ment even two to three years after graduation 
(World Bank 2007).
Despite these poor outcomes, policy makers 
remain keen to expand vocational secondary educa-
tion. Bangladesh has targeted 20 percent and India 
25 percent of secondary education to be vocational. 
There is also a desire to make general secondary 
education more vocational. As in other parts of the 
world, this desire is motivated by the concern that 
large numbers of students complete primary and 
secondary education with no occupational skills 
and the assumption that having occupational skills 
improves prospects in the labor market. 
Such strategies may not be appropriate for the 
following reasons: 
• Vocationalizing education is difficult. It requi-
res specially trained instructors, preferably with 
work experience in the types of skills being taught. 
 Teachers with these qualifi cations are hard to recruit 
and retain. 
• Vocationalizing education is costly. Most variants 
of vocational training cost more per student class 
period than general education subjects, primarily 
because classes are smaller and facilities, equip-
ment, and consumables cost more. 
• Private sector involvement in running vocational 
education systems, setting course content and 
curricula, or managing vocational schools is very 
limited.
• Time spent on vocational skills training can detract 
from the teaching of basic academic skills, which 
provide the foundation for future learning and are 
increasingly essential for labor market success. 
A better alternative to expanding vocational train-
ing in the school system would be to make general 
secondary schools more relevant and better able to 
cater to a wider range of students.
Expanding or retargeting secondary vocational 
programs is not justifi ed unless a model is found that 
substantially improves outcomes. One such model is 
Chile’s Corporación de Desarollo Social del Sector 
Rural (CODESSER) program. CODESSER is a non-
profi t organization created by the National Society of 
Farmers in 1976. Initially, it administered four schools 
with weak reputations that found it diffi cult to attract 
students. Today, some of these schools receive more 
than 300 applications for 45 fi rst-year openings, and 
schools have been added to accommodate growing 
demand. Recent fi gures show that more than 75 per-
cent of graduates from agricultural schools hold mid 
level management positions in agriculture. 
CODESSER has the following features, which 
embody some of the principles for reforming the 
vocational education system: 
• Private sector players participate in management. 
A directorate of seven farmers or industrial entre-
preneurs oversees each school. Their participation 
ensures better job skill matches, a direct connec-
tion to the labor market for graduates, and an 
effective medium for bringing about organiza-
tional and productive innovations. 
• Teachers are hired as private sector employees. 
Personnel policy (including selection and promo-
tion criteria and new contracts) conforms to the 
labor code that regulates private sector employees. 
Teachers’ salaries are about 50 percent higher than 
in municipal schools. There has been a consistent 
effort to upgrade teacher training.
• The focus is on general education. Schools provide 
basic general knowledge in humanities and scien-
ces, prepare students to work in various occupa-
tions, teach students to be problem solvers, and 
encourage them to continue learning. They empha-
size general growth and the development of respon-
sibility, leadership, and personnel management. 
• The curriculum is regularly revised. CODESSER 
conducts periodic surveys of job requirements in 
the areas around each school. The surveys are 
used to adjust vocation-specifi c components in the 
curriculum.
• Schools developed independent sources of funding. 
The real value of public subsidies fell in the early 
1980s; it declined by another 15 percent between 
1987 and 1991. In 1982, the public subsidy repre-
sented the bulk of schools’ budgets; it is now less 
than 50 percent.
Source: Chhoeda, Dar, and Tan 2010.
BOX 5.4 Vocational education provided in the public school system
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FIGURE 5.17 Percentage of graduates from public and private 
industrial training institutions employed in the organized sector in 
three states of India, 2002/03
Source: ILO 2003. 
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preemployment training system (ILO 2003). 
According to the study, formal sector employ-
ment of graduates from both public and pri-
vate industrial training institutions was very 
low. In none of the states did more than half 
of graduates fi nd wage employment, become 
self-employed, or work in a family business 
(fi gure 5.17). 
Pressure to expand will continue, as more 
and more students complete secondary edu-
cation. A key priority for government is to 
strengthen systems to improve quality while 
leveraging partnerships with a variety of 
stakeholders. Also important will be address-
ing market failures that prevent children from 
low-income households from progressing to 
and graduating from higher levels of educa-
tion. In what follows, some of the key chal-
lenges facing these systems and approaches to 
addressing them are examined. 
Strengthening policy and regulatory 
oversight
Fragmented system management blurs the 
roles of various agencies and reduces policy 
coherence. Responsibility for policy direc-
tion, leadership, and regulation of and 
accountability for implementation is often 
diffused across different levels of govern-
ment or multiple ministries and agencies. In 
Bangladesh, for example, both the Ministry 
of Education and the Ministry of Labor are 
responsible for preemployment training, and 
about 10 other ministries run training insti-
tutes. Financing and regulation of tertiary 
education institutions in medicine is also the 
domain of multiple agencies. 
Two main problems result from this 
administrative overlap. The fi rst is a lack of 
clarity and duplication of functions. The sec-
ond is a tendency to emphasize the delivery 
of training by multiple agencies at the cost of 
ensuring quality standards. It is important 
for governments to transition from a preoc-
cupation with provision and fi nancing to a 
stronger stewardship role. 
There is a need for governments to take 
on a stronger stewardship role and clarify 
the functions of various agencies. It may be 
appropriate to entrust one body with playing 
the stewardship role, setting policy, ensuring 
coordination between ministries, oversee-
ing fi nancing, developing curriculum, han-
dling certification and accreditation, and 
providing information on the quality and 
effectiveness of institutions. Critical to the 
success of such a body is the role of employ-
ers. Unless they are given a prominent role 
in the policy and decision-making process, 
provision may not be adjusted suffi ciently to 
meet their needs. 
Australia provides a successful example for 
preemployment training and tertiary educa-
tion (box 5.5). Some interesting initiatives are 
also underway in tertiary education in South 
Asia. If implemented well, for example, estab-
lishment of the National Council of Higher 
Education and Research (NCHER) could 
improve policy coordination and regulation 
of tertiary education and research in India. 
The existing tertiary education bodies—the 
University Grants Commission, the All India 
Council of Technical Education, the National 
Council of Teacher Education, the Distance 
Education Council, and related academic 
councils—are expected to come under the 
umbrella of the NCHER.
In the medium term, the establishment 
of a national qualifi cations framework can 
make programs more coherent and clarify 
the roles of various players. Sri Lanka has a 
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qualifi cations framework for preemployment 
training (the National Vocational Qualifi-
cations Framework), which is being imple-
mented. The government is also working on 
a full national qualifi cations framework that 
will cover primary, secondary, and tertiary 
education, as well as preemployment train-
ing. India plans to establish a standards-
based national vocational qualifications 
framework that will permit individuals who 
follow different learning pathways to cer-
tify their skills through testing and facilitate 
advancement to higher diplomas and degrees. 
Taking advantage of a still nascent tertiary 
education and training system, the govern-
ment of Afghanistan is setting up a national 
qualifications authority and a national 
qualifications framework with which to 
 better coordinate and articulate between 
the general education, tertiary education, 
and training systems, as well as between the 
various players responsible for implement-
ing tertiary education and preemployment 
training. 
A key role for governments is the pro-
vision of information and the strength-
ening of quality assurance mechanisms. 
Limited information, especially on quality 
and outcomes, is an important deterrent to 
improving effectiveness—and to students 
and employers making the right choices. 
Limited information about privately pro-
vided programs can lead to public sector 
crowding out private providers by enter-
ing areas where there is already a private 
supply. To address these issues, most coun-
tries in the region have started establish-
ing education management information 
systems in tertiary education to provide 
information on participation and comple-
tion, transition from college to work, and 
fi nance.  Bangladesh, India, and Nepal have 
begun to work on establishing informa-
tion systems for preemployment training. 
It is important that these systems collect 
and disseminate information on outcomes 
(such as the quality of graduates and their 
employability). Toward this end, some 
Australia’s federal and state governments created the 
Australian National Training Authority (ANTA) in 
the 1990s. The agency was overhauled over time. 
On July 1, 2009, the government formed a 
 Ministerial Council for Tertiary Education and 
Employment (MCTEE) to oversee skills develop-
ment. Membership in the council includes federal, 
state, and territory ministers with responsibility for 
tertiary education, preemployment training, and 
employment. MCTEE is chaired by the federal gov-
ernment minister. 
MCTEE has overall responsibility for skills devel-
opment. Its functions include the following: 
• Setting national priorities and the strategic policy 
directions for the tertiary education sector and 
preemployment training to meet the skills needs of 
the Australian economy 
• Establishing streamlined arrangements for natio-
nal consistency and harmonization of tertiary 
 education and preemployment training (while res-
pecting the mission of each sector) 
• Funding the national training system 
• Maintaining strong industry leadership of and 
engagement in preemployment training and ter-
tiary education 
• Overseeing the work of the Australian Qualifi-
cations Framework Council in strengthening the 
Australian Qualifi cations Framework 
• Engaging with all associated bodies, councils, and 
ministerial committees to ensure the effectiveness 
of policy and strategies for tertiary education and 
preemployment training 
• Responding to business, industry, and stakeholder 
advice on issues affecting tertiary education and 
preemployment training 
• Setting national research priorities for skills 
development.
Source: Skills Australia 2011.
BOX 5.5 Learning from Australia’s systemic reforms of training and tertiary education
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countries have begun to conduct employer 
surveys and tracer studies of graduates 
(in India and Sri Lanka), and student and 
 faculty surveys (in Bangladesh and India).
South Asian countries have also begun 
developing quality assurance and accredita-
tion systems in tertiary education. Although 
there is still a long way to go, and a need to 
increase transparency and strengthen capac-
ity of accreditation agencies, the region has 
been moving toward developing these sys-
tems. India has a formal accreditation sys-
tem, but only 15 percent of its more than 
20,000 institutions are accredited (Agarwal 
2009). Nepal is in the process of establish-
ing an independent quality assurance and 
accreditation council/board. Pakistan estab-
lished the Quality Assurance Agency in 2005 
as a monitoring and regulatory body to facili-
tate quality assurance in both public and 
private institutions. Nine accreditation coun-
cils have accredited 60 programs, and qual-
ity enhancement cells are being established 
within institutions to undertake internal 
quality assurance. Sri Lanka is developing a 
quality assurance review process covering 60 
percent of all universities.
Strengthening institutional governance 
and accountability 
Politicization and insufficient representa-
tion of key stakeholders in governing bodies 
undermines institutional accountability and 
effectiveness. Vice chancellors of public uni-
versities are often politically appointed. In 
addition, many colleges and universities in 
South Asia do not have a board of governors 
with representation of key stakeholders. 
This failure undermines the transparency of 
decision-making process and accountability 
to benefi ciaries, particularly students, par-
ents, and employers. Governing bodies of 
preemployment training institutions are less 
politicized. A key omission in both systems 
is the lack of representation of the private 
sector in the governing bodies. 
Some countries have initiated reforms in 
this regard. India has begun to ban politi-
cians from serving as chairs of the governing 
bodies of tertiary education institutions in 
engineering. It has established qualifi cation 
criteria for their selection and mandated 
greater transparency in the selection process 
(Government of Maharashtra 2009; Govern-
ment of India 2010). Private sector involve-
ment in institutional management of public 
tertiary education and training institutions 
is also increasing. Industry associations and 
individual employers are increasingly repre-
sented on governing boards. In India, the two 
largest industrial associations—the Federa-
tion of Indian Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry and the Confederation of Indian 
Industries—are represented and actively par-
ticipate in the management committees of 
tertiary education and training institutions. 
In Sindh (Pakistan), private sector representa-
tives now head the institutional management 
committees of training institutions. Bangla-
desh and Nepal are moving in this direction. 
Involving employers in management will 
yield positive results only if governments are 
willing to provide institutions with greater 
autonomy. This means letting institutions 
administer themselves and keep the funds 
they raise through fees and other sources. 
Administrative regulations and budgeting 
rules provide scant incentives for effi ciency 
and innovation. Possibly to counter the lack 
of local oversight, many governments in the 
region have highly specifi c rules on hiring, 
fi ring, and rewarding faculty (administrative 
autonomy) and managing revenues, includ-
ing fee setting and expenditures (financial 
autonomy). In Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
and several states of India, teachers are hired 
centrally, removing the power of institu-
tional leaders to hire or promote teachers. In 
Afghanistan, all revenue generated by univer-
sities, including fees, has to be returned to the 
Ministry of Finance. 
Elements of autonomy are also being intro-
duced in the region. In India, public training 
institutions and engineering colleges, in con-
sultation with employers, decide on their own 
training programs, have the freedom to hire 
part-time teachers, and retain part of the rev-
enues generated by selling goods and services. 
Nepal’s tertiary education system is also 
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moving in this direction, albeit slowly. The 
move toward greater autonomy and account-
ability needs to be accompanied by measures 
to increase awareness among and strengthen 
the capacity of members of oversight commit-
tees and governing boards.
In most cases, funding mechanisms still 
provide limited incentives to institutions to 
improve performance. As countries develop, 
funding mechanisms for tertiary education 
gradually shift from incremental budgeting 
(historically negotiated budgets) to perfor-
mance-based approaches (table 5.4). This 
transition has not yet occurred in South Asia. 
Training institutions are typically guaran-
teed continued funding irrespective of per-
formance, with levels of finance allocated 
to poorly performing institutions with high 
drop-out rates equal to those allocated to 
institutions that maintain a high quality of 
teaching and performance. 
Since about 2000, several governments in 
South Asia have laid a cornerstone by allocat-
ing some tertiary education funding through 
competitive or innovation funds. These funds 
transparently fi nance investments in public 
and private tertiary education based on objec-
tive policy goals, such as improved quality and 
relevance of undergraduate programs. One 
example is the Quality Enhancement Fund for 
Higher Education in Sri Lanka, launched in 
2005, which is progressively being strength-
ened based on experience. 
Financing systems for training are also 
seeing reforms. Bangladesh and Nepal are 
introducing performance grants to training 
institutions that meet agreed upon perfor-
mance criteria (such as the pass rate for stu-
dents or the employment rates of students six 
months after graduation). In Pakistan, contin-
ued funding under the Benazir Bhutto Sha-
heed Youth Development Program (BBSYDP) 
TABLE 5.4 Mechanisms for funding tertiary education in South and East Asia, by economy 
Economy
Historically 
negotiated budget
Formula 
funding
Competitive 
funding
Performance-based 
contracts 
High-income 
Hong Kong SAR, China •
Japan • •
Korea, Rep. • •
Singapore • •
Middle-income 
China • •
Indonesia • a •
Malaysia • •
Philippines • •
Thailand • •
Low-income 
Cambodia •
Lao PDR •
Vietnam • •
South Asia
Bangladesh • b
India • b
Nepal • b
Pakistan • b
Sri Lanka • •
Sources: Authors, based on data on East Asia from World Bank 2011a and data on South Asia from sector staﬀ .
Note: a = Formula funding incorporating performance indicators has been piloted in ﬁ ve autonomous universities (and some nonautonomous universities). 
b = Government projects ﬁ nanced by the World Bank have started competitive funding for selected institutions and disciplines. 
 O P E N I N G  T H E  D O O R  T O  B E T T E R  J O B S  B Y  I M P R O V I N G  E D U C A T I O N  A N D  S K I L L S   2 0 5
now requires training providers to achieve 
minimum levels of job placement. 
Increasing the role of the private sector 
Private provision of education is signifi cant 
in South Asia, particularly in preemployment 
training, and is growing. Enrollment in pri-
vate preemployment institutions ranges from 
6 percent of total enrollment in Afghanistan 
to 82 percent in Nepal; in tertiary education, 
the fi gures range from less than 5 percent in 
Afghanistan and Bhutan to more than 50 
percent in Bangladesh (figure 5.18). Even 
in Afghanistan, where formal institutes are 
still very much under government domain, 
strong private and NGO–based initiatives 
are developing. 
Easing barriers to entry and leveling the 
playing fi eld can generate a stronger private 
sector response. Private providers in some 
South Asian countries identify lack of access 
to credit and fi nancing of initial investments 
as key constraints to setting up new and 
upgrading existing institutions.22 Although 
not uniform across countries, other concerns 
include excessive barriers to entry and gov-
ernment bureaucracy in registering institu-
tions and accrediting and certifying courses. 
International experience suggests that 
when private providers are not discouraged by 
stringent regulations, rapid industrial growth 
can be accompanied by strong private sector 
response in supply. Streamlining the process 
of registration/licensing based on clear merit-
based criteria is critical. Imposing strict con-
sequences for malpractice by bureaucrats can 
also help improve the environment for private 
providers. In India, where the private sector 
is more heavily engaged in training in com-
mercial areas than in other countries, up to 
15 percent of all providers now provide tech-
nical training, indicative of private sector 
response despite the higher initial investment 
costs for technical fields. Enabling private 
institutions to compete for public resources 
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In 2003/04, only about 1 percent of children in 
each of the two poorest quintiles were enrolled in 
tertiary education compared to 88 percent in the 
richest quintile. To address the problem, in 2009 the 
government initiated a scheme to provide fi nancial 
support for meritorious and needy students through 
scholarships. These scholarships fi nance education 
and living expenditures up to Rs 40,000 ($530) for 
the duration of study. 
The crucial innovation of the scheme is proxy 
means testing. A poverty score is calculated based 
on a set of observable household characteristics (for 
example, types of walls, roof, cook stove, and toi-
let; number of siblings; parent education; and caste 
and ethnic group). All household characteristics are 
observables; information can therefore be verifi ed 
through household visits to prospective benefi cia-
ries. The calculation gives preference to disadvan-
taged castes and ethnic groups. A minimum share of 
benefi ciaries must be women. As of February 2010, 
176 undergraduate students had received benefits 
under this scheme. 
Sources: Nepal Living Standards Survey 2003/04 and World Bank 2010. 
BOX 5.6 Providing scholarships for tertiary education in Nepal
on a level playing fi eld, particularly in prior-
ity education and training areas, could reduce 
barriers. The recent trend toward competitive 
funding is a promising step in this direction.
PPP arrangements are just being initiated 
in the region. Potential models include the pri-
vate sector investing in and managing defunct 
public institutions as a concession or setting 
up new institutions in underserved areas with 
public subsidies. Early experience suggests sev-
eral lessons for making PPPs work, including 
the importance of sound project fundamen-
tals; attention to the timing, scope, and dura-
tion of transaction; high-quality advisors; a 
strong government implementation team; and 
transparency throughout the process (based 
on unpublished presentation by the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation 2010).
Diversifying the resource base
Until recently, little attention was paid to 
exploring ways to enhance the resource pool 
to finance expansion and improvements. 
Throughout the world, the unit costs of both 
preemployment training and tertiary educa-
tion are significantly higher than those of 
general education. In the face of competing 
demands and limited fiscal space, signifi-
cant expansion and enhancing quality will 
be possible only by diversifying the resource 
base. 
One important mechanism is tuition, 
which is being increased in public tertiary 
and  preemployment training institutions 
in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan. 
The much higher fees being paid at private 
institutions demonstrates both the demand 
for services and the willingness of better-off 
segments to pay. Governments can offset the 
adverse impact of such fees on equity by pro-
viding targeted scholarships to low-income 
groups, as Bangladesh, India, Nepal (box 
5.6), and Pakistan are doing. Student loans 
can help ease liquidity constraints. Student 
loan schemes for tertiary education have been 
implemented in India and are being developed 
in Pakistan.
On-the-job training
Formal on-the-job training can be an impor-
tant channel through which workers can 
build human capital. Although this chapter 
focuses primarily on education and training 
that takes place before entry into the labor 
force, a significant part of human capital 
accumulation takes place in the work place. 
As analysis of business enterprise data in 
South Asia reveals, fi rms that innovate, are 
 O P E N I N G  T H E  D O O R  T O  B E T T E R  J O B S  B Y  I M P R O V I N G  E D U C A T I O N  A N D  S K I L L S   2 0 7
internationally engaged, and have a more 
educated workforce are also more likely to 
invest in the training of their workforce. 
This finding is consistent with the strong 
links found in the international literature 
between on-the-job training and individuals’ 
and fi rms’ productivity. Despite econometric 
challenges associated with identifying the 
impact of on-the-job training on wages and 
firm productivity (see Almeida, Behrman, 
and Robalino 2011 for a review of the evi-
dence), there is convincing evidence, par-
ticularly from developed countries, of the 
positive effects of training. It may be the case 
that on-the-job training may be more criti-
cal in producing skilled workers in develop-
ing countries than in developed countries, in 
view of the considerable skills gaps of gradu-
ates of education and preemployment train-
ing  systems in these countries.
The incidence of formal on-the-job train-
ing is lower in South Asia than in any other 
region (fi gure 5.19). Across the world, small 
and medium-size fi rms are less likely to train, 
but even holding fi rm size constant, the inci-
dence of training in South Asia is relatively 
low. In East Asia and Latin America and the 
Caribbean, for example, more than 70 per-
cent of the largest fi rms and 30 percent of the 
smallest fi rms provide training to their work-
ers. In South Asia, less than 40 percent of the 
largest firms train their workers, and only 
about 5 percent of the smallest fi rms do so. 
Training incidence also varies with 
worker characteristics. It is lowest among 
workers with less schooling, confirming 
complementarities between investments in 
general schooling and on-the-job training. 
Evidence from India also shows distinct dif-
ferences across industries in their propen-
sity to offer formal in-service training, with 
industries such as textiles, garments, leather 
products, food processing, automobile parts, 
and metal products less likely to train and 
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industries such as chemicals, pharmaceuti-
cals, machine tools, electrical white goods, 
electronic products, and software more 
likely to do so. In-house programs (offered 
by 23 percent of all fi rms) tend to be more 
common than external programs (offered by 
14 percent of fi rms). This evidence is consis-
tent with the notion that workforce training 
can complement general skills of workers, 
with training tailored to the production and 
technological requirements of individual 
enterprises (Riboud, Savchenko, and Tan 
2007).
The low incidence of formal training does 
not necessarily imply the need for public inter-
vention. For many fi rms in developing coun-
tries, investment in on-the-job training may 
not be necessary, given technological choices, 
the skills components of most of their jobs, 
or their reliance on informal training. Other 
firms, however, may face severe informa-
tional constraints in, for example, identifying 
relevant training programs, recruiting train-
ing experts, or fi nancing programs. Market 
failures associated with the risk of other fi rms 
poaching trained employees could also lead 
to suboptimal investments. Policies should 
be designed to address the primary source of 
market failure. 
International evidence suggests three main 
reasons why employers do not train workers. 
Responses of managers in enterprise surveys 
suggest that in the majority of fi rms, formal 
training may not be needed (informal training 
is considered suffi cient or the technology does 
not require training) (Almeida, Behrman, 
and Robalino 2011; Batra and Stone 2004). 
High worker turnover or fear of poaching (or 
the ability to hire workers from elsewhere), 
lack of financing, and information barri-
ers also appear to be factors. Improving the 
investment climate should improve incentives 
for employers to invest in both physical and 
human capital. Policies that improve access to 
new technologies and funding for investments 
in technology and skills upgrading would 
also increase fi rms’ demand for training. 
PPPs and collective industry action can 
strengthen the in-house training capabilities 
of fi rms. Firms, industry associations, buyers 
The Penang Skills Development Centre (PSDC) is 
a joint corporate training center established with 
 government support. It has evolved to become a 
full private continuing education institution pro-
viding certificate and diploma-level training. The 
 Malaysian government invests in the center and uses 
it to conduct public training programs. 
With more than 100 member companies, the 
PSDC runs both standardized and customized pro-
grams. It charges at cost and is largely self-fi nancing. 
Companies can recoup their expenditure from the 
Human Resource Development Fund, a training 
fund fi nanced by a 1 percent levy on payrolls. 
The initiative for the PSDC came from the 
 Penang state government, which provided the land 
and buildings. The founding members included large 
multinational companies with training traditions of 
their own. Members donate equipment, laboratories, 
training modules, and trainers. They have access to 
shared training facilities without having to duplicate 
their in-house capability. Small and medium-size 
enterprises enjoy technology transfer from and can 
benchmark their standards against multination-
als. Multinationals, in turn, receive better support 
services. Vendors donate equipment to familiarize 
workers with their products and promote sales. 
Although still a joint training center, the PSDC 
has taken on institutional functions to provide train-
ing for school-leavers, thus moving toward becom-
ing a professional training entity in its own right.
The PSDC is not easily replicated. Eleven of 
Malaysia’s 16 states and federal territories have 
launched similar centers, with varying degrees 
of success. The success of this sort of enterprise 
depends on a number of circumstances, most impor-
tant among them the people initiating and managing 
the process. Centers like PSDC cannot be imposed; 
they need to grow in already fertile ground.
BOX 5.7 Industry-government cooperation: The Penang Skills Development Centre
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and equipment suppliers, and private training 
institutes are an important means of expand-
ing the resources available for developing 
workforce skills. 
Successful examples of such collective 
action—a potential response to the externali-
ties associated with poaching—are in place 
in the region. The Chittagong Skills Devel-
opment Centre is the fi rst industry-led, non-
profi t skills training center in Bangladesh. It 
is modeled on the successful Penang Skills 
Development Center (box 5.7). The center 
provides skills training to corporate mem-
bers and other private companies. Its high-
quality, cost-saving advantage stems from its 
corporate members’ willingness to share their 
training resources, technologies, costs, train-
ers, space, and equipment, which ensures 
demand-driven, timely, and calibrated train-
ing without the overhead investment and 
delay of building a new center. 
Numerous training programs, especially 
in the information and communications tech-
nology sector in India, are meeting industry 
needs. A randomized field experiment that 
provided five months of intensive manage-
ment consultancy to help poorly managed 
textile fi rms adopt standard internationally 
used systems (for quality, inventory, and pro-
duction control) found gradual but signifi cant 
improvements in management practices and 
fi rm performance (Bloom and others 2011). 
Possible reasons for poor initial management 
included informational constraints (firms 
were not aware of many modern management 
practices).
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TABLE 5A.1 Share of Indian labor force requiring high concentration of nonroutine cognitive analytical and interpersonal 
skills, 1994–2010
(percent) 
Type of nonroutine cognitive skill 1994 2000 2005 2008 2010
Analytical
Analyzing information 3.9 5.0 4.2 9.5 11.8
Thinking creatively 3.3 4.3 3.9 6.5 9.5
Interpreting information for others 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.4 1.3
Interpersonal
Establishing and maintain relationships 6.9 7.4 7.9 11.9 13.2
Guiding, directing, and motivating subordinates 1.7 2.9 2.7 4.6 8.2
Coaching and developing others 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.2
Source: Authors, based on national labor force surveys.
Note: High concentration of a skill in an occupation is when the content of the skill in the occupation is valued at 4 or 5 on a 1–5 scale. 
Annex 5A Additional tables and ﬁ gures on education and skills
TABLE 5A.2 Mean years of education of 15–34 year olds in South Asia, by gender and country  
 
Country 
(period studied)
All Male Female
Earliest 
year
Most recent 
year
Earliest 
year
Most recent 
year
Earliest 
year
Most recent 
year
Afghanistan (2008) —  2.5 —  3.7 —  1.4
Bangladesh (2000–10) 4.5 5.9 5.2 6.1 3.9 5.8
Bhutan (2003–07) 3.0 4.5 3.8 5.2 2.4 3.9
India (2000–10) 5.3 7.1 6.4 7.9 4.3 6.3
Maldives (1998–2004) 7.2 7.8 7.5 8.1 7.0 7.6
Nepal (1999–2008) 3.2 5.7 4.5 7.1 2.2 4.8
Pakistan (2000–09) 4.7 5.9 6.0 6.9 3.5 4.9
Sri Lanka (2000–08) 8.7 10.2 8.5 9.9 8.9 10.4
Source: World Bank staﬀ , based on national labor force and household survey data.
Note: — = Not available. 
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TABLE 5A.3 Summary of randomized experiments on teacher incentives
Study Description
Level of 
incentive
Strategy of 
estimation Impact
Unintended 
eff ects
Dufl o, Hanna, and 
Ryan (2010) 
Local program (113 
schools, 57 treated) in 
India monitors teachers’ 
presence at school and 
provides rewards for 
reduction in 
absenteeism.
School and teacher Randomized
experiment
Reduction of teacher 
absence by 21 percentage 
points
Increase in instructional 
time of 30 percent
Positive impact on test 
scores (0.17 standard 
deviation)
Eff ects come from 
incentives and not from 
monitoring
None
Glewwe, Ilias, and 
Kremer (2008)
Local program (100 
schools, 50 treated) in 
Kenya provides cash 
rewards to teachers for 
reducing dropouts and 
increasing test scores.
School Randomized
experiment
No change in homework 
or pedagogy 
No impact on test linked 
to incentives
Short-term impact on 
scores linked to test
No impact on dropout rate
Teaching to the 
test (for example, 
strategies for not 
leaving blank multiple 
choice questions); 
encouragement of 
students to take and 
prepare for the test 
Lavy (2002) Local program 
(involving more than 
62 schools) conducts 
tournament, off ering 
prizes to top third of 
schools.
School: secondary 
schools (grade 7–12); 
all teachers receive 
prizes
Regression 
discontinuity: 
schools in same 
community
Positive impact on 
average test score and 
average credits
Increase in proportion of 
students for matriculation 
certifi cate (especially 
among low-income 
groups) 
Reduction in dropout rate
None
McEwan and 
Santibáñez (2005)
Global program 
(all public teachers) 
provides rewards based 
on student test results. 
Individual teachers 
(all levels, all grades)
Regression 
discontinuity: 
schedule of 
points 
No impact on test scores Permanent increases 
in wages without any 
benefi t
Muralidharan and 
Sundararaman 
(2011)
Program in Andhra 
Pradesh provides 
bonuses to schools and 
individual teachers tied 
to student achievement 
(200 schools including 
100 in group bonus 
program, 100 in 
individual bonus 
program, and 
100 controls).
Group bonus 
scheme covered all 
teachers in school; 
individual bonus 
scheme covered 
teachers who taught 
grades tested
Randomized 
experiment
Increase in test score of 
0.15 standard deviation in 
fi rst year, 0.22 in second 
year in both programs 
Impacts fairly robust across 
grades, test diffi  culty levels, 
and most baseline school 
and student characteristics
Higher impacts in math 
than language; impacts 
also observed on subjects 
not included for bonus
After two years, impact of 
individual bonuses larger 
than group bonuses
None cited
Source: World Bank staﬀ  compilation. 
FIGURE 5A.1 Educational attainment in the labor force in South Asia, by country
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
75
54
43
78
67
49
44
40
34 30
5 3
54
33
65
47
51
45 44 43
6
5
7
9
12
11
10
9
9
9
19
10
13
4
10
12 3
4 3 3
7
17
19
6
9
12
12
14
15
15
26
22
14
26
12
15
15
16 16 16
4
16
21
4
6
20
24
25
28
30 38
48
14
16
9
21
22
25 25 25
5 4
4
1
3 8 10 11
7 8
10
13
2
18
2 3
4 5 5 5
2 4 7
1 3 1 1 2
7 8
3 4 3 4 1 2 5 6 6 7
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
70
80
90
100
Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Sri Lanka Maldives Nepal Pakistan
2008 2000 2010 2003 2007 1994 2000 2005 2008 2010 2000 2008 1998 2004 1999 2008 2000 2006 2008 2009
no education incomplete primary primary lower secondary higher secondary tertiary
212
 
 
213
FIGURE 5A.2 Share of labor force with at least primary, upper-secondary, and tertiary education, in South Asia and international comparators
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Sources: Authors, based on data from World Bank 2011b and national labor force and household surveys.
Note: The dark line shows the predicted values of the share of the labor force with completed primary, upper-secondary, and tertiary education by per capita GDP. Predicted values are obtained from cross-country regressions 
(excluding high-income countries) of the share of the labor force with completed primary, upper-secondary, and tertiary education on the log of per capita GDP. The shaded area is the 95 percent conﬁ dence interval band 
around the regression line.
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FIGURE 5A.2 Share of labor force with at least primary, upper-secondary, and tertiary education, in South Asia and international comparators (continued) 
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FIGURE 5A.3 Gross and net enrollment rates in primary and secondary education, by region and country
Sources: Authors, based on data from UIS Database and EdStats. Net and gross enrollment rates for Afghanistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka were calculated 
using national household surveys. 
Note: For Afghanistan, primary grades are 1–6 (ages 6–12) and secondary grades 7–12 (ages 12–18). For Nepal and Sri Lanka, primary grades are 1–5 
(ages 5–10) and secondary grades are 6–12 (age 11–18). 
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FIGURE 5A.4 Enrollment in vocational education and training as a share of secondary enrollment, 
by region and country 
Source: Chhoeda, Dar, and Tan 2010.
Note: Data are for latest year available. They primarily reﬂ ect preemployment training for South Asian countries. Although vocational education provided by 
the public school sector is also included, this sector is absent in many South Asian countries and is very small in others.
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FIGURE 5A.5 Gross enrollment rate in tertiary education, by region and country 
Sources: Authors, based on data from UNESCO 2011 and World Bank 2011b.
Note: Data are for latest year available. Gross enrollment of 21 percent in Sri Lanka includes students enrolled in external degree programs, some of whom 
may be only nominally enrolled. Gross tertiary enrollment excluding external degree enrollment is about 12 percent. 
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FIGURE 5A.6 Share of young cohorts with completed primary and lower-secondary education in South Asia, by gender and country 
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
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FIGURE 5A.7 Share of young cohorts with completed upper-secondary and tertiary education in South Asia, by gender and country
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
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FIGURE 5A.8 Mean years of education of 15–34 year olds in selected South Asian countries, 
by caste/ethnicity
Source: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys.
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FIGURE 5A.10 Percentage of children under age 5 with stunting in selected South Asian countries, 
by socioeconomic status
Source: Van De Poel and others 2008.
Note: Bars indicate income quintile. 
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FIGURE 5A.9 Share of 20–28 year olds in Afghanistan and Nepal with diﬀ erent years of education 
completed in Afghanistan (2008) and Nepal (2004), by gender and socioeconomic status
Source: Authors, based on national household surveys.
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Annex 5B Projections of the educational attainment of South Asia’s 
population and labor force
attainment projections by age and gender are 
adapted from KC and others (2010). Labor 
force participation rates for each age/sex/
educational attainment/rural-urban group 
were calculated from the latest national labor 
force and household surveys. They were then 
applied to the educational attainment projec-
tions of the population to obtain projections 
on the educational attainment of the labor 
force. The assumption is that there would be 
no behavioral change in labor force participa-
tion, that current participation rates for each 
cell would hold in 2030. Changes in labor 
force participation are therefore driven by 
trends in urbanization and educational attain-
ment of the population. Table 5B.2 shows 
current and projected attainment of the labor 
force under various educational scenarios.
The projections used in this book are based 
on an adaptation of the international pro-
jections by KC and others (2010) to South 
Asia. Projections of educational attainment 
were made under three scenarios, a base-
line scenario and two optimistic scenarios. 
The assumptions under the three scenarios 
are summarized in table 5B.1.
Projections for the male and female labor 
force for 2030 were obtained by explicitly 
factoring in trends in educational attainment 
and urbanization. Various sources of data 
were used: population projections by gender 
and fi ve-year age groups are from World Pop-
ulations Prospects: The 2008 Revision (UN 
2010); urban and rural projections are from 
the UN’s World Urbanization Prospects: The 
2009 Revision (UN 2011); and educational 
TABLE 5B.1 Assumptions underlying scenarios used to project educational attainment of population in South Asia 
Scenario Primary education (age 10–14) Secondary education (age 20–24) Tertiary education (age 30–34)
Baseline SA–GET 
(SA8)
Primary attainment over past 
10 years in all South Asian countries
Global Education Trend (GET), 
based on trends from 120 countries
GET 
Optimistic SA-GET 
(SA6)
Primary attainment over past 
10 years in all South Asian countries 
except Pakistan (stalled) and 
Maldives (universal) 
Rate of increase for secondary age cohorts 
whose gains were higher than the GET in 
past 10 years
GET
Fast Track (FT1) 99 percent by 2020 60 percent 
by 2030, 100 percent by 2040
Tertiary progression 
following Singapore rate
Source: Authors. 
Note: GET scenarios as in KC and others 2010. SA = South Asia.
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Notes
 1.  Access to education is a basic human right. It 
also has considerable value beyond its role in 
the labor market: it enables individuals to be 
better parents, more responsible citizens, and 
more effective stewards of the natural environ-
ment. This book focuses on the skills imparted 
and how they play out in the labor market. 
 2.  Other constraints are more binding for for-
mal sector fi rms in the region as a whole. 
Enterprise surveys provide information only 
about the constraints facing existing enter-
prises. They are not useful in understanding 
constraints perceived by potential fi rms that 
did not enter in the fi rst place.
 3.  Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) argue that 
as a result of computerization, the shift in 
demand for labor has contributed to the secu-
lar increase in the premium for tertiary educa-
tion in the United States.
 4.  The increase in the public sector likely refl ects 
adjustments in wages to reduce wage compres-
sion. In India, the premium for upper-secondary 
TABLE 5B.2 Educational attainment of the South Asian labor force in 2010 (estimated) and 2030 (projected) under various 
scenarios, by country
(percent)
 Country
2010 2030
SA8   SA6    FT
N
o 
Ed
uc
at
io
n
Pr
im
ar
y
Se
co
nd
ar
y
Te
rt
ia
ry
N
o 
Ed
uc
at
io
n
Pr
im
ar
y
Se
co
nd
ar
y
Te
rt
ia
ry
N
o 
Ed
uc
at
io
n
Pr
im
ar
y
Se
co
nd
ar
y
Te
rt
ia
ry
N
o 
Ed
uc
at
io
n
Pr
im
ar
y
Se
co
nd
ar
y
Te
rt
ia
ry
Total
Afghanistan 73.1 15.3 9.6 2.0 43.1 33.4 20.1 3.5 43.1 24.8 28.6 3.5 33.3 30.0 23.0 13.7
Bangladesh 32.9 35.6 25.6 6.0 14.6 37.5 38.1 9.9 14.5 28.9 46.6 9.9 14.3 28.4 32.1 25.2
Bhutan 53.3 26.9 15.2 4.6 23.7 39.0 28.5 8.8 23.4 29.1 38.7 8.7 24.3 28.9 25.4 21.4
India 33.0 24.0 35.5 7.5 15.4 23.3 49.5 11.7 15.5 18.3 54.3 11.9 14.9 18.8 41.7 24.6
Maldives 20.4 32.6 28.8 18.2 4.3 29.9 36.9 28.9 4.3 24.6 42.4 28.7 4.0 24.5 32.9 38.5
Nepal 43.2 27.2 27.4 2.2 18.9 29.9 46.6 4.5 19.0 22.2 54.2 4.6 18.4 23.1 45.3 13.2
Pakistan 41.8 19.5 31.6 7.1 22.8 22.3 43.7 11.2 22.9 16.0 49.6 11.4 19.8 18.3 38.1 23.9
Sri Lanka 2.9 23.2 51.9 22.1 0.8 12.4 55.5 31.4 0.8 8.9 58.9 31.5 0.8 8.6 40.1 50.5
Male
Afghanistan 64.3 20.3 13.1 2.4 34.8 36.8 25.1 3.3 35.0 28.0 33.7 3.4 27.3 34.6 26.1 11.9
Bangladesh 28.8 37.3 27.4 6.6 13.9 37.6 38.5 10.0 13.9 29.5 46.5 10.1 14.0 29.5 32.9 23.6
Bhutan 45.7 32.4 16.2 5.7 20.2 42.7 27.7 9.3 20.2 35.0 35.5 9.4 20.8 35.0 23.8 20.5
India 24.7 25.4 41.4 8.5 10.9 22.3 54.7 12.1 10.9 18.1 58.8 12.2 10.5 18.6 45.5 25.4
Maldives 19.5 33.8 29.5 17.2 4.2 30.8 38.1 26.9 4.2 25.8 43.1 26.9 3.9 25.9 33.3 36.9
Nepal 26.8 33.3 36.3 3.6 10.5 30.3 52.6 6.6 10.5 24.7 58.2 6.6 9.6 25.6 46.4 18.4
Pakistan 33.9 21.8 36.8 7.5 17.9 23.4 48.0 10.7 17.9 17.6 53.6 10.8 15.7 19.9 42.0 22.4
Sri Lanka 2.4 25.9 55.3 16.5 0.8 15.2 62.0 22.0 0.8 11.1 66.0 22.1 0.8 11.1 43.8 44.4
Female
Afghanistan 91.5 4.9 2.3 1.2 62.8 25.1 8.3 3.9 62.3 17.3 16.5 3.9 47.2 19.3 15.7 17.8
Bangladesh 46.0 30.1 19.7 4.1 16.7 37.1 36.8 9.5 16.4 27.2 47.1 9.4 15.0 25.5 29.7 29.8
Bhutan 64.6 18.8 13.7 2.9 28.8 33.5 29.7 8.0 28.0 20.8 43.4 7.8 29.4 20.3 27.6 22.7
India 56.5 20.0 18.8 4.7 29.7 26.6 33.1 10.6 30.4 18.9 39.8 10.9 28.6 19.1 30.0 22.3
Maldives 21.8 30.5 27.8 19.9 4.5 28.7 35.0 31.8 4.4 22.8 41.4 31.4 4.2 22.5 32.3 41.0
Nepal 60.4 20.8 18.0 0.8 28.5 29.5 39.8 2.2 28.8 19.5 49.5 2.3 28.4 20.2 44.2 7.2
Pakistan 73.7 10.1 10.6 5.5 46.6 16.7 22.8 13.8 47.6 8.0 29.9 14.4 38.4 10.7 20.0 30.9
Sri Lanka 3.7 18.5 46.1 31.7 0.9 7.9 44.9 46.4 0.9 5.3 47.4 46.5 0.8 4.9 34.7 59.7
Sources: Authors, based on data from national labor force and household surveys; UN 2009, 2010; and KC and others 2010. 
Note: See text for descriptions of scenarios. FT = fast track, SA = South Asia.
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relative to lower-secondary increased in both 
the private and the public sector.
 5.  Instead of point estimates, the probabilities of 
worker mobility are estimated as upper and 
lower bounds. The lines shown in the fi gures 
link the midpoints of the bounds; they pri-
marily show how the bounds vary with edu-
cation. The midpoints of the bounds should 
not be interpreted as true point estimates.
 6.  These transition probabilities are conditional 
on being in a particular state in the initial 
year. The likelihood of a worker with tertiary 
education being in agriculture or in casual 
employment is relatively low. 
 7.  Annex fi gure 5A.3 shows enrollment rates at 
primary and secondary. Annex fi gure 5A.5 
shows enrollment at tertiary institutions in 
South Asia and other regions. 
 8.  For all countries, this section uses the multi-
purpose household surveys that permit analysis 
by consumption quintiles (see appendix A to 
the report). The only exception is India, where 
the Labor Force Survey is used.
 9.  Between 2000 and 2008, young female 
cohorts in Bangladesh still had lower attain-
ment at the upper-secondary and tertiary lev-
els, but they made signifi cantly larger gains 
at the primary and lower- secondary levels, 
surpassing young men. In Maldives, primary 
attainment among young female cohorts was 
comparable to that of males, but attainment 
at higher levels was still lower. In Sri Lanka, 
educational attainment among young female 
cohorts was higher than of males at all lev-
els of education (see annex fi gures 5A.6 and 
5A.7).
10.  Private expenditures by households are also 
high in some countries. In India, for example, 
they are equal to 1.4 percent of gross domes-
tic product (Tilak 2009).
11.  Hanushek and Woessman fi nd that an increase 
of one standard deviation in student reading 
and math scores (roughly equivalent to improv-
ing a country’s performance ranking from the 
median to the top 15 percent) is associated 
with a 2 percentage point increase in annual 
gross domestic product per capita growth.
12.  The scenario discussed here is the SA6 
 scenario in annex 5B.
13.  Projections are based on a methodology used 
for global projections; as a result, there are 
differences in the defi nitions of educational 
attainments by level used in this section. In the 
projections in this section, “primary” combines 
incomplete and complete primary; “secondary” 
is a broad category that combines lower-sec-
ondary and completed upper-secondary. 
14.  This section benefi ted from the draft chap-
ter on early childhood development and 
preschool prepared for the ongoing regional 
study on the quality of learning in South Asia 
(Alderman 2011). 
15.  A growing neuroscience literature provides 
insights into biologically determined win-
dows in childhood for these processes. For 
example, the number of neurons devoted to 
language peaks before a child turns one and 
then declines, implying that children lose plas-
ticity even before they engage in rudimentary 
conversations.
16.  Martorell and Horta (2010) fi nd that weight 
gain during the fi rst two years of life has the 
strongest association with schooling, followed 
by birthweight. A one standard deviation 
increase in birth weight (about 0.5 kilograms) is 
associated with 0.21 years more schooling and 
an 8 percent decrease in the risk of grade fail-
ure. A one standard deviation increase (about 
0.7 kilograms) in conditional weight gain in 
the fi rst two years of life is associated with 0.43 
years more schooling and a 12 percent reduc-
tion in the risk of grade failure. Gains in educa-
tion as a result of weight gain were particularly 
large for babies who were born small. 
17.  Wasting, stunting, and underweight indica-
tors refer to the proportion of children under 
fi ve whose weight for height, height for age, 
and weight for age are more than two stan-
dard deviations from the medians of an inter-
national reference population recognized by 
the World Health Organization. Low height 
for age (also termed stunting) is a measure 
of chronic malnutrition. Progress toward the 
Millennium Development Goal is tracked 
based on underweight. Trends in underweight 
and stunting tend to move together. Although 
underweight has a somewhat higher risk of 
mortality, stunting is more strongly associated 
with long-term development (human capital 
and economic) outcomes.
18.  These fi ndings are based on indicators devel-
oped by the United Nations Children’s Fund, 
including “family care indicators,” an index 
of inputs and resources, and more compre-
hensive “home observations for measurement 
of the environment” (HOME), which can be 
adapted to household surveys. Family care 
indicators have been validated as a predictor 
of cognitive development in diverse settings. 
See Alderman (2011) for a discussion.
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19.  The role of the private sector varies greatly 
across countries. Whereas almost all second-
ary schools in Afghanistan are government 
schools, almost all secondary schools in 
Bangladesh are private.
20.  Some caution should be exercised in inter-
preting these results, as these studies may 
not take into account all the characteristics 
that infl uence the choice of public or private 
school. Desai and others (2008) control for 
the endogeneity of school choice in India. 
They fi nd modest gains in math and reading 
scores in private schools compared with gov-
ernment schools, with higher gains for chil-
dren from lower economic strata.
21.  These tests do not typically measure impor-
tant skills and knowledge against established 
learning standards, tending instead to rely 
heavily on rote learning and multiple choice 
answers. In addition, the results are generally 
not comparable across years.
22.  Technical training is costly to set up, caus-
ing private entrepreneurs to shy away from 
this kind of training. Commercial training (in 
languages and secretarial skills, for example), 
which costs less to provide, attracts more pri-
vate providers.
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Questions
•  What is the role of labor market policies and 
institutions in encouraging job creation and 
protecting workers in the formal and infor-
mal economy? 
•  How can South Asian countries increase 
access of informal sector workers to programs 
that help them manage labor market shocks?
•  What are the directions for labor market poli-
cies moving forward? 
Findings
•  Employment protection rules create disin-
centives for expanding employment in the 
formal sector, especially in India, Nepal, 
and Sri Lanka. Job security laws are often 
too restrictive, compliance too complicated, 
and enforcement too weak and discretion-
ary. Labor regulations also tend to fall short 
of their intended goal of protecting workers, 
because most workers fall outside the cover-
age of these rules and employers search for 
ways to circumvent regulations.
•  South Asian countries need to reorient their 
labor market policies from protecting jobs to 
protecting workers. Doing so calls for coor-
dinated strategies that relax statutory pro-
tections (especially the procedures and costs 
associated with dismissals) and build up the 
income support and active labor market pro-
grams available to workers. The distributional 
effects imply political economy challenges to 
this approach, but the aggregate welfare gains 
could be substantial. One policy, especially 
relevant in Sri Lanka, is to transform the 
current severance system into an unemploy-
ment benefit scheme, perhaps through the 
 creation of funded worker accounts. Simul-
taneously, cost-effective employment services 
and retraining programs need to be ramped 
up to help workers adjust to changes in the 
labor market. 
•  In the short run, shifting strategy in this way 
would benefit only those informal sector 
workers who fi nd jobs in the formal sector. 
Policy makers need to pay attention to the 
vast majority of workers in South Asia— 
disproportionately poor and vulnerable—
who will not. Universal social insurance 
schemes that cover all informal sector work-
ers may not be feasible, but coverage could 
grow organically by encouraging the most 
effective among the plethora of plans spon-
sored by government and civil society.
•  Public works, self-employment assistance, and 
training programs are also important. All of 
these instruments are already in place through-
out the region. The priority is to improve their 
administration and delivery, thereby expand-
ing access and increasing cost-effectiveness. 
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Labor market regulations, programs, and institutions can have important effects on creating jobs, increas-
ing productivity and earnings, and helping 
workers manage risks of unemployment and 
low and uncertain earnings. However, any 
assessment of the labor market framework 
in South Asia must be based on the reality 
that the region is still dominated by infor-
mal and casual employment. The prevalence 
of low-income, precarious, and informal 
employment refl ects the stage of development 
characterizing much of South Asia. Strong 
growth could gradually change the quality 
of employment in the region, but this process 
is slow, and the experience of other regions 
suggests that the relationship between devel-
opment and the formalization of the labor 
market is not as linear as it was once thought 
to be. 
Given this reality, the policy challenge is 
to reform regulations to encourage the cre-
ation of better jobs while broadening the 
access of all workers to programs that help 
them manage labor market shocks. Doing so 
will require choices on regulation of the labor 
market and design of social protection pro-
grams for workers that are well adapted to the 
South Asian context. These interventions can 
be seen as a system that includes promotion 
(for example, activation programs), preven-
tion (for example, social insurance), and pro-
tection (for example, social assistance). 
The focus of this chapter is on policies, 
regulations, and programs that cover the 
fi rst two of these functions.1 The discussion 
recognizes the distinctions between the for-
mal and informal sectors. How are policies 
affecting the size and quality of employment 
in each sector and movement between them? 
How much access do workers in the two sec-
tors have to programs that could help them 
improve their position in the labor market 
and manage labor market-related risks? This 
chapter considers the formal and informal 
sectors separately, beginning with the formal 
sector.
Labor market institutions, 
policies, and programs in the 
formal sector
Labor laws and social security programs 
apply largely to regular wage or salaried 
workers in nonagricultural employment. 
Although the structure of South Asia’s 
economies is changing, the labor force is 
still predominantly rural and agricultural. A 
majority of workers are either self-employed 
or work in family enterprises.2 Formal sector 
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workers make up only a small minority of 
the workforce.
Nonetheless, the institutional and policy 
framework still has a signifi cant impact on 
the region’s labor markets. Where they are 
enforced, labor laws can protect the rights of 
workers. Job security rules, wage regulations, 
and the financing of social insurance can 
provide important benefi ts to workers, but 
they also affect the cost of labor and, thus, 
employment levels in the formal sector. 
Reform of labor law and the strengthening of 
employment programs could improve incen-
tives for formal sector employment while 
increasing the real protection available to 
workers.
Who is covered by worker protection?
Wage employment accounts for less than half 
of employment in all South Asian countries 
other than Maldives and Sri Lanka. Even in 
the wage sector, nonregular or casual work 
remains very important. None of these work-
ers is typically covered by social protection 
programs. In fact, formal social security and 
labor laws cover less than 10 percent of the 
workforce in most South Asian countries 
and only a fraction of wage employees. Cov-
erage of formal social insurance (based on 
pension coverage) is low not only in absolute 
terms but also relative to per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) in all countries 
except Sri Lanka (figure 6.1). Even in Sri 
Lanka, which has the most extensive social 
protection system in the region, only about 
a third of all workers are covered by formal 
social security, refl ecting the high share of 
self-employed, temporary, and casual work-
ers (social security covers about 9 percent of 
workers in India and 4 percent of workers 
in Nepal). 
Figure 6.2, based on household survey 
data, takes a closer look at social security 
coverage within the wage sector in Sri Lanka 
and India. In Sri Lanka, coverage is high, 
except among casual wage employees. India’s 
profile is more typical of the region as a 
whole, with only a small fraction of workers 
benefi ting from formal protection,  especially 
in the private sector. In contrast, coverage is 
high among regular wage or salaried work-
ers in the public sector. In addition to non-
contributory pension schemes, workers in 
this sector enjoy considerable job security 
and, in some countries, signifi cantly higher 
earnings (see Palacios and Whitehouse 2006 
for pension schemes; see chapter 3 for wage 
differences). Coverage of labor laws that set 
out basic rights of workers, defi ne minimum 
working conditions, and specify contractual 
requirements can be expected to be even 
lower than coverage of formal social insur-
ance programs, because most labor regula-
tions apply only to fi rms above a minimum 
size threshold.3, 4 
Wages, working conditions, and social 
protection for workers can also be deter-
mined through collective bargaining . 
 Collective agreements negotiated at the 
fi rm, industry, or national level can exist in 
parallel with legislation, potentially estab-
lishing more  generous provisions than stipu-
lated by law. 
Unions and collective bargaining play 
a limited role outside the public sector in 
most South Asian countries.5 Figures 6A.1–
6A.3 in the annex provide estimates of 
trade union membership in India, Pakistan, 
and Sri Lanka, based on administrative 
data. Combined with information on total 
employment these estimates suggest that 
less than 1 percent of workers in Pakistan 
(2008), about 2 percent in India (2005), and 
just below 10 percent in Sri Lanka (2008) 
are unionized. Although there are problems 
with these data, alternate sources provide 
a consistent message.6 For countries on 
which data are available, coverage of collec-
tive bargaining is even lower. For example, 
based on a questionnaire administered to 
the Ministry of Labor in Sri Lanka, an esti-
mated 4 percent of the workforce is covered 
by a collective agreement. Union member-
ship is higher in the public sector than the 
private sector (see annex figure 6A.4 for 
India). Although their overall numbers may 
be relatively low, where unions are present, 
they can play important roles in negotiat-
ing benefits and protection of members, 
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increasing compliance, and infl uencing the 
more general policy debate. 
Workers covered under one form of formal 
protection tend to be covered under others, 
but most workers have no coverage at all. 
This duality is illustrated in table 6.1, which 
presents simple correlation coefficients for 
social security coverage, trade union mem-
bership, and employment in workplaces of 10 
or more employees (as a proxy for coverage 
through labor laws) in India. As the matrix 
shows, all of these indicators of formal social 
protection are positively correlated, with sta-
tistically signifi cant coeffi cients. 
There are strong associations between 
access to formal instruments on the one hand 
and poverty and overall welfare on the other. 
The poverty rate for wage workers with 
social security is much lower than the rate 
for workers who are not covered (4 percent 
versus 24 percent in India in 2005; 3 percent 
versus 29 percent in Nepal in 2003/04). The 
poverty rate for nonunion workers (22 per-
cent) in India was more than twice the rate 
for union members (10 percent) in 2010. In 
Sri Lanka, nearly one-third of the workers 
covered by the employment protection law 
come from the richest quintile of the popula-
tion (Heltberg and Vodopivec 2004).
Earnings are higher for workers with 
access to social security or employment pro-
tection.7 Although these correlations may in 
part refl ect the effectiveness of formal instru-
ments in helping workers manage risk, they 
also reflect the greater likelihood of high-
productivity workers fi nding jobs that offer 
protection. In India and Sri Lanka, work-
ers with higher levels of education are more 
likely to hold jobs that provide formal protec-
tion; young, old, and less educated workers 
are less likely to hold such jobs (table 6.2). 
The higher coverage of women in Sri Lanka 
likely refl ects the high degree of selection of 
more educated women into better jobs. 
Protection of workers’ 
fundamental rights 
Labor laws play an important role in protect-
ing the fundamental rights of workers. The 
core labor standards, refl ected in the Inter-
national Labour Organization (ILO) 1998 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work, represent an internationally 
agreed upon group of basic rights relevant 
regardless of the level of development.8 The 
declaration covers four principles and rights, 
each covered by two ILO conventions: 
•  Freedom of association and the effec-
tive recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining
•  Elimination of all forms of forced or com-
pulsory labor
• Effective abolition of child labor
•  Elimination of discrimination in respect 
of employment and occupation. 
Ratification of the eight core conven-
tions does not by itself imply implementa-
tion, but it does signal political will. As 
such, it is a useful metric by which to assess 
countries’ commitment to protecting basic 
worker rights. 
Ratification of the core conventions in 
South Asia has been only partial. Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka ratifi ed all of the conventions 
associated with the core labor standards 
(table 6.3). The other countries in the region 
(excluding Bhutan, which is not a member 
of the ILO, and Maldives, which became 
an ILO member only in 2009) have ratifi ed 
some but not all standards. The conventions 
on freedom of association and collective bar-
gaining and on abolition of child labor have 
TABLE 6.1 Correlation coefficients among union membership, 
social security coverage, and employment in firms with 10 or more 
employees, India, 2010
Union 
membership
Access to 
social 
security
Firm size of 
10 or more 
workers
Union membership 1.00    
Access to social security 0.51a 1.00  
Firm size of 10 or more workers 0.19a 0.42a 1.00
Source: Authors, based on data from the 2009/10 National Sample Survey. 
Note: Social security coverage includes pensions and provident funds only. Union membership 
includes registered trade unions, memberships in associations of owners, and self-employed 
workers. It is not possible to isolate trade union membership. 
a. Pearson correlation coeﬃ  cient signiﬁ cant at the 1 percent level.
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the poorest ratifi cation records. Most coun-
tries have indicated their intention to ratify 
all outstanding core conventions, but some 
diffi culties remain.9
Even in countries that have not ratifi ed all 
conventions, the constitution, national policy, 
or national legislation may broadly recognize 
the principles and rights refl ected in them.10 
In practice, however, limited enforcement 
capacity and large informal sectors, among 
other factors, make protecting the basic rights 
of workers a challenge in South Asia.11
TABLE 6.2 Percentage of workers with access to formal protection instruments in India and Sri Lanka, 
by worker characteristic 
(percentage of workers)
Worker 
characteristic
India Sri Lanka
2005 2010 2008
Social 
security 
coverage
In workplace 
of 10+ 
employees
Union 
membership
Social 
security
coverage
In workplace 
of 10+ 
employees
Social security
coverage
In workplace 
of 10+
employees
All 29 22 11 26 24 51 28
Male 29 22 13 25 24 44 26
Female 28 19 7 27 24 63 31
15–24 years 6 16 5 8 20 42 42
25–44 years 30 22 12 25 25 54 30
45–54 years 54 27 16 42 27 54 20
55–64 years 47 18 12 42 20 39 14
Primary or below 9 14 6 6 15 30 20
Secondary 41 27 14 26 24 58 31
Tertiary 76 57 36 67 50 93 60
Regular wage 45 50 31 44 53 95 87
Casual wage 2 26 5 1 23 10 39
Public 83 70 57 77 67 93 —
Private 12 16 8 12 19 34 60
Source: Authors, based on national labor force and household surveys. 
Note: — = Not available.
TABLE 6.3 Year of ratiﬁ cation of International Labour Organization core conventions, Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles, and Rights at Work, by country
Country
Freedom of association
and collective bargaining
Elimination of forced and
 compulsory labor
Elimination of 
discrimination in 
respect of employment 
and occupation Abolition of child labor
Convention 
87
Convention 
98
Convention 
29
Convention 
105
Convention 
100
Convention 
111
Convention 
138
Convention 
182
Afghanistan a  a  a 1963 1969 1969 2010 2010
Bangladesh 1972 1972 1972 1972 1998 1972 a 2001
India a a 1954 2000 1958 1960 a  a
Nepal a 1996 2002 2007 1976 1974 1997 2002
Pakistan 1951 1952 1957 1960 2001 1961 2006 2001
Sri Lanka 1995 1972 1950 2003 1993 1998 2000 2001
Source: ILOLEX database, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/.
Note: Bhutan is not a member of the ILO. Maldives became a member in 2009 and has not yet ratiﬁ ed any core conventions. a = Not ratiﬁ ed.
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Employment protection legislation and 
its eﬀ ect on labor market outcomes
Employment protection legislation refers to 
the rules governing the initiation and termi-
nation of employment. These rules cover the 
kinds of contracts permitted, the conditions 
under which workers can be terminated, and 
the procedures for termination.12 Employ-
ment protection arrangements are often char-
acterized along a continuum, ranging from 
protective to unregulated (or rigid to fl exible). 
A stylized characterization of this continuum 
is presented in fi gure 6.3. 
Employment protection rules provide job 
security—but not without controversy. Leg-
islation can provide protection by  restricting 
the ability of employers to hire workers on 
an explicitly nonpermanent basis or by mak-
ing dismissal costly. Controversies surround 
employment protection legislation because 
of sharp differences in views about the costs 
and benefits of these policies.13 One per-
spective sees restrictions on nonpermanent 
hiring and employer dismissal rights as pro-
viding important social protection for work-
ers. Increased employment security can also 
encourage longer working relationships and 
the accumulation of firm-specific human 
capital. An opposing perspective emphasizes 
that these regulations raise the cost of labor, 
discouraging job creation and favoring privi-
leged “insiders.” The impacts of employment 
protection legislation are discussed later in 
this section.
Most countries in South Asia have fl exible 
hiring rules, although there are exceptions. 
Table 6.4 summarizes the rules for fixed-
term contracts, based on the World Bank’s 
Doing Business database.14 Most countries in 
the region take a fl exible approach, allowing 
the use of fi xed-term contracts for permanent 
tasks and imposing no limits on the duration 
of such contracts. 
Although the Doing Business database 
indicates no restrictions in India, the situa-
tion with respect to fi xed-term contracting is 
actually more uncertain. The Contract Labor 
(Regulation and Abolition) Act of 1970 is 
intended to prevent denial of job security 
where it is feasible (for example, situations 
that warrant longer-term employment). In 
this regard, it empowers the appropriate gov-
ernment to prohibit contract labor in some 
situations. In practice, states in India adopt 
different stances toward contract labor.15 
Pakistan is the most restrictive country in the 
region, prohibiting fi xed-term contracts for 
permanent activities and limiting their dura-
tion to nine months.16
In contrast, dismissal procedures in much 
of the region are among the most onerous 
in the world. A number of countries rely on 
high administrative and financial costs of 
dismissal as the principal means of protect-
ing permanent workers. India, Nepal, and Sri 
Lanka stand out in that they require not only 
notifi cation but prior approval by the state 
to lay off workers (see table 6.4).17 The three 
countries are among only 33 of 183 countries 
worldwide that require prior approval for 
individual dismissals and among only 42 that 
require prior approval for collective dismissals 
FIGURE 6.3 The continuum of employment protection legislation
Source: Authors.
RIGID OR
PROTECTIVE
FLEXIBLE OR
UNREGULATED
The Employment Protection Continuum
• restricted fixed-term contracting 
• restricted temporary agency work
• restricted employer dismissal rights
• substantial severance and
  advance notice/approval required
• substantial administrative
  requirements for layoffs
• unrestricted fixed term contracting
• unrestricted temporary agency work
• unrestricted dismissal rights
• no severance or notice required
• simple administrative procedures
  for layoffs
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(World Bank 2011a). In addition, severance 
pay requirements, which typically require 
minimum tenure and increase with seniority, 
are high in Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and 
particularly Sri Lanka (fi gure 6.4). 
Indeed, Sri Lanka has one of the most 
costly severance pay systems in the world, 
though workers do not always benefi t from 
it. Sri Lanka’s Termination of Employment of 
Workmen Act (TEWA), which governs non-
disciplinary termination in private fi rms with 
more than 14 workers, has heavy reporting 
demands and requires offi cial authorization 
for intended layoffs.18 Retrenchment costs 
are extremely high by international stan-
dards (see fi gure 6.4), as well as complicat-
ed.19 TEWA requires that workers be paid 
0.5–2.5 months’ salary for each year of ser-
vice, depending on the number of years of 
service. The maximum compensation pay-
able is 48 months (capped at Rs 1.25 million), 
although only very rarely do workers fulfi ll 
the requirements for maximum compensa-
tion. Although statutory severance rights are 
generous, nonpayment or partial payment is 
common (as it is in some other South Asian 
countries).20 
Benchmarking by the Organisation for 
Economic Co- operation and Development 
(OECD) suggests that India’s level of statu-
tory employment protection is considerably 
higher than that of most OECD member 
countries as well as most other major emerg-
ing economies.21 In terms of dismissal protec-
tion for permanent workers, India’s labor laws 
are stricter than all OECD countries except 
 Portugal and all non-OECD countries except 
Indonesia (fi gure 6.5). Indian employers in 
establishments with 100 or more  workers 
cannot lay off any worker (or close down 
operations) without permission from the 
appropriate government. In addition, unfair 
dismissals can lead to reinstatement by the 
court following lengthy court procedures 
TABLE 6.4 Selected hiring and redundancy rules in South Asia, by country
Country 
Hiring rules Redundancy and severance rules
Fixed-term 
contracts 
prohibited 
for 
permanent 
tasks
Maximum length of 
fi xed-term contracts
Coverage of 
severance pay 
Notifi cation 
required
Approval 
required
Average 
notice 
period for 
redundancy 
dismissal 
(months) 
Single 
contract Renewals Excluded categories
1 
worker
9 
workers
1 
worker
9 
workers
Afghanistan No No limit No limit — Yes Yes No Yes 4.3
Bangladesh Yes No limit No limit Firms with fewer 
than fi ve workers, 
managerial positions
Yes Yes No No 4.3
Bhutan No No limit No limit — Yes Yes No No 5.3
India No No limit No limit Firms with fewer than 
50 workers
Yes Yes Yes Yes 4.3
Maldives No 24 months 24 months — No No No No 4.3
Nepal Yes No limit No limit Firms with fewer 
than 10 workers
Yes Yes Yes Yes 4.3
Pakistan Yes 9 months 9 months Firms with fewer 
than 20 workers
No No No No 4.3
Sri Lanka No No limit No limit Firms with fewer than 
15 workers, members 
of cooperatives
Yes Yes Yes Yes 4.3
Sources: Authors, based on data in World Bank 2011a and Holzmann and others 2011.
Note: The notice period for redundancy dismissal is 4.3–10.3 months in Bhutan and 2.0–8.7 months in Maldives for workers with tenures of 9 months–20 years. For Bhutan and 
Maldives, ﬁ gures show notice period for workers with one year of tenure. For other countries, the notice period is the same irrespective of tenure length. — = Not available.
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(see annex table 6A.1).22 Although there are 
no additional costs or notifi cation require-
ments/regulations for collective dismissals, 
the effective costs of dismissals (the sum of 
costs for individual dismissals and any addi-
tional costs for collective dismissals) puts 
India, together with Indonesia, among the 
top third of countries included in the OECD 
benchmarking. India’s employment protec-
tion legislation for temporary and fi xed-term 
contracts, though more relaxed, is just above 
the OECD mean.
The effects of employment protection leg-
islation on labor market outcomes have been 
extensively researched, especially in OECD 
countries (for overviews of this literature, 
see OECD 2006, 2007b). Studies conducted 
in developing countries, particularly in Latin 
America, reach broadly similar conclusions 
(see Freeman 2009). This research fi nds mod-
est impacts on employment and unemploy-
ment, often statistically insignifi cant in the 
case of unemployment. The empirical fi ndings 
are stronger in the case of dynamic effects: in 
general, more restrictive employment protec-
tion legislation is associated with lower labor 
turnover, job creation, and destruction; longer 
job tenure; and longer unemployment dura-
tion. The research also suggests that there are 
distributional impacts of strong employment 
protection rules, with prime-age males and 
skilled workers benefi ting and women, youth, 
and unskilled workers losing. 
Studies on the impact of labor laws in 
South Asia have concentrated on India.23 A 
generally robust set of conclusions emerges: 
states with more protective legislation have 
significantly lower output, employment, 
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FIGURE 6.4 Weeks of wages required to be paid in severance in regions, country income groups, and selected 
South Asian countries, by length of service
Source: Holzmann and others 2011.
FIGURE 6.5 Employment protection indicators in selected countries 
Source: OECD 2009.
Note: The OECD employment protection indicators cover three aspects of employment protection: individual dismissal of permanent workers, regulation of temporary employment, and speciﬁ c requirements for collective dismissal. 
Each subindicator ranges from 0 to 6, with 0 the least restrictive and 6 the most restrictive. The overall indicator—the sum of the three subindicators, weighted at 5/12, 5/12, and 2/12—also ranges from 0 to 6. 
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number of establishments, investment, and 
labor productivity in the formal manufac-
turing sector and higher output in informal 
manufacturing (see Ahsan and Pagés 2009; 
Gupta, Hasan, and Kumar 2009; OECD 
2007a). Gupta, Hasan, and Kumar (2009) 
fi nd that output growth following the signifi -
cant deregulation of the 1980s and 1990s was 
higher in labor-intensive industries in states 
with more fl exible labor regulations. Gains in 
employment generation were higher in states 
with more fl exible regulations, irrespective of 
the labor intensity of the industry. 
Ahsan and Pagés (2009) fi nd evidence of 
strong complementarities across labor laws in 
India. They fi nd that the output and employ-
ment costs of employment protection legisla-
tion are higher in states and time periods in 
which it is more diffi cult to resolve disputes 
and not very important when such costs are 
low. Workers do not benefi t from these laws, 
because any gains in employment protec-
tion are more than offset by the decline in 
employment, resulting in a decline in the total 
wage bill (Ahsan and Pagés 2009; Besley and 
 Burgess 2004). 
Evidence from India and Sri Lanka on job 
turnover suggests efficiency costs of labor 
legislation. Using urban enterprise survey 
data for the early 2000s, Gunatilaka and 
Vodopivec (2010) fi nd that Sri Lanka has very 
low job fl ows relative to other countries (see 
annex fi gure 6A.5) and suggest that its strin-
gent job security legislation may be a signifi -
cant contributing factor. Analysis carried out 
for this book using a newly available panel of 
large (more than 100 employees) manufactur-
ing fi rms in India fi nds higher rates of job cre-
ation and destruction (and therefore job real-
location/turnover) for contract labor relative 
to permanent workers (annex table 6A.2).24 It 
also fi nds higher job turnover for states with 
more fl exible labor regulations (fi gure 6.6).
Although labor regulations are not binding 
on all fi rms in the region, enterprise managers 
in India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka cite them as 
an important constraint to the operation and 
growth of their businesses. Job-creating fi rms 
report that labor regulations are the third most 
important constraint in Bhutan, the fourth 
most important constraint in India, and the 
fi fth most important constraint in Nepal and 
Sri Lanka. In contrast, formal sector fi rms in 
Afghanistan and Bangladesh rate labor regu-
lations as among the least problematic. Labor 
regulations generally become more costly to 
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FIGURE 6.6 Job turnover rates and labor regulations in Indian states
Sources: Authors, based on various sources. Gross job turnover data are calculated from the Annual Survey of Industries panel data for 2000–08 for ﬁ rms with 
more than 100 employees. The Labor Rule Reform Index is the OECD index of state-level reform in India, developed on the basis of data collected through a 
customized survey instrument (Dougherty 2008; OECD 2007a). The proportional index, which captures the state’s share of total reforms, is used here. 
Note: Higher values of the reform index reﬂ ect a greater degree of change in procedures to reduce transactions costs (such as limiting the scope of the 
regulation, providing greater clarity with regard to application, and simplifying compliance procedures in eight speciﬁ c labor law areas).
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firms as GDP per capita rises (figure 6.7). 
India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka report higher lev-
els of this constraint than other countries at 
their level of development.25
In India, labor regulations were mark-
edly more problematic in 2010 than in 2005. 
Firms in high-income states report greater 
severity and ranking of the labor regulations 
constraint than low-income states. Nearly 
30 percent of Indian fi rms that perceive labor 
regulations as a major or severe constraint 
report that restrictions on dismissal are a 
constraint to hiring, about 25 percent report 
that restrictions on employing casual work 
are constraints, and about 20 percent com-
plain about restrictions on temporary work.
Compensation and minimum wages 
Government policy can affect compen-
sation—and thus employment—through 
 various channels, including the rules deter-
mining collective bargaining, pay equity 
 policies intended to eliminate wage discrimi-
nation, and minimum wages. Another way 
in which public policy can affect compen-
sation is through rules mandating contribu-
tions by employers, employees, or both to 
social insurance (such as pension plans and 
health insurance) and other benefits. The 
quality and effi ciency of the insurance and 
benefi ts fi nanced by such contributions are 
in themselves major policy issues. However, 
from the perspective of this book, the rele-
vance of these nonwage labor costs pertains 
to their labor market implications. Depend-
ing on the details of the contributions and 
who ultimately pays for them, these contri-
butions can affect total labor costs incurred 
by the employer (and thus labor demand) or 
net earnings of the employee (and thus labor 
supply). 
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Where social contributions are large, 
employment impacts can be substantial. 
Labor economists typically measure the 
 magnitude of social contributions through 
the “tax wedge”—the difference between 
total labor costs and net earnings.26 Most 
South Asian countries have tax wedges 
that are below the international average 
(see annex fi gure 6A.6). However, the tax 
wedges in India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka 
are high enough that any policy reforms 
must take into consideration the poten-
tial employment disincentives of further 
increases. 
Social insurance systems can also affect 
worker mobility. The lack of portabil-
ity of benefi ts in some countries (including 
India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) with multiple 
schemes could inhibit the movement of work-
ers between the public and private sector. In 
2010 (for the public sector) and 2011 (for the 
private sector), Maldives introduced a new 
contributory pension scheme that is designed 
to address this issue. The design of defi ned 
benefi t schemes can also penalize movement 
out of covered employment (for example, for 
workers covered by India’s employee pension 
scheme).
Minimum wage rules are another inter-
vention with potentially important employ-
ment effects. Like employment protection 
rules, minimum wages can provide security 
to workers adversely affected by market fail-
ures. When they are set too high, however, 
they can have the unintended consequence 
of reducing employment and encouraging 
informality. 
For the most part, the international litera-
ture fi nds the employment effects of minimum 
wages to be modest or negligible (Card and 
Krueger 1997; Neumark and Wascher 2006). 
In developing countries, it suggests that mini-
mum wages often raise the pay of low-paid 
workers in the formal sector and can even 
have a spillover effect on the pay of informal 
sector wage workers.27 However, the impacts 
of minimum wages vary considerably, with 
examples of negative employment effects in 
some countries and groups of workers within 
countries. 
All countries in South Asia have minimum 
wage rules; some have multiple minimum 
wages (see annex table 6A.3). It is important 
to consider local labor market conditions in 
assessing whether the level set for the mini-
mum wage strikes the right balance between 
protection and efficiency. In India, where 
states set the minimum wage, there is wide 
variation in how it relates to market wages, 
although overall the level is low. In a number 
of Indian states, for example, the minimum 
wage is less than 20 percent of the median 
formal wage. It is highest in Dadra and Nagar 
Haveli and Delhi, but even in those states it 
was less than 40 percent of the median wage 
in the formal sector in 2008. In most states, 
the minimum wage is below the median wage 
for casual workers (see annex fi gure 6A.7). In 
Nepal, Pakistan, and the manufacturing sec-
tor of Sri Lanka, it is higher as a proportion 
of the median formal sector wage (46–61 
 percent) (fi gure 6.8). In Nepal and Pakistan, 
it is at or above the median wage for casual 
labor, suggesting that the majority of these 
wage workers are unlikely to fi nd formal sec-
tor employment. Although minimum wages in 
Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are not high 
by international standards, they approach 
the level at which lower- productivity workers 
will be effectively excluded from formal wage 
employment, suggesting caution with respect 
to further increases.
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The main concern regarding minimum 
wages in South Asia involves the institu-
tional arrangements used to implement 
them. Labor regulations typically indicate 
that there should be a minimum wage but 
do not defi ne the mechanisms to set its level 
or enforce it. Regulations are also often 
silent about the structure of the body in 
charge of setting minimum wages, the role 
of employers and employees, and the mecha-
nism to adjust the minimum wage over time, 
creating uncertainty for both employees and 
employers. 
Compliance and dispute resolution 
Lack of compliance weakens the impact of 
labor market rules.28 Firms employ vari-
ous strategies to circumvent statutory rules, 
reducing de facto the regulation of labor 
markets. Incentives for noncompliance can 
be particularly strong where compliance can 
be costly, as in the case of dismissals. Strat-
egies firms use include increasing the use 
of contract and temporary workers (India, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka), using voluntary retire-
ment schemes for collective dismissals 
(India, Sri Lanka), fragmenting production 
and “leasing” production to smaller fi rms 
through subcontracting (India, Sri Lanka), 
using disciplinary grounds to justify fi ring a 
worker or harassing workers to make them 
quit (Sri Lanka), adopting capital-intensive 
technologies (India), locking out workers 
(India); employing foreign workers instead 
of local workers (Nepal), and terminat-
ing workers during the period of probation 
(Pakistan).29, 30 
Weak enforcement is another factor. One 
problem is that the administrative machinery 
for enforcement is inadequate. Bangladesh 
and Nepal, for example, suffer from short-
ages of inspectors. Nepal faces challenges of 
terrain and transport. 
Another problem is the sheer complex-
ity of compliance. This problem is espe-
cially severe in India, with its multitude of 
labor laws, which are often poorly specifi ed 
and interpreted as well as contradictory; its 
requirements to maintain registers and file 
returns under each law; and the lack of a sin-
gle system of inspection for labor legislation 
(Debroy 2011). 
Enforcement is also weakened by collu-
sion between and corruption of inspectors 
and employers. According to World Bank 
enterprise surveys, 50–60 percent of firms 
in India (2005) and Pakistan (2007) report 
that inspectors expect gifts. About 20 percent 
of managers in India in 2002 reported that 
inspectors responded to unoffi cial payments 
by reducing the number of visits to their 
establishments.31 
Implementation is further hampered by 
ineffi cient procedures for resolving disputes. 
In India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, options 
for resolving disputes and grievances 
through negotiation appear to be limited, 
and the legal framework favors adjudication 
over negotiation or collective bargaining. In 
India, for example, the Industrial Disputes 
Act sets the conciliation, arbitration/media-
tion, and adjudication procedures to be fol-
lowed in industrial disputes. If conciliation 
fails, the government may refer the case 
to the industrial tribunal or a labor court, 
which normally leads to a long litigation pro-
cess.32 The backlog means that an average 
adjudication takes three to fi ve years (some 
cases have been pending for more than a 
decade). In  Pakistan, unfair dismissal cases 
can involve protracted processes at labor 
courts and appeals to high courts. In Sri 
Lanka, the process of inquiry in unfair dis-
missal cases can take a substantial amount 
of time and is often arbitrary and nontrans-
parent. Although a 2003 amendment to the 
TEWA mandated a 4:3:2 month formula for 
labor tribunal cases, arbitration, and deci-
sions by the commissioner, the process still 
takes a long time, and most cases drag on 
for two to three years. Poorly resourced 
institutions and weak capacity are evident in 
most countries. 
Strengthening enforcement and dispute 
resolution capabilities are necessary for 
improving compliance, but they require com-
plementary measures. There is consensus in 
most countries on improving the effi ciency of 
inspections and strengthening enforcement 
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capabilities. Inspection must play a key role 
in enforcement, but the sheer number of fi rms 
(especially small fi rms) limits the impact it 
can have. Improving inspection must there-
fore be complemented by other strategies, 
including strengthening complaint and griev-
ance redressal mechanisms and streamlining 
and addressing the lack of clarity and con-
sistency in laws and regulations. Options to 
reduce fi rms’ incentives to circumvent legisla-
tion include reducing the stringency of such 
legislation. These options, on which there is 
typically less consensus, are discussed below. 
Shifting protection from jobs to workers 
Easing protective regulations would improve 
labor market outcomes but weaken job secu-
rity for formal sector workers. Less restric-
tive regulations, especially pertaining to 
dismissal, could create incentives for formal 
sector job creation; benefi t certain groups, 
including women; and encourage compli-
ance with the law. The minority of workers 
that currently benefi t from these regulations 
would lose from such a reform, especially 
in India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, where job 
security rules are strongest.
Better tools to protect workers, such as 
income support and active labor market 
policies, would provide a more broadly effec-
tive mechanism for achieving social and 
employment objectives than the current focus 
on protecting jobs. The strategy of protecting 
workers is based on allowing the labor market 
to function more freely than it does in regimes 
with strong job protection but giving workers 
better access to active and passive programs 
that help them adjust to market fl uctuations 
and increase their future employability. 
Table 6.5 contrasts the different approaches 
to worker protection. The challenge for coun-
tries in South Asia—like other low-income 
countries with small formal sectors and 
indeed many middle-income countries—is to 
move from the lower-right-hand cell in table 
6.5 upward and to the left.
Reducing job protection for formal sec-
tor workers is diffi cult, because it increases 
the prospects of layoffs and dismissals from 
previously protected jobs. Many countries—
including several transition economies of 
Central and Eastern Europe—have taken this 
diffi cult step by combining it with the intro-
duction of better programs to protect workers 
(Holzmann and others 2011; see Vodopivec, 
Wörgötter, and Raju 2005 for a discussion 
of the reform paths and challenges in these 
countries).
One aspect of this shift is to extend the 
legality of nonpermanent contracts. Most 
countries have reasonably fl exible contract-
ing rules. Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan 
set limits on the use of fi xed-term contracts, 
TABLE 6.5 Stylized characteristics of protecting workers versus protecting jobs
Protecting jobs (employment protection legislation)
Low High
Protecting 
workers (income 
support, active 
labor market 
policies)
High •  Broad coverage of social protection
•  Positive impact on job creation
•  High incidence of short-term and temporary 
employment
•  High adjustment fl ows handled through active and 
passive programs 
•  Some duplication in social protection
•  High cost (regulation plus taxes)
•  Incentives for informal activity and low compliance
•  Encourages tenure and human capital investment
•  Strict regulation has negative eff ects on labor market 
dynamism and protects insiders
Low •  Little protection off ered
•  Positive impact on job creation
•  Precarious employment and weak safety net
•  Unfavorable for productivity growth
•  Little social protection support for outsiders
•  Incentives for informal activity and low compliance
•  Encourages tenure and human capital investment
•  Strict regulation has negative eff ects on labor market 
dynamism and protects insiders
Source: Authors.
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however, and in India, lack of clarity has led 
to widely different interpretations, regula-
tions, and practices across states. Opening 
up the use of fixed-term contracting runs 
the risk of encouraging employers to use this 
form of employment to avoid obligations of 
permanent contracts, but it can also have the 
positive effect of shifting workers from casual 
employment relationships (without contracts) 
to more formal contracted positions. If coun-
tries also reduce some of the procedural and 
fi nancial costs associated with dismissal (as 
discussed below), incentives for avoiding per-
manent contracts in legitimately long-term 
employment relationships could be mini-
mized and formalization of casual employ-
ment could be the more dominant effect. 
Combined with strengthened enforce-
ment, minimum income security provi-
sions for contract workers can be improved. 
Although pools of temporary contract and 
casual workers are generally similar—with 
women and young, old, and poorly educated 
workers overrepresented in both groups—
data from India’s 2010 National Sample 
Survey show that social security covers 
more than twice as many contract workers 
(28 percent) as casual workers (12 percent). 
Indeed, increasing protection of contract 
labor by extending minimum wage and 
social security requirements, as well as regu-
lating the conditions of work, is an impor-
tant objective of India’s Contract Labor 
Act. Noncompliance with requirements for 
minimum wage and social security benefi ts 
is widespread, however (NCEUS 2009). 
Opening up the use of contract labor and 
improving enforcement of basic provisions 
of income security could increase the share 
of workers with effective basic protection. 
Reducing the costs of dismissal is an 
important aspect of reform, but it would need 
to be accompanied by improvements in sup-
port for the unemployed. Many stakeholders 
support reducing severance pay (in Sri Lanka) 
and termination-related procedural costs 
(in India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) in order to 
bring them more in line with international 
arrangements. More universal support would 
require steps to ensure protection of workers 
who currently benefi t from job security rules. 
One option would be to grandfather existing 
benefi ciaries while adjusting provisions for 
new entrants. Another would be to combine 
this measure with some form of income sup-
port in the event of unemployment and active 
programs that help unemployed workers fi nd 
new jobs. 
The design of such income support pro-
grams needs to draw on international expe-
riences while making adjustments for income 
and administrative conditions in South Asia. A 
number of countries, especially in the OECD 
and Latin America, have introduced funded 
unemployment accounts (box 6.1). Some 
countries in Eastern Europe have implemented 
flat unemployment benefits, which are 
relatively simple to implement and monitor. 
Studies by the World Bank have looked at 
design principles, particularly those suited 
for Sri Lanka, a higher-income country with 
some administrative capacity (box 6.2). A key 
design question involves how income support 
programs are fi nanced. If fi nancing is through 
social insurance contributions, countries 
need to be careful that these contributions do 
not increase the tax wedge to the point that 
employment is negatively affected. 
Income protection could be complemented 
by strengthened active labor market pro-
grams, including cost-effective training and 
employment services. Active labor market 
programs can enhance labor supply, create 
labor demand, and improve the function-
ing of the labor market, potentially increas-
ing employment, productivity, and earnings. 
They can be tools for helping unemployed 
workers. However, the evaluation literature 
underscores the fact that programs often do 
not meet their intended objectives and are 
often not cost-effective (see, for example, 
Betcherman and others 2004, 2007). Careful 
design and implementation matter.
If it is responsive to the real needs of the 
labor market, training could potentially 
be an important support for unemployed 
formal sector workers. Training can help 
unemployed workers upgrade their skills 
or learn new ones. However, programs in 
many countries are not responsive to the 
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BOX 6.1 Severance reforms in Austria and Chile
In 2003, Austria converted its severance pay to 
a fully funded, contributory system. The reform 
extended entitlement to workers with short tenures 
and removed obstacles to worker mobility, granting 
full portability and allowing the accumulation of 
benefi ts from the beginning of the employment spell. 
Employers contribute 1.5 percent of the payroll to 
each worker. Resources are held in a central account 
and invested in the capital market. Laid-off workers 
with job tenure of three or more years can withdraw 
accumulations from their accounts or keep them 
and claim them upon retirement. (Workers who 
separate voluntarily and workers with tenures of less 
than three years are denied the right of immediate 
withdrawal.)
In 2002, Chile introduced a new unemployment 
insurance system that combines social insurance 
with self-insurance. Both workers and employers 
pay contributions. Unemployment contributions are 
split between individual accounts and a common 
solidarity account, which is partly fi nanced by the 
government.
This scheme has reduced employers’ severance 
payment obligations, which are being partly repla-
ced by the new unemployment insurance system. 
The system is effectively funded with individual 
accounts managed by a freestanding administra-
tor selected through a competitive tender. To sti-
mulate reemployment, the scheme requires benefi t 
recipients to fi rst draw resources from their own 
accounts; when they deplete these funds, they 
draw from the solidarity account. Withdrawals 
from individual accounts are triggered by separa-
tion from the employer, regardless of the reason. 
Withdrawals from the common fund are triggered 
by insufficient resources in individual accounts. 
Claimants must satisfy the usual eligibility condi-
tions under unemployment insurance (not working 
and being available and searching for a job). They 
are limited to two withdrawals over a five-year 
period. Benefi ts are linked to past earnings, with a 
declining schedule.
Source: Holzmann and others 2011.
occupational demands of the labor market, 
and curricula are often not in tune with the 
requirements of fi rms. International experi-
ence has shown that training and retraining 
programs need to have a strong connection 
to the employer community for design and 
implementation. Establishing such a connec-
tion can be done in various ways, including 
promoting competition among trainers, cre-
ating performance incentives through out-
come-based fees for suppliers, and involving 
employers in the planning of training, the 
supervision of trainers, and the direct provi-
sion of training. 
South Asian countries have a variety of 
training programs for unemployed workers. 
Training is delivered by government train-
ing institutes, enterprises, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), and commercial 
training companies. Many programs, par-
ticularly those funded by governments and 
international donors, seek to improve the 
livelihoods of the poor (these programs are 
discussed in the next section). No serious 
evaluation evidence exists on the impact of 
training programs in the region, but there 
appear to be many obstacles that likely 
affect their success. Many programs are 
more about life skills and basic job readiness 
than vocational skills training (Rahman 
and Shamsunnahar 2011). Another concern 
is the lack of correspondence between the 
training provided and the needs of employ-
ers. To strengthen the relevance of training, 
some countries have initiated public-private 
partnerships. The most prominent example 
is India’s National Skill Development Cor-
poration, which provides gap fi nancing to 
trainers in 21 key manufacturing and ser-
vice sectors.
Employment services have generally been 
found to be a cost-effective active labor 
market policy. These services include job 
brokerage, labor market counseling, testing 
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and assessment, and job search assistance. 
Evaluations from developed and developing 
countries suggest that employment services 
are among the most cost-effective mecha-
nisms, especially under favorable economic 
conditions (Betcherman and others 2004). 
When labor demand is sluggish, employ-
ment services need to be combined with 
other interventions. In developing coun-
tries, where employment agencies are weak 
and most hiring is done through informal 
channels, considerable capacity needs to 
be built for public employment agencies to 
be effective. The market for private employ-
ment agencies also needs to be further 
developed.
There is considerable room for improv-
ing the effectiveness of national employment 
services. India’s national employment service 
runs almost 1,000 employment exchanges, 
which register job seekers, notify them about 
vacancies, collect and disseminate labor 
market information, and provide vocational 
guidance to students and youth. The limited 
information available suggests that most (but 
not all) of these exchanges—like exchanges 
elsewhere—are of limited effectiveness 
(World Bank 2010). In Nepal, the Depart-
ment of Labor and Employment Promotion 
operates skills development offi ces for regis-
tering job applicants and provides labor mar-
ket information. 
BOX 6.2 Unemployment beneﬁ t proposals for Sri Lanka
Analysis by Vodopivec (2004) and Abidoye, Orazem, 
and Vodopivec (2009) identifi es design principles for 
moving to a more effective protection system for the 
unemployed in Sri Lanka. Their proposals take into 
account short-term political economy needs as well 
as the need for a longer-term transition to an unem-
ployment benefi t program. Key elements include the 
following:
•  Starting eligibility conditions and coverage would 
be essentially the same as under the Termination 
of Employment of Workmen Act, with retrenched 
workers in fi rms with more than 14 workers recei-
ving both severance and unemployment benefi ts. 
(Workers whose employers went bankrupt would 
at least get unemployment benefits, even if they 
were unable to get TEWA benefi ts.)
•  The continuing eligibility requirements (other than 
employment in the formal sector) found in OECD 
programs would be eliminated. Recipients would 
be automatically entitled to a maximum amount 
of benefi ts, paid as a lump sum. This feature takes 
into account Sri Lanka’s large informal sector, 
in which workers self-protect through informal 
employment, and the associated challenges and 
costs of monitoring. 
•  Employee or a combination of employer and 
employee contributions would be made to indi-
vidual worker accounts, which are transferrable 
across enterprises, based on a modest level of 
benefi ts (for example, a maximum potential dura-
tion of 6–10 months, with a replacement rate of 
about 50 percent), to take into account the fact 
that potential benefi ciaries would be from better-
off segments of the population. 
•  Workers would be able to access their accounts on 
becoming unemployed.
•  Existing administrative systems—such as the 
Employees Provident Fund network—would be 
used to pay out benefi ts into benefi ciaries’ accounts 
(to address the administrative costs of setting up 
new systems). 
•  Unused funds remaining in individual accounts 
on retirement would be transferred to pension 
accounts. 
•  Employment services would be provided (through 
JobsNet, for example).
In the long run, employers’ obligations under 
TEWA could be fully transformed into their regular 
monthly contributions to the individual accounts of 
workers and coverage extended to all workers cove-
red by the Employees Provident Fund scheme, which 
does not have a size-related threshold. The insurance 
function could be improved through the addition of 
a social insurance component to supplement indivi-
dual savings for workers who exhaust their accounts 
(see the example from Chile in box 6.1).
Sources: Abidoye, Orazem, and Vodopivec 2009; Vodopivec 2004.
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There are promising models and emerg-
ing good practices in the region, all of which 
include a central role for information tech-
nology in reaching jobseekers and employers 
and in providing detailed information for 
employers to review. There has also been an 
increase in job fairs, which enable employers 
and workers to engage directly. Employment 
exchanges in Gujarat, India, and in Sri Lanka 
have strong linkages with private employers. 
In Gujarat, a group of NGOs provides local 
labor market information. 
The state of Karnataka has set up India’s 
fi rst employment exchange based on a pub-
lic-private partnership. Under this arrange-
ment, the state government and TeamLease 
Services, a staffing solutions company, 
have created the Karnataka Employment 
Center. 
In Sri Lanka, JobsNet—which intends to 
set up a wide network of job service centers 
and is one of the largest active labor market 
services in terms of registrations—provides 
intermediation, career guidance and counsel-
ing, and job search assistance. It is fi nanced 
by a commission of employers. It receives 
special funds from the government treasury 
for programs that target youth and inter-
nally displaced people. JobsNet’s board of 
 directors—which has representation from 
government, the private sector, and trade 
unions—is responsible for framing policy pri-
orities and overseeing the implementation of 
programs. Several private fi rms are involved, 
as both job providers and providers of pri-
vate sector perspectives on industry needs. A 
transparent database facilitates monitoring of 
the program. 
Labor market institutions, 
policies, and programs in the 
informal sector
Labor market regulations, institutions, and 
programs are important even in sectors that 
are informal: public works, self-employment 
assistance including microfi nance, and many 
training programs are oriented to workers 
who are outside the formal sector. These and 
other types of programs may be fi nanced or 
delivered by government, donors, NGOs, 
or the private sector. Indeed, South Asia 
has a rich mix of informal worker associa-
tions and trade unions, self-help groups, and 
other membership- and community-based 
organizations, all of which play important 
roles in the labor market (box 6.3). The role 
of labor market institutions and programs 
in the informal sector is of great relevance 
in South Asia, given that this sector employs 
the vast majority of workers. 
The social protection challenge in low-in-
come countries is how to cover the gap in pro-
tection for informal sector workers while not 
constraining incentives for creating income 
from informal activities. This gap covers 
all aspects of the social protection system, 
including activation programs, which pro-
mote opportunities for workers; social and 
self-insurance plans, which prevent declines 
in income from shocks; and safety net pro-
grams, which protect against destitution. 
Countries in South Asia rely on three types 
of programs to support workers in the infor-
mal sector: public works, training, and sup-
port for self-employment/small business.33 
These interventions play both an activation 
(promotion) and a safety net (protection) 
role. There are also efforts to extend social 
insurance (prevention) options to informal 
workers—the thrust of proposals made by 
the National Commission for Enterprises in 
the Unorganised Sector for minimum univer-
sal social security in India (NCEUS 2009), 
for example. The different approaches need 
to be considered in terms of their effects on 
adequacy of protection, effi ciency, function-
ing of the labor market, and productivity.
Public works
Public works have a long history in South 
Asia and continue to be an important instru-
ment for activation, insurance, and safety 
nets in the region. A global review of public 
works programs fi nds that South Asia has 
more participants than any other region (del 
Ninno, Subbarao, and Milazzo 2009). Most 
countries in the region have public works 
programs, which provide cash or food in 
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return for work on projects typically devel-
oped by governments (at the national, sub-
national, or local level); donors; or NGOs. 
Various public works designs exist across 
the region (table 6.6). Public works are an 
important tool in the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan, for example, where programs 
include food-for-work programs, supported 
by the World Food Programme, and the 
National Rural Access Program, which 
reconstructs and maintains rural infrastruc-
ture. Nepal has implemented a range of 
public works activities, some reaching out 
to the remote communities. In some cases 
(for example, the Poverty Alleviation Fund), 
public works have been part of larger pro-
grams with various components. The Rural 
Community Infrastructure Works Program 
is a food-for-work program operated jointly 
with the World Food Programme. Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka have provided some pub-
lic works programs, but public works have 
been used less there than elsewhere in the 
region. 
Bangladesh and India, where public works 
are most prominent, have been using public 
works since the 1950s. Bangladesh has fi ve 
programs that directly create employment 
through public works. The emphasis is on 
the rural poor. The program with the largest 
number of participants is Employment Gen-
eration for the Hard Core Poor, which served 
1.8 million beneficiaries between October 
2009 and May 2010. This program oper-
ates in 16 poor districts, with the objectives 
of creating temporary employment, reducing 
poverty, and contributing to rural develop-
ment. The program provides up to 100 days 
of wage employment to one person per poor 
family. This model is similar in some ways 
to India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA). 
Bangladesh also has a food-for-work pro-
gram, which has the largest budget of all 
public works programs. 
India has had a succession of public works 
programs over the past half century. The 
national and state governments, NGOs, and 
the private sector have all been, and continue 
to be, involved. The most prominent program 
is the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Program, created 
BOX 6.3 Nongovernment players in South Asia’s informal labor market
An impressive range of NGOs provides various 
forms of protection to workers in informal labor 
markets in South Asia, carrying out functions 
that are typically the responsibility of government 
agencies and trade unions in the formal sector. 
Informal worker associations, microfi nance institu-
tions, self-help groups, and other membership- and 
community-based organizations are involved in the 
full range of worker protection activities. They pro-
mote income-generating activities, largely through 
microfinance services and training, and mitigate 
labor market– related shocks, through social and 
self- insurance plans and by advocating for the basic 
rights of informal workers. Programs target the poor 
and vulnerable, often with a focus on women. 
Some of South Asia’s organizations are well 
known internationally. Grameen Bank has been a 
pioneer in microfi nance, offering credit and related 
banking services to the poor in Bangladesh since the 
1970s. BRAC, the largest NGO in the world, has 
an extensive microfi nance operation as part of its 
wide-ranging development activities. India’s Self-
Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) is a leading 
example of an organization devoted to improving the 
security and self-reliance of workers in the informal 
sector. The organization—actually a registered trade 
union—provides a broad range of services, including 
microfi nance and banking services, training, insur-
ance, housing, and lobbying and negotiating for bet-
ter wages and working conditions. 
These (and some other) organizations operate on 
a very large scale and have major impacts. Many 
smaller organizations also provide services to the hun-
dreds of millions of South Asian workers who work 
beyond the reach of labor laws, statutory social insur-
ance programs, and formal collective agreements.
Source: Authors.
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in 2006 under MGNREGA. With its rights-
based design—which guarantees 100 days of 
work annually for any rural household will-
ing to perform unskilled manual labor, at a 
rate no more than the wage specifi ed by the 
scheme—MGNREGA is being watched with 
interest (box 6.4).
MGNREGA has created much more 
employment than other Indian public works 
programs have, but the employment guar-
antee has not been fully implemented. In 
2009/10, the program provided employment 
to about one-fourth of rural households 
(table 6.7). Although the number of days of 
work has been higher than other programs, 
qualitative evidence and fi eld studies indi-
cate that there is substantial unmet demand 
for MGNREGA work in some states.34 
About one-fifth of rural households who 
sought work in the program did not get 
it (table 6.7). This evidence, together with 
field monitoring reports from the Profes-
sional Institutional Network, suggests that 
the employment guarantee does not always 
operate in the way set out in the act.35, 36 
Evidence suggests that MGNREGA ben-
efi ciaries tend to be poor and that the pro-
gram is largely successful in targeting the 
TABLE 6.6 Selected public works programs in South Asia, by country
Country Program Target population Benefi ts
Number of participants 
(latest year available)
Afghanistan Protracted Relief and 
Recovery Operations
(with World Food Programme)
Food insecure in rural areas, 
women, internally displaced 
people, excombatants
Food, basic education, and 
training for girls and women
700,000 
National Rural Access Program Rural unemployed Short-term employment, 
training for excombatants 
1,435,000 labor days
Bangladesh National Service Program Unemployed rural youth 
and women with secondary 
education and above
Wages and training 13,000
Rural Employment 
Opportunities for Public 
Assets
Poor rural female household 
heads
Wages (portion put into savings 
account for future 
self-employment)
5,000
Employment Generation for 
the Hard Core Poor
Rural poor Wages 1,800,000
Rural Employment and Road 
Maintenance Program
Poor rural women Wages (portion put into savings 
account for self-employment in 
future), training, other supports 
for self-employment
10,000
Food for Work Food insecure in rural areas; 
people aff ected by disasters
Food 56,000
India National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Program
Rural poor Wages 41 million rural households 
Swarna Jayanti 
Shahari Rozgar 
Yojana (Urban Wage 
Employment Program)
Urban poor and unemployed Wages 71 million person-days under 
wage program 
Nepal Rural Community 
Infrastructure Works
Food insecure in rural areas Food 30,000 households from 
food-insecure regions
Support Activities for Poor 
Producers of Nepal (SAPPROS)
Households aff ected by 
drought
Food 30,000
Social Safety Net Project Households in chronically 
food-insecure districts
Food 168,000
Pakistan People Works Program Poor and unemployed youth Wages 228,000 
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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BOX 6.4 Key features of India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act
Under India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act, the government guar-
antees 100 days of work per rural household per 
year. Each rural household is entitled to a free job 
card with photographs of all adult members living 
in it. A job card holder may then apply for employ-
ment. The government must provide employment 
within 15 days. If it fails to so, a daily unemploy-
ment allowance has to be paid to the applicant. 
Work must be provided within fi ve kilometers of the 
applicant’s residence. If it is not, the worker receives 
a 10 percent premium over the scheme wage. How 
the household distributes the 100 days among its 
members is entirely the household’s decision. The 
scheme is therefore completely self-targeted and fol-
lows a demand-driven, rights-based approach.
The central government in the union budget of 
2009/10 promised to provide a real wage of Rs 100 
a day (indexed to state-specifi c infl ation) for work 
performed under MGNREGA. Payment is based on 
a rural schedule of rates that depends on the amount 
of work performed by a person. This schedule of 
rates should be set such that able-bodied workers 
should be able to produce the output that could earn 
them the program wage. 
Wages are paid in cash—a departure from previ-
ous public works programs, which typically included 
a food component. In a move to counter corruption 
in forging job cards and tampering with muster 
rolls (registries of eligible households) and improve 
transparency in wage payment, the government 
announced that as of April 1, 2008, all MGNREGA 
wages would be paid directly into worker bank or 
post offi ce accounts, opened free of charge. The idea 
was that separating the implementing agency from 
the payment mechanism would reduce room for 
fraud and harassment. 
Adequate worksite facilities are to be provided. 
To facilitate manual labor, the act mandates provi-
sion of certain basic facilities at the worksite, includ-
ing provision of shade, drinking water, crèches for 
children, and fi rst-aid facilities. 
Several provisions of the act favor the participa-
tion of women. The act mandates that one-third 
of workers be women. It ensures equal wages for 
men and women, with women typically having to 
perform less work to earn the program wage. The 
act also provides for childcare facilities for children 
under six if more than fi ve such children are pres-
ent at a worksite. Together with the provision that 
the job be within fi ve kilometers of the worker’s resi-
dence, these features make MGNREGA work a fea-
sible option for women. 
The act focuses on labor-intensive rural develop-
ment works, with a focus on water and irrigation 
activities as well as connectivity. In addition to the 
list of specifi c types of works allowed under the act, 
there is a provision for other types of works based 
on consultations between the state and the central 
government. Overall, the scheme maintains a 60:40 
labor to capital ratio. Contractors and machines are 
explicitly banned. 
Panchayati Raj institutions (PRIs) and communi-
ties play a central role in implementing MGNREG. 
Unlike previous public works and social protection 
programs, PRI leaders and communities are sup-
posed to identify the list of works through discus-
sions in the gram sabha (village council). PRIs also 
participate in implementation (at least half of works 
by value are to be implemented through the gram 
panchayat [local self-governments in villages and 
small towns]), supervision, and monitoring of works 
(including through social audits). This program fea-
ture represents a signifi cant shift from earlier public 
work schemes which were based on central rules, 
with PRIs involved only in supportive implementa-
tion or distribution functions. 
To implement MGNREG, the act calls for dedi-
cated administrative structure. Unlike previous pub-
lic works programs, there is a specifi c provision of 
administrative costs, which are borne by the center 
and supplemented by states. There is also provi-
sion for a dedicated cadre of MGNREGA offi cials 
and functionaries at the district, block, and gram 
panchayat level responsible for implementing the 
program. 
The act emphasizes accountability, through the 
use of information and communication technology 
tools and reliance on communities and third-party 
monitoring. Management information systems 
have been established to handle administrative data 
on employment generated and assets created at the 
lowest level. Field-based monitoring is  supposed 
to be performed by national field-level monitors 
(continues next page)
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disadvantaged.37 Nationally, households in 
poorer quintiles are considerably more likely 
than households in richer quintiles to be reg-
istered with and report employment through 
the program (table 6.7).38 Rural households 
in the poorest quintile report about twice as 
many days of MGNREGA work as house-
holds in the richest quintile. However, a 
small but nontrivial share of MNREGA 
work opportunities go to better-off house-
holds, and the number of days of work is 
actually higher for participants from richer 
quintiles.39
Administrative data show that women 
account for almost half of work days funded 
by MGNREGA (figure 6.9). Although 
households determine who will participate, 
the program sets targets for the share of 
jobs held by women (box 6.4). To achieve 
this target, MGNREGA encourages states 
and localities to design projects that are 
accessible to women. Scheduled castes and 
tribes are also well represented in the pro-
gram, although there is some evidence that 
their share of total work declined in recent 
years.40
The design of MGNREGA partially 
addresses some of the traditional problems 
with public works, including the lack of com-
munity participation, the leakage of funds 
and related forms of corruption, and the lack 
of monitoring and evaluation (see box 6.4). 
However, an implementation review reveals 
problems with the issuance of job cards; 
manipulation of program data; discrimina-
tion against women, scheduled castes and 
tribes, and people with disabilities; fraudu-
lent payments and anomalies; and slippage 
in execution of work undertaken (NCAER–
PIF 2009). Moreover, concerns remain about 
BOX 6.4 Key features of India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act (continued)
reporting to the central ministry, as well as local 
vigilance and monitoring communities. Some 
states are also using community-based monitoring 
through social audits.
The central government bears 90 percent of the 
total cost of the program. It covers all wage costs 
and three-quarters of the nonwage component 
(materials and most administrative expenses, subject 
to a maximum limit), working on an assumed 60:40 
labor to capital ratio. States are responsible for pro-
viding unemployment allowances should they fail to 
provide work within 15 days of it being demanded. 
This penalty is designed to create a strong incentive 
for the state government to provide work. 
Source: World Bank 2011b. 
TABLE 6.7 Participation in the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Program, 
by consumption quintile, 2010
(percentage of households, except where otherwise indicated)
Quintile
Holds 
MGNREGA 
job card
Reports working in 
MGNREGA program
Sought but did 
not obtain 
MGNREGA work
Mean person 
days for households 
that worked in 
MGNREGA program 
Mean person days 
for all rural 
households 
1 (poorest) 47 34 25 34 11
2 41 30 22 36 11
3 39 27 21 38 10
4 33 23 18 40 9
5 22 14 14 40 6
All 35 24 19 37 9
Source: Authors’ estimates, based on the 2009/10 National Survey Sample.
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the poor quality of the assets created, which 
critics cite as indicative of a primary focus on 
employment generation at the expense of the 
creation of productive assets and improved 
future livelihood opportunities.41 The effec-
tiveness with which MGNREGA has been 
implemented has varied considerably across 
states. 
MGNREGA has potentially important 
effects on the functioning of rural labor mar-
kets. A concern is that it may be affecting 
labor supply by offering wages above what 
would normally be offered for unskilled labor. 
Given the scale of the program, this issue is 
important. Although there is anecdotal evi-
dence that in some areas MGNREGA wages 
may be discouraging labor supply outside the 
program (in, for example, labor-importing 
states like Punjab and Haryana [Wall Street 
Journal 2011]), there is no systematic evidence 
with which to rigorously assess this claim. 
This issue should be carefully analyzed.
Public works can provide an effective 
safety net for poor and vulnerable house-
holds. The evidence both internationally 
and in the region suggests that public works 
can have a positive impact on benefi ciaries’ 
(short-term) income and ability to smooth 
consumption (del Ninno, Subbarao, and 
Milazzo 2009). 
The cost-effectiveness of public works as 
a safety net is enhanced when a number of 
design and implementation-related features 
are incorporated. These features include 
encouraging self- targeting (by setting the 
wage or in-kind rate appropriately); estab-
lishing the optimal labor intensity; respond-
ing to seasonality variations; exhibiting 
 gender sensitivity; maintaining transparency 
and accountability; and ensuring commu-
nity involvement in project selection. (See del 
Ninno, Subbarao, and Milazzo 2009 for an 
elaboration of these points.) 
Less clear is whether and how public 
works can be an effective “activation” strat-
egy that helps workers improve their employ-
ability and income-earning potential. The 
limited evaluations on the effects of public 
works on employability suggest that partici-
pation improves postprogram employment 
chances for about half of participants but 
does not improve earnings (Betcherman and 
others 2004).42 
Could these programs play a greater role in 
enhancing the labor market prospects of par-
ticipants? Some programs attempt to activate 
participants in various ways. One way is to 
combine work with training. Another, used 
in a few programs in Bangladesh, is to allo-
cate a portion of wages to a savings account 
used to support future self-employment. 
The lack of evaluation evidence makes 
it diffi cult to empirically establish whether 
these, or other, design features are asso-
ciated with success. In any event, policy 
makers need to be cautious in choosing the 
 employability-related objectives they estab-
lish for public works programs. Experiment-
ing with different activation designs would 
be worthwhile, especially in urban labor 
markets as the region continues to urban-
ize. Better monitoring and evaluation will 
be essential to identify and then disseminate 
good practices. 
FIGURE 6.9 Participation of women and members of scheduled 
castes and tribes in the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Program, 2006/07–2010/11
(share of person days of employment provided)
Sources: World Bank 2011b and MGNREGA website (http://nrega.nic.in).
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Training
Even under optimistic scenarios of educa-
tional attainment, the majority of prime-age 
and older workers in South Asian countries 
other than Sri Lanka will continue to have 
only primary education or less over the next 
20 years (see chapter 5). Workers with little 
education will likely continue to hold infor-
mal jobs, suggesting both the importance of 
developing initiatives to help workers in the 
informal sector and the challenge of doing 
so with workers with a low skills base. 
Most public training agencies and private 
sector trainers focus on the formal sector. 
Although some initiatives are in place that 
seek to improve the skills of informal work-
ers, until recently they have been ad hoc in 
nature, making it difficult to estimate the 
number of workers they cover.
Many training initiatives do cover infor-
mal sector workers, but the numbers involved 
are small. In Afghanistan, vibrant private 
sector and NGO training activities exist for 
the informal sector, although it is extremely 
diffi cult to assess the size of these efforts. 
In India, several initiatives provide skills to 
the informal sector. Community polytech-
nics provide skills training within commu-
nities, with no entry prerequisites. The Jan 
Shikshan Sansthan (Institute for People’s 
Education) focuses on unskilled workers in 
both rural and urban areas, offering courses 
ranging from candle and incense stick mak-
ing to sewing and embroidery to computers. 
India’s National Institute of Open School-
ing provides skills training to disadvantaged 
youth. The Ministry of Labor and Employ-
ment’s Modular Employable Skills program 
is also geared toward the informal sector. It 
provides vocational training to school leav-
ers, existing workers, graduates of industrial 
training institutes, and others to improve 
their employability by optimally using the 
training infrastructure available in public 
and private institutions and within industry. 
Nepal’s Department of Cottage and Small 
Industries and the Small Industry Develop-
ment Board provide skill-oriented training 
programs and assistance in the operation 
of small enterprises and income-generating 
activities (such as textile manufacturing, tai-
loring, knitting, carpentry, batik painting, 
plumbing, house wiring, and radio and TV 
maintenance). Pakistan’s Training for Rural 
Economic Empowerment program offers 
vocational, entrepreneurial, managerial, and 
literacy/numeracy skills to 2,400 trainees.
Training institutions play a limited role 
in improving skills in the informal sector. 
In most of South Asia, the mandate of for-
mal training institutions includes training 
workers for the informal sector, but evidence 
shows that they are rarely successful in doing 
so. In India, for example, only 12 percent 
of graduates of formal training institutions 
enter the informal sector (World Bank 2007). 
Although similar numbers are not available 
from other countries, anecdotal evidence 
from Bangladesh and Nepal suggests that 
they face a similar situation.
Overall, current efforts through formal 
programs and training institutions are inad-
equate to meet the training needs of the large 
workforce in the informal sector, many of 
whom have never been to school. Because 
of its entry requirements and concentration 
in urban areas, the formal training system is 
not designed to offer skills to low-educated 
people, particularly people in the rural non-
farm sector. 
What distinguishes some informal sector 
employment from formal wage employment 
is the breadth of tasks that need to be per-
formed, especially by self-employed workers, 
who typically need to complete specifi c jobs by 
themselves, from beginning to end (table 6.8). 
These self-employed workers must perform 
a variety of functions, including conduct-
ing initial market surveys, maintaining cost 
and quality control, and handling fi nancing 
and marketing. Technical and business skills 
are important in enhancing productivity and 
the quality of goods and services produced. 
Improving skills will strengthen the ability to 
compete. Complementary services (access to 
credit, technology, markets, and information) 
appear to lead to better outcomes.43 
Reorienting public training institutions is 
probably not the best solution to meeting the 
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training needs of the informal sector. Public 
institutions would fi nd it diffi cult to make the 
changes and serve both the formal and infor-
mal sectors. Major investments would be 
needed to upgrade facilities and equipment, 
develop and retain new staff, and design cur-
ricula and materials to provide the package 
of skills described above. Such improvements 
would require far greater resources than 
are currently provided as public subsidies. 
Increased training fees would not generate 
much income in view of the lack of clear ben-
efi ts of past training and constraints on fam-
ily incomes of the target groups.
Trainers from local NGOs are often more 
effective in providing services that meet the 
needs of the informal economy. Anecdotal 
evidence on the impact of these programs is 
positive, although only a few programs have 
been evaluated. 
One such program that has been carefully 
evaluated is the Afghanistan Skills Develop-
ment Program. In view of its own inability to 
provide services in hard to reach and insecure 
rural provinces, the government contracted 
with NGOs to provide skills training in 
diverse areas (such as business development, 
horticulture, food processing, and livestock) 
to farmers, underemployed youth, and poor 
women. In almost all provinces, people who 
received training reported signifi cantly higher 
wages than those who did not. These positive 
impacts likely refl ect the fact that the NGOs 
are providing tailor-made training catering to 
the needs of the local labor market.
A significant—and undocumented—
amount of training in the informal sector 
occurs through informal apprenticeships and 
learning by doing. The model for this train-
ing is a simple one: an experienced tradesper-
son or master craftsperson teaches a trade to 
younger apprentices and workers.
More young people acquire competence 
through traditional (informal) apprentice-
ships than would be possible through the 
formal education system. Although data for 
South Asian countries are not available, fi g-
ures for other countries with informal sectors 
of similar size suggest that 50–70 percent of 
employees in microenterprises in India may 
TABLE 6.8 Skill requirements in the informal sector
Skill area Training needs
Technical •  General upgrading of technical skills used in trade
•  Improved knowledge of materials used in trade
•  Practical ways to reduce waste of materials
•  Basic reading of designs and drawings
•  Repair of own equipment
•  Skills required for new product designs
•  Understanding of more advanced equipment and improved technologies
•  Basic knowledge of industrial production techniques
Management •  Costing, pricing, and related aspects of fi nancial administration
•  Various aspects of marketing, including rudimentary market research
•  Customer relations, including creation of a customer data base
•  Division of labor in the workshop and personnel management
•  Input stock planning
•  Quality control
•  Workshop layout
•  Legal and fi scal regulations
Literacy and numeracy •  Functional language skills and higher educational attainment (to enhance trainability)
Other •  Knowledge of recent technological developments in the trades
•  Improvement in the teaching skills of master craftspeople (to increase the eff ectiveness of the 
training)
•  Ability to work cooperatively (why and how to work together, informally, or as a trade association) 
Source: Johanson and Van Adams 2004.
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have obtained their skills through apprentice-
ships (World Bank 2007). 
Effective informal apprenticeships have 
several advantages. They provide trainees 
with flexible and dynamic skills, are self-
regulating, cost the government virtually 
nothing, and require little initial skill or 
experience, just a willingness to be trained 
by a master, often a relative. But they also 
have important limitations. They are based 
on traditional technologies and ideas from 
previous generations, and the quality of 
training is only as good as the skills of the 
master and his or her willingness and ability 
to pass them on. The theoretical aspect of 
learning is weak or absent; only the simplest 
skills are learned, resulting in low-quality 
products or services. Apprentices also often 
lack exposure to modern training systems 
and technologies as well as the innovative 
aspect of learning. The range of skills taught 
tends to be narrow, limited to a particular 
product or phase in production. These skills 
may quickly become outdated in rapidly 
changing labor markets. 
Governments may not be the best deliver-
ers of training for informal workers, but they 
have an important role to play as facilitators. 
Instead of delivering training themselves, 
governments could focus on creating an envi-
ronment to support nonpublic providers by 
performing the following roles:
•  Establishing a policy framework (regula-
tions and incentives)
•  Supporting curriculum development, the 
training of trainers, and competency-
based skills testing
•  Stimulating investment through tax 
incentives or fi nancial support, in order 
to increase the capacity and the quality of 
training 
•  Revising apprenticeship acts that are out-
dated and contain regulations that ham-
per enterprise-based training. 
An interesting concept in this regard is 
India’s National Skills Development Cor-
poration (NSDC), set up in 2009 as a non-
profit company to promote private sector 
involvement in skills development.44 NSDC 
will perform three key functions:
•  Stimulate private sector training provid-
ers, by providing seed capital and viability 
gap funding.
•  Facilitate the direct involvement of private 
sector fi rms in the development of train-
ing programs and curricula, in part by 
supporting sector skills councils in prior-
ity sectors 
•  Focus on the informal sector, underprivi-
leged segments of society, and “backward” 
areas, in which residents have not received 
adequate opportunities to acquire skills. 
Although evidence is sparse on effective 
training programs for informal workers, 
some international experiences show some 
promise. One successful approach has been 
Mexico’s Integral Quality and Moderniza-
tion Program (CIMO, later renamed PAC 
and then PAP). Like India, Mexico is domi-
nated by small and medium-size fi rms. The 
program shows that partnerships between 
the public and private sector to provide 
training and a range of support services 
can enhance the productivity of workers in 
the informal sector (box 6.5). The program 
was successful not only because the govern-
ment facilitated the provision of training to 
small and medium-size enterprises but also 
because enterprises were provided with an 
integrated package of services, including 
information on technology, new production 
processes, quality control techniques, mar-
keting, and how to run a business.
Some public-private partnerships have 
improved the quality of informal apprentice-
ships. Their strategy focuses on upgrading 
both the technical and management skills 
and the pedagogical skills of masters. Tra-
ditional apprenticeships can be linked with 
specialized training providers or master 
craftspeople, with the government acting as 
facilitator. There are examples of innovative 
fi nancing as well, as exemplifi ed by Kenya’s 
Jua Kali project, in which vouchers for train-
ing are distributed to informal sector entre-
preneurs (box 6.6). 
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Support for self-employment and 
microenterprises
Interventions that support self-employ-
ment or microenterprise development can 
help informal sector workers improve their 
potential for generating income. Financial 
assistance has been the primary means of 
encouraging income-generating activities in 
most South Asian countries. In fact, since 
the 1970s and the founding of the Grameen 
Bank, South Asia has been at the forefront 
of the microfi nancing movement, which has 
become prominent in international develop-
ment.45 Almost half of the people worldwide 
who use microfi nance services live in South 
Asia (World Bank 2009). In contrast to 
other regions—particularly Latin America, 
where microfinance focuses on linking 
microentrepreneurs to the formal credit 
market— microfi nance in South Asia focuses 
on  reducing poverty. 
Microfinance providers in South Asia 
reach more than 50 million clients.46 Cover-
age of microfi nance services ranges from 0.1 
percent of the population in Afghanistan to 
more than 20 percent in Bangladesh (table 
6.9). Demand for microcredit services far 
outstrips supply. Microfi nance in the region 
has concentrated on women in rural areas, 
although in Bangladesh, and increasingly 
India, the share of urban clients is growing. 
The principle underlying microcredit is 
activation: providing credit to individuals 
without access to formal banking services 
BOX 6.5 Mexico’s proactive approach to supporting small and medium-size enterprises 
Mexico’s Integral Quality and Modernization 
program, known as CIMO, is a good example of 
a comprehensive program that assists small and 
medium-size enterprises and has a sound embedded 
monitoring and evaluation effort. Launched in 1987, 
CIMO was one of several Mexican programs tar-
geting small and medium-size enterprises. It focused 
on training and consulting by specifying its goal to 
improve productivity by increasing training levels, 
helping design training plans, and expanding the 
availability of training. 
The program, administered by the Ministry of 
Labor, was decentralized to the state level in 2002 
under the name Training Support Program (Programa 
de Apoyo a la Capacitación [PAC]) and in 2009 under 
the name Productivity Support Program (Programa de 
Apoyo para la Productividad [PAP]). There was also 
a change in the design of the program: before 2000, 
all training was provided by the private sector; after 
2000, the program used only public providers. With 
an estimated budget of about $75 million, CIMO/
PAC trained about 1.6 million workers between 2001 
and 2006 and benefi ted more than 226,000 fi rms. 
Before its decentralization, one of the unique fea-
tures of CIMO was its comprehensive approach to 
addressing training. Because small and medium-size 
enterprises face multiple constraints, training alone 
may not enhance their productivity. In recognition 
of those constraints, CIMO provided an integrated 
package of training and consulting services through 
independent private instructors (while promoting 
fi rms’ participation in defi ning their own training) 
as well as a range of industrial extension services. 
Another noteworthy feature of the CIMO/PAC 
program is its monitoring, evaluation, and data col-
lection. The collection of panel data allows for rig-
orous evaluation of these interventions. Evaluations 
of CIMO before its decentralization fi nd that it was 
effective in improving the performance of targeted 
companies. Compared with fi rms in a control group, 
CIMO fi rms increased investments in worker train-
ing, had higher rates of capacity use, and were more 
likely to adopt quality control practices. These 
improved outcomes were associated with an increase 
in net productivity of 6–11 percent for CIMO par-
ticipants. Evaluations of the program’s performance 
after 2000 do not fi nd signifi cant effects on fi rms’ 
productivity, although they do find an increase 
in worker training and the use of quality control 
practices.
Sources: López-Acevedo and Tinajero 2010; Tan and López-Acevedo 2005. 
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BOX 6.6 Training informal workers: Kenya’s Jua Kali experience
The Jua Kali (informal sector) project, funded by 
the International Development Association, aimed 
to upgrade skills and technology for about 25,000 
informal sector manufacturing workers, increase the 
access of informal sector entrepreneurs to services, 
and improve the policy and institutional environ-
ment by removing restrictive laws and policies. A 
key feature of the project was a voucher program 
intended to introduce consumer choice, enabling 
informal sector operators to purchase the training 
they want wherever they want. Intermediaries (allo-
cation agencies) were selected by competitive tender 
to market, allocate, and redeem vouchers in a decen-
tralized way throughout Kenya. Allocation agen-
cies received a fee equal to 3 percent of the value of 
vouchers issued. Vouchers could be used for any kind 
of training from any registered training provider.
Over the course of the project in the 1990s and 
the earlier part of the last decade, about 700 train-
ing providers prequalifi ed for providing training. By 
early 2001, some 18,000 training vouchers had been 
issued. 
The impact of the project on benefi ciaries, eval-
uated through two tracer studies, has been highly 
positive. Employment among graduates was 50 
percent higher than employment before training, 
and the income of surviving enterprises increased 
50  percent. According to anecdotal evidence, some 
participants who received a voucher for basic train-
ing paid the full cost of more advanced training. 
Lessons from this project include the following:
•  The use of a voucher mechanism enabled the proj-
ect to stimulate demand for training, technology, 
management, and marketing consultation by micro 
and small enterprises. A supply response was gen-
erated and a training market established to address 
these fi rms’ needs.
•  An unexpected impact of the voucher training pro-
gram was the emergence of skilled craftspeople as 
the leading providers of training. In the fi rst phase 
of the project, 85 percent of all vouchers went to 
pay for their services; only 15 percent went to train-
ing institutions. Entrepreneurs preferred receiving 
training from master craftspeople to training in 
formal institutions. This training was usually well 
adapted to entrepreneurs’ need for short, practical 
training. 
•  Implementation experience underscores the impor-
tance of appropriate management arrangements. 
A project for the private sector is best managed 
by the private sector, with government playing a 
facilitating role.
Source: Johanson and Van Adams 2004. 
TABLE 6.9 Coverage of microﬁ nance in South Asia, by country, 
2009/10
Country
Population 
2010 
(millions)
Number of microfi nance 
borrowers 2009/2010 
(millions)
Percentage
 of 
population
Afghanistan 31 0.3 0.1
Bangladesh 149 30.0 20.2
India 1,225 22.6 1.8
Nepal 30 1.8 6.0
Pakistan 174 1.9 1.1
Sri Lanka 21 2.5 12.0
Sources: Authors, based on data on number of microﬁ nance clients from South Asian 
Microﬁ nance Network (http://www.samn.eu/?q=microﬁ nance-asia) and population ﬁ gures 
from UN 2010. 
Note: Data on number of clients are for 2010 for Afghanistan and Pakistan and 2009 for other 
countries (http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm). With the exception of a few 
limited eﬀ orts to provide microcredit services as part of integrated development projects, Bhutan 
and Maldives do not have speciﬁ c microﬁ nance sectors.
in order to enable them to initiate or expand 
productive activities, usually in the form of 
self-employment or a household enterprise. 
An important limiting factor is the level of 
human capital among entrepreneurs. For this 
reason, adding training, counseling, and vari-
ous forms of technical assistance to microfi -
nance (“microfi nance plus”) is key to promot-
ing business development among small-scale 
entrepreneurs. A key challenge from an acti-
vation perspective is to develop instruments 
that allow providers of microfi nance to iden-
tify the entrepreneurs most likely to benefi t 
from credit or associated subsidies. 
The institutional structure of microfi nance 
programs varies widely. NGOs, nonprofit 
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microfi nance institutions, and community-
based organizations, including cooperatives, 
account for most of the outreach of fi nancial 
services available to the poor in the region. 
The retail operations of development and 
commercial banks; post office banks; and, 
less often but increasingly, insurance com-
panies provide a small amount of additional 
lending services. Commercial banks are less 
important to microfi nance than they are in 
some other regions, such as Latin America, 
although in all countries except Afghanistan 
and Bangladesh, microfi nance does have sig-
nifi cant commercial bank linkages (EDA and 
APMAS 2006).47 
This diverse set of institutional arrange-
ments of microfinance programs is mir-
rored by a diversity of delivery systems. The 
Grameen model refers to a methodology fi rst 
applied by the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh. 
Borrowers have to be a part of a small group 
that gets together with 7–10 other groups 
from the same village or neighborhood, 
forming a “center.” By aggregating liabilities 
within each center, this model reduces the 
likelihood of default. This delivery system is 
the dominant methodology in Bangladesh. 
All retail development banks in Nepal, some 
institutions in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
and some leading microfi nance institutions in 
India also use this system. 
The self-help group is the main approach 
to microfi nance in India. It is based on the 
principle of revolving members’ own savings. 
Savings thus precedes borrowing by mem-
bers. Groups, made up of 15–25 members, 
operate a revolving fund that is supplemented 
with external fi nancial assistance. 
Another mode of delivery is cooperative 
programs, in which microfi nance institutions 
provide fi nancial services to individual cli-
ents organized into credit and savings coop-
eratives. All borrowers need to be members 
of the cooperative. Sri Lanka, with its large 
number of cooperative banks, relies heavily 
on this approach. India and Nepal have simi-
lar initiatives.
One of the main issues facing microfi-
nance institutions relates to financial sus-
tainability. A small number of gradually 
more efficient institutions account for a 
large share of the market; the majority of 
institutions are relatively weak, sustained 
mainly by the high level of subsidies provi-
ded by donors or governments (World Bank 
2009). In  Bangladesh, three of the top four 
microfinance  institutions—ASA, BRAC, 
and  Grameen Bank—show positive returns. 
These organizations account for some 11 mil-
lion of an estimated 16 million clients. 
India has a large number of loss-making 
microfi nance institutions and relatively few 
viable ones. Political and social restrictions 
have inhibited many microfinance institu-
tions from setting actuarially neutral interest 
rates, which affects their performance. 
In Pakistan, the provision of microfi nance 
on a sustainable basis is particularly challeng-
ing, partly as a result of substantial pressure 
from government offi cials, elected represen-
tatives, and the press to charge low interest 
rates. To date, the only microfi nance institu-
tion that has become fully sustainable is the 
Kashf Foundation. 
In Sri Lanka, the schemes under the 
 Samurdhi program offer subsidized inter-
est rates. They face default rates of 30–50 
percent. 
South Asia has numerous programs invol-
ving not only microfi nance but other forms 
of assistance to support self-employment and 
microenterprise development. Table 6.10 lists 
some of these programs.
Both internationally and within the region, 
there is little evidence on the impact on 
employability and earnings of programs that 
support self-employment.48 The few studies 
that exist suggest that the provision of ser-
vices to support entrepreneurs often results 
in higher rates of business success and higher 
earnings (Betcherman and others 2004, 
2007). In general, a combination of access to 
credit and support services, such as counsel-
ing, seems to have the best outcomes. 
Few evaluations use rigorous methods or 
try to calculate cost-benefi t ratios. One excep-
tion is a recent evaluation of a Sri Lanka pro-
gram that uses training and fi nancial support 
to encourage women to create and expand 
businesses (box 6.7).
2 5 8   M O R E  A N D  B E T T E R  J O B S  I N  S O U T H  A S I A  
TABLE 6.10 Selected programs supporting self-employment and microenterprises in South Asia, by country
Country/program Institutional set-up Target population Services
Bangladesh
Vulnerable Group Development 
for Ultra Poor
Directorate of Women’s Aff airs; funded 
by the European Union
Poor, landless women Subsistence allowance, training
Employment Guarantee Scheme 
for Hard-Core Poor in Northern 
region
Bangladesh Rural Development Board 
(BRDB)
Poor Training assistance in 
organizing income-generating 
activities 
Urban-Based Marginal Women’s 
Development Agency
Jatio Mahila Sangstha Poor, assetless women Training, fi nancial assistance
India
Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar 
Yojana
(now the National Rural 
Livelihoods Mission)
Ministry of Rural Development Poor families in rural 
areas
Financial assistance, training, 
support for self-help groups 
Swarna Jayanti Shahari Rojgar 
Yojana
Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty 
Alleviation
Urban unemployed or 
underemployed
Financial assistance, training, 
support for self-help groups
Prime Minister’s Employment 
Generation Programme
Khadi and Village Industries Commission Unemployed youth Credit and subsidies
Rajiv Gandhi Udyami Mitra 
Yojana
Ministry of Micro, Small, and Medium 
Enterprises 
Potential fi rst- generation 
entrepreneurs
Technical assistance, counseling
Nepal
Great Himalayan Trail 
Development Program
Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation, in 
partnership with Stichting Nederlandse 
Vrijwilligers (a Dutch development 
organization), local authorities, industry 
associations, and communities
Local communities Skills training, support for 
entrepreneurs
Production Credit for Rural 
Women
Ministry of Local Development, various 
banks; funded by the International 
Fund for Agriculture Development 
Poor women Microcredit
Rural Self-Reliance Fund Nepal Rastra Bank Poor and specifi ed 
vulnerable groups
Wholesale provision of 
microcredit
Microenterprise Development 
Programme
Ministry of Industry, multilateral donors Poor and specifi ed 
vulnerable groups
Training, microcredit
Poverty Alleviation Fund Board reports to prime minister, 
community-based organizations, and 
NGOs; funded by International 
Development Association
Rural poor and 
vulnerable groups
Training, technical assistance
Development Project Service 
Center (DEPROSC) Nepal 
Executive director reports to seven-
member board; implementation follows 
guidelines of Nepal Rastra Bank
Poor women Microcredit, training, 
entrepreneurial development
Pakistan
Rural Support Programs National and provincial Rural Support 
Programs 
Poor people, especially 
women
Microcredit, microinsurance, 
training
Khushali Bank Created under Rural Support Programs; 
four banks are shareholders
Poor people, particularly 
women
Microcredit
Khasf Foundation Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund, U.K. 
Department of International 
Development, and Agha Khan 
Foundation provided core funding
Women from low-
income households
Microcredit
(continues next page)
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BOX 6.7 Business training and ﬁ nancial support for self-employed women in Sri Lanka 
Self-employment is a potentially important form of 
employment for women in South Asia. However, 
most women-owned enterprises are small and barely 
generate a subsistence-level income for their owners. 
Policy efforts have sought to enhance the likelihood 
of women owning small businesses and increase the 
earnings of women business owners. 
Business training programs are a popular policy 
used for this purpose. Preliminary results from a 
randomized experiment in Sri Lanka offer insight 
into whether such training works and whether it can 
complement fi nancial assistance. 
The study worked with two random samples, 
of about 600 women each. One sample included 
women operating subsistence enterprises. The second 
included women who were out of the labor force but 
interested in starting a business. Both samples were 
randomly divided into three groups: a control group; 
a group invited to attend a seven- to nine-day business 
training course based on the International Labour 
Organization’s “Generate, Start, and Improve Your 
Business” programs; and a group invited to receive 
this training and receive a cash grant of Rs 15,000 
($130) upon completing the training.
Business training sped up the creation of new 
businesses, but it did not ultimately lead to more 
new businesses. Women who were out of the labor 
force were more likely to have a business 4 months 
and 8 months after the training program, but by 16 
months the control group had the same rate of busi-
ness ownership. Receiving cash in addition to train-
ing led to even larger short-run effects but no differ-
ence in business ownership after 16 months. 
Although training did not seem to lead to more 
businesses, it did result in more successful businesses 
for the sample of women who had been out of the 
labor force. Firms created by women who received 
training earned higher profi ts 16 months later than 
fi rms created by women in the control group. These 
results suggest some success for business training 
among women interested in opening a business who 
currently do not work.
For women already operating businesses, training 
alone led to some improvement in business practices 
(they were more likely to implement some of the ideas 
taught in the training course), but it did not lead to 
any improvement in profi ts, sales, or capital stock. In 
contrast, the combination of business training and 
the cash grant led to large and signifi cant improve-
ments in business performance for these enterprises, 
with profi ts rising 36–50 percent and capital stock 
increasing by about the amount of the grant. As pre-
vious work with female microenterprises fi nds little 
return to capital alone, the authors of this study 
argue that the results suggest important complemen-
tarities between training and access to capital.
Together with other recent experiments with 
women-owned microenterprises (Bruhn and Zia 
2011; Gine and Mansuri 2011), these results suggest 
that it is much easier to get women to start enter-
prises than it is to get these enterprises to grow. Only 
1–2 percent of the enterprises started by women 
who underwent business training employed any 
paid workers who were not family members. Female 
self-employment is thus largely a means to increase 
income and provide a living for enterprise owners 
themselves rather than a means of generating addi-
tional jobs for others.
Source: de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruﬀ  2011.
TABLE 6.10 (continued)
Country/program Institutional set-up Target population Services
Sri Lanka
Samurdhi Authority Ministry of Economic Development Low-income groups Microcredit
Small Enterprise Development 
Division
Ministry of Youth Aff airs Youth, especially 
dropouts
Microcredit
Ministry of Labour Relations Unemployed Microcredit
Sarvodaya Economic Enterprise 
Development Services
SEEDS (NGO), 
donors
Poor people, women 
and girls, migrants Microcredit
Source: Authors’ compilation, based on country research on active labor market programs.
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There is more evaluation evidence on 
microfi nance programs. The focus of these 
studies has typically been on the antipov-
erty effects and effects on microenterprise 
creation and survival, but studies have also 
considered other outcome variables (for 
example, health, education, empowerment 
of women). Longer-run labor market out-
comes (for example, employability and earn-
ings) have been included less often. 
There is a some controversy over the impact 
of microfi nance, but, on balance, evaluations 
point to positive effects.49 Findings are het-
erogeneous, with welfare effects ranging 
from nonexistent to signifi cant (Armendáriz 
de Aghion and Morduch 2004). Many evalu-
ations use fl awed methodology, with selec-
tion bias and other issues confounding results 
(EDA and APMAS 2006). 
Many concerns can be addressed with 
random experimental designs, which tend 
to be rare in the study of microfi nance. One 
exception is a randomized evaluation in 
Hyderabad that found that the opening of 
branches of a microfinance institution had 
signifi cant and positive impacts on business 
start-ups and the profi tability of existing busi-
nesses, but no impact on average household 
consumption. The results led the authors to 
conclude that “microcredit therefore may not 
be the ‘miracle’ that is sometimes claimed on 
its behalf, but it does allow households to 
borrow, invest, and create and expand busi-
nesses” (Banerjee and others 2009, p. 21).
Extension of social insurance 
to informal workers 
A key question for labor market policy in 
South Asia is whether social insurance 
models can be extended to protect infor-
mal workers from risks related to income 
and employment and to provide a vehicle 
for pension, disability, and health coverage. 
Effi cient programs with adequate benefi ts 
and wide coverage play an important pre-
vention function, by reducing the vulner-
ability of workers and their families to the 
negative impact of various shocks. They 
also fi ll a promotion function, by provid-
ing workers with more room to maneu-
ver in making human capital investments 
and transitioning to better employment 
opportunities. 
Bismarkian social insurance systems linked 
to formal employment relationships have lim-
ited scope in South Asia. In the absence of 
extensive formalization, the key question is 
whether the formal social insurance model 
can be modifi ed and adapted to the realities 
of informal sector workers in the region. 
Plans to extend social insurance to infor-
mal workers need to take into account pos-
sible effects on the incidence of informal-
ity itself. Employers may be more likely to 
seek ways to opt out of formal contributory 
systems if they know employees can access 
social protection in other ways. Depend-
ing on how programs are fi nanced, workers 
themselves may prefer to remain informal. 
Although the extension of social insurance 
(for example, for pensions, health, and dis-
ability) would address the vulnerability 
problem associated with informality, other 
problems, including the fi scal and produc-
tivity disadvantages of large informal sec-
tors, would remain. Thus, although there 
would be benefi ts to extending social protec-
tion coverage beyond the formal sector, the 
tradeoffs should not be ignored.
Various social insurance schemes for 
informal workers have been introduced in the 
region. To encourage informal sector partici-
pation, the new pension law in  Maldives pro-
vides for matching contributions for infor-
mal sector workers such as fi shers. Sri Lanka 
has voluntary pension schemes for infor-
mal farmers, fi shers, and the self- employed. 
NGOs also provide microinsurance schemes 
that protect against specifi c risks. 
India has been active in trying to extend 
social insurance to informal sector work-
ers. Numerous welfare funds and insurance 
schemes exist nationally, at the state level (in, 
for example, Kerala and Tamil Nadu), and 
by occupation (covering, for example, work-
ers making hand-rolled cigarettes). Informal 
worker associations, self-help groups, and 
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other organizations have also been active in 
this area (IHD 2011).
Proposals have been made—by, for 
example, the National Commission for 
Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector 
(NCEUS)—to institute a national minimum 
social security. The NCEUS proposal sought 
to guarantee minimum coverage for health, 
death and disability, and pension benefi ts 
for all workers, organized and unorga-
nized, earning less than Rs. 6,500 in 2005. 
Benefi ts were to have been fi nanced through 
equal contributions, at least notionally, from 
government, employers, and employees. In 
fact, the burden would have been greatest 
on government, as it would have had to 
cover the employer share when an employer 
could not be identified and the employee 
share in the case of the poor. Although the 
NCEUS proposal was the spark behind the 
Unorganised Workers Social Security Act of 
2008, that bill was much more modest in 
scope (IHD 2011).50
The limited scope of the Unorganised 
Workers Social Security Act underlines the 
diffi culties of implementing an overarching 
policy framework for social insurance in the 
informal sector. Given the heterogeneity of 
informal workers, it seems more likely that 
broader coverage could be achieved by creat-
ing and expanding different programs with 
different design features—programs that run 
alongside existing contributory programs for 
the formal sector.51 
The potential for extending social insur-
ance to the informal sector depends heavily 
on fi nancing and the degree to which indi-
viduals are able to contribute. Workers in the 
informal sector fall into three broad catego-
ries, with the fi rst accounting for only a very 
small share of the population:
•  High-income individuals (for example, 
professionals and large landowners), who 
are able to protect themselves through 
savings and insurance schemes already 
available in the market
•  Middle-income individuals, who may be 
able to benefi t from insurance and pen-
sion coverage and could afford to pay 
for a signifi cant portion of the required 
contributions
•  Low-income individuals, who are unable 
to make any contributions beyond a very 
marginal level.
Given the high prevalence of individuals 
with no or limited capacity to contribute, cov-
erage can be expanded only if governments 
are willing to provide signifi cant subsidies. 
The level of subsidies needs to be determined 
in light of the mandate of the programs, 
and the subsidies need to be allocated and 
fi nanced in ways that minimize labor market 
distortions. 
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FIGURE 6A.2 Trade union membership in Pakistan, 1999–2008
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Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics Pakistan 2011. 
Note: Trend line indicates three-year moving average of membership in reporting unions.
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FIGURE 6A.1 Trade union membership in India, 1987–2006
Source: Indiastat.com.
Note: Trend line indicates three-year moving average of membership in workers’ unions submitting returns in India. 
Annex 6A Additional tables and ﬁ gures on labor market regulations 
and institutions
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FIGURE 6A.3 Trade union membership in Sri Lanka, 1987–2006
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Source: Department of Labour, Sri Lanka. 
Note: Fluctuation in total membership is a result of poor reporting by unions. Trend line indicates three-year moving average.
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FIGURE 6A.4 Percentage of unionized workers in India, by employment status and sector, 1994 and 2000
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FIGURE 6A.5 Job creation and destruction ﬂ ows in Sri Lanka and selected groups of countries
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Source: Gunatilaka and Vodopivec 2010 (based on 2003 Sri Lanka urban enterprise survey using employment data for three years in the early 2000s).
Note: Transition economies include Estonia (1997–2000), Hungary (1994–2000), Latvia (1994–99), Romania (1994–2000), and Slovenia (1992–2000). 
Developed countries include Canada (1985–97), Denmark (1982–94), France (1991–96), Finland (1989–98), Germany (1978–99), Italy (1988–93), Portu-
gal (1984–94), the Netherlands (1994–97), the United Kingdom (1987–98), and the United States (1989–97). Developing countries include Argentina 
(1997–2001) and Mexico (1987–2000). Job reallocation is the sum of job creation and job destruction, where job creation is the sum of new jobs in ﬁ rms 
that expanded during the previous year, and job destruction is the sum of employment losses in ﬁ rms that contracted. Another measure, net employment 
growth, is the diﬀ erence between the job reallocation and net employment growth. Using these measures, excess job reallocation computes the diﬀ erence 
between job reallocation and net employment growth. This indicator measures the extent of job ﬂ ows over and above what is needed to accommodate a 
needed change in net employment; hence, it reﬂ ects the intensity of enterprise restructuring. All variables are expressed as a percentage of the average of 
the stocks at the beginning and end of the period.
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FIGURE 6A.6 Tax wedges in South Asian and international comparator countries
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FIGURE 6A.7 Ratio of minimum wage to median casual and formal sector wage, by states in India, 2008
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FIGURE 6A.7 Ratio of minimum wage to median casual and formal sector wage, by states in India, 2008 
(continued)
Sources: Authors, based on data on minimum wages and state GDP per capita from IndiaStat.com and data on wages from labor force survey.
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TABLE 6A.1 Selected aspects of employment protection in India
Type of employment protection Legal provisions
Procedures for individual notifi cation and dismissal •  Written notice to employee
•  Employee given suffi  cient warning and opportunity to respond
•  Employers with at least 100 workers must give government 60 days’ notice before 
dismissing worker and await its approval before doing so 
Notice period for individual dismissals •  Workers small fi rms with 4 or more years of tenure: 1 month
•  Workers at large fi rms with at least 20 years of tenure: 3 months
Severance pay for individual dismissals •  Workers with 4 or more years of tenure: 2 months
•  Workers with at least 20 years of tenure: 10 months
Economic reason as valid reason for dismissal •  Permitted, but in absence of agreement between worker and employer, last person to 
be employed in category should be one dismissed
Maximum time to make complaint of unfair dismissal •  No time limit
Compensation for unfair dismissal •  Court orders reinstatement in most cases (with or without back pay)
•  In extreme cases, court may order compensation instead of reinstatement
•  Typical compensation for employee with 20 years of tenure is 42 months’ wages
• Typical three to four years for labor courts to settle disputes and make award 
Defi nition and notifi cation requirements or additional 
procedures for collective dismissals
• No special regulations or additional costs
Valid cases for fi xed-term contracts • Limited for work of temporary nature likely to be fi nished within a limited time
•  Some industries (information technology, business process outsourcing); export 
processing zones, and special economic zones in some states are exempted
Maximum number of fi xed-term contracts •  No limits on number of renewals or maximum duration
Temporary agency work •  Allowed in noncore activities; prohibited in some industries or fi rms
•  No limits on durations or renewals
•  Contractors and fi rms with more than 20 employees required to obtain license 
(renewable every 12 months) and pay fees before engaging contract workers
•  Contractors required to report changes in number of workers or conditions of work to 
licensing authority
•  Wages and conditions of work of contract worker must be same as direct employees 
performing same type of work
Source: Authors’ compilation, based on information in OECD 2009.
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TABLE 6A.2 Job creation and destruction rates in large manufacturing ﬁ rms in India, by employment type, 
2001–08
(percent)
Type of 
worker/year
Job creation 
rate
Job destruction 
rate
Net job 
growth rate
Job reallocation 
rate
Job excess 
reallocation rate
Contract workers
2001 15.3 18.7 –3.3 34.0 30.7
2002 19.1 19.1 0.0 38.2 38.2
2003 18.2 16.0 2.2 34.1 32.0
2004 21.3 16.2 5.2 37.5 32.3
2005 21.4 14.5 6.9 35.9 29.0
2006 24.8 14.5 10.3 39.3 28.9
2007 22.9 14.0 8.9 36.8 28.0
2008 23.6 13.8 9.9 37.4 27.5
Total 24.5 15.6 8.9 40.1 31.2
Noncontract workers
2001 6.5 10.1 –3.6 16.6 13.0
2002 7.6 10.1 –2.4 17.7 15.3
2003 7.5 9.0 –1.5 16.5 15.0
2004 8.2 10.0 –1.8 18.2 16.4
2005 9.5 7.9 1.6 17.4 15.8
2006 9.7 7.9 1.8 17.6 15.8
2007 11.5 7.4 4.1 18.9 14.8
2008 11.9 6.7 5.2 18.6 13.4
Total 9.1 9.8 –0.7 18.9 18.1
All employees
2001 6.6 10.2 –3.6 16.7 13.2
2002 7.8 9.8 –2.0 17.7 15.6
2003 7.9 8.8 –0.9 16.7 15.8
2004 8.9 9.3 –0.4 18.2 17.8
2005 10.1 7.4 2.7 17.6 14.8
2006 10.9 7.1 3.8 18.0 14.3
2007 12.2 7.0 5.2 19.2 14.0
2008 13.0 6.6 6.4 19.6 13.3
Total 9.8 8.6 1.2 18.4 17.1
Source: Authors, based on data from various rounds of the Annual Survey of Industries.
Note: See ﬁ gure 6A.5 for deﬁ nitions.
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TABLE 6A.3 Minimum wage policies in South Asia, by country
Country
Minimum wage 
setting Coverage
Latest available 
minimum wage 
Year of last update of 
minimum wage
Afghanistan One minimum wage set for 
public sector workers.
Public sector workers Af 4,000 a month 2009
Bangladesh Three-person national minimum 
wage board convenes every fi ve 
years to set minimum wages by 
industry.
Minimum wage does not 
apply to categories of workers 
excluded from general coverage 
of the Labor Act of 2006 under 
§1(4) (for example government 
offi  ces, small establishments run 
by family members).
Sectors not covered by 
industry-specifi c minimum 
wages: Tk 1,800 a month 
Garment industry: Tk 3,000 
a month
Shrimp industry: Tk 2,510 
a month
Garment industry: 2010
Shrimp industry: 2009
Bhutan Ministry of Labor and Human 
Resources, in consultation with 
the government, 
employers, and employees, 
fi xes minimum wage or wages.
National coverage Nu 3,000 a month 2010
India Minimum wage set at state 
level by scheduled sectors and 
occupations.
Workers in sectors/occupations 
categorized as scheduled sector/
occupation in a particular state 
National minimum wage 
(nonbinding): Rs 115 a day
2011
Maldives One minimum wage for public 
sector.
Public sector is covered. 
Employment Act of 2008 provides 
a mechanism to establish a 
minimum wage in the private 
sector.
Rf 2,600 a month 2008
Nepal Government sets monthly 
minimum wage set for four skill 
categories (unskilled, semiskilled, 
skilled, and high skilled). Daily 
minimum wage set for daily 
wage workers. Separate 
provisions made on industry 
basis. 
Private sector workers and 
employees in enterprises of 
more than 10 workers and 
enterprises operating in 
industrial districts established 
by the government.
Minimum monthly wage for 
unskilled workers: NPR 6200
Minimum daily wage: NPR 231
 2011
Pakistan Federal government sets 
minimum wages for unskilled 
workers at the national level, 
through an ordinance. Provincial 
governments then adjust federal 
minimum wage to account for 
regional diff erences and skill 
levels.
Workers in agricultural sector 
and people employed by federal 
or provincial governments are 
not covered by minimum wage 
legislation.
PRs 7,000 a month 2010
Sri Lanka Minister of Labour may set 
up wages boards by trade 
(occupation), sector, or region to 
recommend minimum wages by 
grade levels of jobs within  each 
category.
Bases on scope of wage boards. Agriculture (average for 
plantation sector): 
SL Rs 235.15 a day
Manufacturing:
SL Rs 247.04 a day
Construction: 
SL Rs 292.50 a day
2009
Sources: Authors, based on data from ILO database; U.S. Department of State; national labor force and household surveys.
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Notes
 1.  Labor market and social protection inter-
ventions often straddle these functions. For 
example, public works can play both an acti-
vation and a safety net role. This chapter does 
not address wider aspects of social protection, 
such as the provision of pension benefi ts and 
health care services, except in terms of how 
they may affect job creation and the function-
ing of the labor market.
 2.  As discussed in this chapter, voluntary social 
security schemes have begun to emerge for 
informal sector workers, but they cover only 
a small share of them. The various schemes in 
India are estimated to cover less than 10 per-
cent of the unorganized labor force (World 
Bank 2011b). In Sri Lanka, voluntary social 
security schemes cover an estimated 0.5 mil-
lion members of the workforce of roughly 
7.5 million (Gunatilaka 2011). 
 3.  For example, India’s 1948 Factories’ Act, one 
of the main laws governing working conditions, 
applies to manufacturing establishments with at 
least 10 workers if the establishment uses power 
and at least 20 workers if it does not. See table 
6.4 for coverage of laws that protect workers 
against redundancy in South Asian countries.
 4.  IHD (2011) and NCEUS (2009) provide 
estimates of the intended coverage of vari-
ous labor laws in India. They estimate that 
12 million workers were covered by the 
Factories Act in 1999/2000. The Ministry of 
Labor estimates coverage (generally based on 
enterprises that have submitted returns under 
the act) of 8.8 million workers the same year. 
The fi rst estimate translates into 3 percent of 
the total workforce; the second translates into 
2.2 percent of the total workforce. Together, 
they suggest coverage of about three-quarters 
of the workers intended to be covered. 
 5.  The possible exception is Nepal, where esti-
mates of union density in the private sector 
range from about 29 percent of the work-
force (for fi rms in the formal sector surveyed 
in the 2009 enterprise surveys) to 75 percent 
of the formal work force in 2010 (http://
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/). In Sri Lanka, 
the corresponding estimates are 11 percent of 
the nonagricultural private labor force and 
26 percent of the workforce of fi rms included 
in the 2004 enterprise survey sample. 
 6.  Data are typically based on returns fi led 
by unions. Unions may not fi le returns in a 
timely manner or not at all. They can there-
fore provide an unreliable picture especially 
on trends. Statistics cited in the 2010 U.S. 
Department of State Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices at http://www.state
.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/ give a similar picture— 
with estimated union membership of 13–15 
million in India, and estimated union densi-
ties of approximately 10 percent in Sri Lanka, 
under 1 percent in Nepal, 3 percent in Pakistan, 
and 4 percent in Bangladesh. In India, where 
household data for 2010 provide information 
on union membership, the estimated density 
is higher (11 percent) (see annex fi gure 6A.4), 
but the fi gure includes self-employed workers 
and members of associations of owners and 
other associations whose objective is to look 
after the interests of their members. 
 7.  Median monthly earnings in for wage work-
ers with social security were Rs. 5,332 in India 
(2010), NPR 5,128 in Nepal (2008), and SL 
Rs7,881 in Sri Lanka (2008). These earnings 
exceeded those of workers without coverage by 
a factor of 3.1 in India, 1.9 in Nepal, and 1.7 in 
Sri Lanka. Wage workers who were members 
of unions had mean/median monthly earnings 
that were about 2.5 times those of nonunion 
members in India (National Sample Survey 
1999/2000). Heltberg and Vodopivec (2004) 
estimate that the earnings of wage workers in 
Termination of Employment of Workmen Act 
(TEWA) jobs were 11–12 percent higher than 
those of workers in informal jobs in 1999/2000 
after taking into account differences in educa-
tion and other characteristics. 
 8.  See http://www.ilo.org/declaration/lang--en/
index.htm.
 9.  Afghanistan has signaled its intention to ratify 
its three conventions that are outstanding, but 
the government has indicated the need for ILO 
assistance to ensure and support this process. 
Nepal has delayed ratifi cation of C.87, citing 
political instability and the period of political 
transition as reasons for delay. Bangladesh iden-
tifi es diffi culties in addressing the large infor-
mal sector where child labor is engaged as an 
obstacle in ratifying C. 138 in 2001. India has 
cited various issues complicating ratifi cation of 
the collective bargaining and freedom of asso-
ciation and child labor conventions. For details 
on ratifi cation status by country, see http://www
.ilo.org/declaration/
10.  In Afghanistan, India, and Nepal, the basic 
legal provisions on freedom of association 
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and collective bargaining are provided in the 
constitution as well as in national legislation; 
in India, judicial decisions have also upheld 
these rights. In Bangladesh, the Labor Act 
of 2006 not only establishes minimum age 
requirements, it also strengthens the labor 
administration for enforcement. In addition 
to the constitution, about a dozen pieces of 
legislation provide the basic legal provisions 
on child labor in India. In Nepal, the prin-
ciple of and rights to freedom of association 
and collective bargaining are enshrined in the 
2007 interim constitution as well as national 
legislation. 
11.  See http://www.ilo.org/declaration/ and http://
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/. 
12.  Particularly relevant are the rules governing 
whether and how workers can be dismissed 
for “economic” reasons (shrinking markets, 
increasing competitiveness, and so forth). 
This class of terminations stands in contrast to 
dismissals for “noneconomic” reasons, such 
as job performance.
13.  Freeman (1993) characterizes these two per-
spectives as the “institutionalist” and “distor-
tionist” views. For an updated interpretation, 
see Freeman (2009).
14.  Cross-country comparisons of employment 
protection rules need to be viewed with some 
caution, especially because of the impor-
tance of enforcement, which is diffi cult to 
take into account. National settings can 
matter as well. The Doing Business database 
includes almost all employment protection 
legislation. Its indicators are based primar-
ily on laws and regulations, with country 
scores calculated by local experts. See www
.doingbusiness.org for scores and method-
ological details. 
15.  The main sources of uncertainty related to 
the legislation arise from interpretation and 
court judgments on what constitutes “core” 
or “perennial” activities, for which contracts 
are prohibited, and pressure to absorb con-
tract labor into permanent employment. 
Andhra Pradesh has relaxed the use of con-
tract labor in “core” activities; Goa has 
tightened the prohibition of contract labor in 
“noncore” activities. 
16.  The relevant legislation is the West Pakistan 
Industrial and Commercial Employment 
(Standing Orders) Ordinance of 1968. Fixed-
term contracts can be used only in “objec-
tively defi ned cases.”
17.  In Sri Lanka, prior approval is necessary 
only when the worker does not consent in 
writing to the lay-off. This is different from 
India, where Chapter VB of the Industrial 
Dispute Acts requires establishments with 
100 or more workers to gain prior approval 
from government even if workers give their 
consent. Under Chapter VA of the act, which 
applies to enterprises employing 50 or more 
workers, employers are obligated to inform 
the government of dismissals rather than ask 
for their consent. The clause does not specifi -
cally mention worker consent. However, if 
workers do not consent, they resort to dis-
pute resolution.
18.  Employers need the authorization of the com-
missioner of labor for each intended layoff if 
the employee worked for at least 180 days 
the year before termination and does not give 
written consent to the termination. The com-
missioner has the power to grant or refuse 
permission to terminate services.
19.  The level of pay is determined by two vari-
ables: years of service with the employer 
(past service) and the age of the worker 
(denied future service). It is relatively high for 
young workers and those with short service, 
exceeding the average for all the regions of 
the world. For older workers and those with 
long service, the severance pay determined by 
the formula is more in line with international 
practice (Vodopevic 2004). 
20.  “Nonperformance” is a generic problem 
with unfunded severance systems: employ-
ers’ liabilities rise when they are likely to be 
in fi nancial diffi culty. This problem becomes 
most acute during recessions. During the 
recent economic crisis, labor authorities 
took unprecedented steps to enable fi rms to 
weather the crisis. Employers were allowed 
to temporarily lay off workers for a period 
of three months on half pay on application to 
and approval by the commissioner of labor. 
If after three months the employer was still 
unable to resume operations as normal, he or 
she was required to apply for a second tem-
porary lay-off (Gunatilaka 2011). 
21.  The OECD measure calculates strictness of 
employment protection legislation based on 21 
indicators covering three areas of employment 
protection: dismissal protection for individual 
workers with regular contracts, additional 
costs for collective dismissals, and regulations 
governing temporary contracts. Summary 
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scores for each area are calculated as weighted 
averages of the relevant indicators. An overall 
employment protection legislation measure is 
calculated as a weighted average of the three 
summary scores. For details, see http://www
.oecd.org/employment/protection.
22.  Since the Industrial Disputes Act was amended 
in 1965, any nonmutual layoff, retrenchment, 
or closure becomes an industrial dispute, going 
fi rst to the Ministry of Labor for conciliation 
and then, if conciliation fails, to tribunals of 
courts, which often order reinstatement.
23.  The more recent research builds on the work 
of Besley and Burgess (2004), who exploit 
variations across Indian states and over time 
in amendments to central legislation. The 
Besley-Burgess index of state employment 
protection legislation has been controversial 
(see Ahsan and Pagés 2009; Gupta, Hasan 
and Kumar 2009; and OECD 2007 for criti-
cisms and approaches to addressing them). 
24.  Analysis of the full sample of manufactur-
ing fi rms in the Annual Survey of Industries 
data for 2000–08 shows increases in formal 
sector manufacturing beginning in 2005 in 
both large (100 or more employees) fi rms and 
smaller fi rms. Large fi rms account for 70 per-
cent of formal manufacturing employment. 
The analysis also shows rapid growth in the 
use of contract labor: the share of contract 
labor increased from 12 percent of total for-
mal manufacturing employment in 1999 to 24 
percent in 2008. The biggest increases were 
in large fi rms (100 or more employees), but 
the share also increased (from 12 percent to 
19 percent) in smaller fi rms. The job creation/
job destruction analysis, which relies on panel 
data, uses all fi rms for which two consecu-
tive years of data are available. This analy-
sis is possible only for fi rms with more than 
100 employees. Results for contract workers 
should be treated with some caution, as a zero 
for contract workers in one year could simply 
refl ect nonreporting and hence lead to artifi -
cially large job creation or destruction fi gures. 
25.  Comparisons of enterprise survey results over 
time are not shown in fi gure 6.7, which pools 
all surveys for individual countries.
26.  Many countries in the Europe and Central Asia 
region have large tax wedges, with unfavorable 
employment consequences (Rutkowski 2007).
27.  See Freeman (2009) for a more detailed 
review. Minimum wages are not an effective 
antipoverty tool. 
28.  The discussion of compliance and dis-
pute resolution draws on Kyloh (2008) for 
Nepal, World Bank (2006) for Pakistan, and 
Gunatilaka (2011) for Sri Lanka.
29.  Information for India suggests that pay-
offs under voluntary retirement schemes are 
far above the severance pay provided in the 
Industrial Disputes Act and that average 
observed costs place India among the most 
costly in the world for dismissals (Debroy 
2011; OECD 2007a). Use of golden hand-
shakes does require approval by trade unions. 
30.  Labor legislation may be only part of the story. 
In Sri Lanka, for example, it is diffi cult to dis-
entangle the effects of TEWA, the Payment of 
Gratuity Act, and the Inland Revenue Act, as 
all three kick in at a fi rm size threshold of 14 
workers (Gunatilaka 2011). Gunatilaka and 
Vodopevic (2010) fi nd suggestive evidence that 
all three are likely responsible for the irregular 
size distribution of fi rms and limited growth 
of fi rms with 14 workers. Abidoye, Orazem, 
and Vodopivec (2009) test this hypothesis by 
applying a difference-in-differences method to 
a panel data set of formal sector fi rms. They 
distinguish between fi rms in export processing 
zones (EPZs), which enjoy tax exemptions 
and other incentives offered by the Board of 
Investment, and others. They fi nd that non-
EPZ fi rms at or below the threshold are less 
likely to increase employment than non-EPZ 
fi rms above the threshold. Above the threshold, 
non-EPZ fi rms are more likely to shed workers, 
and EPZ fi rms are more likely to add workers. 
At all sizes, EPZ fi rms are more likely to add 
workers than non-EPZ fi rms. 
31.  Firms reporting incidents reported that on 
average, making informal payments cut the 
number of visits and time spent in dealing 
with inspections by about half.
32.  Conciliation normally succeeds in cases in 
which an agreement could have been arrived 
at without conciliation (NCEUS 2009). 
33.  Information on these programs comes from 
country studies of active labor market pro-
grams commissioned for this book. 
34.  Drèze and Khera (2009) fi nd considerable 
latent demand for public works in their study 
of six northern states. In other states, such as 
Kerala, fi eld studies report a lack of demand 
(Jacob and Varghese 2006). 
35.  The Professional Institutional Network of the 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act (http://www.nrega.net/pin) is a 
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network of institutions, including the Indian 
Institutes of Management, the Indian Institutes 
of Technology, the National Institute of Rural 
Development, agriculture universities, the 
Administrative Staff College of India, think 
tanks, civil society organizations, and other 
professional institutes. It was created by the 
Ministry of Rural Development as an inte-
grated structure for monitoring, appraising, 
diagnosing implementation constraints, and 
recommending remedial action and sustain-
able interventions to enhance the quality of 
the program.
36.  Moreover, there is little evidence that state-
funded unemployment benefi ts are always 
made. 
37.  In their survey of 100 MNREGA worksites 
spread across six northern states, Drèze and 
Khera (2009) fi nd that a majority of people 
employed in the program come from the most 
disadvantaged segments of society.
38.  An important question to be examined is the 
extent to which this national picture applies 
at the state level, where there are important 
differences in implementation.
39.  A more detailed picture of participation in 
MGNREGA and a fuller evaluation of the 
program should be obtained from special pur-
pose surveys designed to assess the  program. 
40.  These shares of participation by social group 
from administrative data for 2010 are con-
sistent with those obtained from the 2009/10 
National Sample Survey.
41.  See Ambasta, Shankar, and Shah (2008) and 
CSE (2008) for a discussion of the quality of 
assets.
42.  At the time of this review, nine rigorous 
evaluations of public works programs in 
developing countries were identifi ed. Of these, 
fi ve found that participants had higher post-
program employment rates than nonpartici-
pants in the control group, and four found no 
effect. None of the three studies that looked 
at earnings found any positive effect. 
43.  Some training programs in South Asia 
are also beginning to reorient themselves 
to the nature of informal employment. In 
Nepal, for example, the recently introduced 
Adolescent Girls Employment Initiative tar-
gets unemployed girls and girls working in 
the informal sector. In addition to providing 
technical training, the initiative also pro-
vides job placement services and life-skills 
training (covering a range of life skills most 
likely required by young women in their 
households, communities, and the labor 
market, such as negotiation skills, dealing 
with discrimination, workers’ rights edu-
cation, reproductive health, basic fi nancial 
management, control over the use of their 
own income, and mentoring). About 60 per-
cent of the fi rst round of trainees has been 
gainfully employed after completing training 
(Employment Fund 2010). 
44.  NSDC is jointly owned by the private (51 per-
cent) and public (49 percent) sectors. It was 
established as a nonprofi t company under 
Section 25 of the Indian Companies Act.
45.  Microfi nance services include microcredit, 
deposit services, money transfer services, and 
microleasing.
46.  See http://www.samn.eu/?q=microfi nance-asia.
47.  These linkages are miniscule from the point of 
view of the banks (EDA and APMAS 2006). 
48.  For reviews of the limited evaluation evidence 
on self-employment programs in developing 
countries, see Betcherman and others (2004, 
2007).
49.  Some of the controversies relate to issues 
that are tangential to this book, including 
the role of commercial banking institutions 
in microfi nance, the interest rates charged 
on microloans, the debt accumulated by 
poor people through microloans, and the 
politicization of some programs. There 
is also a claim that the benefi ts of micro-
fi nance have been oversold. Although these 
are important concerns, they do not speak 
directly to the question of whether micro-
fi nance can be an effective instrument for 
helping informal workers manage labor 
market–related risks.
50.  In effect, the act provides for the formulation 
by the central and state governments of social 
insurance schemes for unorganized workers. 
It does not establish a universal minimum 
social insurance program.
51.  The design of the benefi t side of social insur-
ance programs is beyond the scope of this 
book. Promising initiatives exist throughout 
the region. One prominent example is India’s 
recently introduced national health insurance 
scheme, Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana 
(RSBY), designed to provide hospitalization 
coverage to households below the poverty 
line. For more details on the program and its 
early implementation experience, see World 
Bank (2011b). 
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Questions
•  How does armed confl ict affect labor markets?
•  What are the key constraints to job creation 
in confl ict-affected areas of South Asia?
•  What are the policy priorities for creat-
ing more and better jobs in confl ict-affected 
areas?
Findings
•  Even when it is over, armed confl ict remains a 
serious obstacle to job creation in South Asia. 
Confl ict affects both the demand for and the 
supply of labor. It affects demand by reduc-
ing both the incentives and the ability of fi rms 
to invest and create jobs. Lack of security, 
inadequate infrastructure and services, and a 
weak governance and regulatory environment 
are the most signifi cant deterrents for private 
sector job creation in confl ict-affected areas. 
Loss of skills, migration, fl uctuations in fam-
ily income, and demographic changes also 
affect the nature of the workforce in confl ict 
zones. Confl ict-affected areas in South Asia 
remain more rural, more dependent on agri-
culture, and more isolated than low-intensity 
confl ict areas. They also remain less likely to 
have private employers, more likely to have 
low-skilled workers, and more likely to have 
vulnerable jobs. 
•  In the initial postconfl ict phase, labor market 
 programs and policies can play important 
roles in providing and promoting employ-
ment, through such efforts as disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration programs 
and broader-based public works. Govern-
ments also need to take initial steps to attract 
the private sector (such as reforming business 
regulations, issuing temporary tax breaks, 
and forging public-private partnerships) so 
that the private sector can eventually become 
a more signifi cant provider of jobs. Interna-
tional organizations and foreign governments 
have important roles to play in providing 
funding and building capacity in these early 
stages, particularly in cases of nationwide 
confl ict. 
•  Policy makers should plan three important 
 transitions for policies and programs over 
the medium term: increasing the role of the 
private sector; refocusing attention from the 
agricultural sector toward facilitating higher-
productivity employment in other sectors; and 
moving from targeted programs for vulnerable 
groups (such as excombatants, at-risk youth, 
war victims, and displaced people) to broad-
based employment generation. 
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Armed conflict represents a major challenge to job creation. Conflict destroys communities, institutions, 
and physical and human capital and leaves 
the affected population living in insecurity 
and often without sources of livelihood. 
More than 58,000 people worldwide died 
directly as a result of armed conflict in 
2009—more than a third of them in South 
Asia (IISS 2010). Most countries in South 
Asia are immersed in—or only recently 
emerged from—armed conflict, ranging 
from the insurgencies in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan and low-level localized insurgency 
in India to the recently ended civil wars in 
Nepal and Sri Lanka.1 Some of these con-
fl icts have offi cially ended, but even in these 
cases sustainable peace is not guaranteed. 
The creation of more and better jobs 
should be at the center of any recovery plan 
for confl ict-affl icted areas, as the literature 
suggests that poor economic conditions and 
labor market prospects increase the likelihood 
of confl ict. At the same time, a minimal level 
of security is essential to economic recovery 
and to the success of policies and programs 
that encourage job creation. Jobs and sustain-
able peace can therefore positively reinforce 
each other, as long as programs and policies 
are inclusive and sensitive to the grievances 
that led to confl ict in the fi rst place. House-
hold surveys and focus group discussions in 
confl ict-affected areas in Afghanistan and Sri 
Lanka show that economic recovery and the 
restoration of livelihoods are people’s main 
priorities after the cessation of hostilities 
(World Bank 2010a). The fact that millions 
of new entrants will enter the South Asian 
labor force in the next two decades further 
increases pressure to create more and better 
jobs, especially in postconfl ict environments 
and areas at risk of new or renewed violence. 
This chapter describes the key challenges to 
job creation in confl ict-affected environments 
and outlines what governments in the region 
can do to overcome them.2 The next section 
discusses the characteristics and intensity of 
armed conflict in South Asia. The  second 
section discusses the constraints to labor 
demand and labor supply in  confl ict-affected 
areas. The third section takes a closer look 
at the profile of labor markets in conflict-
 affected areas in South Asia. The fourth 
 section focuses on the role the private sector 
can play in creating jobs in confl ict-affected 
areas, the main constraints it faces, and the 
lessons international experience yields regard-
ing effective interventions. The fifth sec-
tion discusses education delivery in confl ict 
 situations. The sixth section focuses on the 
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role of labor market policies and programs. 
The last section discusses some of the key 
transitions needed in confl ict-affected areas if 
job creation is to be sustainable. It identifi es 
the main actors, the key sectors to focus on, 
and the groups to target. 
Characteristics and intensity 
of armed conﬂ ict in South Asia
South Asia has experienced one of the high-
est levels of armed confl ict in the world. On 
average, countries in the region experienced 
armed conflict for half of the years since 
2000, as measured by the incidence of at 
least 25 battle-related deaths a year (fi gure 
7.1). This is the highest incidence of confl ict 
in absolute terms and the second-highest 
proportion of deaths from armed conflict 
in the world. Among the top 10 countries in 
terms of direct deaths from armed confl ict in 
2008, 4 (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and 
Sri Lanka) were in South Asia (fi gure 7.2).3
This chapter focuses on internal armed 
violence against the state—violent incidents 
perpetrated by a relatively organized group 
of nonstate actors and directed against the 
apparatus of the state or with the intent of 
destabilizing the state. This definition of 
internal confl ict is used in the Uppsala Con-
fl ict Data Program and Centre for the Study 
of Civil War at the International Peace 
Research Institute (UCDP/PRIO) conflict 
database. It is similar to the definition of 
 terrorism adopted in most incident-level data 
sets dealing with internal confl ict. The defi ni-
tion excludes interstate confl icts and violence 
between individuals. 
The focus in this chapter is on internal 
confl ict against the state for two main rea-
sons. First, internal armed confl ict directed 
against the state arguably poses the greatest 
challenge to the ability of the state to imple-
ment policies and programs conducive to 
employment generation. Second, the majority 
of confl icts in the developing world, includ-
ing South Asia, are internal confl icts. Since 
World War II, internal confl icts have resulted 
in three times as many deaths as interstate 
wars (Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
The nature, duration, and intensity of 
internal armed conflicts vary across South 
FIGURE 7.1 Proportion of country-years in armed conﬂ ict, by region, 2000–08
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Source: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conﬂ ict Dataset version 4-2009 (http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conﬂ ict/UCDP-PRIO/Armed-Conﬂ icts-Version-X-2009/).
Note: Armed conﬂ ict refers to internal armed conﬂ icts between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups that result in at least 
25 battle-related deaths a year.
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Asian countries. Ongoing conflicts in the 
region include the confl icts in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, the long-running insurgency 
movements in India’s northeastern regions, 
and the escalating violent activities of left-
leaning groups in the eastern and central 
parts of India. Table 7.1 provides informa-
tion on the major internal armed conflicts 
in South Asia over the past decade (see Iyer 
2009 for a discussion of these confl icts).
The challenges posed by armed conflict 
vary signifi cantly with the type of confl ict. 
The focus here is on two dimensions of con-
fl ict of particular importance for job creation: 
the geographic scope and the stage of the 
confl ict. Geographic scope refers to whether 
the confl ict is nationwide or localized. The 
stage of the conflict refers to whether the 
confl ict is ongoing or has ended. A confl ict 
is classifi ed as having ended if there has been 
a clear military victory or a peace agreement 
Source: National Counterterrorism Center 2009, based on the Worldwide 
Incidents Tracking System (WITS), which contains details about incidents 
of violence against civilians and noncombatants from publicly available 
information.
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FIGURE 7.2 Top 15 countries in number of deaths 
from armed conﬂ ict, 2008 
TABLE 7.1  Major internal armed conﬂ icts in South Asia since 1978
Country/region
Approximate start 
and end dates
Estimated number 
of fatalities
(2000–09)
Outstanding 
number of 
internally 
displaced people
Afghanistan
Nationwide 1978– 51,580 More than 235,000
Bangladesh
Nationwide 2005–07 93 —
India
Assam 1990– 3,838 257,000
Manipur 1982–2008 2,712 180,000
Nagaland 1992–2007 710 62,000
Tripura 1978–2006 1,708 —
Eastern and central states 1980– 5,290 60,000
Nepal
Nationwide 1996–2006 13,592 60,000
Pakistan
Baluchistan 2004– 1,294 80,000
North West Frontier Province 
(renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
in 2010) and the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas 2002– 20,261 900,000
Sri Lanka
Northern and Eastern Provinces 1980–2009 51,815 320,000
Source: Authors, based on start and end dates from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conﬂ ict Dataset version 4-2009 (http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-
Conﬂ ict/UCDP-PRIO/Armed-Conﬂ icts-Version-X-2009/) and number of fatalities and displaced people from the Armed Conﬂ ict Database compiled by the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, based on data from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (http://www.iiss.org/publications/armed-
conﬂ ict-database/). 
Note: — = Not available.
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between the warring parties and the number 
of confl ict-related deaths has declined signifi -
cantly as a result.
The confl icts in South Asia between 2000 
and 2010 show considerable variation along 
both of these dimensions (table 7.2). Armed 
confl icts in Afghanistan and Nepal were wide-
spread in almost all parts of the country. In 
Afghanistan, the confl ict continues. In Nepal, 
the confl ict was formally brought to an end by 
a comprehensive peace agreement in 2006. 
Constraints to job creation 
in conﬂ ict-aﬀ ected areas
Armed confl ict affects the demand for labor, 
because firms and businesses are reluctant 
to invest in the face of signifi cant threats to 
the security of life and property (fi gure 7.3). 
Inadequate or confusing regulations and the 
poor quality of governance in affected areas 
also discourage firms from investing. The 
presence of warring parties and fragile states 
adds to uncertainty regarding both what the 
regulations are and who is enforcing them. 
Infrastructure losses and unreliable access 
to key services, such as electricity and trans-
port, restrict the scale of fi rm activity, and the 
absence of markets increases input prices. At 
the height of the armed confl ict in northern Sri 
Lanka in 2007, for example, the price of a bag 
of cement was more than four times higher in 
Jaffna (Northern Province) than in other parts 
of the country (World Bank 2010c). 
Conflict also affects the capacity of the 
population to supply labor, as well as the 
quality and composition of the workforce. 
Security concerns in traveling to work can be 
a major constraint to labor supply. Disrup-
tions to education and the loss of job-related 
skills and training reduce the quality of the 
workforce in confl ict areas, with potentially 
long-term effects. Population displacement 
and migration, as well as the challenges posed 
by the reintegration of returnees after the end 
of confl ict, place further restrictions on the 
availability of skilled labor. Finally, labor 
supply will also be affected by changes in 
household income resulting from the confl ict 
as, for example, women start working to sup-
plement the family’s income in the absence of 
male family members who join the fi ghting.
Although all of these constraints apply in 
some degree to all confl ict situations, poor 
governance and inadequate infrastructure are 
more likely to be severe constraints in areas of 
nationwide confl ict, because regional confl ict 
typically coexists with a functioning state in 
the rest of the country. This means that the 
government has a tax base on which to draw, 
the ability to provide public services and 
infrastructure, and functioning institutions 
(army, police forces, bureaucracy, judicial sys-
tem), which can be extended to the confl ict-
affected region when the confl ict ends. 
In contrast, nationwide conflicts often 
involve the building up or complete reform 
of state institutions when the confl ict ends. 
As discussed in the World Development 
Report 2011 (World Bank 2011c), building 
Conflict
Factors affecting
labor supply
• Lack of security 
• Losses of education
   and skills
• Displacement of
 population
• Changes in household
  income
Factors affecting labor
demand
• Lack of security 
• Poor regulatory
 framework (regulatory
 uncertainty, weak
 governance)
• Infrastructure losses
• High input prices
FIGURE 7.3 Eﬀ ects of conﬂ ict on demand for and 
supply of labor
Source: Authors.
TABLE 7.2 Armed conflicts in South Asia, by conflict stage, 
geographic scope, and number of casualties per thousand people
Confl ict stage
Ongoing Postconfl ict
Geographic 
scope
Nationwide Afghanistan (1.80) Nepal (0.475)
Localized Pakistan (0.130)
India (0.013)
Sri Lanka (2.570)
Sources: Authors, based on data on casualties from the armed conﬂ ict database compiled by the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (http://www.iiss.org/publications/armed-conﬂ ict-
database); population data from World Development Indicators; and Afghanistan population 
estimate from the CIA Factbook.
Note: Figures in parentheses are estimates of number of casualties per 1,000 people between 2000 
and 2009. The classiﬁ cation of conﬂ ict stage is based on the status as of December 2010. 
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institutions is a long-term affair that gener-
ally takes a generation. Policy makers in 
countries emerging from nationwide confl ict 
face the additional challenge of reestablish-
ing connectivity with the rest of the world or 
neighboring countries, in addition to rebuild-
ing internal connectivity. The lack of such 
external connectivity can signifi cantly affect 
access to foreign goods and capital, access to 
foreign markets, and the ability of interna-
tional agencies to deliver humanitarian and 
other assistance. 
Internal migration to safer parts of the 
country is likely to be signifi cant in cases of 
localized confl ict. In Pakistan, for example, 
an estimated 60 percent of workers in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
leave their tribal area to find employment 
(World Bank and ADB 2010).4 Migration 
can help households access more and better 
jobs and send home money that can be used 
for human capital investments or business 
start-ups. The presence of large numbers of 
internal migrants and displaced people raises 
an important policy question related to job 
creation, however: should jobs for internal 
migrants be created in their current areas 
of residence, or should the focus be primar-
ily on creating jobs in confl ict-affected areas, 
thereby providing incentives for the displaced 
to return? 
When the confl ict is ongoing, it may not 
pay to rebuild infrastructure, which could be 
damaged during fi ghting. In postconfl ict situ-
ations, the intensity of violence has decreased, 
allowing better planning and reducing uncer-
tainty in investment and resource allocation 
decisions. But violence also characterizes 
many postconflict situations. Peace is very 
fragile: historically, 40 percent of postconfl ict 
situations have reverted to conflict within 
a decade (Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 
2008).
Armed conﬂ ict and labor 
markets 
Labor market indicators (such as lack of 
jobs for young people and low wage growth) 
are important predictors of the likelihood 
of confl ict (Collier, Hoeffl er, and Sambanis 
2005; Hoeffler 2011; Smith 2004; World 
Bank 2011). But how does confl ict change 
labor markets in confl ict zones? 
This section begins by briefl y discussing 
the impact of armed conflict on aggregate 
economic growth and unemployment. It then 
analyzes the impact of confl ict on employ-
ment, unemployment, sectoral composition, 
and the types of jobs, using national house-
hold and labor force surveys. Multiple rounds 
of household data were used to compare 
trends in high-confl ict and low-confl ict areas 
of India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka (see annex 
7A for defi nitions of high- and low-confl ict 
areas). Within-country variation in the inten-
sity of armed confl ict was exploited to better 
understand the relationship between confl ict 
and labor markets.
Two caveats should be heeded in interpret-
ing the results. The fi rst refers to interpreting 
results as causal. Labor market characteris-
tics may be different in confl ict areas because 
of the confl ict itself or because of preexisting 
conditions. Where information for more than 
one point in time is available, the data can be 
interpreted as caused by the confl ict, to the 
extent that the two types of areas would have 
followed similar trends in the indicators of 
interest in the absence of the armed confl ict.5 
For Afghanistan, where household data for 
only one year are available, results should be 
interpreted with more care. 
The second caveat refers to the potential 
bias in the sample composition, as areas 
affected by conflict are often underrepre-
sented in household surveys. If these areas 
were included in the surveys, it is possible 
that labor market conditions in conflict-
 affected areas would look even worse, as the 
worst- affected areas are probably omitted. 
Annex 7B describes the difference in trends 
for South Asian countries for employment and 
unemployment, disaggregated by gender.6 
Conﬂ ict, growth, and the 
peace dividend 
Confl ict can have aggregate effects on eco-
nomic growth and therefore on the quantity 
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and quality of jobs the economy is able to 
generate.7 
Assessing the economic costs of armed 
confl ict is empirically complicated, because it 
is diffi cult to specify an appropriate counter-
factual, data are not available from confl ict-
affected countries or regions, and different 
methodologies often yield widely different 
results (Gardeazabal forthcoming). For exam-
ple, in 1998 the macroeconomic impact 
of the civil war in Sri Lanka was offi cially 
estimated at 2–3 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth a year since its start 
(Central Bank of Sri Lanka 1998). More 
recent estimates for the period 1984–96 put 
the annual cost at 10.8–15.8 percent of 1996 
GDP (Arunatilake, Jayasuriya, and Kelegama 
2001). 
Cross-country estimates find that coun-
tries that experienced civil war between 1960 
and 1999 saw their annual GDP growth rate 
reduced by 2.4 percentage points on average 
(Hoeffl er and Reynal-Querol 2003). Even for 
countries with some confl ict during 1980–
2008, growth was 1.2 percentage points 
higher, on average, in years of peace than 
in years of conflict. In South Asia as well, 
periods with more confl ict have usually been 
periods of slow growth (fi gure 7.4). 
This evidence suggests that the peace divi-
dend for growth and job creation is poten-
tially large. Chen, Loayza, and Reynal-Querol 
(2007) analyze 41 countries that experienced 
civil war between 1960 and 2003. They fi nd 
that once the war ended, recovery in eco-
nomic performance, health, education, and 
political development was signifi cant. 
Once violence ceased, conflict-affected 
communities also experienced a faster reduc-
tion in poverty than communities less directly 
exposed to the conflict within the same 
country. Poverty reduction was particularly 
high in Sri Lanka, where it fell 40 percent in 
confl ict-affected areas (the average decline 
elsewhere in the country was 34 percent) 
(World Bank 2010a).8 During the ceasefi re 
that lasted from 2002 to 2004, unemploy-
ment fell from 13.0 percent to 9.2 percent in 
the Northern Province and from 15.9 percent 
Source: Authors, based on data from World Bank 2011b. 
Note: Each data point represents a single year.
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FIGURE 7.5 Unemployment rates in the Northern 
and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, 1997–2001 and 
2002–04
Source: Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 
to 10.5 percent in the Eastern Province, at a 
time when the national unemployment rate 
decreased only slightly, from 8.8 percent to 
8.3 percent (fi gure 7.5). 
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Employment rate
Armed confl ict seems to be associated with 
an increase (or a smaller reduction) in high-
confl ict areas in the share of the working-age 
population that is economically active and 
employed.9 In Afghanistan, the share of the 
working-age population that was employed 
was 55.6 percent in low-confl ict provinces 
and 68.3 percent in high-confl ict areas. In 
India, employment rates in confl ict-affected 
areas fell less than in peaceful areas. In 
Nepal, the proportion of the working-age 
population that was employed increased 
about 2 percentage points between 1996 
(preconflict) and 2004 in low-conflict 
areas and more than 4 percentage points 
in high-confl ict areas (fi gure 7.6). This evi-
dence suggests that confl ict could increase 
labor supply even in the face of decreased 
demand.10 Together these forces are likely 
to reduce equilibrium wages in conflict 
areas over time, leading to a decline in liv-
ing standards. 
Increased labor force participation and 
employment in confl ict zones seems to arise 
primarily from the increase (or smaller 
reduction) in employment of women. In 
Afghanistan, for example, the proportion 
of men employed is 4 percentage points 
higher in high-confl ict areas, but the pro-
portion of working-age women employed is 
19 percentage points higher. The difference 
in employment patterns over time is statis-
tically insignificant for men in India and 
Nepal; among women, the likelihood of 
being employed increases with the intensity 
of the confl ict in both countries. In high-
conflict areas of Nepal, for example, the 
proportion of working-age men increased 
about 3 percentage points between 1996 
(preconfl ict) and 2004, whereas the propor-
tion of women increased almost 6 percent-
age points (fi gure 7.7). 
There are two potential reasons for the 
increased participation of women. One is the 
“added-worker” effect, whereby additional 
members of the household enter the labor 
force in response to economic necessity or 
the absence of key earning members. Both of 
these conditions are likely to apply in confl ict-
affected areas, given that men often leave to 
fi ght and economic conditions in the house-
hold usually worsen as a result of the confl ict.
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likelihood of armed confl ict on the one hand 
and youth unemployment and other indica-
tors of economic opportunities on the other 
(Collier, Hoeffl er, and Sambanis 2005; Urdal 
2006). A similar result is obtained across 
states in India, especially when combined 
with slower wage growth in rural areas 
(Urdal 2008). There is also evidence that 
young adolescents are the optimal target of 
rebel forces (Beber and Blattman 2010). 
Other work has failed to fi nd economet-
ric evidence of a relationship between youth 
unemployment and armed confl ict. The evi-
dence overall remains mixed, as discussed in 
the World Development Report 2011 (World 
Bank 2011c).
In South Asia, some limited evidence sup-
ports the hypothesis that male youth unem-
ployment may be a risk factor for confl ict. 
In Nepal, where labor market information 
before the violence started is available, pre-
conflict unemployment rates among men 
15–35 years old were 2.4 percentage points 
higher (almost twice as high) in districts 
where the confl ict started (in the midwestern 
hills) than in the rest of the country, even after 
accounting for differences in poverty, loca-
tion (urban or rural), and education levels.12 
In South Asia as a whole, the more important 
question is likely to concern the relationship 
between the quality of jobs available to youth 
and confl ict, as open unemployment is gener-
ally low. 
The evidence from South Asia on the 
impact of confl ict on overall unemployment 
is mixed. In Nepal, the confl ict seems to have 
been associated with a reduction in the unem-
ployment rate in high-confl ict areas. In India 
and Sri Lanka, the difference is not statisti-
cally signifi cant (see annex 7B). There is also 
no clear pattern across countries in relative 
unemployment rates before the start of the 
confl ict (see annex 7B).13 
Employment patterns by location 
and sector 
Confl ict-affected countries tend to be less 
urbanized, in part because the mountain-
ous and forested terrain is usually favorable 
A rise in employment among women dur-
ing diffi cult economic times has been docu-
mented in cross-country studies  (Bhalotra 
and Umana-Aponte 2010); during the Asian 
crisis (Jones and others 2009); and in Nepal 
(Menon and van der Meulen 2010). Several 
researchers have also documented increased 
female labor force participation where men 
are absent because of war (see Finegan and 
Margo 1994, who document this phenom-
enon for advanced economies during World 
War II, and Schweitzer 1980). Another pos-
sible reason for the increased labor force 
participation of women in confl ict-affected 
areas could be the higher prevalence of 
agricultural employment in these areas, 
an activity where women traditionally 
participate.11
Unemployment
Unemployment, particularly of youth, 
is often associated with a higher risk of 
confl ict. 
Two complementary theories try to 
explain the relationship between (male) youth 
unemployment and armed confl ict. The fi rst, 
the youth bulge theory, states that when a 
large proportion of the population consists 
of young men who are marginalized from 
political and economic opportunities, coun-
tries are more vulnerable to instability, and 
violence becomes a rational option for engag-
ing the system and making demands. 
The second theory is that youth unemploy-
ment and poverty correlate with the onset of 
armed confl ict because the opportunity cost 
of joining rebel organizations is lower. In 
Peshawar, Pakistan, for example, a militant 
recruit can earn PRs 15,000–20,000 ($176–
$235) a month—nearly twice the remunera-
tion for unskilled work in the area (World 
Bank and ADB 2010). The high unemploy-
ment among people 15–24 (close to 10 per-
cent in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan; 
16 percent in Maldives; and almost 20 per-
cent in Sri Lanka) bodes ill for the possibil-
ity of confl ict. 
Some cross-country empirical evidence 
finds a positive correlation between the 
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for rebellion (see Collier and Sambanis 
2005; Do and Iyer 2010). At the global level, 
58 percent of the population in conflict-
 affected countries lives in rural areas—a 
proportion that is 11 percentage points 
higher than the average in nonconfl ict coun-
tries (World Bank 2011b). Jobs in confl ict 
areas are therefore more likely to be in rural 
areas and the agricultural sector. 
In South Asia, too, the workforce in 
high-confl ict areas is also signifi cantly more 
likely to be in rural areas. In Afghanistan, 
for instance, 22 percent of the working-
age population lives in urban areas in low-
 conflict areas; the corresponding figure 
for high- conflict areas is 5 percent. Work 
is primarily in agriculture: 71 percent of 
workers in high-confl ict areas work in this 
sector, compared with 52 percent in the 
rest of  Afghanistan. In India, the share of 
employment in agriculture was 61 in high-
conflict and 58 percent in low-conflict 
areas. In Nepal, 87 percent of workers in 
high- confl ict and 78 percent in low-confl ict 
countries work in agriculture. 
Conflict delays urbanization and the 
structural transformation of the economy. 
The proportion of the workforce located 
in urban areas increased by 10 percent-
age points in low-confl ict areas of Nepal 
between 1996 (preconfl ict) and 2004 but 
by only 4 percentage points in the high-
confl ict areas (fi gure 7.8). To the extent that 
urban areas are able to provide better jobs 
and better access to public services, this 
pattern refl ects a slowdown in the improve-
ment of household welfare. The same pat-
tern is evident in India.
In India and Nepal, armed confl ict seems 
to have also delayed the transition of the 
workforce out of agriculture. In India, for 
example, the share of workers employed 
in agriculture fell throughout the country 
between 2000 and 2007, but the decline was 
3 percentage points lower in confl ict-affected 
areas. In Nepal, agriculture fell in all districts 
between 1996 and 2004, but the average 
decline was 2 percentage points lower in high-
confl ict areas (see annex 7B). These results 
echo findings in other settings, including 
Mozambique, Rwanda, and Uganda (Brueck 
2004; Deininger 2003; McKay and Lover-
idge 2005).
Economic activities outside of agriculture 
are very limited in confl ict-affected areas in 
South Asia, as evidenced by the small share 
of the workforce employed by a third party 
and the limited presence of manufactur-
ing, construction, and commercial activities 
(see annex 7B). This finding is important, 
because the international evidence shows that 
diversifi ed economies experience less confl ict 
than those that rely on a few sectors (Collier, 
Hoeffl er, and Sambanis 2005). It is especially 
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relevant for countries like Afghanistan and 
Nepal, which remain overwhelmingly agrar-
ian. Fostering small and medium-size non-
farm enterprises in confl ict-affected areas can 
contribute to the economic development of 
those areas and may also contribute to peace. 
Types of jobs 
Jobs in high-conflict are more likely to 
remain vulnerable as a result of the con-
fl ict, for two main reasons. First, the dearth 
of employers in high-confl ict areas means 
that people are significantly less likely to 
become regular wage or salaried employees. 
In Nepal, the share of regular wage or sala-
ried workers increased 1.2 percentage points 
between 1996 and 2004 in low-confl ict dis-
tricts but dropped in high-confl ict districts. 
In India, the share of workers in regular 
wage or salaried jobs increased 3 percentage 
points in low-confl ict areas, but the increase 
was only 1 percentage point in high-confl ict 
areas (see annex 7B).14 
Second, a larger proportion of workers in 
confl ict areas remains dependent on unpaid 
family work. The share of workers engaged 
in unpaid family labor declined sharply in 
low-conflict areas of India; high-conflict 
areas saw a much smaller decline (fi gure 7.9). 
In Sri Lanka, the armed confl ict was associ-
ated with an increase of 7 percentage points 
in the likelihood of being an unpaid family 
worker. This pattern partly refl ects the higher 
concentration of employment in agriculture, 
but it is also evident in urban areas.
The patterns on casual wage work are 
mixed, with confl ict associated with lower 
shares of wage work in casual activities in 
Afghanistan and Nepal, higher shares in Sri 
Lanka (possibly because of the sizable expan-
sion of the construction sector), and no appar-
ent association in India. A mixed picture also 
emerges for informal work. It is perhaps not 
surprising that the evidence on vulnerability 
of jobs is stronger in the context of unpaid 
family workers than for casual wage work, 
as casual wage work typically requires third-
party employers.
Education 
Levels of education are signifi cantly lower in 
the areas of South Asia most affected by con-
fl ict. In Afghanistan in 2008, for instance, 
the share of the working-age population with 
no education was 68 percent in low-confl ict 
areas and 82 percent in high-confl ict areas. In 
every South Asian country, a smaller propor-
tion of the workforce had completed second-
ary education in confl ict-affected areas than 
in low-conflict or peaceful areas, with the 
differences both pre-dating the confl ict and 
resulting from the confl ict (fi gure 7.10). (For 
a breakdown of the working-age population 
by education level, see annex 7B.) The differ-
ence in education levels is not related only to 
lower urbanization: differences are smaller 
but remain when urban and rural areas are 
analyzed separately. 
These effects take place through the impacts 
of confl ict on supply and demand factors that 
affect schooling decisions. On the supply side, 
armed confl ict may lead to the destruction of 
schools or complementary infrastructure and 
the absence or death of teachers. In Nepal, 
for example, almost 5 percent of all victims 
of the civil war have been identifi ed as teach-
ers or students (INSEC 2010). In Pakistan’s 
North West Frontier Province, 8 percent of 
schools were destroyed between 2002 and 
2009 (World Bank 2009b). The availability 
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and quality of school facilities has been asso-
ciated with student attendance and achieve-
ment (Glewwe 2002). 
Several factors—including the decline in 
household income and job opportunities, 
increased security risks, and lowered expected 
returns to education—can reduce demand for 
schooling in confl ict areas:
•  Increased pressure to supplement house-
hold income (or join the confl ict) can lead 
to children dropping out of school.15
•  Lack of security makes it more diffi cult for 
students to reach school, and schools may 
be attacked. In Afghanistan, for instance, 
threats of sexual violence reportedly keep 
many girls at home (Amnesty Interna-
tional 2003). 
•  Confl ict potentially reduces the expected 
returns to education by reducing job 
opportunities for educated people. 
Between 2000 and 2008, the rate of emi-
gration among South Asians with tertiary 
education was 4.7 percent in nonconfl ict-
affected countries and 14.8 percent in con-
fl ict-affected ones (World Bank 2011b). 
•  Population displacement makes it diffi cult 
to continue schooling. 
The literature reveals mixed results on the 
direction in which confl ict has a causal effect 
on schooling and skill acquisition. Using 
detailed household and individual surveys, 
several researchers fi nd a signifi cant loss of 
education and experience for children and 
youth exposed to confl ict (see Verwimp and 
Van Bavel 2010 on Burundi; Akresh and de 
Walque 2008 on Rwanda; Shemyakina 2011 
on Tajikistan; Blattman and Annan 2010 on 
Uganda). Research by Stewart, Huang, and 
Wang (2001), however, suggests that coun-
tries with favorable institutions are able to 
maintain enrollment rates during armed con-
fl ict or recover quickly to their preconfl ict 
enrollment levels once the conflict is over. 
In particular, they fi nd that primary school 
enrollment fell in only 3 of 18 African coun-
tries affected by internal confl ict and actually 
improved in 5 (it is important to note that the 
authors lacked appropriate counterfactuals 
in their exercise). Lopez and Wodon (2005) 
fi nd that in Rwanda, where the confl ict was 
short but intense, school enrollment rates 
returned to their preconfl ict levels within fi ve 
years of the end of the violence. In Nepal, 
as discussed later in this chapter, important 
progress in education was made in confl ict-
affected areas during the civil war. 
In summary, labor markets in confl ict-af-
fected areas present unique features. Overall, 
confl ict-affected areas tend to be more rural 
and more dependent on agriculture, rely less 
on regular wage or salaried employment and 
more on unpaid family work, and have work-
forces that are signifi cantly less educated. In 
most cases, these characteristics refl ect both 
the conflict and conditions predating it. 
These characteristics of the labor markets in 
confl ict-affected areas mean that job creation 
efforts need to initially focus on agriculture 
or other low-skilled sectors, such as construc-
tion. Additionally, providing inputs such as 
fi nance, infrastructure, and training needs to 
be tailored to the informal and casual sector, 
in addition to the formal sector.
Facilitating private sector 
job creation
Armed confl ict, even confl ict that has ended, 
is a serious obstacle to job creation in South 
Asia. Chapter 4 showed that political insta-
bility is one of the three most common bind-
ing constraints for formal urban and rural 
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nonfarm fi rms in South Asia. Almost 60 per-
cent of formal fi rms in South Asia included 
in the World Bank’s enterprise surveys rank 
political instability as a major or severe con-
straint to doing business. In Afghanistan and 
Nepal, respondents identifi ed political insta-
bility as the leading constraint; in Bangla-
desh and  Pakistan, they ranked it among the 
top three constraints. Only in Bhutan was it 
a negligible concern.16 
The second most important constraint 
to fi rm activities is the provision of electric-
ity. Key governance (e.g., corruption) and 
regulatory issues are also cited as major con-
straints. These issues—insecurity, inadequate 
infrastructure, and a poor regulatory frame-
work—are precisely the factors that are likely 
to be exacerbated in confl ict situations. 
In Afghanistan’s 2008 enterprise survey, 
for example, firms located in areas where 
confl ict was most violent reported that they 
were more severely constrained than fi rms in 
more peaceful areas in most aspects of the 
business environment. The biggest differ-
ences between high- and low-confl ict areas 
were reported in infrastructure (electricity 
and transport); the governance and regu-
latory environment (corruption, business 
licensing, courts, land); security (crime and 
political instability); and skills (fi gure 7.11). 
The data on other South Asian countries do 
not allow for a similar analysis, because too 
few fi rms operating in confl ict-affected areas 
were included in the enterprise surveys. The 
rest of this section discusses each of these 
constraints to job creation, focusing on ways 
in which different actors—the state, inter-
national donors, nongovernmental organi-
zations (NGOs), local communities—can 
address them. 
FIGURE 7.11 Severity of business environment constraints (average) reported by ﬁ rms in low-conﬂ ict and 
high-conﬂ ict areas of Afghanistan, 2008
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Source: Authors, based on data from the 2008 Afghanistan enterprise survey.
Note: High-conﬂ ict provinces are deﬁ ned as provinces in which the number of deaths per 1,000 population caused by terrorist incidents in 2007 was greater 
than 0.1. By this deﬁ nition, Baghlan, Ghazni, Farah, Helmand, Kandahar, Khost, Kunarha, Nimroz, Paktika, Paktya, Panjsher, Takhar, Urozgan, Wardak, and 
Zabul are high-conﬂ ict areas. Only diﬀ erences that are statistically signiﬁ cant at at least the 5 percent in an ordinary least squares regression including ﬁ rm 
size and industry ﬁ xed eﬀ ects are shown.
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Improving security
Security risks, which affect the economic 
returns to investment, persist even after 
armed confl ict offi cially ends, putting both 
facilities and workers at risk. Firms need 
additional funds to ensure security by hir-
ing private security or paying off the warring 
sides in a confl ict. 
Firms also experience diffi culties in obtain-
ing supplies for production. Farmers do not 
plant crops or go fishing when they live in 
fear. The lack of security may also manifest 
itself in the hesitation of the local community 
to take part in economic activities led by the 
private sector (or the government for that 
matter). 
Even after a confl ict has offi cially ended, 
considerable risks to security remain. Nepal, 
for instance, witnessed 514 deaths attributed 
to groups other than the Maoists and the 
government in 2007, after the peace agree-
ment had been signed, an increase over the 
327 such deaths in 2006 (INSEC 2008). 
Continued violence is attributable largely 
to the inability of a fragile state to provide 
effective security to all parts of the country; 
it highlights the risk that armed confl ict can 
transform itself into other forms of violence 
or instability, as discussed in the World 
Development Report 2011 (World Bank 
2011c). Once fi rms leave, they often do not 
come back. In Assam, India, and Sri Lanka, 
for example, communities affected by armed 
conflict report that factories and planta-
tions that shut down during confl ict did not 
reopen when security improved (World Bank 
2010a).
Governments can manage some of the 
security risks in conflict situations, by, for 
instance, implementing disarmament, demo-
bilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs 
(discussed later in this chapter) and creating 
“safe” economic zones. Together with the pri-
vate sector, the government can also involve 
local communities in security arrangements. 
The fi rst two options are more likely to be 
successful when violence has been signifi-
cantly reduced and an end to the confl ict is 
in sight. 
Special economic safe zones
Special economic safe zones are modeled 
after special economic zones (SEZs).17 SEZs 
typically provide duty-free imports and good 
infrastructure, with a view to encouraging 
exports. In addition to easing the regula-
tory system or providing direct incentives, 
such as tax breaks and loan guarantees, safe 
zones provide targeted security and other 
public services.
SEZs have been established in several 
postconfl ict countries, including Cambodia 
and Mozambique, where they have helped 
attract foreign investors and spur job cre-
ation. In Cambodia, for example, export 
processing zones have been associated with 
the country’s impressive job creation per-
formance after the war, especially among 
women (female employment in industry grew 
20 percent a year compared with 7 percent 
for men) (McLeod and Davalos 2008). 
In Sri Lanka, the government has been 
planning to establish economic zones in 
conflict-affected areas (Indian Express 
2009). Policy makers should think of these 
zones as an interim step in providing a good 
business environment, gradually extending 
 benefi ts such as better regulation and infra-
structure to fi rms throughout the country.
SEZs could be further complemented with 
“resource corridors,” which would more 
directly link local communities, farmers, and 
workers to areas with high concentration of 
natural resources (by, for example, strength-
ening logistics and infrastructure). Afghani-
stan’s mining sector, for example, has great 
potential. Although not labor intensive itself, 
it could be better linked to existing economic 
activities and livelihoods. This approach has 
been tested predominantly in nonconflict 
environments but could also be a promising 
path in countries recovering from confl ict.
Private sector and local community 
initiatives
The private sector has found innovative 
ways of alleviating some of the challenges 
stemming from lack of security in confl ict-
affected areas by partnering with local 
entrepreneurs. Firms in confl ict areas often 
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hire private security firms or strike deals 
with warring parties. Foreign fi rms also take 
political risk insurance to cover some risks, 
through, for example, the World Bank’s 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) or the U.S. government’s Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). 
Respondents to a recent survey of fi rms in 
confl ict-affected cited engagement with the 
government in the host country and joint 
ventures/alliances with local companies as 
the two main tools they use to mitigate polit-
ical risks in these countries (MIGA 2011). 
Another option is to involve local commu-
nities in security arrangements, as Roshan, a 
telecommunications provider in  Afghanistan, 
has done (box 7.1). The community-based 
strategy resulted in better security for 
Roshan is the largest mobile phone company in 
Afghanistan. Since beginning operations in 2003 in 
six major cities, the company has expanded opera-
tions to all 34 provinces and more than 230 cities 
and towns. By 2009, it had more than 3.5 million 
active subscribers. 
Since 2003, the company has invested more than 
$390 million all over the country. Employing more 
than 1,000 people directly (and more than 25,000 
indirectly, as dealers, distributors, contractors, and 
suppliers), Roshan is the largest private employer in 
Afghanistan. One-fi fth of its labor force is women, 
in contrast to a women’s workforce participation of 
1 percent in Afghanistan. Roshan is also the larg-
est taxpayer in Afghanistan, accounting for about 
6 percent of government revenues.
In 2008, Roshan faced a surge in attacks on 
its cell network towers. These attacks strained 
Roshan’s operating budget, given that the company 
was already paying $14 million a year to a private 
company to provide security. 
In response, Roshan decided to implement a new 
community-based security model. The fi rst step was 
to consult with more than 1,000 local shuras (local 
councils) regarding their views of Roshan. The pri-
mary complaint was that Roshan was not providing 
jobs for locals; communities therefore had no inter-
est in supporting the company. 
In response, Roshan signed explicit contracts with 
each community. The company paid a leasing fee to the 
community for the use of the tower site, and the local 
community was required to ensure that the instal-
lations were not attacked. Roshan also introduced 
other incentives, such as bonus payments if the tower 
remained safe for a given a number of months, and it 
made signifi cant investments in local infrastructure, 
based on the community’s wishes (in some communi-
ties, Roshan provided funds for a local well; in others 
it funded solar electricity for the local mosque). 
Taking this bold experiment a step farther, 
Roshan implemented it in Kandahar, one of Afghan-
istan’s most confl ict-affected regions. Within a few 
months, the company saw dramatic results and soon 
expanded the program to all areas of the country. 
The program is very popular in local communi-
ties, where it has generated jobs for local youth and 
provided much needed infrastructure in a war-torn 
country. The initiative also reduced the company’s 
security bill for its cell towers from $14 million to 
$7.5 million.
Roshan’s experience highlights three major issues 
in conflict zones. First, demand for jobs is high. 
Roshan reported receiving 10,000 applications for 
every job it fi lled in the early stages of the program. 
Second, private sector companies can overcome the 
disadvantages of operating in a high-risk environ-
ment, including security-related ones. Third, the 
private sector can be a useful source of funding for 
local infrastructure, without compromising profi t-
ability (Roshan has been profi table since its second 
quarter of operation).
Is Roshan’s experience replicable? One key to 
success appears to be the company’s orientation 
toward social development in addition to profi t mak-
ing. This orientation probably refl ects the fact that 
Roshan’s majority shareholder is the Aga Khan Fund 
for Economic Development, which has a longer-term 
outlook and a commitment to building sound busi-
nesses in the developing world. Ninety percent of 
Roshan’s employees are Afghans, and the expatriate 
component is being further reduced. As CEO Karim 
Khoja says, “My proudest moment will be to trans-
fer the company to an Afghan CEO.” 
Sources: Authors, based on Herman and Dhanani 2010; remarks by CEO Karim 
Khoja at HBS Social Enterprise Conference, March 2010 and personal communi-
cation with Karim Khoja, July 2010; and Roshan web site (http://www
.roshan.af).
BOX 7.1 Private sector solutions to the security constraint: Lessons from Afghanistan 
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Roshan’s facility, at a significantly lower 
cost than the alternative of hiring an inter-
national private security agency. In addition, 
it provided important benefi ts for the local 
community.
Rebuilding infrastructure
Armed conflict destroys or inflicts heavy 
damage to physical infrastructure instru-
mental to providing basic services and con-
necting communities and fi rms to markets. 
Electricity and water supplies, roads, rail 
networks, bridges, communication systems, 
and sanitation systems are often destroyed 
or rendered unusable. Based on the limited 
evidence from investment climate surveys, 
lack of access to electricity and transport 
seem to be a particularly important con-
straint to job creation in conflict-affected 
areas. In Afghanistan, for example, more 
than three decades of war left the country 
largely in ruins: in 2004, only 16 percent of 
households in rural Afghanistan had access 
to electricity, and three-quarters of the popu-
lation had no access to public transportation 
in their communities (World Bank 2005). 
After two decades of violence in Sri Lanka, 
in 2003 only 64 percent of households in the 
Northern and Eastern provinces had access 
to electricity, compared with a national aver-
age of 73 percent.18 Road networks were 
also considerably inferior in confl ict-affected 
provinces (those located in the north and the 
east of the island) (fi gure 7.12). 
Infrastructure limitations make it more 
expensive to do business and create jobs in 
confl ict-affected areas. In Afghanistan, for 
example, 87 percent of fi rms have to operate 
with a private generator (chapter 4). 
In Sri Lanka, the end of the conflict in 
the Northern Province in 2009 provided an 
opportunity to assess some of the economic 
benefits associated with improved infra-
structure and access to markets, as the A9 
highway that connects the north with the 
rest of the country was reopened. Improved 
connectivity allowed for more fl uid mobility 
of people and goods, resulting in the rapid 
convergence of prices. The average price pre-
mium in Jaffna compared with Colombo on 
10 selected items was 48 percent in May–July 
2008; one year later, the price premium on 
the same products had declined to 24 percent 
(World Bank 2010c).
Rebuilding much needed infrastructure 
in the aftermath of violent confl ict faces sig-
nifi cant challenges. Financing requirements 
are great, renewed violence could destroy the 
rebuilt infrastructure, and the vast scale of 
needs makes it diffi cult to prioritize. 
Private, public, NGO, and international 
actors have found ways to address some 
of these challenges. Three complementary 
approaches are adopted: 
•  Providing infrastructure on a limited basis, 
possibly in SEZs, which are  geographically 
FIGURE 7.12  Sri Lanka infrastructure accessibility index
Source: World Bank 2007.
Note: The accessibility index is calculated for every point as the sum of the population totals of 
surrounding cities and towns inversely weighted by the road network travel time to each town.
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limited and managed separately from the 
rest of the economy. SEZs could also help 
address some of the regulatory and secu-
rity concerns associated with job creation 
in conflict-affected areas, as discussed 
above. 
•  In the medium term, tapping into 
 innovative forms of fi nancing. Confl ict-
affected countries can use some inno-
vative financing mechanisms—such as 
diaspora bonds, future-flow securitiza-
tion, and performance-indexed bonds—
to alleviate fi nancing constraints (Ketkar 
and Ratha 2009). These mechanisms are 
likely to be available only in the medium 
term, however, as they can be very com-
plex and often require a stronger fi nancial 
and regulatory framework than exists 
immediately after confl ict. 
•  Supporting the community-based/decen-
tralized building of infrastructure and 
service provision. An innovative experi-
ment in progress in Afghanistan is the 
National Solidarity Program, which uses 
a decentralized community-driven mech-
anism coupled with international funds 
to execute local infrastructure projects 
(box 7.2). A similar program in Nepal 
Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program (NSP), 
launched in 2003, is a community-led rural devel-
opment initiative focused mainly on reconstruction 
and rural infrastructure. The program provides 
block grants (averaging $32,800 per community) to 
local governance bodies known as community devel-
opment councils (CDCs) for infrastructure proj-
ects selected by benefi ciaries. Grants are disbursed 
directly to the councils and managed through a bank 
account with a public bank. Participation of women 
in the CDCs is mandatory, although they sometimes 
participate in women-only councils. Communities 
are also required to contribute 10 percent of the 
cost of each project, with funds in the form of cash 
donations, work hours, or construction materials. 
The program is implemented by Afghanistan’s Min-
istry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and 
fi nanced by a consortium of international donors.
The NSP is the only program to have reached all 
provinces in Afghanistan, affecting the lives of more 
than 17 million people. As of 2009, some 22,000 
communities had successfully elected CDCs, and 
more than 50,000 community projects had been par-
tially or fully fi nanced (about 31,000 had been com-
pleted). Most projects focus on building or restoring 
irrigation facilities, power supply, roads, and bridges 
and bringing drinking water to communities. 
The program is estimated to have employed 
some 4,000 Afghan nationals. It has also devel-
oped the skills of 600,000 local council members 
in areas such as conflict resolution, accounting, 
and  bookkeeping. Average economic rates of return 
across four sampled sectors (irrigation, power, water 
supply, and roads) have been estimated at 18.9 per-
cent. An early randomized evaluation shows that the 
program has led to the creation of functional local 
councils, thereby decreasing the power of traditional 
elites. The program has led to greater engagement 
of women in community life and improved the per-
ception of government figures. The impact of the 
program on access to services, infrastructure and 
utilities, economic activities, communities’ trust, or 
the likelihood of violence, however, has been mixed 
(Beath and others 2010). 
The successful roll-out of the NSP shows that 
community-driven development initiatives can be 
an important instrument amid confl ict, when gov-
ernments may be in too feeble a position to imple-
ment programs. In addition to direct economic 
benefi ts, these schemes can serve to foster cohesion 
and develop local capacities. However, signifi cant 
challenges remain. Can coverage be extended to the 
9,000 communities most affected by confl ict, which 
are currently not part of the scheme? Will the NSP 
be sustainable without international donor funding? 
Can these small projects be scaled up? Will the CDCs 
continue to represent their communities, or will they 
be captured by the traditional elites over time? 
Sources: Authors, based on Beath and others 2010; World Bank 2009a; World 
Bank Afghanistan National Solidarity Program website (http://web.worldbank.
org/WBSITE/ EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21166174
~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:223547,00.html). 
BOX 7.2 Community-led infrastructure provision: Afghanistan’s National Solidarity 
Program
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(the Poverty Alleviation Fund) is a rural 
development program focused on devel-
oping rural community infrastructure 
linked to communities’ priorities. In both 
programs, local communities identify, 
plan, build, operate, and maintain infra-
structure. Community-based infrastruc-
ture development and service provision 
could help alleviate some security risks 
and help policy makers prioritize in an 
environment of tight fiscal constraints 
and vast needs. This type of intervention 
is less relevant for large infrastructure 
projects with cross-regional spillovers 
(ports, airports, highways), which are bet-
ter addressed by higher-level government 
administrations.19 
Strengthening the regulatory 
framework and governance 
In enterprise surveys, private businesses 
in South Asia cite lack of effective regu-
lation and governance as a major con-
straint, especially in conf lict-affected 
areas. Almost 40 percent of firms in the 
region cite corruption as a major or severe 
constraint, the third-most-cited obstacle 
to business after political instability and 
electricity. Tax administration and policy 
uncertainty are also among the top con-
straints. There is some variation across 
countries in the importance of different 
elements of regulation and governance, as 
discussed in chapter 4. Average severity 
appears higher on all dimensions of regu-
lation and governance in confl ict-affected 
areas (fi gure 7.11). This fi nding is consis-
tent with findings from conflict-affected 
countries outside the region, where politi-
cal risk—mainly in the form of potential 
adverse regulatory changes, which are sig-
nifi cantly more likely than in other devel-
oping countries—are a main concern of 
investors (MIGA 2011).
Regulatory issues—related to land, for 
instance—can be at the heart of armed con-
fl ict. In India, for example, the Maoist insur-
gency is heavily concentrated in forest areas, 
where land rights are at the center of the dis-
pute. The Indian government has taken steps 
to address this constraint and source of griev-
ance, enacting, for example, the Scheduled 
Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers 
Act in 2006 (box 7.3). Although it is prob-
ably too early to assess the effects of this law, 
the act is a very positive sign. Land issues 
also appear to be an important constraint in 
Afghanistan, where 68 percent of companies 
that tried to obtain additional land between 
2005 and 2008 reported being unable to do 
so, according to the country’s 2008 enterprise 
survey.
Improving the regulatory environment 
is key to encouraging private sector job 
creation in conflict situations. To attract 
investment, governments can focus on “soft 
measures,” such as reducing barriers to 
fi rm registration and operations and clean-
ing up at least the most blatant pockets of 
corruption. 
There is significant room for improve-
ment. Afghanistan, for example, ranks 
160th in the world on the overall ease of 
doing business and last in the world on pro-
tecting investors, trading across borders, 
and closing a business. But some of the top 
performers in improving their Doing Busi-
ness rankings in recent years are postcon-
fl ict countries, such as Liberia (box 7.4) and 
Rwanda. Given the limited upfront costs, 
simplification of business regulations is a 
key fi rst step to attracting the private sector. 
Other components of the regulatory frame-
work, such as tackling pervasive corrup-
tion, are likely to take more time to show 
improvement. 
Three broad lessons for the develop-
ment of the private sector in conflict-af-
fected areas emerge from the success stories 
described in this section. First, the state 
plays an important role as an enabler of pri-
vate sector activity by rebuilding infrastruc-
ture, strengthening the regulatory environ-
ment and the legitimacy of institutions like 
the judiciary, and providing security for the 
labor force. Second, communities can play 
a vital role in the success of private compa-
nies, sometimes by becoming stakeholders 
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The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest 
Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act of 2006 
represents a departure from past forestry policy 
in India. The act seeks to address forest dwellers’ 
demands for land rights by granting both individual 
and communal rights to people living and cultivat-
ing land in forested areas. The Ministry of Tribal 
Affairs, in conjunction with state governments and 
village councils, is required to verify occupancy and 
grant titles to forest dwellers that meet the require-
ments of the law.
Production in forest areas in India is a combina-
tion of timber, agriculture, and collection of non-
timber forest produce (NTFP). Forestry and logging 
accounted for about 1 percent of GDP in 2009. Col-
lection of fuelwood employed an estimated 11 mil-
lion people, generating revenue of about $17 billion 
in 2001. Although data on forest production are 
limited, the Ministry of Environment and Forests 
estimates that 200 million people rely on timber and 
NTFPs for part or all of their livelihoods.
The Forest Rights Act is therefore expected to 
have a signifi cant impact on the livelihoods of for-
est dwelling communities. Increased tenure security 
should provide incentives for investments in improve-
ments to the land. Granting communities rights and 
responsibility over nonagricultural land should lead 
to more effi cient forest management and sustainable 
collection of NTFPs. Livelihoods in forest areas are 
severely constrained by a lack of infrastructure and 
government services. By providing for the adminis-
trative transformation of forest villages into revenue 
villages, the Forest Rights Act should increase the 
supply of roads, electricity, schools, and other gov-
ernment services to forest-dwelling communities.
Because of slow and partial implementation, 
many of the benefi ts of the Forest Rights Act have yet 
to be realized. According to the Ministry of Tribal 
Affairs, which periodically publishes data on the sta-
tus of the implementation of the act, implementation 
varies widely from state to state. As of September 
2010, Chhattisgarh had received more than 16 times 
the number of claims as Jharkhand and distrib-
uted more than 11 times as many titles. Orissa had 
issued titles for more than half of all claims submit-
ted, whereas Gujarat had issued titles for less than 
10 percent of claims. No state had accepted claims 
or issued titles for a signifi cant number of communal 
claims. Instead, the focus has been on implementing 
the individual titles that represent part of the rights 
granted to forest dwellers under the act. The coming 
years should prove critical to the success of this act 
and the livelihoods of the populations dependent on 
forestry.
Sources: Authors, based on World Bank 2006; Government of India 2007, 2010. 
The full text of the act is available at http://forestrights.nic.in. 
BOX 7.3 Improving the land rights framework in India
in private fi rms. Third, in their own inter-
est, successful fi rms take a holistic approach 
to business, investing in their core economic 
activities (by creating jobs and develop-
ing human resources), contributing to their 
communities (by supporting education and 
health programs), and conducting policy 
dialogue with and supporting the reforms of 
the government. Community development 
initiatives are a way for fi rms to ensure local 
ownership, enhance their reputations, and 
improve security and the profi tability and 
sustainability of their activities. 
Although constraints to job creation in 
confl ict-affected areas are severe, there are 
ways around some of them. Developing a 
vibrant private sector takes a long time, 
however. In Afghanistan, for example, 10 
years after the start of the latest armed 
confl ict, domestic fi rms still produce pri-
marily for the small domestic market, few 
foreign companies (less than 2 percent 
of all firms) operate, the quality of jobs 
remains low (World Bank 2008a). The 
public sector is therefore called on to play 
a more active role through labor market 
programs in confl ict-affected areas during 
the initial phase of the recovery, before the 
private sector is able to absorb workers and 
generate jobs. 
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Liberia is still recovering from the ravages of 14 years 
of confl ict (1989–2003), during which it experienced 
one of the largest economic collapses in the world 
since World War II, with GDP decreasing by more 
than 90 percent. More than 6 percent of Liberia’s pop-
ulation was killed, an estimated 500,000–1 million 
people were internally displaced (IDMC 2010), and 
an estimated 70 percent of schools and government 
buildings were destroyed. Apart from privately owned 
generators, there was no electricity in most of Liberia 
from 1991 to 2006 (Radelet 2007). 
After the restoration of peace, in 2003, and the 
election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, in 2005, Liberia 
pursued a private sector–driven growth strategy 
(World Bank 2008b). A cabinet-level working group 
was created to think about the nature and sequenc-
ing of the reforms needed to attract the private sec-
tor. As a fi rst step, the committee identifi ed areas 
where “quick wins” could be obtained, in the form 
of simplifi cations to the business registration process 
and the establishment of a one-stop-shop to advise 
potential entrepreneurs of opportunities and pro-
vide them with technical support. As a second step, 
the committee focused on longer-term reforms that 
required legislative changes, such as the investment 
and revenue legal codes. In 2007, the Liberia Better 
Business Forum was established to facilitate public-
private dialogue for further proposals to improve the 
business environment. 
After debuting in the Doing Business ranking 
at number 170 in 2007, Liberia moved to 155th 
place by 2010. The number of days needed to open 
a business was reduced from 68 in 2008 to 20 in 
2010. Obtaining construction permits was made 
easier by abolishing the requirement to obtain a tax 
waiver certifi cate before submitting documents. As a 
result, the number of days needed to obtain a permit 
dropped from 398 in 2008 to 77 in 2010. The trade 
process was expedited by creating a one-stop shop 
bringing together various ministries and agencies 
and streamlining the inspection regime. In 2009, 
Liberia also committed to the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative, under which it must comply 
with the global standard for transparent manage-
ment of revenues from its extractive industries (iron, 
ore, diamonds, gold, timber, and rubber). 
These reforms appear to be paying off: net infl ows 
of foreign direct investment increased from $21 mil-
lion in 2002 to $83 million in 2005 and $144 mil-
lion in 2008. GDP per capita growth was 9.4 percent 
in 2007 and 7.1 percent in 2008, despite the global 
fi nancial crisis. 
Sources: Radelet 2007; Doing Business Indicators; World Development Indicators. 
BOX 7.4 Improving the regulatory framework in a postconﬂ ict situation: Lessons from 
Liberia
Education service delivery 
in conﬂ ict situations 
Confl ict usually forces people to miss out 
on years of education and training. In 
South Asia, conflict-affected areas start 
from a very low skill base, with illiteracy 
rampant among the workforce. As dis-
cussed in chapter 5, improving educa-
tional attainment and skills of the future 
workforce is fundamental if workers are 
to access more and better jobs. In confl ict 
areas, the education system can also play 
a critical role in addressing some of the 
societal divisions associated with violence 
(World Bank 2011). 
Skills provision in conflict situations 
requires innovative delivery mechanisms. 
Security concerns and the lack of physical 
(schools) and human (teachers) infrastructure 
are three important challenges. The diffi culty 
of providing education and training in con-
fl ict-affected areas is compounded by exten-
sive migration and displacement. 
Although the public sector is likely to take 
the lead, NGOs, international aid organiza-
tions, private companies, and community ini-
tiatives can also be active in providing trained 
personnel or funds to rebuild, building infra-
structure and improving security and access. 
The diaspora could play a vital role, as its 
members have the knowledge, ideas, and 
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BOX 7.5 Improving schooling despite armed conﬂ ict through community schools in Nepal
The government of Nepal had managed schools in 
the country since 1971—with poor educational 
results on average and wide inequalities across wealth 
categories. In 2001, the nationwide literacy rate was 
54 percent, and gross enrollment in primary schools 
ranged from 22 percent among the poorest fi fth of 
households to 90 percent among the top fi fth. 
In 2001, the government amended the Educa-
tion Act, renaming all government-funded schools 
as community schools. Communities were empow-
ered to take over the management of public schools 
by applying formally to the government and putting 
together a school management committee consisting 
of parents and infl uential local citizens. The school 
management transfer option was available to all com-
munities, and the transfer process was voluntary.
The process of transferring the management of 
schools to communities began in 2002. It accelerated 
after 2003, when the World Bank provided fi nan-
cial and technical support through the Community 
School Support Program (CSSP). The CSSP had four 
main components: incentive grants of $1,500 in the 
year of transfer and performance grants for increas-
ing enrollment and promotion rates; scholarships for 
children who were disadvantaged or had never been 
enrolled in school; training programs for teachers, 
community members, and supporting organizations; 
and monitoring and evaluation of strategies and 
interventions in recently transferred schools. 
As of July 2010, more than 10,000 of Nepal’s 
25,000 public schools had been transferred to 
community management. A rigorous random-
ized control trial compared a set of 40 treat-
ment schools that had been encouraged to apply 
for a transfer of management with 40 control 
schools, which were not given any such encour-
agement. Communities whose schools came under 
community management as a result of this promo-
tion scheme were found to have a smaller share of 
out-of-school children, particularly among disad-
vantaged groups. These schools also had better 
grade progression rates and enhanced community 
participation and parental involvement. There 
were no signifi cant differences in teacher absen-
teeism or student learning levels within the time-
frame of the evaluation.
The experience in Nepal provides an example of 
an alternative service delivery mechanism that could 
be helpful in times of armed confl ict. Community 
ownership (and the corresponding autonomy from 
the government) means that schools, students, teach-
ers, and school management are in a better position 
to avoid altercations with the groups fi ghting in the 
war. In fact, progress in school enrollment in con-
fl ict-affected areas, where community schools where 
most prevalent, was more rapid than in the rest of 
the country. As a result, high-conflict areas had 
higher primary school enrollment rates than low-
confl ict areas by 2004. The increase in enrollment 
rates was particularly pronounced for girls, among 
whom enrollment rates increased 27 percentage 
points in high-confl ict areas (box fi gure 7.5.1).
BOX FIGURE 7.5.1 Primary school enrollment rate in Nepal among children 6–10 years old, 1996–2004
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Can Nepal’s experiment be generalized to other 
areas? Nepal’s government decided to transfer 
schools to community management not on the basis 
of objective data but because such management 
was already prevalent in other places, such as for-
estry conservation and small irrigation areas. Many 
schools already had functioning school management 
committees; it was not clear whether their function-
ing changed as a result of this initiative. This his-
tory of community management may be absent in 
other settings, making Nepal’s experience diffi cult 
to replicate.
Sources: Chaudhury and Parajuli 2009; World Bank 2001, 2010b. 
BOX 7.5 (continued)
market experience obtained while working 
abroad as well as local knowledge—and pos-
sibly still relevant socioeconomic ties—that 
may allow them to be successful. 
Educational services such as “school in a 
box” kits and mobile educational program-
ming could be useful in camps and settle-
ments for internally displaced people. In the 
wake of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, for 
example, schooling was provided inside buses 
that moved from community to community 
or camp to camp.20 In areas with signifi cant 
numbers of internally displaced people, tem-
porary suspension of any documentation 
requirements could ease some of the con-
straints they face when enrolling in school 
and allow them to register for school without 
having to return to their areas of origin.21 
Other alternatives, such as community 
delivery of educational services, could be 
helpful in addressing security issues. Com-
munity- and home-based education initia-
tives are two ways to get around security 
constraints, especially during the transitional 
stage. Community-level schemes could be 
useful by having women in a community, for 
example, organize themselves to accompany 
children and women to educational centers. 
In Afghanistan, many of these programs have 
been supported by NGOs, both before and 
after the ousting of the Taliban in 2001. The 
Ministry of Education has also participated 
as an offi cial partner (Sigsgaard 2009). 
Community- and home-based education 
initiatives can also facilitate the expansion 
of educational services into places affected 
by confl ict, which are often diffi cult to reach 
and cut off from population centers. The 
experience of Nepal’s community schools 
can provide some lessons for the delivery of 
educational services amidst armed confl ict 
(box 7.5). 
Distance education through television, 
video, and particularly radio is another 
way of working around security problems. 
According to the British Broadcasting Cor-
poration (BBC), almost half of the Afghan 
population listens to its radio dramas every 
week, suggesting great potential to use this 
medium as an educational tool, raise aware-
ness, and promote social cohesion. 
Labor market policies 
and programs 
Because reforms to improve the business 
environment take time to bear fruit, labor 
market institutions, policies, and programs 
such as those discussed in chapter 6 have 
a particularly important role to play at the 
early postconflict stage. DDR programs; 
public works; training programs; and poli-
cies to support self-employment and the 
informal sector play both an activation (pro-
motion) and a safety net (protection) role. 
As discussed below, however, the design of 
these programs is more complex in confl ict 
situations.
Disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration programs 
The DDR of excombatants has become a key 
element of peace building in confl ict-affected 
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countries. DDR programs usually target 
excombatants in three broad phases: disar-
mament (collecting and disposing of weap-
ons); demobilization (disbanding military 
structures); and reintegration (the process 
of facilitating the return of former combat-
ants to civilian life, the armed forces, or the 
police). The last phase is essentially an acti-
vation program. Reintegration packages—
including vocational training, formal edu-
cation, physical and mental health services, 
incentives for entrepreneurship, employment 
services, public works, and cash transfers—
are at the heart of this phase (UN 2010).
DDR programs are underway in Afghani-
stan and Nepal. Afghanistan’s $141  million 
demobilization program, which ran from 
2003 to 2005, demobilized 63,000 profes-
sional soldiers and 7,500 child  soldiers. 
In the reintegration phase, 46 percent 
of excombatants attended vocational or 
small business training, and 43 percent 
opted to go into agriculture. The rein-
tegration phase was to have been com-
pleted in 2006 but was extended an addi-
tional two years after it was revealed that 
56 percent of all demobilized excombatants 
were earning less than $1 a day (Carames and 
Sanz 2009). A new reintegration  program 
directed at the entire affected community 
(not only excombatants), the Afghanistan 
Peace and Reintegration Program, is now in 
place. No formal evaluation exists, but by 
June 2011, 1,700 former fi ghters had publi-
cally joined the program (ISAF 2011).
In Nepal, nearly 20,000 members of the 
People’s Liberation Army have been demo-
bilized, at a cost of about $50 million.22 
These excombatants were to have been 
gradually reintegrated into the national 
armed forces, but political disagreements 
have prevented this phase from being 
completed.23
DDR programs can be costly. In a 
global survey of programs in 19 countries, 
researchers found that the average cost per 
demobilized person was $1,434—about 
3.5 times per capita income in these coun-
tries (Carames and Sanz 2008). In Afghani-
stan and Nepal, programs have been more 
expensive, with costs per demobilized per-
son of $2,278 in Afghanistan and $2,500 in 
Nepal  (Carames and Sanz 2009). The disar-
mament and demobilization stages usually 
represent a small share of the budget (less 
than 10 percent); most of the spending goes 
toward reinsertion and reintegration. In this 
phase, excombatants who participate in the 
reintegration program often receive eco-
nomic compensation to substitute for some 
of the income they would have earned by 
participating in violent activities. Afghani-
stan paid excombatants a total of $990, on 
average, to participate ($180–$480 a month 
over a period of two to four months)—
the second-highest payment in the world 
after Colombia ($2,750). Nepal pays $46 
a month (the duration of payments is not 
clear). DDRs may be unaffordable for many 
countries, especially when the conflict is 
nationwide. 
Reintegration is the most diffi cult part of 
the DDR process. Providing relevant training 
and helping people fi nd economic opportuni-
ties during or after a confl ict is always dif-
fi cult. The task is even harder in the case of 
excombatants. Reintegration is often about 
more than just fi nding new income sources, 
as excombatants have also lost physical secu-
rity, political infl uence, social networks, and 
prestige with the end of the confl ict  (Willibald 
2006). Failure to address these losses may 
jeopardize the DDR process and peace more 
generally (box 7.6). 
The extensive use of cash transfers in the 
reintegration process illustrates some of the 
risks of such interventions. The effectiveness 
of the cash transfers is unclear a priori. On the 
one hand, to the extent that fi nancing is the 
binding constraint, transfers could encourage 
compliance with disarmament commitments 
and help restore livelihoods. On the other 
hand, transfers, especially in cash, could 
exacerbate the illicit arms trade and generate 
resentment in the community. The effective-
ness of transfer programs is therefore likely 
to depend on economic opportunities and the 
details of the implementation of the program, 
such as payment location, eligibility criteria, 
and targeting mechanisms.
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In Uganda, a country affected by more than two 
decades of civil confl ict, a group of researchers put 
together a program in the northern part of the coun-
try aimed at reintegrating youth. The program—the 
Survey of War Affected Youth (SWAY)—included 
an analysis of the needs and diffi culties experienced 
by youth returning from the Lord Resistance Army 
(LRA), one of the main rebel groups in the country. 
It surveyed more than 1,000 households and 741 
young men in 2005 and 2006 and 619 young women 
in 2007. 
The program focused on youth who lived in the 
areas of interest before the escalation of the violence 
in 1996 and who had recently returned after hav-
ing been part of the LRA. As the LRA selected and 
abducted members randomly, outcomes for these 
youth could be compared with those of youth who 
were not selected or abducted to serve in the LRA. 
The idea was to use the results of the survey to 
inform policy makers who were about to design a 
full DDR program for excombatants.
Assistance to youth in Northern Uganda took two 
main forms: reinsertion assistance and longer-term 
reintegration and development services. Reinsertion 
assistance included interim counseling; vocational 
training; basic health care; and a reinsertion package 
that comprised household items, agricultural tools, 
seeds, and an unconditional cash payment. Cash pay-
ments were provided not only to returnees but also to 
other families living in affected areas. Interventions 
included vocational training, cash, and assistance in 
starting small enterprises and psychosocial care. 
Some of the lessons drawn by the team could be 
helpful in the design of other DDR programs in other 
parts of the world. Three fi ndings deserve attention:
•  Catching up on missed education is a pressing 
need, requiring a strong focus on secondary school 
and adult literacy. There is a need to go beyond the 
usual focus on primary education. 
•  In part as a consequence of lost education and 
work experience, excombatants were less than half 
as likely as noncombatant peers to be engaged in 
a skilled trade or a business. Their earnings were 
about a third those of youth who had not served 
in the LRA. Cash was one of the most crucial 
inputs needed for new income- generating activi-
ties; even the modest amounts of cash associated 
with the reinsertion package helped excombatants 
regenerate livelihoods. Interventions such as 
facilitation or business skills  training could have 
important impacts on the effectiveness of these 
funds.
•  Reinsertion packages for excombatants should 
be introduced in tandem with larger programs of 
support for all youth. SWAY researchers identifi ed 
increased resentment and stigmatization on the 
part of people not receiving these benefi ts, making 
reintegration more diffi cult. Where cash disburse-
ments are paid, it is crucial that they be designed 
to minimize the risks of stigmatization, resentment, 
misuse, and theft. 
Source: Annan and others 2007.
BOX 7.6 Lessons from eﬀ orts to reintegrate Ugandan youth
Despite the prevalence of DDR programs in 
postconfl ict environments, the individual and 
country-specifi c factors that lead to  successful 
reintegration are still not well understood. In 
their study of the highly regarded program 
in Sierra Leone, Humphreys and Weinstein 
(2007) fi nd that it was of limited effective-
ness in reintegrating more educated people, 
higher-ranking members of the rebel forces, 
and people who had been part of military 
units that had been most abusive of civil-
ians. The fact that the effects of the pro-
gram varied depending on the characteris-
tics of the individuals calls for more detailed 
evaluations of DDR programs, allowing for 
heterogeneous effects across individuals. 
International experience with DDR 
does suggest some lessons for improving 
the chances of successful reintegration or 
activation:
•  Because DDR is a long process, a strong 
commitment to peace from all parties and 
suffi cient fi nancing—often from interna-
tional donors—is crucial.24 
•  A strong training component seems to 
be critical. Such training is especially 
relevant in a country like Nepal, where 
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the military is already large and there are 
few prospects for absorbing all demobi-
lized excombatants into it or the police 
forces. 
•  Public employment is likely to play an 
important role for excombatants, who 
often lack employable skills and are cut 
off from social networks. 
•  In certain cases, the private sector can be a 
useful partner, as it has been in Colombia, 
where public-private partnerships have 
created more than 1,800 jobs for internally 
displaced people (box 7.7). This experi-
ence can be extended to excombatants.25 
Public work programs 
Public works programs are often imple-
mented in nonconfl ict situations (chapter 6).26 
In an analysis of 102 communities in coun-
tries affected by confl ict in 2005, research-
ers found that 44 percent of conflict-af-
fected communities had at least one public 
works project (World Bank 2010a). These 
programs have many features that make 
them well-suited for confl ict situations:27 
•  The workforce in confl ict and postconfl ict 
areas is more likely to be in rural areas, 
where agriculture is the primary source 
of income. Most workfare programs tar-
get rural areas and involve the building 
or rehabilitating of community infrastruc-
ture, which is likely to increase the produc-
tivity of the agricultural sector and rural 
nonfarm activities.
•  People in conflict areas have lower lev-
els of education than people in noncon-
fl ict areas. Workfare programs are ideal 
for such people, because they provide 
work for unskilled workers (some pro-
grams also provide additional vocational 
training). 
•  People in confl ict and postconfl ict areas 
are more likely to work in informal 
jobs, which provide little or no social 
 protection. By instituting a workfare pro-
gram, governments can provide informal 
unemployment insurance.
Colombia has suffered from violence for more than 
two decades. The primary sources of violence are 
confl icts among the government; right-wing para-
military groups, such as the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC); and left-leaning gue-
rillas. By 2008, 2.65–4.36 million people had been 
displaced by the confl ict, the second-largest popula-
tion of displaced people in the world (after Sudan). A 
disproportionate number of the displaced are Afro-
Colombians or members of indigenous tribal groups, 
who have low levels of literacy and numeracy. 
Colombia is also the second-largest exporter of 
cut fl owers in the world. In 2006, 70 percent of all 
roses and 97 percent of the carnations sold in the 
United States came from Colombia.
In 2003, the Colombian Association of Flower 
Exporters (Asocolfl ores) established a school of fl o-
riculture to enable people displaced by the confl ict 
to find work. It developed a nine-month training 
course focused on cultivating, harvesting, grading, 
and packing fl owers. The course was followed by 
a four-month work period on flower farms, after 
which participants found permanent employment in 
the fast-growing fl ower industry. 
The program was funded by Asocolflores and 
flower farmers; it also received funds and techni-
cal support from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the Pan-American Devel-
opment Fund (PADF). Participants were provided 
with a stipend, lodging, and psychological support 
to help them recover from displacement. By 2008, 
with an investment of $1.8 million, the school had 
benefited more than 1,631 families. A key lesson 
from the Colombian experience is that the private 
sector, supported by public funds, can be a useful 
source of training and jobs for displaced popula-
tions, especially in fast-growing industries that 
employ unskilled labor.
Sources: Caycedo and Mendoza 2008; IDMC 2009; PADF 2008; USAID 2006. 
BOX 7.7 Training and employing displaced people: The case of Asocolﬂ ores in Colombia
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•  Confl ict and postconfl ict areas are char-
acterized by mobile populations. Work-
fare programs, along with a traditional 
resettlement campaign, can help ease the 
transition of internally displaced people to 
their places of origin by providing them 
with temporary employment and guaran-
teed income for a period of time. 
Implementing a public work program in 
conflict and postconflict situations poses 
certain challenges, however:
•  Security is a major concern. In most cases, 
workfare programs can proceed only 
when there is suffi cient order to provide a 
secure work environment and transporta-
tion to work sites, especially for women. 
Land mines and other conflict-induced 
hazards must be removed before a work-
fare program can begin. 
•  Most workfare programs use the wage 
rate as a targeting device, setting it at a 
level that is high enough to induce peo-
ple to participate in the program and low 
enough to attract only the very poor. In 
confl ict-affected areas, setting an appro-
priate wage can be difficult if private 
labor markets have not functioned for 
some time. In such situations, practitio-
ners must be creative. In Sierra Leone, 
for example, preconfl ict household survey 
data, along with monthly price data on 
staple foods and fi sh, were used to come 
up with a wage estimate. 
•  Some communities may be so destroyed 
that the scope of public works may be 
broader than usual. In such communities, 
it could be desirable to include the rebuild-
ing of private homes as part of the work-
fare program, as was done in Sri Lanka. 
•  Excombatants may not be able to work 
with other members of society, given the 
animosities generated during the confl ict. 
Fearing reprisals, many excombatants in 
Sierra Leone did not wish to return to 
their villages, where a workfare program 
had been established. The solution was to 
allow such people to work in the workfare 
program set up in the capital.
Sri Lanka’s public works program over-
came some of these problems (box 7.8).
The decades-long conflict between the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lanka 
government ended in May 2009. The confl ict had led 
to the destruction of social and economic infrastruc-
ture and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of 
people from the fi ve northern districts of Jaffna, Kili-
nochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, and Vavuniya. As part 
of its resettlement plan, the government established a 
cash-for-work program to repair community infras-
tructure and provide returning internally displaced 
populations with short-term income support.
Community leaders and project officers of the 
fi ve districts identifi ed projects. Community mem-
bers mobilized returning households to form com-
munity cash-for-work committees, which identifi ed 
projects of immediate need for the communities. 
Projects included debris removal and land clearance, 
well restoration and construction, small-scale irriga-
tion canal rehabilitation, small road rehabilitation 
and repairs, classroom rehabilitation, health clinic 
repairs and rehabilitation, and repair and construc-
tion of community drinking water facilities.
A maximum of three adults (including the head 
of household) from each returning household were 
eligible to participate in the program, with only one 
member allowed to participate on a given day. This 
feature of the program was included to encourage 
participants to seek other work. 
In order to encourage only the very poor to self-
select into the program, the wage rate was set at 15 
percent below the market rate for unskilled labor for 
the district. The market wage was established by a 
BOX 7.8 Implementing public works in a postconﬂ ict environment: Sri Lanka’s Northern 
Province Emergency Recovery Project
(continues next page)
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Training
The considerably lower skill base of the 
workforce in confl ict-affected areas means 
that reskilling—with an emphasis on pro-
moting literacy, noncognitive skills, and 
practical skills—is key for postconflict 
recovery. Given the large informal sectors in 
these areas, the discussion of training pro-
grams in chapter 6 is relevant here. 
Public work and DDR programs often 
include training components, which attempt 
to cater to the diverse training needs of tar-
get groups. In the Afghanistan Peace and 
Reintegration Program, for instance, training 
includes not only literacy skills but also prac-
tical training in farming, farm equipment 
maintenance, nursery establishment and 
management, watershed management, road 
building and maintenance, and basic electri-
cal work and plumbing. 
Initially, the government takes the lead, 
often in partnership with international aid 
organizations and NGOs. Over time, the 
 private sector can play an important role, 
particularly as it is more likely to provide 
 job-related training and an employment path-
way for trained workers (see box 7.7). 
The diffi culty of providing education and 
training in conflict-affected areas is com-
pounded by extensive migration and displace-
ment. The usual approach is to wait for peo-
ple to come back to their homes, as evidenced 
by the common reallocation packages offered 
in postconfl ict situations. Sometimes, how-
ever, people do not have the right opportuni-
ties at home or fear returning. Following the 
ceasefire in Sri Lanka, for example, unem-
ployment rates increased signifi cantly for the 
most educated (especially people who had 
recently moved back) in the Northern and 
Eastern provinces. With unemployment at 
29 percent, this group became the most likely 
to be unemployed in the conflict-affected 
areas—a change from confl ict times (World 
Bank 2007). 
Support for self-employment 
and microenterprise development 
Other interventions seek to support self-
 employment and microenterprise devel-
opment to help informal sector work-
ers improve their potential for generating 
income. Particularly relevant are microfi-
nance, the strengthening of business sup-
ply chains, and business training in foster-
ing entrepreneurship in the informal sector 
(World Bank 2011). Much of the discussion 
of interventions that promote self-employ-
ment in chapter 6 is also relevant for confl ict-
affected areas. It is important to recognize, 
however, that the presence of a large mobile 
population, security risks, malfunctioning 
product and input markets, and the erosion 
of trust in the community make microcredit 
(district) wage-fi xing committee that included repre-
sentatives of the government (who consulted the pri-
vate sector), NGOs, and donors.
Participants could work for a total of 50 days. 
Given that the vast majority of internally displaced 
people returned to homesteads that had been seve-
rally damaged during the confl ict, participants were 
allowed to work on their own homes during the fi rst 
10 days. The rationale was that they would not be 
able to work well with the workfare program or 
with any other job if their homes remained in disre-
pair. Repairing one’s own home also increased the 
sense of revival and confi dence in the future.
By 2010, about 275,000 internally displaced peo-
ple had returned to their villages. Participants in the 
program worked more than 380,000 person-days, 
repairing 1,500 kilometers of roads and 145 wells and 
cleaning more than 900 hectares of public spaces.
Source: Government of Sri Lanka 2010. 
BOX 7.8 Implementing public works in a postconﬂ ict environment: Sri Lanka’s Northern 
Province Emergency Recovery Project (continued)
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and related operations particularly challeng-
ing in confl ict-affected areas. 
One example of a program that tries to 
tackle these issues in a postconfl ict environ-
ment is the Nepal Poverty Alleviation Fund 
(PAF), which seeks to promote entrepreneur-
ship through its income-generating compo-
nent. PAF provides loans, complemented with 
funds for infrastructure needed to better link 
products to markets.28 
Initiatives directed at bringing producers 
and markets together—such as initiatives in 
Kosovo and Rwanda in the tourism, coffee, 
and dairy industries—could also bring early 
results (World Bank 2011). As with other 
interventions, programs directed at sup-
porting self-employment need to be further 
evaluated before more specifi c lessons can be 
drawn on what works, when, and where.29
Fiscal and capacity constraints 
to public employment programs 
Most conflict-affected areas lack govern-
ments with sufficient fiscal resources or 
capacity to administer large bureaucracies 
or public employment programs. Both of 
these constraints are likely to be particularly 
severe in cases of nationwide confl ict. 
Conflict-affected countries tend to have 
high levels of indebtedness (fi gure 7.13), low 
tax revenues, and high dependency on for-
eign aid. Tax revenues are low across South 
Asia, especially in Afghanistan (6 percent 
of GDP) and Pakistan (10 percent of GDP) 
(World Bank 2011b). Moreover, the military 
takes up a large share of central government 
expenditures in South Asia, estimated at 10 
percent in Afghanistan and Bangladesh, 15 
percent in India and Sri Lanka, and 18 per-
cent in Pakistan (the average for conflict-
affected countries worldwide is 3.2 percent) 
(World Bank 2011b).
These fi scal constraints and the consid-
erable capacity constraints in confl ict envi-
ronments suggest an important role for 
international organizations and foreign gov-
ernments in funding and capacity building. 
A risk, however, is that postconfl ict countries 
become highly dependent on foreign aid, 
especially when the confl ict is nationwide. In 
Afghanistan, for example, offi cial develop-
ment assistance represented 45.8 percent of 
gross national income in 2008 (World Bank 
2011b). This dependency on foreign aid may 
pose risks to postconfl ict recovery by crowd-
ing out domestic resource mobilization, 
making unsustainable expenditure commit-
ments, and raising the exchange rate (Boyce 
2007). Moreover, international aid declines 
significantly after the initial postconflict 
period (Chen, Loayza, and Reynal-Querol 
2007), before local revenue sources have 
recovered sufficiently. Some postconflict 
areas also depend heavily on international 
organizations and NGOs for well-paid jobs, 
which could further distort labor markets.30 
Despite these caveats, international orga-
nizations have an important role to play, 
especially in the short term, by ensuring that 
local fi rms have the opportunity to partici-
pate in aid-fi nanced tenders (in the logistics 
and construction sectors, for example). The 
Afghan First initiative by the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization is a promising example 
of how to build capacity and increase the par-
ticipation of local fi rms in confl ict-affected 
areas.31 
FIGURE 7.13 Central government debt as a percentage of GDP 
in conﬂ ict and nonconﬂ ict areas of South Asia and the world, 
1990s and 2000s
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Sources: Authors, based on data from World Bank 2011b and UCDP/PRIO conﬂ ict database. 
Note: Diﬀ erences between conﬂ ict and nonconﬂ ict are signiﬁ cant at the 5 percent level. A country is 
considered to be in conﬂ ict in a given year if it experienced 25 or more battle deaths from confron-
tations between the military forces of two parties, at least one of which is the government of a state. 
Results do not change if India is excluded from the analysis. 
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A jobs transition path 
in conﬂ ict zones
Job-related interventions need to be 
sequenced depending on the stage and 
the type of the confl ict. The constraints to 
job creation vary depending on whether 
the conflict is ongoing or over, nation-
wide or localized. These constraints will 
determine the design of all labor market 
programs discussed in this chapter, from 
public works and microcredit programs 
to changes in regulation and the provision 
of basic services, including education and 
infrastructure.
Security is a key determinant of the sus-
tainability and desirability of investment 
in conflict-affected areas. Insecurity is a 
 continuum: even postconfl ict situations expe-
rience a certain degree of violence. A mini-
mum level of security is needed before certain 
investments can be made in confl ict-affected 
areas; achieving security is likely to drive the 
sequencing of interventions.32 There is little 
private investment in confl ict-affected areas, 
and opportunities for wage employment are 
restricted. Large infrastructure projects or 
other fi xed investments may not be feasible in 
areas where violence and insecurity are still 
rampant; innovative interventions that try 
to maintain human capital may represent a 
 better investment. 
Once a minimum level of security is 
achieved, job creation efforts in conflict 
zones need to undergo three major types 
of transitions: from the public sector as the 
key provider of jobs to a greater role for the 
private sector, from low-skilled agricultural 
jobs to higher-productivity nonfarm jobs, 
and from targeted programs to broad-based 
job creation. Table 7.3 summarizes these 
transitions.
Who creates jobs? 
Given the constraints on private business, 
the public sector is often the main creator 
of jobs initially after confl ict. Direct pub-
lic employment should be only a transi-
tion strategy, however. Fiscal conditions, 
efficiency considerations, and unintended 
adverse effects of public employment (such 
as corruption and politicization of jobs) all 
caution against maintaining the state as a 
long-term provider of jobs. Given these con-
cerns, policy makers need to develop a strat-
egy for transitioning to a greater role for the 
private sector.
What jobs to create? 
In the initial stages, it is natural that jobs be 
created in the agricultural sector, where the 
bulk of the workforce is already involved, 
as well as in other unskilled sectors. Sectors 
such as construction, which have the poten-
tial to employ local unskilled labor and help 
in postconfl ict rebuilding, should be encour-
aged, through, for example, public works 
and training in needed skills. The  Pakistan 
postcrisis needs assessment identified 
TABLE 7.3 Labor market transitions in postconﬂ ict zones
Key question Constraints/concerns
Job transition path
From To
Who creates jobs? Security, infrastructure, 
poor regulations, fi scal 
constraints
Public sector, international 
organizations
Private sector, public-private 
partnerships
What jobs to create? Security,
rural, unskilled work force
Agricultural, unskilled, 
casual
Nonfarm, skilled, regular 
wage or salaried
For whom to create jobs? Vulnerable populations 
(excombatants, youth 
at risk, war victims)
Targeted programs Broad-based job creation
Source: Authors.
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construction as the sector with the greatest 
immediate potential for job generation in the 
confl ict-affected areas. Yet key sectors are 
often not prioritized, especially in view of 
the need for quick gains. In the worldwide 
community surveys conducted as part of the 
Moving out of Poverty series (World Bank 
2010a), for example, only 16 percent of con-
fl ict-affected communities reported receiving 
assistance with agriculture and only 7 per-
cent benefi ted from a fi nance/credit project.
The transition plan should seek to move 
workers toward higher-productivity jobs, 
which will pay more and result in greater wel-
fare improvements. Initial steps toward doing 
so can include making the agricultural sector 
more productive, by, for example, providing 
better inputs, such as improved seeds, fertil-
izer, and storage facilities; creating function-
ing local markets; and rebuilding transport 
and communication networks to access more 
distant markets. Longer-term transition plans 
could include retraining the workforce to par-
ticipate in manufacturing or services, as well 
as facilitating the growth of fi rms in the non-
farm sector. These measures are likely to create 
more jobs that pay regular wages or salaries. 
The private sector can be involved, through 
public-private partnerships, for example. 
For whom to create jobs? 
In the early stages of the conflict, policy 
interventions should be directed at managing 
the risks of renewed confl ict and addressing 
the lack of economic opportunities for the 
vulnerable. Without credible economic alter-
natives to people involved in the fighting, 
an end to the violence is unlikely. Job cre-
ation can play an important role in helping 
address the concerns and grievances that led 
to the confl ict, which is fundamental in but-
tressing confi dence in the peace process.33 
Nepal—where persisting disagreements on 
how to integrate excombatants have left the 
country politically unstable almost fi ve years 
after the peace agreement—illustrates the 
importance of addressing such concerns.
Job creation efforts in confl ict-affected areas 
have to deal with three types of populations 
with special needs. The fi rst is excombatants, 
who need to be integrated into the civilian or 
military workforce and be given incentives to 
refrain from violence. The second is at-risk 
youth and war victims. This group includes 
families who have lost some of their members; 
people with physical or mental disabilities; 
and households that are extremely  vulnerable 
because they have no steady streams of 
income. The third is people displaced by the 
conflict, who may wish to return to their 
homes but need to be able to fi nd jobs and 
feel secure there. 
Targeting is diffi cult in confl ict-affected 
areas. Identifying and locating benefi ciaries 
often proves diffi cult. One way to overcome 
these problems can be to target programs 
for specifi c areas rather than specifi c people, 
thereby allowing self-selection to determine 
who receives benefi ts. This is the approach 
followed in Afghanistan, for example, under 
the Peace and Reintegration Program (Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan 2010). 
Over the longer term, broad-based job 
creation is needed in these areas. To work 
toward this goal, government can operate 
targeted programs for a limited time while 
encouraging the growth of other activities 
and firms to provide a broader set of jobs. 
Table 7.4 summarizes some policies that can 
be implemented at each step of this transition 
process.
Because of the violent nature of confl ict, 
the impacts of policy interventions in con-
fl ict or postconfl ict environments have rarely 
been rigorously analyzed. As a result, policy 
makers cannot draw on a large body of evi-
dence.34 Some evidence on World Bank proj-
ects suggests that urban development projects 
are most likely to succeed and that private 
sector development projects need a longer 
time horizon for success (Chauvet, Collier, 
and Duponchel 2010). The quality of super-
vision is also an important determinant of 
project success, but evidence remains limited. 
Piloting some interventions and progressively 
expanding programs could help shed light 
on program effectiveness. In many confl icts, 
governments do not regain control of all 
confl ict areas at the same time. Starting the 
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TABLE 7.4  Policy interventions in the initial postconﬂ ict stages
Goal Possible interventions
Create some jobs quickly. • Set up labor-intensive public works, especially in rural areas.
• Create employment agencies where needed. 
•  Respond to the needs of the displaced and internally mobile by creating job opportunities 
outside areas directly aff ected by confl ict.
•  Distribute tools and inputs for farming and construction (starting with rehabilitation of people’s 
own houses).
Promote agriculture and other informal 
sector activities, such as jobs in 
construction and self-employment.
•  Rehabilitate complementary infrastructure needed for production and getting products to 
market (this intervention should be combined with appropriate business services).
•  Provide credit, funds, and training to foster entrepreneurship (microcredit, cash transfers to start 
businesses, business development training).
Create the base for better jobs by 
improving workers’ skills.
•  Focus on progressively getting children back to school and providing practical training and 
literacy courses for youth and adults using existing networks, community initiatives, and NGOs 
when available. 
•  Address security concerns related to accessing schools or training, especially for girls (through 
mobile schools, community involvement in security).
•  Focus on the needs of displaced people and internal migrants, allowing for reskilling outside areas 
directly aff ected by confl ict.
Improve the investment climate. • Create “safe” zones that provide better regulation, services, and security.
•  Tap into innovative source of fi nancing, such as diaspora bonds, as well as innovative forms of 
guarantees for foreign direct investment.
•  Establish investment information centers that match interested foreign investors with potential 
local partners.
•  Create links between fi rms and local communities to ensure the sustainability and profi tability of 
enterprises.
•  Improve the overall business environment by simplifying regulations and facilitating processes 
for entry and exit.
Source: Authors.
piloting of labor market programs and poli-
cies in areas where control has been restored 
and then scaling up to the rest of the confl ict-
affected areas can improve policy results. The 
National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan 
is a case in point: the program was piloted in 
locations where violence was less pronounced 
before being progressively extended to the 
rest of the country. In Sri Lanka, many of 
the labor market and development programs 
the government is planning for the North-
ern Province were fi rst piloted in the Eastern 
Province. 
In short, the employment challenge in con-
fl ict-affected areas is larger than just creating 
jobs. It concerns the fundamental problem of 
establishing functioning economies, creating 
occupations different from those that existed 
in the war economy, promoting growth, gen-
erating government revenue, and addressing 
some of the underlying economic and social 
grievances that may have led to the armed 
confl ict in the fi rst place and could reinitiate 
violence if not addressed. There are examples 
of promising interventions, but achieving 
these goals is likely to take a long time.
 C R E A T I N G  J O B S  I N  C O N F L I C T  A F F E C T E D  A R E A S   3 1 1
Annex 7A Deﬁ nitions of high-conﬂ ict and low-conﬂ ict regions 
in selected South Asian countries
This annex describes the classification of 
high- and low-confl ict regions in Afghani-
stan, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.
Afghanistan
Classifi cation is at the province level. High-
conflict provinces are defined as provinces 
in which the number of deaths per 1,000 
people caused by terrorist incidents in 2007 
was greater than 0.1. By this defi nition, 15 
provinces are in high-confl ict areas (Baghlan, 
Ghazni, Farah, Helmand, Kandahar, Khost, 
Kunarha, Nimroz, Paktika, Paktya, Panjsher, 
Takhar, Urozgan, Wardak, and Zabul) areas. 
Data on terrorism deaths were obtained 
from the National Counterterrorism Center 
(2008). 
India
Classification is at the state level. Low-
 conflict states are states that recorded no 
 conflict-related fatalities in 2000 or 2007. 
High-confl ict states are states that transitioned 
to a state of confl ict during this  period—that 
is, states that recorded no casualties in 2000 
but did record confl ict-related casualties in 
2007. This means that states in conflict in 
2000 are excluded from this analysis. By this 
defi nition, 10 states are in high-confl ict areas 
(Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, 
Maharashtra, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Orissa, 
Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal). Confl ict-
related fatalities are based on data from the 
RAND-MIPT Terrorism Database, collected 
by the National Memorial Institute for the 
Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), in collabo-
ration with the National Counterterrorism 
Center (NCTC). Data are available for the 
period January 1998–April 2007.
Nepal
Classifi cation is at the district level. High-
 conflict districts are those in which the 
number of confl ict deaths per 1,000 people 
in 2004 was greater than the median; low-
confl ict districts are those in which the num-
ber of confl ict deaths per 1,000 people was 
less than the median level of 0.67. The time 
period considered was 1996–2004 (two 
years before the end of the confl ict). By this 
defi nition, half of Nepal’s 36 districts are 
classified as high-conflict areas (Achham, 
Arghakhanchi, Bajura, Banke, Bardiya, 
Bhojpur, Dadeldhura, Dailekh, Dang, 
Dhading, Dolakha, Dolpa, Doti, Gorkha, 
Humla, Jajarkot, Jumla, Kailali, Kalikot, 
Kanchanpur, Kavrepalanchok, Lamjung, 
Mugu, Myagdi, Nuwakot, Okhaldhunga, 
Ramechhap, Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan, 
Sankhuwasabha, Sindhuli, Sindhupalchok, 
Solukhumbu, Surkhet, and Taplejung). 
Data on confl ict deaths were obtained from 
the annual Human Rights Yearbooks pub-
lished by the Informal Sector Service Centre 
(INSEC), an NGO based in Kathmandu.
Sri Lanka
Classifi cation is at the province level. The 
Northern Province was not included in the 
analysis because of lack of data. The East-
ern Province is classifi ed as high confl ict; all 
other provinces are classifi ed as low confl ict. 
The analysis for Sri Lanka should be inter-
preted with caution, however, as the data 
reflect almost two decades of conflict. In 
addition, the analysis for Sri Lanka differs 
from that of other countries in that confl ict-
affected regions are moving from confl ict to 
peace.
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Annex 7B Labor market characteristics and educational attainment in 
high-conﬂ ict and low-conﬂ ict areas of selected South Asian countries 
TABLE 7B.1 Labor market characteristics in high-conﬂ ict and low-conﬂ ict areas of Afghanistan, 2008
Afghanistan
2008
Low- confl ict 
areas
High-confl ict 
areas Diff erence Diff erence (rural)
Percentage of working age population employed 55.67 68.37 12.705*** 9.192***
 Male 76.09 81.08 4.984***
 Female 35.49 54.76 19.273***
Unemployment rate 1.96 0.66 –1.305*** –1.008***
 Male 2.82 0.83 –1.989***
 Female 1.12 0.47 –0.644***
Labor force participation rate 57.63 69.03 11.400*** 8.184***
 Male 78.91 81.90 2.995***
 Female 36.60 55.23 18.629***
Percentage of workers in urban areas 21.77 5.29 –16.481***
Percentage of workers by sector of employment
 Agriculture 51.46 70.50 19.038*** 9.698***
 Manufacturing 6.62 1.43 –5.191*** –4.742***
 Construction 9.43 4.90 –4.532*** –4.469***
 Commerce 12.65 8.45 –4.195*** –0.502*
 Transportation 3.13 2.94 –0.183 0.902***
 Public administration 4.87 2.21 –2.664*** –0.440***
Percentage of workers by type of employment
 Regular wage or salaried 11.92 4.24 –7.673*** –2.966***
 Casual 16.05 10.33 –5.719*** –7.371***
 Employer 0.56 0.39 –0.176** –0.230***
 Self-employment 42.98 44.97 1.986*** 3.346***
 Unpaid family worker 28.46 40.05 11.590*** 7.232***
Percentage of workers who are informal 89.09 96.26 7.170*** 1.872***
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on household and labor force surveys of Afghanistan.
Note: The “diﬀ erence” column indicates the diﬀ erence in labor market characteristics between households residing in high-conﬂ ict areas and those in low-conﬂ ict areas, as deﬁ ned in 
annex 7.A. The “diﬀ erence (rural)” columns computes the same diﬀ erence for rural areas only.
*** Signiﬁ cant at the 1% level; ** signiﬁ cant at the 5% level; * signiﬁ cant at the 10% level.
TABLE 7B.2 Labor market characteristics in high-conﬂ ict and low-conﬂ ict areas of India, 2000 and 2008
India
2000 2008
Low- 
confl ict 
areas
High-
confl ict 
areas
Low- 
confl ict 
areas
High-
confl ict 
areas
Diff erence-in-
diff erence
Diff erence-in-
diff erence (rural)
Percentage of working age population 
employed 60.75 55.98 58.25 54.37 0.896** 1.118**
 Male 81.00 81.17 80.74 80.88 –0.033
 Female 40.01 29.81 35.36 27.17 2.011***
Unemployment rate 2.23 2.24 2.11 2.09 –0.024*** 0.034***
 Male 3.10 3.59 3.09 3.31 –0.260***
 Female 1.34 0.85 1.11 0.83 0.228***
Labor force participation rate 62.99 58.22 60.35 56.46 0.871*** 1.153***
 Male 84.11 84.76 83.83 84.19 –0.293***
 Female 41.35 30.65 36.46 28.00 2.238***
Percentage of workers in urban areas 24.05 21.45 27.87 22.36 –2.902***
(continues next page)
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TABLE 7B.2 Labor market characteristics in high-conﬂ ict and low-conﬂ ict areas of India, 2000 and 2008 (continued)
India
2000 2008
Low- 
confl ict 
areas
High-
confl ict 
areas
Low- 
confl ict 
areas
High-
confl ict 
areas
Diff erence-in-
diff erence
Diff erence-in-
diff erence (rural)
Percentage of workers by sector of employment
 Agriculture 58.18 61.35 50.18 56.38 3.027*** 2.327***
 Manufacturing 11.20 10.65 13.79 11.27 –1.960*** –0.525
 Construction 5.71 4.08 8.81 6.46 –0.717*** –1.133***
 Commerce 10.77 10.62 11.19 10.66 –0.381 0.061
 Transportation 3.84 3.69 4.95 4.40 –0.397* –0.516**
 Public administration 2.79 2.38 1.86 1.97 0.515*** 0.010
Percentage of workers by type of employment
 Regular wage or salaried 15.94 13.70 18.94 14.83 –1.865*** –1.312***
 Casual 30.73 31.45 29.34 30.55 0.491*** –0.259
 Employer 1.03 0.60 1.44 0.96 –0.053 –0.265**
 Self-employment 29.61 32.71 30.90 32.92 –1.086** –1.010*
 Unpaid family worker 22.69 21.53 19.38 20.73 2.514*** 2.846***
Percentage of workers who are informal 86.37 87.94 91.27 92.07 –0.762** –1.033***
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on household and labor force surveys of India.
Note: The “diﬀ erence-in-diﬀ erence” column indicates the diﬀ erence in labor market trends between households residing in high-conﬂ ict areas and households residing low-conﬂ ict 
areas between 2000 (when there was no conﬂ ict in any of the areas considered here) and 2007 (when only the conﬂ ict group was in conﬂ ict). The “diﬀ erence-in-diﬀ erence (rural)” 
columns computes the same diﬀ erence for rural areas only.
*** Signiﬁ cant at the 1% level; ** signiﬁ cant at the 5% level; * signiﬁ cant at the 10% level.
(continues next page)
TABLE 7B.3 Labor market characteristics in high-conﬂ ict and low-conﬂ ict areas of Nepal, 1996 and 2004
Nepal
1996 2004
Low- 
confl ict 
areas
High-
confl ict 
areas
Low- 
confl ict 
areas
High-
confl ict 
areas
Diff erence-in-
diff erence
Diff erence-in-
diff erence (rural)
Percentage of working age population 
employed 73.84 81.92 75.91 86.34 2.352* 0.588
 Male 79.16 86.26 83.41 89.50 –1.010
 Female 69.07 78.09 69.59 83.83 5.222***
Unemployment rate 1.68 1.71 2.32 1.17 –1.181*** –0.788**
 Male 2.68 2.23 3.16 1.89 –0.819
 Female 0.79 1.25 1.62 0.59 –1.484***
Labor force participation rate 75.52 83.62 78.24 87.51 1.172 –0.200
 Male 81.84 88.49 86.56 91.39 –1.829
 Female 69.87 79.34 71.21 84.42 3.738**
Percentage of workers in urban areas 7.34 2.31 17.40 6.16 –6.213***
Percentage of workers by sector of employment
 Agriculture 77.79 87.16 72.67 84.76 2.726** –1.946
 Manufacturing 4.52 2.65 7.56 3.08 –2.619*** –1.151*
 Construction 2.47 2.57 2.99 2.84 –0.247 0.265
 Commerce 7.45 3.00 7.30 3.02 0.161 1.267*
 Transportation 1.21 0.58 1.64 0.49 –0.521* –0.530*
 Public administration 0.62 0.21 0.76 0.23 –0.121 0.183
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TABLE 7B.3 Labor market characteristics in high-conﬂ ict and low-conﬂ ict areas of Nepal, 1996 and 2004 (continued)
Nepal
1996 2004
Low- 
confl ict 
areas
High-
confl ict 
areas
Low- 
confl ict 
areas
High-
confl ict 
areas
Diff erence-in-
diff erence
Diff erence-in-
diff erence (rural)
Percentage of workers by type of employment
 Regular wage or salaried 7.66 4.80 8.91 3.89 –2.167*** 0.485
 Casual 17.86 11.66 16.30 7.02 –3.084*** –3.835***
 Unpaid family worker 49.35 57.22 47.78 60.08 4.420** 3.048*
Percentage of workers who are informal 92.25 95.75 90.79 95.98 1.685** –0.831
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on household and labor force surveys of Nepal.
Note: The “diﬀ erence-in-diﬀ erence” column indicates the diﬀ erence in labor market trends between households residing in high-conﬂ ict areas and households residing low-conﬂ ict 
areas between1996 (before the conﬂ ict) and 2004 (after the conﬂ ict had begun). The “diﬀ erence-in-diﬀ erence (rural)” columns computes the same diﬀ erence for rural areas only.
*** Signiﬁ cant at the 1% level; ** signiﬁ cant at the 5% level; * signiﬁ cant at the 10% level.
TABLE 7B.4 Labor market characteristics in high-conﬂ ict and low-conﬂ ict areas of Sri Lanka, 2004 and 2008
Sri Lanka
2004 2008
Low- 
confl ict 
areas
High-
confl ict 
areas
Low- 
confl ict 
areas
High-
confl ict 
areas
Diff erence-in-
diff erence
Diff erence-in-
diff erence (rural)
Percentage of working age population 
employed 54.70 45.92 56.51 45.95 1.787 1.655
 Male 75.55 75.52 77.80 76.27 1.504
 Female 34.96 19.74 37.60 18.99 3.384**
Unemployment rate 4.73 5.35 3.32 4.03 –0.083 –0.084
 Male 4.79 5.68 3.15 4.01 0.032
 Female 4.67 5.06 3.48 4.05 –0.180
Labor force participation rate 59.43 51.27 59.84 49.98 1.704 1.571
 Male 80.33 81.20 80.95 80.28 1.536
 Female 39.64 24.80 41.08 23.03 3.204**
Percentage of workers in urban areas 12.13 22.75 10.24 21.42 –0.558
Percentage of workers by sector of employment
 Agriculture 31.66 27.39 30.85 24.03 2.545 3.362*
 Manufacturing 18.58 11.75 19.21 12.66 –0.273 –1.876
 Construction 5.36 4.42 6.32 10.52 –5.148*** –5.303***
 Commerce 14.66 24.55 15.38 19.91 5.362*** 5.024***
 Transportation 5.82 5.87 6.11 4.63 1.537* 1.750*
 Public administration 7.38 9.34 6.78 10.80 –2.059* –2.340*
Percentage of workers by type of employment
 Regular wage or salaried 37.64 26.59 27.18 20.27 –4.138** –5.741***
 Casual 23.00 28.54 29.84 43.15 –7.758*** –9.203***
 Employer 2.79 2.91 2.95 2.11 0.964 1.025
 Self-employment 27.27 31.50 29.25 29.42 4.065** 6.078***
 Unpaid family worker 9.31 10.45 10.78 5.05 6.868*** 7.842***
Percentage of workers who are informal 81.24 79.10 71.13 75.99 –6.992*** –6.556***
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on household and labor force surveys of Sri Lanka.
Note: The “diﬀ erence-in-diﬀ erence” column indicates the diﬀ erence in labor market trends between households residing in high-conﬂ ict areas and households residing in low-
conﬂ ict areas between 2008 (after the cease ﬁ re) and 2004 (during the cease ﬁ re). The “diﬀ erence-in-diﬀ erence (rural)” columns computes the same diﬀ erence for rural areas only.
*** Signiﬁ cant at the 1% level; ** signiﬁ cant at the 5% level; * signiﬁ cant at the 10% level.
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TABLE 7B.5 Educational attainment in high-conﬂ ict and low-conﬂ ict areas of South Asia, by country
(percentage of working-age population)
Counry/level of education
Low-
confl ict 
areas
High- 
confl ict 
areas
Low-
confl ict 
areas
High- 
confl ict 
areas Diff erence
Diff erence 
(rural)
Diff erence-in-
diff erence
Diff erence-in-
diff erence (rural)
Afghanistan 2008
No education 67.87 82.19 n.a n.a 14.320*** 4.500*** n.a n.a
Some primary school 8.74 4.32 n.a n.a –4.418*** –3.450*** n.a n.a
Completed primary school 10.04 6.73 n.a n.a –3.315*** –0.906*** n.a n.a
Lower-secondary schooling 5.45 3.67 n.a n.a –1.786*** 0.433*** n.a n.a
Upper-secondary schooling 5.94 2.59 n.a n.a –3.340*** –0.346** n.a n.a
Tertiary education 1.96 0.50 n.a n.a –1.460*** –0.231*** n.a n.a
India 2000 2008
No education 37.48 45.51 28.79 35.80 n.a n.a –1.017*** –1.563***
Some primary school 9.23 8.37 8.36 7.66 n.a n.a 0.162 0.405
Completed primary school 13.92 10.06 15.30 13.53 n.a n.a 2.094*** 2.144***
Lower-secondary schooling 28.08 25.67 31.70 29.49 n.a n.a 0.202 0.500
Upper-secondary schooling 10.85 9.90 8.96 7.54 n.a n.a –0.464* –1.072***
Tertiary education 0.43 0.49 6.90 5.98 n.a n.a –0.975*** –0.414***
Nepal 1996 2004  
No education 61.27 69.90 48.22 57.94 n.a n.a 1.092 -2.343
Some primary school 7.90 10.49 9.46 11.71 n.a n.a –0.340 0.237
Completed primary school 12.69 10.25 13.98 13.93 n.a n.a 2.387** 1.923*
Lower-secondary schooling 15.58 8.43 22.89 14.69 n.a n.a –1.053 0.029
Upper-secondary schooling 1.63 0.58 3.46 1.21 n.a n.a –1.214*** 0.104
Tertiary education 0.93 0.34 1.99 0.53 n.a n.a –0.873*** 0.051
Sri Lanka 2004 2008  
No education 4.79 7.56 3.13 5.28 n.a n.a 0.626 0.145
Some primary school 14.99 22.73 8.36 13.24 n.a n.a 2.853*** 2.543**
Completed primary school 23.02 26.10 19.61 25.95 n.a n.a –3.260*** –4.847***
Lower-secondary schooling 43.39 35.58 53.89 43.77 n.a n.a 2.307* 2.833*
Upper-secondary schooling 11.64 6.04 12.34 9.30 n.a n.a –2.549*** –0.381
Tertiary education 2.17 1.97 2.69 2.46 n.a n.a 0.024 –0.293
Sources: Authors’ calculations, based on household surveys and conﬂ ict data described in annex 7A.
Note: The “diﬀ erence” column indicates the diﬀ erence in labor market characteristics between households residing in high-conﬂ ict areas and households residing in low-conﬂ ict areas, as deﬁ ned in annex 7A. The “diﬀ erence (rural)” 
column computes the same diﬀ erence in rural areas only. The “diﬀ erence-in-diﬀ erence” column is calculated as in tables 7B.2–7B.4 for the respective countries. The “diﬀ erence-in-diﬀ erence (rural)” column computes the same 
diﬀ erence in trends in rural areas only. 
n.a. = Not applicable. *** Signiﬁ cant at the 1% level; ** signiﬁ cant at the 5% level; * signiﬁ cant at the 10% level.
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Notes
 1.  This chapter focuses on internal armed con-
fl ict against the state. Although the civil wars 
in Nepal and Sri Lanka recently ended, both 
countries are included in the analysis, because 
many of the challenges addressed—and the 
policy options discussed—refer to postcon-
fl ict areas. Moreover, a better understanding 
of the impact of confl ict in these countries can 
provide insights for the rest of South Asia. 
With this in mind, throughout this chapter 
the term confl ict affected is used to character-
ize areas that are either experiencing violence 
from internal armed confl ict or recovering 
from armed confl ict. 
 2.  Many of the issues discussed in this chapter 
could also be relevant for other types of dis-
ruptions, such as natural disasters. Asia as 
a whole is the continent most often hit by 
natural disasters. Since 1950, it has experi-
enced more than 3,900 disasters, 42 percent 
of the global disasters in this period. These 
disasters killed more than 5.6 million people 
(83 percent of the world total) and affected 
more than 5.4 billion others (90 percent of 
the world total) (CRED 2011). 
 3.  Measuring the intensity of armed confl ict is 
very diffi cult. Due to data limitations and for 
comparability reasons, the indicator of inten-
sity used here is the number of direct deaths 
from armed confl ict. Data sources and meth-
odology are discussed in annex 7A.
 4.  Migration can also play an important role 
as a source of jobs for skilled and unskilled 
workers from confl ict-affected countries, 
both during and after confl icts (World Bank 
2011).
 5.  This assumption is probably stronger in some 
cases than in others, given that important dif-
ferences in labor market indicators in confl ict 
and nonconfl ict areas often predate the con-
fl ict. Lack of data prevents analysis of pre-
confl ict trends.
 6.  In India and Nepal, the earlier year is a year 
of peace; during the later year, there was con-
fl ict in areas of both countries. In Sri Lanka, 
the year of confl ict is 2008; 2004 was a year 
of relative peace (the middle of a ceasefi re). 
The effect of a few additional years of vio-
lence is measured. In Afghanistan, where only 
one round of household survey data is avail-
able, the simple differences in outcomes for 
high-confl ict and low-confl ict areas are com-
pared. In Pakistan, household surveys do not 
provide enough coverage of confl ict-affected 
areas.
 7.  Although establishing causality is diffi cult, 
there is some evidence that lower economic 
growth and poor economic performance 
increase the likelihood of armed confl ict. A 
very robust result in the cross-country litera-
ture on confl ict is that poorer countries and 
countries with slower growth are at higher 
risk of experiencing civil war (Collier and 
Hoeffl er 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Using 
rainfall as an exogenous determinant of eco-
nomic growth in Africa yields a similar result, 
suggesting that there is a causal relationship 
between a lack of economic growth and the 
incidence of confl ict (Miguel, Satyanath, and 
Sergenti 2004). Within-country analyses also 
fi nd a strong link between poverty and eco-
nomic shocks on the one hand and the subse-
quent emergence of confl ict on the other (see 
Dube and Vargas 2008 on Colombia; Do and 
Iyer 2010 on Nepal; and Iyer 2009 on South 
Asia). 
 8.  In this particular study, defi nitions of poverty 
are based on subjective measures and a locally 
defi ned poverty line for each community. A 
“ladder of life” was used to determine who in 
a community qualifi ed as poor. During a lad-
der of life exercise, focus group participants 
describe the steps (or levels) of overall well-
being of households in their villages. They 
then rank up to 150 households in their vil-
lage/neighborhood according to their step on 
the ladder of life, currently and in the past. 
The results of this ranking exercise produce 
a community mobility matrix for each village 
that can be used to estimate the evolution 
of prosperity, including the share of house-
holds that moved out of poverty, the share of 
households that experienced upward mobil-
ity of any kind, and the degree of mobility 
(either up or down). 
 9.  Smuggling and other illegal activities (such 
as poppy cultivation in Afghanistan) are 
also a major source of employment in many 
 confl ict-affected areas in the region. The scope 
of these activities is diffi cult to quantify. In 
2005, illegal opium revenues were estimated 
to reach nearly $3 billion, equivalent to half of 
Afghanistan’s legal economy (UNODC 2005). 
Households in Afghanistan that  cultivate 
poppy are  signifi cantly less likely to be poor 
(World Bank 2005).
10.  The effect of confl ict on the employment 
rate—as on other labor market indicators—is 
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likely to vary depending on the context and 
the subgroups of the population considered. 
The effect may also change in the immedi-
ate aftermath of the confl ict. In Pakistan, for 
example, after the fi rst wave of the militancy 
crisis in the North West Frontier Province 
(Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), women’s movements 
were severely limited after internally displaced 
people arrived. As a result, women became 
less likely to work (World Food Programme 
2011). 
11.  As discussed in chapter 3, the female employ-
ment rate in Nepal is more than twice the 
unweighted average of employment rates of 
the other South Asian countries (40 percent-
age points higher). Confl ict seems to explain 
only a small share of this, as the evidence indi-
cates that the confl ict led to a 5 percentage 
point increase in employment rates among 
women in areas most affected by confl ict.
12.  In India, the difference in preconfl ict youth 
unemployment rates is not statistically sig-
nifi cant.
13.  Except possibly in Sri Lanka, unemployment 
is not a very strong indicator of labor market 
conditions in South Asia, where few people 
can afford to be unemployed, making these 
trends diffi cult to interpret.
14.  What look like worse labor market outcomes 
in confl ict environments do not necessarily 
translate into lower average labor incomes. 
In Nepal, the median household labor income 
per capita in low-confl ict areas was already 
1.5 times that of confl ict-affected areas before 
the confl ict; the confl ict increased this gap to 
1.7 by 2004. In contrast, in Afghanistan and 
Sri Lanka, labor incomes were higher in con-
fl ict-affected areas. 
15.  For example, school enrollment often falls 
signifi cantly after natural disasters, as chil-
dren join the labor force (Jacoby and Skoufi as 
1997; Jensen 2000; Santos 2007).
16.  In India, Maldives, and Sri Lanka, fi rms were 
not asked about political instability. Surveys 
there referred to “government policy insta-
bility,” which includes both macroeconomic 
and political instability. In Sri Lanka, gov-
ernment policy instability was cited as the 
second-most severe constraint; in India and 
Maldives, it was not among the top fi ve con-
straints.
17.  SEZs have become increasingly popular in the 
developing world: as of 2008, an estimated 
3,000 SEZs in more than 130 countries had 
created more than 68 million direct jobs (FIAS 
2008). Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, 
and Sri Lanka all have SEZs. Afghanistan has 
no duty-free import zones. It is considering 
establishing trade facilitation zones, export 
processing zones, or both to enhance export 
potential. Legislation before the U.S. Congress 
would establish special import tax status for 
certain categories of goods made in recon-
struction opportunity zones (http://www.state
.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/ics/2010/138776.htm).
18.  Even this fi gure for the north is likely to be an 
overestimate, as the survey could not cover 
the remote districts of Kilinochchi, Mannar, 
and Mullaitivu, where up to 90 percent of the 
households may not have power (World Bank 
2007).
19.  For more information on community-driven 
development projects in postconfl ict environ-
ments, see Barron (2010).
20.  See http://www.clintonfoundation.org/haiti_
longstanding/haiti_fact_sheet.php.
21.  For a discussion of interventions to provide 
educational services to displaced populations, 
see Mooney and French (2005).
22.  The program is not offi cially a DDR program 
but rather a “campment, UN monitoring, 
and reintegration” (CMR) program. In the 
long term, the goals of both programs are 
essentially the same (Gurung 2006).
23.  The Nepal Peace Project also includes activa-
tion programs to assist families.
24.  The review of DDR programs by Carames 
and Sanz (2009) fi nds that the disarmament 
and demobilization stages take about 16 
months on average, ranging from 4 months 
in Angola to 27 months in Sierra Leone. The 
reintegration phase usually takes consider-
ably longer, lasting two years on average.
25.  For a more detailed discussion on the lessons 
learned from DDR programs, see Meek and 
Malan (2004).
26.  For a review of experiences with public work 
programs around the world, see Del Ninno, 
Subbarao, and Milazzo (2009).
27.  The authors are grateful to Ernest Sergenti 
(World Bank) for his contributions to this 
section.
28.  See the Poverty Alleviation Fund website 
(www.pafnepal.org.np/index.php).
29.  For a more detailed discussion of microfi -
nance, cooperatives, and self-help groups in 
postconfl ict situations, see ILO (2003).
30.  In confl ict-affected communities in Afghani- 
stan, for example, employment by NGOs 
was rated as highly desirable, and households 
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with an NGO employee were rated as best off 
(World Bank 2010a).
31.  Afghan First has not been rigorously evalu-
ated, but initial data from a capacity build-
ing project for local enterprises suggest 
that Afghan companies supported by the 
project over the years are increasingly win-
ning contracts. The increase has become 
steeper since the introduction of Afghan 
First in 2009. For more information, see 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-BF6A3963-
402643FF/natolive/official_texts_62851.
htm?mode=pressrelease).
32.  Of course, the security situation itself can be 
infl uenced by policy—not only by direct secu-
rity measures like policing but also by other 
interventions discussed in this chapter.
33.  For instance, in countries in which ethnic 
differences were at the heart of the confl ict, 
postconfl ict public work programs need to be 
careful not to favor one group over others. In 
cases where the confl ict arose as a result of 
issues in the management and distribution of 
natural resources, such as forests, any post-
confl ict job creation strategy needs to ensure 
that property rights are strengthened and that 
the rules of the game for the exploitation of 
the resources are clear and fair.
34.  Some notable exceptions are the ongoing 
impact evaluation of the National Solidarity 
Program in Afghanistan (Beath and others 
2010) and ongoing work evaluating DDR 
programs and employment interventions in 
Uganda (Blattman and Fiala 2009).
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Appendix A 
Household surveys used
Table A.1 summarizes the labor force and 
living standards surveys used throughout 
this book. In countries where both types 
of data are available (Bangladesh, Nepal, 
and Pakistan), labor force surveys were the 
primary source of data, as they tend to be 
 better suited for the analysis of the labor 
market. For these countries, living standards 
surveys were used to complement labor force 
survey data and to analyze poverty and 
employment (household consumption is not 
available in most labor force surveys). These 
living standard surveys were also used for 
examining specific issues for which they 
were better suited, such as education pro-
vision or educational attainment by socio-
 economic group. The most recent labor 
 survey in Bangladesh is a welfare-monitoring 
survey, which differs from a typical labor 
force survey. It was used in order provide the 
latest estimates. This survey does not allow 
for the calculation of all indicators used in 
this book. Finally, either due to coverage or 
year of surveys, only particular national sur-
veys were suitable for the analysis of labor 
market outcomes and conflict. Table A.1 
provides a summary of the different national 
surveys used, and identifi es when a partic-
ular survey was used to examine selected 
issues only.
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TABLE A.1 Labor force and living standards surveys used
Country Survey Year Comments
Afghanistan National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2007/08  
Bangladesh Labor Force Survey 2002/03  
Labor Force Survey 2005/06  
Monitoring of Employment Survey (MES) 2009 Core indicators only
Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2000 Poverty analysis and education 
analysis only
Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2005 Poverty analysis only
Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2010 Poverty analysis and education 
analysis only
Bhutan Living Standards Survey 2003  
Living Standards Survey 2007  
India National Sample Survey (Employment Schedule) 1983  
National Sample Survey (Employment Schedule) 1993/94  
National Sample Survey (Employment Schedule) 1999/2000  
National Sample Survey (Employment Schedule) 2004/05  
National Sample Survey (Employment Schedule) (Thin Round) 2007/08  
National Sample Survey (Employment Schedule) 2009/10  
Maldives Vulnerability and Poverty Assessment 1998  
Vulnerability and Poverty Assessment 2004  
Nepal Labor Force Survey 1998/99  
Labor Force Survey 2007/08  
Living Standards Survey 1995/96 Poverty analysis, education 
analysis, and confl ict analysis only
Living Standards Survey 2003/04 Poverty analysis, education 
analysis, and confl ict analysis only
Pakistan Labor Force Survey 1999/2000  
Labor Force Survey 2007/08  
Labor Force Survey 2008/09  
Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey 2001/02 Poverty analysis and education 
analysis only
Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey 2007/08 Poverty analysis and education 
analysis only
Sri Lanka Labor Force Survey 2000  
Labor Force Survey 2004 Education analysis and confl ict 
analysis only
Labor Force Survey 2006 Education analysis only
Labor Force Survey 2008  
Household Income and Expenditure Survey 1995/96 Poverty analysis only
Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2006/07 Poverty analysis and education 
analysis only
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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Appendix B
Methodology used to analyze 
labor transitions
The book is interested in labor transitions—
specifi cally, the ability of workers to move 
across sectors and types of employment over 
time and the extent to which they move from 
less desirable to more desirable jobs (and 
vice versa). Such transitions are typically 
measured with panel data on individuals or 
households over time. Such panel data are 
only rarely available in South Asia, however. 
To compensate for the absence of true panel 
data, the authors constructed synthetic panel 
data from multiple rounds of cross-sectional 
surveys for Bangladesh, India, and Nepal, 
adapting a technique developed by Lanjouw, 
Luoto, and Mckenzie (2011) for studying 
poverty transitions.
The key idea behind the method is to 
exploit the relationship between an individ-
ual’s employment status, which varies from 
period to period, and time-invariant indi-
vidual and household characteristics in order 
to examine labor transitions over time. Indi-
vidual time-invariant characteristics can be 
obtained from cross-sectional surveys (with 
certain assumptions). They thus form the 
connectors that help convert cross-sectional 
data into synthetic panel data. 
The following (minimal) econometric 
expression illustrates the method. Let yij be 
binary variables that represent the various 
labor outcomes of interest for individual i, 
i = 1, . . . , N, in survey round (or period) j, 
where j = 1 or 2. The main labor outcomes 
of interest are the employment statuses of 
individuals: for workers in rural areas, being 
employed in the rural nonfarm sector (versus 
agriculture); for workers in urban areas, being 
employed as casual or low-end self-employed 
workers (versus regular wage or salaried 
workers or high-end self-employed workers). 
Although the same subscript i is used to index 
individuals, the only data available are cross-
sectional. 
The labor transitions of interest can be 
represented by 
 P(yi1 < z1 | yi2 < z2) (B.1)
 P(yi1 < z1 | yi2 > z2) (B.2)
 P(yi1 > z1 | yi2 < z2) (B.3)
 P(yi1 > z1 | yi2 > z2) (B.4)
The first quantity represents the prob-
ability that individual i stays in the same 
employment status (for example, working 
in agriculture) in both survey rounds (that 
is, no labor transition takes place over the 
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time spanned by the two survey rounds). 
The second quantity represents the prob-
ability that individual i improves his or 
her employment status in the second time 
period (for example, by moving from agri-
culture in the first survey round to the 
rural nonfarm sector in the second survey 
round). The cut-off point is zj, set at 0.5. 
Below this point (indicated by <), workers 
are in the less desirable employment status; 
above this point indicated by >), they are in 
the more desirable employment status. An 
analogy can be made to poverty analysis, 
where a similar cut-off point is known as 
the poverty line: households are considered 
poor if their consumption falls below this 
cut-off point.
The synthetic panel data are constructed 
from repeated rounds of cross-sectional 
data by applying estimated coeffi cients and 
error terms obtained from the regressions 
of individual labor outcomes on individual 
time-invariant characteristics in one sur-
vey round to a second round. These data 
can then be used to predict lower-bound 
and upper-bound estimates of labor tran-
sitions (B.1–B.4) overall and for various 
population groups. Estimates are made 
using both nonparametric and parametric 
methods.
The method for analyzing poverty tran-
sitions was validated with true panel data 
(including data on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, Peru, and 
Vietnam). The method for labor transitions 
was validated with true panel data from 
Nepal. The estimates of the lower and upper 
bounds for poverty and labor transition 
rates largely encompass the true rates, pro-
viding empirical support for the validity of 
this method. (For more technical details on 
the methodology used to construct pseudo-
panel data, see Dang and Lanjouw 2011 and 
Lanjouw, Luoto, and McKenzie 2011.)
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South Asia, which is home to more than 40 percent of the world’s absolute poor, 
will contribute nearly 40 percent of the growth in the world’s working age population 
over the next several decades. More and Better Jobs in South Asia attempts to answer 
three questions:
 Has South Asia been creating an increasing number of jobs and better jobs?
 What has determined the quality of job creation and what is the employment challenge 
going forward?
 What demand- and supply-side bottlenecks need to be eased to meet South Asia’s 
employment challenge in the face of intensifying demographic pressure?
The region has created just under 800,000 jobs per month during the past two decades, 
a rate that broadly tracks growth in its working age population. The quality of jobs—
measured in terms of higher wages for wage workers and lower poverty for the self-
employed—has been improving, thanks to strong economic growth in some countries and 
massive out-migration and workers’ remittances elsewhere. But there is absolutely no room 
for complacency. South Asia will add between 1 million and 1.2 million new entrants to the 
labor force every month for the next two decades. Absorbing them into the labor force at 
rising levels of labor productivity is the crux of the employment challenge.
Meeting the employment challenges calls for a reform agenda that cuts across sectors. 
It includes enhancing access to reliable electricity supply for ﬁ rms in urban and rural 
settings, reducing corruption in dealings between ﬁ rms and the state, facilitating access to 
land, strengthening transport links between town and country, focusing on better nutrition 
in early childhood, improving the quality of education to equip workers with relevant skills 
for the world of work, and protecting workers in both informal and formal sectors rather 
than protecting jobs for the few in the formal sector of the economy.
Recognizing that South Asia is the most conﬂ ict-affected of the major regions in the world, 
the book also includes a chapter on how the challenges of job creation are magniﬁ ed in 
such environments as well as some priorities going forward for labor market policies 
and programs.
More and Better Jobs will be of interest to policy makers and their advisers, not only in South 
Asia but also in other parts of the world where creating better jobs is a signiﬁ cant challenge, 
as well as to the international development community and students of economics.
